在日韓雙邊爭端中檢視韓國之中型權力形象 - 政大學術集成

全文

(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 在日韓雙邊爭端中檢視韓國之中型權力形象. ‧. Testing Korea’s Middle-Power Image in KoreaJapan Bilateral Disputes n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. Student: James Eger III Advisor: Chyungly Lee. 中華民國 107 年 1 月 JANUARY 2018. v.

(2) TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS…...……………...…………………………………………………………………………1 ABSTRACT……………..…………………………………………………………………………………………….3 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………....4 1.1 BACKGROUND………....………………………………………………………………………………4 1.1.1 DISPUTES: COMFORT WOMEN…..………..……………………………………………..5 1.1.2 DISPUTES: DOKDO ISLAND AND THE EAST SEA…………..………………………....6 1.1.3 KOREA AND MIDDLE POWER……...………………...………………………………....10 1.2 PURPOSE OF RESEARCH……..……...……………………………………………………………....11 1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN…….……..……...……………………………………………………………....14 1.4 CHAPTER ARRANGEMENT….……...……………………………………………………………....17 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………………………………………..20 2.1 MIDDLE POWER CONCEPT………………………………………………………………………….20 2.2 KOREA AS A MIDDLE POWER……………………………………………………………………...24 2.3 CRITICAL REVIEW OF KOREA AS A MIDDLE POWER………………………………………….29 2.4 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS..………………………………………………………………………….33. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. CHAPTER 3: COMFORT WOMEN……………………………………………………………………………...35 3.1 TENSION……...………………………………………………………………………………………..35 3.2 RESPONSE……………………………………………………………………………………………..37 3.2.1 ROH TAE-WOO (1988-993)..................................................................................................37 3.2.2 KIM YOUNG-SAM (1993-1998)...........................................................................................38 3.2.3 KIM DAE-JUNG (1998-2003)...............................................................................................39 3.2.4 ROH MOO-HYUN (2003-2008)............................................................................................40 3.2.5 LEE MYUNG-BAK (2008-2013)...........................................................................................42 3.2.5 PARK GEUN-HYE (2013-2017)............................................................................................43 3.3 ANALYSIS…………..………………………………………………………………………………….45 3.3.1 MULTLILATERALISM.….………………….….………………………………………….45 3.3.2 COMPROMISE.….…………..…………………………….……………………………….48 3.3.2 LEADERSHIP...….…………………...…………………….……………………………….49. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. CHAPTER 4: DOKDO……………………………………………………………………………………………...50 4.1 TENSION……...………………………………………………………………………………………..50 4.2 RESPONSE……………………………………………………………………………………………..53 4.2.1 KIM YOUNG-SAM (1993-1998)...........................................................................................53 4.2.2 KIM DAE-JUNG (1998-2003)...............................................................................................54 4.2.3 ROH MOO-HYUN (2003-2008)............................................................................................55 4.2.4 LEE MYUNG-BAK (2008-2013)...........................................................................................57 4.2.5 PARK GEUN-HYE (2013-2017)............................................................................................58 4.3 ANALYSIS………………...……...…………………………………………………………………….59 4.3.1 MULTILATERALISM…………...………..…….……………………….………………….59 4.3.2 COMPROMISE………….……...……………….………………………………………….60 4.3.3 LEADERSHIP……...…………...……………….………………………………………….61 CHAPTER 5: EAST SEA…………………………………………………………………………………………...62. 1.

(3) 5.1 TENSION……...……………….……………………………………………………………………….62 5.2 RESPONSE……………….……………………….…………………………...……………………….63 5.2.1 STATE-LED INITIATIVES………………...……………………………………………….64 5.2.2 OTHER INITIATIVES………………………………..…………………………………….67 5.3 ANALYSIS……………………..…………...……………….………………………………………….69 5.3.1 MULTILATERALISM…………...………...…….………………………………………….69 5.3.2 COMPROMISE…….…………...……………….………………………………………….70 4.3.1 LEADERSHIP…………...……………….……………………………………...………….71 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………….74 6.1 RESEARCH FINDINGS.……………………………………………………………………………….74 6.2 THEORETICAL REFLECTION…….………………………………………………………………....78 6.3 FUTURE STUDIES………………...…………………………………………………………………..81. 政治大. BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………..…………………………………………………………………….84. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 2.

(4) ABSTRACT This thesis seeks to test South Korea’s image as a middle power by examining the country’s approach to bilateral disputes with Japan. After a review of literature supportive and critical of Korea’s status as a middle power nation, it then focuses on evaluating the country’s management of ROK-Japan bilateral disputes using three different case studies span from the early 1990s to the Park Geun-hye administration. Finally, this thesis concludes by suggesting that since Korea does not consistently adhere to orthodox middle power behavior in its disputes with Japan, the. 政治大 orientation. However, with time and with a sincere reevaluation of its Japan policies, South 立 middle power theory does not adequately describe South Korea’s unique foreign policy. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Korea has the potential to adopt a more robust middle power alignment.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 3.

(5) Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Background The interplay between Korea’s government and its people extends back to the pre-democratic era, and it has continued to play an important role in guiding the course of Korea’s national policies. The year 1987 was a pivotal one for South Korea. Until then, the nation had been governed by what was essentially a military dictatorship with General Chun Doo-hwan at the helm. The nation’s first hosting of the Olympic Games in the prior year had been successful, and the country’s economic development was. 政治大. rapidly progressing, but demands for democratic reforms to the political system had been boiling up from civil society for quite some time.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Korea’s shift toward democracy goes back to 1980 when the government directed national security forces to crack down on university students for protesting against dictatorship. Many were. ‧. injured and some were killed. In response, the local citizens attacked government offices in an event. sit. y. Nat. known as the Gwangju Uprising. Over the next decade, continuous offenses like this by the authorities. io. al. er. against citizens led to more intense and widespread calls for democracy. The final stroke came in 1987. n. when a student protester from Seoul National University died under police interrogation. Violent public. Ch. i n U. v. reaction left then President Chun with no option but to finally undertake social and political reforms,. engchi. holding the country’s first true presidential election the following year in 1988. Democratization opened up society in new ways. One important change was that social issues that had previously been ignored or suppressed under dictatorship, could now rise to the surface to influence politics and society. Democratically elected leaders now had to take into account larger social issues that were of concern to voters. Activist and lobby groups formed around popular issues, and individuals within government could also begin to advocate for policy changes according to their concerns. Among those new concerns, three issues in particular found a wide audience at the state and social levels: justice for the so called ‘comfort women,’ sovereignty over Dokdo Island and rectifying the. 4.

