CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.2 PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
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At around the same time as these debates over history began impacting ROK-Japan relations, South Korea’s identity as a modern nation-state was beginning to form around the idea of middle power. The middle power concept with regard to Korea first appeared in the mid 1980’s and continued to increase throughout the 90’s and in the decades thereafter (Jojin 2014:
329-332). Since then, many more scholars have noted Korea’s ascension to middle power status (Ikenberry 2013; Kim Woo-sang 2008; Kim Sangbae 2014; Robertson 2007; Rozman 2007;
Sohn 2012.)
Throughout the 21st century, the concept of middlepowerism began to significantly influence ROK national policy-making. As early as the 1990s, newly democratic Korea asserted that it would begin to “seek new roles as a middle power” (Evans and Grant 1995: 397).
Scholarship frequently references Korea’s many international initiatives as evidence for the nation's middle power status, like Kim Young-sam’s Globalization Policy; Lee Myung-bak’s Global Korea Policy; Park Geun-hye’s Eurasia Initiative, Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative and leadership of MIKTA. The steady increase in the number of organizations dedicated to multilateral peace initiatives and the U.N. sustainable development goals throughout Korea also point towards middlepowerism as an overarching national policy.
1.2 Purpose of Research
The discussion of middle powers in international relations examines role of mid-sized powers in the world system. There are several frameworks for analyzing middle powers. Three prominent categories are functional, positional and behavioral.
The functional perspective stipulates that a middle power is any nation capable of extending its influence over certain areas or functions in the international system. To be more
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specific, middle powers must have sufficient control over material and non-material resources;
must be willing to exercise leadership on important issue areas and bend other nations’ actions toward supporting regional stability; and must be militarily capable of inflicting unacceptable damage to any potentially hostile great power (Fels 2017).
Positional theories focus on states’ relative capabilities and where those capabilities locate them within a larger hierarchy of power (Holbraad 1984; Wood 1988). Kim (2009) noted that this perspective tends to use statistical indices for categorizing countries such as size of territory, GDP, the volume of trade and foreign currency reserves, population, or number of soldiers. In other words, the positional approach systematically ranks and categorizes states according to their objective capabilities.
The behavioral perspective, which forms the foundation of this thesis, defines middle powers by their foreign policy behavior under various geopolitical circumstances (Cooper et al.
1993). The essential feature of middle powers in the behavioral perspective is that their foreign policies always lean toward a common set of characteristics: compromise, cooperation, conflict resolution, multilateralism and support for rule of law (Cooper et al. 1993; Holbraad 1984;
Jordaan 2003).
This perspective furthermore contends that such nations behave in this way for ideological reasons, i.e., to be 'good’ or ‘responsible’ international citizens (Cooper et al. 1993:
19; O’Neil 2015: 77; Schweller 2017: 8). Schweller (2017: 9) describes middle power foreign policy as “a statecraft rooted in the conviction that [they] have a responsibility . . . to protect the international order from those who would threaten it, whether they be great or small powers.” In other words, middle powers are determined to use multilateral and institutional methods to solve
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international disputes and promote international peace - all because they see themselves, and want others to see them, as good international citizens.
In summary, archetypal middle power foreign policy behavior in international disputes is characterized by a tendency to seek multilateral solutions, to seek compromise and demonstrate good international citizenship (Jojin 2014: 329).
In the case of Korea, the ROK has for many decades repeatedly claimed it is a middle power. Yet, the country is also in a series of bilateral disputes with Japan over history and territory. Previous studies have not considered instances where a middle power country is itself one of the disputants in an international conflict, because the current academic discussion operates under the implied assumption that middle powers are not themselves disputants in such situations.
Furthermore, the current literature discussing middle power in the Korean context usually analyzes either the country’s position (the positional framework) or behavior (the behavioral framework), but it always applies these analytical frameworks to the global level. The positional framework asks where Korea is located in the global hierarchy of power, and the behavioral framework looks at how Korea conducts itself within the international system.
Considering these two points, there appears to be an opening within the scholarship for further analysis into the nature of middle power, especially with regard to South Korea. When a self-proclaimed middle power is itself a disputant in an international conflict, as in the case of Korea with Japan, how well do its actions conform to the established behavioral framework?
Therefore, the purpose of this research is to develop a framework by which to test Korea’s middle power image in bilateral disputes with Japan. In so doing, my research will add to the
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existing body of literature on middle powers and their foreign policies, and contribute to a more thorough understanding of the nature middle powers, especially in bilateral disputes.
Finally, my research could shed some light on the logic behind Korea’s behavior toward Japan. Were it not for the two nations being united under the American security umbrella, troubles plaguing their relationship might be even greater. This is unfortunate because, from the rise of China and the ever present threat posed by North Korea, to the shared democratic ideology and socio-cultural traits, South Korea and Japan clearly have many overlapping interests. It would be to their own mutual benefit for them to work together in promoting liberal democratic values, balancing against Chinese hegemony, and pressuring North Korea to be a more responsible member of the international community. Together, Korea and Japan have vast potential to promote peace, stability and democracy across Asia and the world. The logic appears to suggest that they ought to be obvious partners working together in these areas of shared concern. This is especially true if Korea is in fact following the foreign policy of a middle power, as it claims to be.
Providing some clarity on Korea’s behavior toward Japan may also be able to help other researchers construct policy proposals to better guide the United States in managing its relationship with its two most important security partners in the Asia-Pacific.