CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 MIDDLE POWER CONCEPT
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Middle Power Concept
Within the field of IR theory, scholars disagree on what specific features make up a middle power. Foundational scholarship has guided the discourse on middle powers by identifying three distinct definitional categories: functional, behavioral and positional (Chapnick 1999: 73-82).
The functional approach, which was devised by the Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong in 1942, says that a nation’s ability to influence certain areas and functions in international affairs helps determine its status as a middle power (Hynek 2004: 33-43). The positional approach ranks and categorizes states by applying standards relating to objective material capabilities, such as size of territory, GDP, the volume of trade and foreign currency reserves, population, and number of soldiers (Kim 2009: 7-36). In this way, nations with medium-range capabilities can be grouped as middle powers.
The behavioral approach, on which this thesis is based, classifies a country is a middle power if it simply adheres to certain roles. More specifically, according to Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, middle powers all share:
The tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide...diplomacy. Middle powers are states who commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace. Middle
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powers help to maintain the international order through coalition-building, by serving as mediators and "go-betweens," and through international conflict management and resolution activities, such as UN peacekeeping. (Cooper 1993: 19).
In other words, they tend to act out similar roles in the international system by pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems, preferring compromise positions in international disputes and embracing notions of good international citizenship. But by maintaining the international order through “serving as mediators and go-betweens,” the assumption here, as well as in other scholarship, is that middle powers are themselves not among the disputants in international conflicts.
Middle powers have also been noted for their ability to serve as “bridges” between great and small powers, adopting the position of a mediator when communication between them breaks down due to a dispute. In his discussion of this bridging role, Lee sites the opportunities that middle powers have to help resolve disagreements between powerful, developed countries like the United States and developing nations on contentious policies such as climate change: “To resolve this standoff, a middle power sides with neither group and continues to propose ideas that opposing sides can accommodate” (Lee 2015: 6).
O’Neil (2015: 76) elaborated on this bridging idea when he described the ability of orthodox middle powers, like Canada, Australia and the Netherlands, to play an “honest-broker” role in multilateral settings in order to promote positive outcomes between larger powers in diverse policy areas ranging from arms proliferation to environmental protection.
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Norway, Sweden and Canada are especially well recognized for their “peace agendas,” branding themselves as “peace-entrepreneurs” and leading the world in practicing conflict mediation (Vandamme 2015: 54-55). Canada in particular has long acted as the mediator and advocated for multilateralism during many international crisis.
It’s dedication to multilateralism as a founding membership of the United Nations and NATO, and its mediation of in the 1965 Suez Canal Crisis using diplomacy and peacekeeping forces to help avert a potentially major armed conflict in the Middle East, are just a few examples illustrating how its foreign policy behavior embodies the qualities of middle power.
Similarly, some policy proposals have suggested that middle powers also have significant capacity to settle maritime disputes, reducing political tensions by encouraging joint resource extraction and persuading the disputants to shelve issues of territorial sovereignty (Lee 2015: 17).
The case of Australia is a good example. As a frequently cited middle power that also happens to be politically close to the US as a treaty ally, yet is economically dependent upon China as its largest trading partner, Australia has a vested interest in brokering peace between these to larger powers as they compete for geopolitical advantage in the Asia-Pacific. Hence, Australia is compelled for both ideational as well as practical reasons to mediate conflicts between the US and China, and this especially true in the South China Sea, where there is ongoing tension between the two countries.
It must also be noted that middle powers often seek to preemptively avert conflicts between warring parties by getting to the source of many geopolitical disputes - economic
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instability (Jordaan 2003: 6). This is typically addressed through generous financial aid packages. Japanese foreign policy, for example, is noted for its middle power activism particularly in providing foreign economic relief, as well as its focus on conflict resolution4. The country has provided substantial economic assistance throughout Southeast Asia when the Asian Financial Crisis struck in the late 1990s, and has participated in conflict resolution and mediation activities in the region, including in Cambodia, Indonesia, East Timor and Mindanao (Lam 2006: 141-159).