(6) name ‘East Sea’ in place of the international standard name ‘Sea of Japan.’ Over time, these three issues in particular have grown to become ever more important to Korean people.. 1.1.1 Disputes: Comfort Women From 1932 to 1945, the Japanese Empire collected young women from conquered territories around Asia, including Korea, and employed them as sex workers, or ‘comfort women,’ to service the Japanese soldiers (Piper 2001). Comfort stations first sprang up in Shanghai, and by 1937 the military government adopted a general policy of establishing these. 政治大. brothels in all of its acquired territories (Yoshimi 2000: 43-51).. 立. Korean civil society is generally very passionate about obtaining justice for the now. ‧ 國. 學. elderly victims. For example, a weekly protest, called the Wednesday Demonstration, has been. ‧. held in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul every Wednesday at noon since January 8, 1992.. sit. y. Nat. In 2011, a golden bronze memorial statue was erected at the protest site, and since then,. io. even in other countries.. al. er. advocacy groups have spent a great deal of effort to erect statues in other parts of Korea, and. n. iv n C U been consistently rather limp in h e ngovernment Oddly though, the Korean national g c h i has. pressing Japan on this topic, much to the frustration of the Korean public. In the post-Korean War years, it never emerged as a major point of contention at the state level. At the time of this writing, it still does not appear as a policy issue on the Korean MOFA homepage, nor is there any information about it when searching the rest of the website. Judging from the treatment that the issue receives from official sources, compensation for Korea’s comfort women does not appear to be a priority issue for the national government. 1.1.2 Disputes: Dokdo Island and the East Sea 5.

(7) The international standard name for the sea separating Japan and Korea is the “Sea of Japan,” but Korea objects to this designation. The ROK’s position is that the name “Sea of Japan” only became widespread as a result of Japanese expansionism and colonial rule over Korea, so the sea’s “true” historical name, the East Sea, should be restored or at least used concurrently (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, East Sea). Located within this sea is an outcrop of rocky islets, collectively called Dokdo Island, claimed by Japan but administered and passionately defended by Korea.. 政治大 page of their website. Following 立the links takes visitors to web pages filled with promotional. Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlights these two territorial disputes on the front. ‧ 國. 學. videos, maps, diagrams, historical documents that “prove” why the disputed islets belong to Korea, and why “East Sea” is the true and correct name based on their view of history. The. ‧. websites are attractively designed and much of the material is presented in multiple languages. 1. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dokdo and East Sea webpages are available here: http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/ and here: https://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/focus/eastsea/index.jsp?menu=m_20_10_20 ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs East Sea video is available here: https://www.youtube.com/embed/zmF2o3NEUd4?ecver=1. 6.

(8) 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Picture 1: Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dokdo Webpage: http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/kor/. ‧. sit. y. Nat. Moreover, the Korean government continues to work closely with various think tanks,. io. er. private organizations and civic groups in order to lobby international organizations, such as the United Nations and the International Hydrographic Organization, as well as foreign companies,. al. n. iv n C like Google and the National Geographic Society, to replace h e n g c h i U“Sea of Japan” with “East Sea” or insist that the names be used concurrently. Enhanced government-civil society collaboration has. also yielded a public relations campaign aimed at boosting international awareness and shaping global public opinion regarding the East Sea and Dokdo. Korea’s national educational curriculum also plays a prominent role in internationalizing the two disputes. History can of course be leveraged as a powerful tool to shape young minds; using education in this way is nothing new in South Korea. Under former dictator Park Chunghee, the national education system was used to justify his rule, and subsequent Korean presidents. 7.

(9) have similarly tried manipulate the curriculum to instill an uncritical love of country among youth, as in the recent scandal regarding the Park Geun-hye administration’s approval of national textbooks that censor atrocities committed by her father, Park Chung-hee, the former Korean dictator (Choe 2016). Patriotic education is now used to instill a love for Dokdo Island and an assertive preference for the term East Sea. 2. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. i n U. v. Pictures 2 and 3: Korean School children celebrate Dokdo Day (left), Korean students visit Dokdo Museum in Seoul (right).. engchi. The emotional significance of all three of these disputes (comfort women, Dokdo Island and the East Sea) is rooted in Korea’s experience of being colonized by Imperial Japan. Dokdo was among the first pieces of Korean territory ceded to Imperial Japan, which preceded a complete loss of sovereignty over their own country and systematic suppression of 2. As a state-sponsored English teacher in South Korea, my personal experience reaffirms this. During my orientation period, I was guided through a government sponsored Dokdo promotional center in Seoul. Because of the political education that children receive through the national school system, students sometimes approached me just to inform me that “Dokdo belongs to Korea.” There are even TV commercials and popular songs celebrating Koreans’ love for Dokdo.. 8.

(10) their language, culture and traditions, as well as widespread discrimination by their Japanese colonizers (Henry 2014). The ROK feels that Japan’s contemporary claim to the islets, like the name “Sea of Japan,” are relics from what they perceive as an era of oppression and victimization. Indeed, Korea’s anti-Japanese nationalism, which is deeply rooted in sensitivity over Korean sovereignty, is at the heart of Dokdo and East Sea disputes. Many have identified nationalism as a primary driver of Korean policy on Dokdo and the East Sea. Palmer, for. 政治大 society have embedded Dokdo and 立the East Sea into the nation’s everyday culture as symbols of. example, described in extensive detail the many ways in which the Korean government and civil. ‧ 國. 學. victimization by Japan (being taught in national school curriculum, presented in museums, found in popular songs, and exploited by businesses for profit) as a way to strengthen the ROK’s. ‧. official claims (Palmer 2016). Similarly, Kozisek elaborately explained how Dokdo has been. sit. y. Nat. converted by the ROK into a national symbol of emotional trauma, which is conveniently. n. al. er. io. invoked by the elites to fuel anti-Japanese sentiments whenever necessary (Kozisek 2016).. i n U. v. Consequently, these issues are so important to Koreans at both the state level and societal. Ch. engchi. level because they have become incorporated into their national identity as symbols of their nation’s past victimization, and as symbols of resistance against imperialism and Japan's ongoing reluctance to face history; in this way, the elderly women, the islets and the sea are now practically imbued with sacred status. For these reasons, since the 1990s the comfort women, Dokdo and the East Sea have persisted as ongoing points of contention within ROK-Japan bilateral relations. 1.1.3 Korea and Middle Power. 9.

