Yemen as a Case

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Arabs (ICG, “The Next Iraqi War?” 12-13). Furthermore, about 500 Sunni candidates were disqualified to participate in the 2010 parliamentary election (Cordesman and Khazai 159). Also, the Shiite-dominated government led by Maliki failed to kept the promise to integrate the Sunni elements into the institution. For instance, the government neither kept the inclusion of the Sunni fighters under the name of Sunni Awakening and Sons of Iraq program into former Iraqi armies and other government jobs after the leaving of the US, nor completed the implement of 2008 law cancelling the ban on former Baathists to participate politics (Brynen et al. 54-55; Cordesman and Khazai 159-160). Finally, as what Cordesman and Khazai says:

Iraq’s failed attempts at political reconciliation – coupled to the Maliki government’s growing attempts to crack down on its political opponents – have exacerbated public discontent and agitation… Sunnis and former Ba’ath [=Baath] party members banned from participating in government, increasingly view the current regime as illegitimate, and have redirected violence once aimed at American occupiers towards the Maliki-led government (88-90).

The inaccessibility to power pushed the Sunnis to the opposition, which fits what

“anocracy” hypothesis said.

In Iraq case, we can observe the effect of past hatred and “anocracy” during the present civil war. The tension between Sunni and Shiite, once significantly heightening between 2006 and 2007, might enhance again after 2011. Also, the marginalization of the Sunnis from power is also an essential factor pushing the Sunnis to take part in opposition against the government.

3.5.2. Yemen as a Case

In Yemen, under the influence of events happening in Tunisia and Egypt, youngsters took to streets protesting for economic, political, and social grievance, however, the situation exacerbated into clashes among several different groups.

According to the available data about the fatalities in Yemen, the conflicts causes 2,000 deaths and 1,106 deaths in 2011 and 2012 respectively (“Yemen (2004 – First Combat Deaths)”) In 2012, President Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to transfer power to his deputy Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. In October 2013, the violence reached the climax, but there is no data about vitalities available now (ICG, “The Huthis” 3).

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Despite of an effort to promote national reconciliation by the UN and the GCC:

National Dialogue Conference, from March 18, 2013 to January 24, 2014, the situation in Yemen remained volatile until the time of writing.³⁰

We can find the signals for the involvement of old hatred: in addition to AQAP occupying southeastern region, which is less relevant to this study, in the past both the Houthi movement in the north and the Hiraak movement in the south had fought against the Saleh regime. About the northern Yemen, it had been under the rule of an imamate characterized by Hashemites, the descendants from the Prophet’s clan, and Zaydism,³¹ a branch of Shiite, for about one thousand years until the 1962 revolution overthrowing it and establishing Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) which became the incumbent regime after unification with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1990. From 2004 to February 2010, the Houthi movement bearing both identities to Hashemites and Zaydism fought six rounds of wars with the Saleh regime in Saada governorate (Dorlian; ICG, “Yemen”). During the Arab Spring, the Houthi movement joined the opposition against the regime but then broke up with other oppositions. In addition, during the conflicts the Houthi movement expanded its territorial control from Saada governorate to Sanaa governorate where the capital located.

About the southern Yemen, it was once a British colony with Aden as a center, and after the 1967 independence it was ruled by PDRY until 1990 unification with YAR under the Republic of Yemen. Due to the feeling of unbalanced North-South distribution in resources and power, a civil war broke out between the North and the South for two months in 1994, and it led to causalities between 5,000 and 7,000 (ICG,

“Breaking Point?” 4). From 2006 to 2007, there were popular demonstrations for more balanced distribution in power and resources in the south, and in late 2008 the core demand transferred into call for Southern independence due to inappropriate dealing by the government. The secessionist Hiraak was on the rise before the Arab Spring (ICG, “Breaking Point?” 6-9). During the Arab Spring, the Hiraak had tried to join the national protest but failed to reach a consensus with oppositions from the north; as a result, the Hiraak decided to go their own path to pursue independence (ICG, “Breaking Point?” 10-11). In short, as the above discussion show, there are signals for the fact that old hatred repeated in the new civil war.

30 The Houthi movement and AQAP still fought against the governmental forces in the northern region and southeastern regions, see “Yemen President Sacks 2 Army Chiefs”.

31 For more information about Hashemites and Zaydism, see ICG, “Yemen” note 2, 3.

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As to the inclusiveness of Yemeni political institution, we can find that both Houthis and Hiraak are excluded from formal politics. The Houthis has been largely out of the formal politics, though there is a party, Hizb al-Haqq, bearing both Hashmites and Zaydism characteristics similar to the Houthis and once led by Hussein al-Houthi, who was an initiator of the Houthi movement and died in 2004.

According to Phillips, Hizb al-Haqq “may be broadly sympathetic with some of the aims of the Houthi family, but it considers them a renegade group, not a formal faction of the party” (108). That is, there is still distance for Hizb al-Haqq from represent the Houthis in formal politics. Moreover, the urges by government officers and oppositions, including President Saleh, for the Houthis to form a political party also indirectly reflect the fact that the Houthis is out of formal politics (ICG, “Yemen”

25-26).

The exclusion of the South in Yemen led to the emergence of the Hiraak contradicting against the regime before and during the Arab Spring. Phillips suggests that the Yemeni institution is “a system that excludes southerners from government employment and other benefits” (Phillips 26). Although Yemeni Socialist Party is a party bearing symbolic significance for the South, it cannot fully represent the Hiraak.

This party only has limited appeal among the Southerners, and there is rift between members supporting and opposing secession (ICG, “Breaking Point?” 18-19; Phillips 107). Furthermore, according to ICG report, there is a narrative that “Northerners purportedly purged Southern civil servants and military personnel” (“Breaking Point?” 5), and the feeling of inequality is prevalent among the Southerners. In addition to the narrative, in fact:

Centralization of government ministries and private sector offices in Sanaa put Southerners at a natural employment disadvantage… Southerners also suffered more from post-war civil services cuts… Although Southerners occupy prominent government posts, these are largely symbolic in a country dominated by informal access and decision-making (“Breaking Point?” 6).

The proofs above reflect the marginalization, whether in narrative or in practice, of the Southerners from the political institution in Yemen.

Though only the hypothesis cannot tell the whole story, it is not unreasonable to suggest that “peace duration” and “anocracy” hypotheses can explain the happening of Yemeni civil war in 2011. As what “peace duration” said, the Yemeni civil war in 2011 broke out along the old fault lines within the society: The past civil war between

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the government and the Houthi movement from 2004 to 2010 ceasefire was repeated during the Arab Spring;³² as to the Hiraak, though it had remained relatively peaceful, which might not go across the threshold of civil war, but we still can find the resurge of the Hiraak during the Arab Spring. In addition, the Houthis and the Hiraak, both out of formal political institution, participated in oppositions against the government, which fit what “anocracy” hypothesis says.