In summary, the behavioral framework portrays middle powers as being driven to act out a certain role, i.e., good international citizenship, and they accomplish this by embracing a distinctive model of diplomacy that is based on multilateralism, compromise and mediation aimed at resolving international conflicts. But whether it is “serving as mediators and go-betweens,” as a “bridge” or as an “honest-broker” between great and small powers, or working to settle maritime disputes, middle powers are analyzed by how they project their foreign policies at the global level to solve problems among foreign countries. As such, these portrayals all make the consistent assumption that the middle power in question is not itself among the disputants in the international conflict.
2.2 Korean Middle Power
South Korea's rising status in regional and global affairs has received significant attention in recent years. The country started off as an aid dependent, poverty stricken nation still reeling from the Korean War. The so-called Miracle on the Han River - a set of export-led economic policies started in the 1960’s - fueled nearly thirty years of intense and sustained economic
4 While it could be debated whether Japan is a great or middle power, its actions here nevertheless help to illustrate the global nature of middle power activism.
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growth. By 1996, Korea’s progress was internationally recognized when it was made an official member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Today, South Korea is a major economic and cultural power, a leader in many technological industries, and a frequent host to international summits and conferences.
As a result of the achievements in all of these areas brought by its intense economic development, some scholars have declared that South Korea today is a leader among the middle powers in the international system. (Lee 2012; Robertson 2007: 151-174). However, just as in the discussion of middle powers more generally, most of the literature regarding Korea’s exercise of middle power puts a much great emphasis on its actions at the global level, while paying little to no attention to the nation’s behavior at the bilateral level.
South Korea’s middlepowerness is most often discussed in terms the country’s deployment of a series of internationalist policies that have pushed for Seoul playing a larger role outside the Northeast Asian region and moving beyond the U.S. alliance as the focal point for national strategy. The earliest example of this kind of middle power activism was the emergence of the Segyehwa Policy (globalization) which sought to boost South Korea’s global influence during the Kim Young-sam government from 1993 to 1998. In his first speech introducing Segyehwa Policy in 1995, President Kim stated that
Globalization is the shortcut which will lead us to building a first-class country in the 21st century. This is why I revealed my plan for globalization and the government has concentrated all of its energy in forging ahead with it. It is aimed at realizing globalization in all sectors - politics, foreign affairs, economy, society,
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education, culture and sports. To this end, it is necessary to enhance our viewpoints, way of thinking, system and practices to the world class level . . . we have no other choice than this. (Kim 2000: 1)
Since then, ROK elites have displayed a consistent interest in boosting their nation’s image and expanding their international presence. President Roh Moo-hyun, for example, was responsible for the creation of a ‘National Image Committee’ within the Office of the Prime Minister, which was then upgraded to ‘Presidential Committee on Nation Branding’ by Roh’s successor Lee Myung-bak (O’Neil 2015: 82). Importantly, the Lee administration also spearheaded an annual China-Japan-ROK Trilateral Summit designed to foster cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea in the areas of trilateral relations, regional economyand disaster relief.
But as O’Neil (2015) points out, it wasn’t until President Lee Myung-bak’s implementation of the Global Korea Initiative in 2009 that the ROK became a major player in the realm of middle-power diplomacy. The underlying philosophy of Global Korea envisioned “a Korea that leaves behind a habit of diplomacy narrowly geared to the Korean Peninsula, and adopts a more open and enterprising posture that sees the world as the appropriate platform for its foreign policy and national interest” (O’Neil 2015: 83).