(11) At around the same time as these debates over history began impacting ROK-Japan relations, South Korea’s identity as a modern nation-state was beginning to form around the idea of middle power. The middle power concept with regard to Korea first appeared in the mid 1980’s and continued to increase throughout the 90’s and in the decades thereafter (Jojin 2014: 329-332). Since then, many more scholars have noted Korea’s ascension to middle power status (Ikenberry 2013; Kim Woo-sang 2008; Kim Sangbae 2014; Robertson 2007; Rozman 2007; Sohn 2012.). 政治大 influence ROK national policy-making. 立 As early as the 1990s, newly democratic Korea asserted. Throughout the 21st century, the concept of middlepowerism began to significantly. ‧ 國. 學. that it would begin to “seek new roles as a middle power” (Evans and Grant 1995: 397). Scholarship frequently references Korea’s many international initiatives as evidence for the. ‧. nation's middle power status, like Kim Young-sam’s Globalization Policy; Lee Myung-bak’s. sit. y. Nat. Global Korea Policy; Park Geun-hye’s Eurasia Initiative, Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation. io. al. er. Initiative and leadership of MIKTA. The steady increase in the number of organizations. iv n C h eas nan goverarching Korea also point towards middlepowerism c h i Unational policy. n. dedicated to multilateral peace initiatives and the U.N. sustainable development goals throughout. 1.2 Purpose of Research. The discussion of middle powers in international relations examines role of mid-sized powers in the world system. There are several frameworks for analyzing middle powers. Three prominent categories are functional, positional and behavioral. The functional perspective stipulates that a middle power is any nation capable of extending its influence over certain areas or functions in the international system. To be more. 10.

(12) specific, middle powers must have sufficient control over material and non-material resources; must be willing to exercise leadership on important issue areas and bend other nations’ actions toward supporting regional stability; and must be militarily capable of inflicting unacceptable damage to any potentially hostile great power (Fels 2017). Positional theories focus on states’ relative capabilities and where those capabilities locate them within a larger hierarchy of power (Holbraad 1984; Wood 1988). Kim (2009) noted that this perspective tends to use statistical indices for categorizing countries such as size of. 政治大 soldiers. In other words, the positional approach systematically ranks and categorizes states 立. territory, GDP, the volume of trade and foreign currency reserves, population, or number of. ‧ 國. 學. according to their objective capabilities.. The behavioral perspective, which forms the foundation of this thesis, defines middle. ‧. powers by their foreign policy behavior under various geopolitical circumstances (Cooper et al.. y. Nat. sit. 1993). The essential feature of middle powers in the behavioral perspective is that their foreign. n. al. er. io. policies always lean toward a common set of characteristics: compromise, cooperation, conflict. i n U. v. resolution, multilateralism and support for rule of law (Cooper et al. 1993; Holbraad 1984; Jordaan 2003).. Ch. engchi. This perspective furthermore contends that such nations behave in this way for ideological reasons, i.e., to be 'good’ or ‘responsible’ international citizens (Cooper et al. 1993: 19; O’Neil 2015: 77; Schweller 2017: 8). Schweller (2017: 9) describes middle power foreign policy as “a statecraft rooted in the conviction that [they] have a responsibility . . . to protect the international order from those who would threaten it, whether they be great or small powers.” In other words, middle powers are determined to use multilateral and institutional methods to solve. 11.

(13) international disputes and promote international peace - all because they see themselves, and want others to see them, as good international citizens. In summary, archetypal middle power foreign policy behavior in international disputes is characterized by a tendency to seek multilateral solutions, to seek compromise and demonstrate good international citizenship (Jojin 2014: 329). In the case of Korea, the ROK has for many decades repeatedly claimed it is a middle power. Yet, the country is also in a series of bilateral disputes with Japan over history and. 政治大. territory. Previous studies have not considered instances where a middle power country is itself. 立. one of the disputants in an international conflict, because the current academic discussion. ‧ 國. 學. operates under the implied assumption that middle powers are not themselves disputants in such situations.. ‧. Furthermore, the current literature discussing middle power in the Korean context usually. y. Nat. sit. analyzes either the country’s position (the positional framework) or behavior (the behavioral. n. al. er. io. framework), but it always applies these analytical frameworks to the global level. The positional. i n U. v. framework asks where Korea is located in the global hierarchy of power, and the behavioral. Ch. engchi. framework looks at how Korea conducts itself within the international system. Considering these two points, there appears to be an opening within the scholarship for further analysis into the nature of middle power, especially with regard to South Korea. When a self-proclaimed middle power is itself a disputant in an international conflict, as in the case of Korea with Japan, how well do its actions conform to the established behavioral framework? Therefore, the purpose of this research is to develop a framework by which to test Korea’s middle power image in bilateral disputes with Japan. In so doing, my research will add to the. 12.

(14) existing body of literature on middle powers and their foreign policies, and contribute to a more thorough understanding of the nature middle powers, especially in bilateral disputes. Finally, my research could shed some light on the logic behind Korea’s behavior toward Japan. Were it not for the two nations being united under the American security umbrella, troubles plaguing their relationship might be even greater. This is unfortunate because, from the rise of China and the ever present threat posed by North Korea, to the shared democratic ideology and socio-cultural traits, South Korea and Japan clearly have many overlapping. 政治大 democratic values, balancing against 立 Chinese hegemony, and pressuring North Korea to be a. interests. It would be to their own mutual benefit for them to work together in promoting liberal. ‧ 國. 學. more responsible member of the international community. Together, Korea and Japan have vast potential to promote peace, stability and democracy across Asia and the world. The logic appears. ‧. to suggest that they ought to be obvious partners working together in these areas of shared. y. sit. n. al. er. io. as it claims to be.. Nat. concern. This is especially true if Korea is in fact following the foreign policy of a middle power,. i n U. v. Providing some clarity on Korea’s behavior toward Japan may also be able to help other. Ch. engchi. researchers construct policy proposals to better guide the United States in managing its relationship with its two most important security partners in the Asia-Pacific. 1.3 Research Design The behavioral theory holds that middle powers share a specific pattern of foreign policy actions, collectively termed ‘middlepowermanship:’ “[the] tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, [the] tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and [the] tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’. 13.

(15) to guide...diplomacy” (Cooper et al. 1993). Middle power diplomacy, as it is referred to by Neack (2000), can be further identified by a commitment toward coalition-building and performing international conflict management and resolution activities, e.g., UN peacekeeping and mediating between two or more unfriendly countries. Finally, it is important to note that middle power diplomacy uses these sorts of multilateral and cooperative initiatives as a means of bringing stability and legitimacy to the global order (Jordaan 2003). Theoretically middle powers are expected to handle international disputes in the above-. 政治大 disputes may vary and even deviate from the middle power image. This study is thus to test 立 mentioned specific ways. In practice, nevertheless, individual country’s approach to bilateral. Japan.. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. South Korea’s image as a middle power by examining her approaches to bilateral disputes with. Therefore the behavioral perspective will be used as the analytical framework of this. y. Nat. sit. thesis research. To test Korea’s image, this perspective will be applied to three different cases of. n. al. er. io. bilateral disputes. Case one is about Comfort Women, case two is about Dokdo dispute and case. i n U. v. three is about the East Sea dispute. In each of the three test cases, the extent to which Korea’s. Ch. engchi. actions conform to the behavioral framework will be analyzed.. To summarize, the analytical framework of this thesis relies on three essential attributes of middle power foreign policy: multilateralism, compromise and exercising leadership towards peaceful outcomes. 1. MULTILATERALISM: Middle powers see themselves as good international citizens. They want to be model states who uphold the global order and follow international norms. As a result, they will tend to bring problems to multilateral. 14.

(16) arbitration, rather than trying to settle them bilaterally. In each of the three disputes with Japan, does Korea favor bilateral or multilateral solutions? 2. COMPROMISE: Middle powers embrace compromise positions in international disputes to demonstrate their good international citizenship, and as a way of fostering peaceful relations. When there’s a chance to make a deal in each of their disputes with Japan, does Korea offer to negotiate, or show willingness to accept negotiations from the Japanese side? Or do they shun compromise when the. 政治大 LEADERSHIP: Middle 立 powers place regional stability as their end goal. Disputes opportunities arise?. 3.. ‧ 國. 學. can sometimes lead to armed conflict. But for middle powers, war is not an option, so they should prevent conflicts from arising in the first place. In each of. ‧. the three disputes, does Korea take initiatives to move the conflicts in the. io. al. er. aggravate problems even further?. sit. y. Nat. direction of peace and stability, or do they tend to take provocative actions that. n. iv n C U of this thesis. Qualitative research Qualitative research serves as thehmethodological e n g c h i basis is a systematic method of inquiry that social scientists use to form theories that explain the world of human relations. While there are many definitions of qualitative research, most basic definition is that “it uses words as data . . . collected and analyzed in all sorts of ways. Quantitative research, in contrast, uses numbers as data, and analyzes them according to statistical techniques.” 3 With regard to international relations in particular, qualitative analysis. 3. Merriam, Sharan. Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation. Jossey-Bass; 3 edition. 2009. p. 6.. 15.

(17) tries to understand and explain various social and political phenomena, such as current events, as well as the formation of world regions and the behavior of countries and individuals. This study focuses on the foreign policy of South Korea and its relationship to Japan, so although some statistical data may be included, qualitative, rather than quantitative research, is the main methodology. The research is informed primarily through past and current literature, historical documents and official government statements regarding the policies and implementation of Korean foreign policy and overall national strategy.. 政治大. The time period necessary to cover for researching these cases will range from the. 立. beginning of Korea’s use of the middle power concept - which took place in the early 1990s - to. ‧ 國. 學. the Park Geun-hye administration.. ‧. 1.4 Chapter Arrangement. Nat. sit. y. The introduction provides a general description of the areas of tension in the Korea Japan. n. al. er. io. relationship. This includes some of my own observations and experiences previously as an English teacher in the country.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In the second chapter, I will review the existing literature of middle powers, providing the general ideas and opinions of scholars regarding middle power foreign policy, in particular focusing on how they resolve international disputes. Included in this section will be a review of literature that is more specifically about Korea as a middle power. In chapter 3, I will first introduce the source of the comfort women dispute, the positions of the Japanese and Korean governments, a timeline of the major events and the methods former Korean administrations have used in order to deal with the problem. I’ll accomplish this by. 16.

(18) looking at policy statements by officials, official records and news reports. I’ll conclude this chapter with a discussion of the issue as it relates to the analytical framework. In chapter 4, I will provide some historical background on the dispute over Dokdo island, including the official positions of both the Japanese and Korean governments. Following this, I will provide an outline of the major events in this dispute, describing how various Korean presidential administrations have handled the problem. Like in chapter 3, I will draw on official policy statements, records and news reports in order to illustrate the extent to which Korea used. 政治大. middle power foreign policy to deal with Dokdo. Again, I conclude this chapter by applying the. 立. analytical framework to the dispute.. ‧ 國. 學. As for chapter 5, it discusses the East Sea dispute following the same structure as the previous two chapters; an introduction to the source of the dispute and the official positions of. ‧. the Japanese and Korean governments, followed by a timeline of events to show how Korea has. y. Nat. al. er. io. framework of middle power foreign policy.. sit. historically managed this dispute with Japan, concluding with a review based on the behavioral. n. iv n C In the sixth and final Chapter, Ih will review the analysis e n g c h i U made in chapters 3, 4 and 5 in order to assess the extent to which Korea’s actions align with the behavioral framework within each of the these three ongoing disputes it has with Japan. This will include a theoretical discussion about how Korea’s handling of disputes with Japan relates to its middle power foreign policy. Additionally, I will summarize the main points of each chapter in order to provide my own personal reflection and then make some final comments about the possible direction of future research. This thesis consists of the following six chapters:. 17.

(19) One. Introduction Background Purpose of Research Research Design Chapter Arrangement. Two. Literature Review Middle Power Concept Korean Middle Power. 政治大. Critical Review of Korean Middle Power. 立. Concluding Analysis. ‧ 國. 學. Three Comfort Women Tension. ‧. Response. y. sit. al. n. Tension. er. io. Four Dokdo. Nat. Analysis. Response. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Analysis Five. East Sea Dispute Tension Response Analysis. Six. Conclusion Research Findings Theoretical Reflection 18.

(20) Future Studies. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 19.

(21) Chapter 2: Literature Review 2.1 Middle Power Concept Within the field of IR theory, scholars disagree on what specific features make up a middle power. Foundational scholarship has guided the discourse on middle powers by identifying three distinct definitional categories: functional, behavioral and positional (Chapnick 1999: 73-82).. 治政 The functional approach, which was devised by the 大 Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong in 立 1942, says that a nation’s ability to influence certain areas and functions in international affairs ‧ 國. 學. helps determine its status as a middle power (Hynek 2004: 33-43). The positional approach. ‧. ranks and categorizes states by applying standards relating to objective material capabilities, such as size of territory, GDP, the volume of trade and foreign currency reserves, population, and. y. Nat. al. er. io. be grouped as middle powers.. sit. number of soldiers (Kim 2009: 7-36). In this way, nations with medium-range capabilities can. n. iv n C The behavioral approach, on which thesis is based, classifies a country is a middle h ethis ngchi U. power if it simply adheres to certain roles. More specifically, according to Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, middle powers all share:. The tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide...diplomacy. Middle powers are states who commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace. Middle. 20.