Hermanns (2013: 68) identified three important shifts in Korean foreign policy that emerged from the Global Korea Initiative: promoting itself as a responsible global player, an economic power, and a culturally relevant nation. Regarding Korea’s desire to promote itself as an international mediator, he cites its aggressiveness in hosting international meetings and
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institutions, as well as a number of other events, from sports events to political meetings such as the G20 Summit in November 2010 and the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012. He furthermore notes the government’s deft exploitation of cultural exports (e.g., Korean pop music, TV programs, films, collectively referred to as ‘Hallyu,’ or the ‘Korean Wave’) as a means to extend its soft power around the world.
The Global Korea Strategy, since it aimed to upgrade Korea’s position as a hub of international exchange and peace-building, reflects some of the most important behavioral elements of middle power: multilateralism and exercising leadership towards greater stability in order to show itself as a good international citizen.
Though not an official policy of her administration, the spirit of Lee’s Global Korea strategy has continued to grow under President Park Geun-hye. Importantly, Vice-Minister Kim Kyou-hyun touted middlepowerism as a central pillar of the Park administration during a 2013 keynote speech at an international conference on middle powers hosted by the Korean Association of International Studies and the Korea Foundation (Kim 2013). Moreover, President Park’s Eurasia Initiative aimed to establish a network of energy, infrastructure and diplomatic links from North Korea and Russia out toward Central Asia and Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, 2015: 105-113). The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) sought to address the ‘Asian Paradox’ phenomenon by building trust and cooperation among East Asian nations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, 2015: 100-104), while MITKA - a multilateral group comprising Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea and Australia - convened regularly to identify and discuss global issues and common goals. Finally, on North Korea, the Park administration adopted a “trust-building policy” aimed at enhancing peace and reconciliation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, 2015: 36-47, 107).
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Korea is also host to several noteworthy organizations that further reflect its commitment to multilateralism, compromise and peacebuilding at the global level. In 2010, Lee Myung-bak launched the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) which has since grown into an international treaty-based organization that supports and promotes sustainable economic growth in developing countries. Seoul is home to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific: Subregional Office for East and North-East Asia (ESCAP-ENEA), which according to their website, aims to “build and strengthen multilateral partnerships and intergovernmental cooperation for inclusive and sustainable development and integration in Northeast Asia.”
There’s also the East Asia Foundation, a think-tank and ‘international partnership organization’ established to promote conflict resolution through scholarship and dialogue. And as part of an initiative to frame its southern tourist spot Jeju Island as an ‘Island of World Peace,’
Korea has founded the Jeju Peace Institute as well as the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity which collaborate to disseminate research on conflict resolution and organize programs related to cooperation in Northeast Asia and the world. Jeju Island also hosts the UNITAR CIFAL Jeju International Training Center, which offers workshops, conferences, seminars and training on sustainable development to towns and cities throughout South and East Asia.
All of these organizations are part of a broader national strategy outlined in the Presidential Declaration of 2005, “A National Vision for Sustainable Development,” the goal of which was to continue the growth of the ROK as “an advanced country while maintaining balance among economy, society and the environment” (Chung 2006: 3). Positioning South Korea as a leader in promoting and achieving the U.N.’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and as a hub of multilateral peace initiatives clearly resonates with middle power values as they are classically understood.
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Collectively, Korea’s initiatives and policies - from Segyehwa to Global Korea and MIKTA - genuinely seem to embody the most important aspects middle power identity:
multilateralism, compromise, peace-building, conflict resolution, and playing the role of a good international citizen. Finally, the ROK’s robust engagement across these areas not only attracts high-profile participants to Korea but also generates substantial international attention on the nation, thus raising even further its ability to contribute to the peace and stability of the existing global order.
A nation can be defined as a middle power by looking at its foreign policy behavior. This is typically done by reviewing its policies and actions at the global level, such as in the cases of well-established orthodox middle powers like Canada or Australia, and in the case of nations whose middle power status is still debatable, like Japan. Scholars agree that these nations all seem to share a broad devotion to conflict resolution by promoting multilateralism, compromise and peace-building in order to portray themselves as good international citizens. In the case of an emerging or new middle power like South Korea, reviewing the literature clearly shows that there is a good case to be made based on its foreign policies at the international level.