(22) powers help to maintain the international order through coalition-building, by serving as mediators and "go-betweens," and through international conflict management and resolution activities, such as UN peacekeeping. (Cooper 1993: 19).. In other words, they tend to act out similar roles in the international system by pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems, preferring compromise positions in international disputes and embracing notions of good international citizenship. But by maintaining the international order through “serving as mediators and go-betweens,” the. 政治大. assumption here, as well as in other scholarship, is that middle powers are themselves not. 立. among the disputants in international conflicts.. ‧ 國. 學. Middle powers have also been noted for their ability to serve as “bridges” between. ‧. great and small powers, adopting the position of a mediator when communication between. sit. y. Nat. them breaks down due to a dispute. In his discussion of this bridging role, Lee sites the. io. al. er. opportunities that middle powers have to help resolve disagreements between powerful, developed countries like the United States and developing nations on contentious policies. n. iv n C such as climate change: “To resolve thishstandoff, a middle U e n g c h i power sides with neither group and continues to propose ideas that opposing sides can accommodate” (Lee 2015: 6).. O’Neil (2015: 76) elaborated on this bridging idea when he described the ability of orthodox middle powers, like Canada, Australia and the Netherlands, to play an “honestbroker” role in multilateral settings in order to promote positive outcomes between larger powers in diverse policy areas ranging from arms proliferation to environmental protection.. 21.

(23) Norway, Sweden and Canada are especially well recognized for their “peace agendas,” branding themselves as “peace-entrepreneurs” and leading the world in practicing conflict mediation (Vandamme 2015: 54-55). Canada in particular has long acted as the mediator and advocated for multilateralism during many international crisis. It’s dedication to multilateralism as a founding membership of the United Nations and NATO, and its mediation of in the 1965 Suez Canal Crisis using diplomacy and peacekeeping forces to help avert a potentially major armed conflict in the Middle East,. 政治大. are just a few examples illustrating how its foreign policy behavior embodies the qualities of middle power.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Similarly, some policy proposals have suggested that middle powers also have significant capacity to settle maritime disputes, reducing political tensions by encouraging. ‧. joint resource extraction and persuading the disputants to shelve issues of territorial. Nat. al. er. io. sit. y. sovereignty (Lee 2015: 17).. The case of Australia is a good example. As a frequently cited middle power that. n. iv n C politically close to as a treaty ally, h ethenUS gchi U. also happens to be. yet is economically. dependent upon China as its largest trading partner, Australia has a vested interest in brokering peace between these to larger powers as they compete for geopolitical advantage in the Asia-Pacific. Hence, Australia is compelled for both ideational as well as practical reasons to mediate conflicts between the US and China, and this especially true in the South China Sea, where there is ongoing tension between the two countries.. It must also be noted that middle powers often seek to preemptively avert conflicts between warring parties by getting to the source of many geopolitical disputes - economic. 22.

(24) instability (Jordaan 2003: 6). This is typically addressed through generous financial aid packages. Japanese foreign policy, for example, is noted for its middle power activism particularly in providing foreign economic relief, as well as its focus on conflict resolution 4 . The country has provided substantial economic assistance throughout Southeast Asia when the Asian Financial Crisis struck in the late 1990s, and has participated in conflict resolution and mediation activities in the region, including in Cambodia, Indonesia, East Timor and Mindanao (Lam 2006: 141-159).. 政治大. In summary, the behavioral framework portrays middle powers as being driven to. 立. act out a certain role, i.e., good international citizenship, and they accomplish this by. ‧ 國. 學. embracing a distinctive model of diplomacy that is based on multilateralism, compromise and mediation aimed at resolving international conflicts. But whether it is “serving as. ‧. mediators and go-betweens,” as a “bridge” or as an “honest-broker” between great and. Nat. sit. y. small powers, or working to settle maritime disputes, middle powers are analyzed by how. n. al. er. io. they project their foreign policies at the global level to solve problems among foreign. i n U. v. countries. As such, these portrayals all make the consistent assumption that the middle. Ch. engchi. power in question is not itself among the disputants in the international conflict.. 2.2 Korean Middle Power South Korea's rising status in regional and global affairs has received significant attention in recent years. The country started off as an aid dependent, poverty stricken nation still reeling from the Korean War. The so-called Miracle on the Han River - a set of export-led economic policies started in the 1960’s - fueled nearly thirty years of intense and sustained economic 4. While it could be debated whether Japan is a great or middle power, its actions here nevertheless help to illustrate the global nature of middle power activism.. 23.

(25) growth. By 1996, Korea’s progress was internationally recognized when it was made an official member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Today, South Korea is a major economic and cultural power, a leader in many technological industries, and a frequent host to international summits and conferences. As a result of the achievements in all of these areas brought by its intense economic development, some scholars have declared that South Korea today is a leader among the middle powers in the international system. (Lee 2012; Robertson 2007: 151-174). However, just as in. 政治大 exercise of middle power puts a much great emphasis on its actions at the global level, while 立. the discussion of middle powers more generally, most of the literature regarding Korea’s. ‧ 國. 學. paying little to no attention to the nation’s behavior at the bilateral level. South Korea’s middlepowerness is most often discussed in terms the country’s. ‧. deployment of a series of internationalist policies that have pushed for Seoul playing a larger role. Nat. sit. y. outside the Northeast Asian region and moving beyond the U.S. alliance as the focal point for. n. al. er. io. national strategy. The earliest example of this kind of middle power activism was the emergence. i n U. v. of the Segyehwa Policy (globalization) which sought to boost South Korea’s global influence. Ch. engchi. during the Kim Young-sam government from 1993 to 1998. In his first speech introducing Segyehwa Policy in 1995, President Kim stated that. Globalization is the shortcut which will lead us to building a first-class country in the 21st century. This is why I revealed my plan for globalization and the government has concentrated all of its energy in forging ahead with it. It is aimed at realizing globalization in all sectors - politics, foreign affairs, economy, society,. 24.

(26) education, culture and sports. To this end, it is necessary to enhance our viewpoints, way of thinking, system and practices to the world class level . . . we have no other choice than this. (Kim 2000: 1). Since then, ROK elites have displayed a consistent interest in boosting their nation’s image and expanding their international presence. President Roh Moo-hyun, for example, was responsible for the creation of a ‘National Image Committee’ within the Office of the Prime. 政治大. Minister, which was then upgraded to ‘Presidential Committee on Nation Branding’ by Roh’s. 立. successor Lee Myung-bak (O’Neil 2015: 82). Importantly, the Lee administration also. ‧ 國. 學. spearheaded an annual China-Japan-ROK Trilateral Summit designed to foster cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea in the areas of trilateral relations, regional economy and. ‧. disaster relief.. y. Nat. er. io. sit. But as O’Neil (2015) points out, it wasn’t until President Lee Myung-bak’s implementation of the Global Korea Initiative in 2009 that the ROK became a major player in. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. the realm of middle-power diplomacy. The underlying philosophy of Global Korea envisioned “a. engchi. Korea that leaves behind a habit of diplomacy narrowly geared to the Korean Peninsula, and adopts a more open and enterprising posture that sees the world as the appropriate platform for its foreign policy and national interest” (O’Neil 2015: 83). Hermanns (2013: 68) identified three important shifts in Korean foreign policy that emerged from the Global Korea Initiative: promoting itself as a responsible global player, an economic power, and a culturally relevant nation. Regarding Korea’s desire to promote itself as an international mediator, he cites its aggressiveness in hosting international meetings and. 25.

(27) institutions, as well as a number of other events, from sports events to political meetings such as the G20 Summit in November 2010 and the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012. He furthermore notes the government’s deft exploitation of cultural exports (e.g., Korean pop music, TV programs, films, collectively referred to as ‘Hallyu,’ or the ‘Korean Wave’) as a means to extend its soft power around the world. The Global Korea Strategy, since it aimed to upgrade Korea’s position as a hub of international exchange and peace-building, reflects some of the most important behavioral. 政治大 order to show itself as a good international citizen. 立. elements of middle power: multilateralism and exercising leadership towards greater stability in. ‧ 國. 學. Though not an official policy of her administration, the spirit of Lee’s Global Korea strategy has continued to grow under President Park Geun-hye. Importantly, Vice-Minister Kim. ‧. Kyou-hyun touted middlepowerism as a central pillar of the Park administration during a 2013. Nat. sit. y. keynote speech at an international conference on middle powers hosted by the Korean. n. al. er. io. Association of International Studies and the Korea Foundation (Kim 2013). Moreover, President. i n U. v. Park’s Eurasia Initiative aimed to establish a network of energy, infrastructure and diplomatic. Ch. engchi. links from North Korea and Russia out toward Central Asia and Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, 2015: 105-113). The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) sought to address the ‘Asian Paradox’ phenomenon by building trust and cooperation among East Asian nations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, 2015: 100-104), while MITKA - a multilateral group comprising Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea and Australia - convened regularly to identify and discuss global issues and common goals. Finally, on North Korea, the Park administration adopted a “trust-building policy” aimed at enhancing peace and reconciliation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, 2015: 36-47, 107).. 26.

(28) Korea is also host to several noteworthy organizations that further reflect its commitment to multilateralism, compromise and peacebuilding at the global level. In 2010, Lee Myung-bak launched the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) which has since grown into an international treaty-based organization that supports and promotes sustainable economic growth in developing countries. Seoul is home to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific: Subregional Office for East and North-East Asia (ESCAP-ENEA), which according to their website, aims to “build and strengthen multilateral partnerships and intergovernmental. 政治大 There’s also the East Asia Foundation, a think-tank and ‘international partnership 立. cooperation for inclusive and sustainable development and integration in Northeast Asia.”. ‧ 國. 學. organization’ established to promote conflict resolution through scholarship and dialogue. And as part of an initiative to frame its southern tourist spot Jeju Island as an ‘Island of World Peace,’. ‧. Korea has founded the Jeju Peace Institute as well as the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity. sit. y. Nat. which collaborate to disseminate research on conflict resolution and organize programs related to. io. al. er. cooperation in Northeast Asia and the world. Jeju Island also hosts the UNITAR CIFAL Jeju. iv n C sustainable development to towns and cities h ethroughout i U and East Asia. n g c hSouth n. International Training Center, which offers workshops, conferences, seminars and training on. All of these organizations are part of a broader national strategy outlined in the Presidential Declaration of 2005, “A National Vision for Sustainable Development,” the goal of which was to continue the growth of the ROK as “an advanced country while maintaining balance among economy, society and the environment” (Chung 2006: 3). Positioning South Korea as a leader in promoting and achieving the U.N.’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and as a hub of multilateral peace initiatives clearly resonates with middle power values as they are classically understood.. 27.

(29) Collectively, Korea’s initiatives and policies - from Segyehwa to Global Korea and MIKTA - genuinely seem to embody the most important aspects middle power identity: multilateralism, compromise, peace-building, conflict resolution, and playing the role of a good international citizen. Finally, the ROK’s robust engagement across these areas not only attracts high-profile participants to Korea but also generates substantial international attention on the nation, thus raising even further its ability to contribute to the peace and stability of the existing global order.. 政治大 is typically done by reviewing its 立policies and actions at the global level, such as in the cases of A nation can be defined as a middle power by looking at its foreign policy behavior. This. ‧ 國. 學. well-established orthodox middle powers like Canada or Australia, and in the case of nations whose middle power status is still debatable, like Japan. Scholars agree that these nations all. ‧. seem to share a broad devotion to conflict resolution by promoting multilateralism, compromise. sit. y. Nat. and peace-building in order to portray themselves as good international citizens. In the case of an. io. al. er. emerging or new middle power like South Korea, reviewing the literature clearly shows that. v. n. there is a good case to be made based on its foreign policies at the international level.. Ch. engchi. i n U. Yet, these analysis fall short in several ways. The foundational literature regarding middle powers in general relies on the assumption that such nations not themselves among the disputants in international conflicts. In the case of Korea more specifically, the scholarship tends to focus on its behavior at the global level, while overlooking its bilateral relationships. Since Korea proclaims itself a middle power but at the same time is in a series of bilateral disputes with Japan, its handling of those bilateral conflicts should be studied in order to reveal much or how little alleged middle powers adhere to their roles as “bridges” and “peacemakers” when they are among the disputants in international conflicts.. 28.

(30) 2.3 Critical Review of Korean Middle Power Many other observers have shown skepticism that the middle power framework best explains South Korea’s identity and diplomatic initiatives. A majority of the criticism agreed in its skepticism about both the utility of the concept in the specific case of South Korea, and the lack in consistency of middle-power diplomacy from administration to administration. In the interest of clarifying South Korean grand national strategy, some analysts have proposed alternative frameworks for analyzing the country’s status and behavior.. 政治大. A prominent critique is that there are fundamental differences between South Korea’s. 立. unique adoption of the middle power concept versus the orthodox understanding of it in a more. ‧ 國. 學. Western-centric context. The classic idea of what middle powers are supposed to be like is based on an analysis of the behavior of Western nations like Canada, Australia, Denmark, the. ‧. Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. In these analyses, it became clear that these nations generally. Nat. sit. y. prefer to play mediating roles between the great powers and weaker states (Wight and. n. al. er. io. Holbraad 1978; Cox 1989: 823-32; Young 1989: 335; Cooper and Nossal 1993), and tend to. i n U. v. enact feel-good, peacebuilding policies like, foreign aid and immigration, out of a sense of. Ch. ethical duty (Stokke 1989; Pratt 1994).. engchi. In the case of South Korea, analysts believe that in order to construct the country’s international identity, South Korea, particularly under the Lee administration, has merely adopted the rhetoric of a middle power, and in so doing, have forced a Western-specific concept into a geopolitical, historical and cultural context that simply doesn’t support it (Shin 2012: 147148).. 29.