Yet, these analysis fall short in several ways. The foundational literature regarding middle powers in general relies on the assumption that such nations not themselves among the disputants in international conflicts. In the case of Korea more specifically, the scholarship tends to focus on its behavior at the global level, while overlooking its bilateral relationships. Since Korea proclaims itself a middle power but at the same time is in a series of bilateral disputes with Japan, its handling of those bilateral conflicts should be studied in order to reveal much or how little alleged middle powers adhere to their roles as “bridges” and “peacemakers” when they are among the disputants in international conflicts.
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2.3 Critical Review of Korean Middle Power
Many other observers have shown skepticism that the middle power framework best explains South Korea’s identity and diplomatic initiatives. A majority of the criticism agreed in its skepticism about both the utility of the concept in the specific case of South Korea, and the lack in consistency of middle-power diplomacy from administration to administration. In the interest of clarifying South Korean grand national strategy, some analysts have proposed alternative frameworks for analyzing the country’s status and behavior.
A prominent critique is that there are fundamental differences between South Korea’s unique adoption of the middle power concept versus the orthodox understanding of it in a more Western-centric context. The classic idea of what middle powers are supposed to be like is based on an analysis of the behavior of Western nations like Canada, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. In these analyses, it became clear that these nations generally prefer to play mediating roles between the great powers and weaker states (Wight and Holbraad 1978; Cox 1989: 823-32; Young 1989: 335; Cooper and Nossal 1993), and tend to enact feel-good, peacebuilding policies like, foreign aid and immigration, out of a sense of ethical duty (Stokke 1989; Pratt 1994).
In the case of South Korea, analysts believe that in order to construct the country’s international identity, South Korea, particularly under the Lee administration, has merely adopted the rhetoric of a middle power, and in so doing, have forced a Western-specific concept into a geopolitical, historical and cultural context that simply doesn’t support it (Shin 2012: 147-148).
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For example, traditional Western middle powers function within wealthy, stable political environments, meanwhile South Korea is a divided nation balancing between Chinese and American hegemony, while it deals with security threats from soon-to-be nuclear powered regime to the north. In particular, Kim (2016) points out that inter-Korean relations have chained the South to a Cold War style security structure that has prevented it from implementing more substantial middle-power diplomacy. Empirical evidence supports this: “public support for peacekeeping activities tends to decrease quickly when tension between the two Koreas rises”
(O’Neil 2015: 87).
Given this reality, it is argued that using a Western-oriented theory to understand South Korea’s identity and behavior may be inappropriate.
Other valuable research conducted by Robertson (2016: 127-30) has argued that nations’
diplomatic styles are informed by their individual history, culture, geography, and formative experiences. In the case of South Korea, he demonstrates that foreign policy is driven largely by various aspects of traditional Korean social values: emotionalism (i.e., pride, honor) and a preoccupation with status. For instance, in his interviews with current and former Korean diplomats, Robertson found that middlepowerism was most frequently viewed as merely as the achievement of a status symbol, which is in turn used compare and contrast the security, economic and political influence of South Korea relative to other states. The emotion-based diplomatic style of the Korea was revealed in diplomats’ frustration over the discord between their self-perceived status and the status they believe is to accorded to their country by the international community.
Looking at Korea’s unique history as a “shrimp among whales,” geopolitically dominated first by the Chinese and then by the Japanese, Hwang (2017) has argued that the ROK’s
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aggressive participation in such a wide range of global forums is simply a strategy to ensure its security, rather than an effort to maximize its middle power capabilities. Meanwhile, the long term sustainability of South Korea’s middle power agenda has also been called into question.
Because the South Korean presidential system encourages foreign policy differentiation, so Robertson (2016: 25-27) suggests that future administrations are likely to abandon former
Because the South Korean presidential system encourages foreign policy differentiation, so Robertson (2016: 25-27) suggests that future administrations are likely to abandon former