(31) For example, traditional Western middle powers function within wealthy, stable political environments, meanwhile South Korea is a divided nation balancing between Chinese and American hegemony, while it deals with security threats from soon-to-be nuclear powered regime to the north. In particular, Kim (2016) points out that inter-Korean relations have chained the South to a Cold War style security structure that has prevented it from implementing more substantial middle-power diplomacy. Empirical evidence supports this: “public support for peacekeeping activities tends to decrease quickly when tension between the two Koreas rises”. 政治大 Given this reality, it is argued that using a Western-oriented theory to understand South 立. (O’Neil 2015: 87).. ‧ 國. 學. Korea’s identity and behavior may be inappropriate.. Other valuable research conducted by Robertson (2016: 127-30) has argued that nations’. ‧. diplomatic styles are informed by their individual history, culture, geography, and formative. Nat. sit. y. experiences. In the case of South Korea, he demonstrates that foreign policy is driven largely by. n. al. er. io. various aspects of traditional Korean social values: emotionalism (i.e., pride, honor) and a. i n U. v. preoccupation with status. For instance, in his interviews with current and former Korean. Ch. engchi. diplomats, Robertson found that middlepowerism was most frequently viewed as merely as the achievement of a status symbol, which is in turn used compare and contrast the security, economic and political influence of South Korea relative to other states. The emotion-based diplomatic style of the Korea was revealed in diplomats’ frustration over the discord between their self-perceived status and the status they believe is to accorded to their country by the international community. Looking at Korea’s unique history as a “shrimp among whales,” geopolitically dominated first by the Chinese and then by the Japanese, Hwang (2017) has argued that the ROK’s 30.

(32) aggressive participation in such a wide range of global forums is simply a strategy to ensure its security, rather than an effort to maximize its middle power capabilities. Meanwhile, the long term sustainability of South Korea’s middle power agenda has also been called into question. Because the South Korean presidential system encourages foreign policy differentiation, so Robertson (2016: 25-27) suggests that future administrations are likely to abandon former middle power initiatives in an effort to separate themselves from their presidential predecessors: “The country’s political leaders are often reluctant to recycle existing initiatives from previous. 政治大 Likewise, despite middle power rhetoric surrounding Park Geyun-hye’s administration, 立. governments, instead preferring to try to inspire constituents with novel concepts.”. ‧ 國. 學. she has made little substantial progress in any of her diplomatic efforts, which has led O’Neil (2015: 86) to warn that South Korea is likely to face a “credibility deficit,” making it harder to. ‧. propose future multilateral initiatives if her initiatives fall apart or fail to bear fruit.. Nat. sit. y. For the above reasons, at least one analyst has proposed alternative concepts that might. n. al. er. io. better match South Korea’s overall foreign policy strategy: utilizing the attractiveness and. i n U. v. influence of Korean culture to act as a ‘creative’ or ‘constructive’ regional power; a ‘principles-. Ch. engchi. based’ approach that focuses on doctrines rather than hard-power or identity; or “embracing a posture of ambiguity in international relations” (Kim 2016: 13). And although South Korea’s leadership in China-Japan-ROK trilateral relations has been used as an example to demonstrate its middlepowerness (Vio 2012: 43-46), Teo (2015) has pointed out that it is difficult to reconcile South Korea’s claim to middle power status on the global stage with the reality of its troubled relationships with those two countries.. 31.

(33) She points to the annual China–Japan–ROK Trilateral Summit initiated by Lee Myungbak, which was put on hold for 3 years from 2012 - 2015 due to political and historical disputes among the three nations, especially between Korea and Japan. Likewise, security concerns over North Korea have led to the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system by Seoul. This in turn has invited harsh criticism and powerful economic sanctions from China that have seriously impacted the Korean economy. The important takeaway from Teo is that South Korea can hardly be considered a credible conflict negotiating. 政治大. middle power if it can’t even get over its own bilateral disputes with its two closest neighbors.. 立. 2.4 Concluding Analysis. ‧ 國. 學. Reflecting on this literature review, there is today a gap in the scholarly discussion. It well understood that middlepowerism is defined by a desire to resolve international conflicts. ‧. through multilateralism, compromise and peace-making, yet few scholars have considered how. Nat. sit. y. middle power theory as a whole would be affected when established middle powers are. n. al. er. io. themselves involved in bilateral disputes. Under such circumstances, do middle powers still. i n U. v. remain committed to multilateral resolutions, or try to solve the problems by themselves? Do. Ch. engchi. they still seek negotiated solutions, or do they reject opportunities to compromise? Do they still tend to move the dispute toward peaceful resolution, or are they more willing to take provocative actions that potentially inflame the disputes even further? There aren’t any clear answers to these questions because bilateral disputes among middle powers are understudied. It also appears that while many observers have shown skepticism that the middle power framework best explains South Korea’s identity and diplomatic initiatives, in-depth discussion of the effect that ROK-Japan disputes has on the nature or legitimacy of South Korea’s middlepowerness appears to be lacking. Clearly, Korea is ardently promoting multilateralism, 32.

(34) compromise and peace-building globally, but does it remain so enthusiastically dedicated to these principles in its bilateral disputes with Japan? As of this writing, this question too remains unclear because few, if any, proponents or critics of Korean middle power have discussed it in terms of ROK-Japan bilateral disputes. Bilateral disputes are not adequately considered in literature about middle power foreign policy, while Korea-Japan bilateral disputes are not adequately covered in literature critical of the South Korean middle power framework. Reflecting on this, what is assumed about middle. 政治大 will help to answer these questions by testing Korea’s commitment to middle power diplomacy 立 power foreign policy in international conflicts needs to be more rigorously tested. This research. ‧ 國. 學. in bilateral disputes by evaluating how it handles three ongoing historical and territorial conflicts with Japan. Doing so will help to fill in a gap of missing critical evaluation about middle power. ‧. behavior in bilateral disputes. It could also lead to a more careful use of the middle power. sit. y. Nat. concept as an analytical framework in future assessments of Korea’s grand national strategy and. io. n. al. er. foreign policy behavior.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 33.

(35) Chapter 3: Comfort Women 3.1 Tension Of all the crimes committed by Imperial Japan, perhaps none has had a more lasting impact on Korea-Japan relations than the use of so called “comfort women,” a euphemism for women and girls recruited to work in brothels for the Imperial Army. Since Korea’s democratization, the issue has become increasingly complex.. 政治大. The first comfort station was established in the Japanese colony of Shanghai in 1932. 立. (Hicks 1997: 45). The number of comfort stations expanded within China and throughout other. ‧ 國. 學. conquered territories. As for the total number of comfort women, the number is believed to have been around 200,000 altogether (Asian Women’s Fund: 10). Comfort women were not. ‧. exclusively Korean; women were also drawn from Japanese controlled territories and even from. Nat. sit. n. al. er. io. in 1945.. y. Japan itself. These stations continued to provide sexual services for soldiers until Japan’s defeat. Ch. i n U. v. Because it wasn’t included in the 1965 Basic Treaty, the Korean government largely. engchi. ignored the comfort women issue throughout the post-war decades. It wasn’t until the late 1980’s and early 90’s that this historical issue became a major sticking point in Korea-Japan relations when activism by women’s groups in both countries, along with a series of highly publicized news articles, forced the issue into public awareness (Matsui 1984; Hicks 1994: 173-178). As a result, in 1989 women’s groups staged a protest and wrote a letter to the Korean government against a planned Korean emissary to the funeral of Japanese Emperor Hirohito. They were ignored by the Korean government, who, echoing the official line of the Japanese. 34.

(36) government, cited lack of documentary evidence (Edwards 2013: 110). In 1990, leaders of these organizations sent a letter to then Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki demanding an admission, an apology and financial compensation. Japan asserted the women were prostitutes who had worked voluntarily for private contractors, so the government and military couldn’t be held responsible (Soh 2009: 63). By this time, Korea had transitioned from dictatorship into a democracy. As a result of new political freedoms and civil rights, many people began organizing advocacy groups around. 政治大 such organization is the Korean Council which was established in 1990. The Korea Council 立. different issues, including advocating on behalf of former comfort women. The most prominent. ‧ 國. 學. issued a list of demands to the Japanese government that, according to their website, includes financial reparations, official apology and acknowledgement, construction of a memorial and the. ‧. inclusion of comfort women system into Japanese history textbooks.. Nat. sit. y. In particular, former Korean comfort woman Kim Hak Sun is well noted for bringing the. n. al. er. io. issue into the political spotlight when in 1991, she publicly testified about her past experience as. i n U. v. part of a lawsuit against the Japanese government demanding compensation for forced. Ch. engchi. prostitution. Motivated by her efforts, other former comfort women soon filed lawsuits against Japan too. The following year, many of these women testified at the United Nations, bringing the world’s attention on the issue and increased international pressure on Japan. No longer insulated from public opinion as in the pre-democratic era, Korea’s elected leaders have been forced by growing domestic outrage and advocacy groups to address the issue. 3.2 Response. 35.

(37) I intend to highlight the response of the South Korean government to this issue by highlighting notable actions and statements by each presidential administration, beginning with the Roh Tae-woo administration - when middle power first entered political dialogue - and ending with the Park Geun-hye administration. Responses from current President Moon Jae-in are not included because he has been in office less than a year, so it is too recent to consider. 3.2.1 Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) Roh Tae-woo served as President of South Korea from 1988 to 1993, just when. 政治大. awareness of the comfort women issue was beginning to gain traction in Korean society.. 立. The problem caused by Japan’s use of Korean women as sex workers was first formally. ‧ 國. 學. raised in June 1990, after the state visit by Roh Tae-woo, whose official inquiry into the matter. ‧. was instigated by the demands for apology and compensation by democratic South Korea’s new advocacy groups, particularly the Korean Council (Soh 2009: 63). In the meeting, Roh requested. y. Nat. io. sit. a list of draftees, which the Japanese provided but only names were included without any other. n. al. er. information (Stetz 2001: 15). With public pressure growing, Roh again requested that relevant. Ch. i n U. v. facts be brought to light during Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa's state visit to Korea in. engchi. January 1992 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1993). Importantly, after a 1992 investigation performed by the Japanese government itself revealed that it was indeed complicit in organizing the comfort women system, Miyazawa again visited South Korea and apologized to President Roh (Jameson 1992).. 3.2.2 Kim Young-sam (1993-1998). 36.

(38) In response to these revelations, LDP Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono issued an official apology in 1993 for Imperial Japan’s abuse of women as sex slaves, which came to be known as the Kono Statement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1993). This was followed by an official apology delivered in 1995 by Prime Minister Murayama for Japan’s aggressive role in WWII. Known as the Murayama Statement, it apologized for Japan’s colonial rule, war of aggression, and for the various other atrocities committed by Japan’s Imperial forces (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1995).. 政治大 (AWF) to provide further apologies 立 and compensation for the former comfort women. However In the same year, the Japanese government also established the Asia Women's Fund. ‧ 國. 學. civil society organizations in South Korea opposed this action because they insisted that since the payments were funded by Japanese citizens rather than the national government, it was merely. ‧. an attempt to evade full legal responsibility. Activist groups therefore called on individuals to. io. sit. y. Nat. reject both the payments and the apology.. n. al. er. In contrast, the Kim Young-sam administration seemed to eager to work with Japan.. Ch. i n U. v. Records of the negotiations between the ROK and Japan indicate extensive negotiations between. engchi. the two countries leading up to the Kono Statement and establishment of the Asian Women’s Fund, despite an acknowledgement from the ROK itself that it “would not be able to exert pressure domestically in order to try to control the situation.” (Tadaki, Akizuki, Arima, Kawano, Hata 2014: 8).. 37.

(39) The day before the official issuance of the Kono Statement, Kim Yong-sam furthermore stated that he “appreciated” the final draft presented by Japan and “communicated to Japan that the Government of South Korea accepted the wording of the draft” (Tadaki et al., 2014: 17). 3.2.3 Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) In 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung made a state visit with Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. During the visit, the two signed the Joint Declaration of a New JapanRepublic of Korea Partnership Towards the Twenty-First Century, also known as the Obuchi. 政治大 overcoming their unpleasant history (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1998). Likewise, 立. Declaration, in which Kim stressed the importance of building future-oriented relations by. ‧ 國. 學. Obuchi expressed Japan's apology for having inflicted pain and suffering on the Korean people. Their joint declaration was heralded as “groundbreaking” and the beginning of “a new era in. ‧. partnership” (Dudden 2014: 45).. sit. y. Nat. The following year the two leaders celebrated the six-month anniversary of the Obuchi. io. al. er. Declaration by staging a live TV broadcast in which they touted a policy of “cultural sharing.”. iv n C Japanese movies, music and televisionhwhich in place for over fifty years. Japan e n ghadc hbeeni U n. (Dudden 2014: 47). Under the new policy, the Kim Dae-jung administration lifted the ban on. returned the gesture by boosting tourism to South Korea. But despite the expanded political, security, cultural and people-to-people exchanges that Kim Dae-jung’s policies enabled, the South Korean public was still outraged over the comfort women issue. Between 1996 and 1997, comfort women activist groups led fundraising campaigns in order to prevent the surviving women from accepting money from the Japanese AWF. At the urging of the Korean Council, the Kim Dae Jung administration was instead forced in 1998 to pay out 31.5 million won in support money to about 140 survivors, who were required. 38.