國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Chapter 4: Dokdo Island
4.1 Tension
Territorial sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima remains a sharp point of contention in contemporary ROK-Japan relations. The island is actually a rocky outcrop composed of two rock-like land features, known as Dokdo in South Korea, Takeshima in Japan and the Liancourt Rocks internationally. The land features are about 87 kilometers from the nearest Korean territory, and South Korea considers them under the jurisdiction of Ulleung Island. Japan considers the islets under the jurisdiction of the Oki Island, which is about 157 kilometers away.
Tokyo and especially Seoul continue to produce their own maps, charts, documents and records that they claim proves why they are the rightful owners of these barren, desolate sea rocks.
Picture 5: Map of Dokdo between Korea and Japan.7
7 Korean National Geographic Information Institute:
http://www.ngii.go.kr/dokdoen/contents/contentsView.do?rbsIdx=42
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Picture 6: Dokdo Island 8
Although military personnel have been stationed there for decades, multiple Korean scholars have noted that the islands are unsuitable to support human habitation, and that “rock” is probably the best term to describe these land features (van Dyke 2013: 54). Therefore, the terms
“island,” “islet,” or “rock” will all be used interchangeably in this thesis.
Territorial disputes are commonly tied up with national history and formation of the state;
Dokdo is a case in point. Thus, any assessment of this territorial dispute would be incomplete without considering the historical baggage associated with the claims.
Japanese Imperial forces seized the islets in January 1905, the same year in which Japanese forces compelled Korea to accept a treaty that made it into a Japanese vassal state, which was in turn a prelude to full colonial annexation in 1910. Prior to the 1905 Korea-Japan Treaty, Korea’s international relations were primarily governed by its tributary relationship with China. As a colony, Korea, like Japan’s other acquired territories, benefited from modernization
8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Republic of Korea: http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
policies that produced many social improvements, but was also subjected to assimilation policies that suppressed native languages and cultures, discriminated against non-Japanese, and forced people to adopt Japanese names and convert to Shinto, the state religion of Imperial Japan (Henry 2014). These negative aspects are well remembered by Koreans today. One commentator stated that from the perspective of the Korean public, the dispute represents a “deep emotional trauma that occurred as a result of Imperial Japan’s brutal occupation that has since been internalized into Korea’s cultural narrative and represents an unhealed psychic scar that has become an article of faith with an almost religious significance” (Mazarr 2012). Consequently, Japan’s contemporary claim to Dokdo is inherently tied to the past subjugation and humiliation of the nation at the hands of Japan.
The 1951 San Francisco Treaty between the United States and defeated Japan did not clarify to which country the Dokdo islets were to be surrendered. The unresolved nature of specific territorial borders in the treaty opened the way for discord between Japan and its neighbors, especially Korea (Hara 2006: 9). Calder in particular noted that the failure of the San Francisco Treaty to establish clear territorial boundaries was a factor in making Northeast Asia the “Arc of Crisis” that it has been ever since (Calder 2004: 135-139).
Korea’s transition to democracy opened up the government’s foreign policy decisions to be influenced by domestic populism. Just as public activism forced the government to take action on the comfort women issue, so too has public activism encouraged the government to take Dokdo seriously. However, the ROK has much more aggressively advocated the latter over the former.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Just one year after the Treaty of Basic Relations was signed, South Korea’s first President, Syngman Rhee, unilaterally declared the so called “Rhee Line” which delineated a clear border between Korea and Japan, and of course included Dokdo on the Korean side.
In the following decades, Korea has stationed other armed personnel to the islets and set up other facilities including a helipad and a port facility which have helped to legitimize their claim to the islets. All the while, Japan has contested Korea’s claim and has been urging International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction over the issue, to which Korea has responded by stating that “no territorial dispute exists regarding Dokdo, and Dokdo is not a matter to be dealt with through diplomatic negotiations or judicial settlement (Korea Hydrographic and Oceanographic Agency).
4.2 Response
Just as I did in the previous chapter on comfort women, I intend to highlight the most notable actions and statements by each South Korean administration. However, since the earliest actions/statements on the Dokdo issue begin with Kim Young-sam, I will begin there and conclude with Park Geun-hye.
4.2.1 Kim Young-sam (1993-1998)
The Dokdo question came to the forefront of Korea-Japan relations in the late 90’s after antagonistic actions taken by both Japan and Korea. Despite this, there were initially some signs of accommodation. In August 1996, the ROK and Japan held talks on establishing a joint fishing area around Dokdo (Min 2010: 88).
But this accommodation didn’t last; after Korea decided to construct a wharf facility on Dokdo in 1996, Japan’s Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko demanded that the facilities and
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
personnel be immediately removed from the islets (New York Times 1996). Violent anti-Japan protests erupted across the country, with Korean citizens burning Japanese flags and effigies of Ikeda.
At the state level, Kim Young-sam canceled a meeting with Tokyo legislators and threatened to cancel a summit meeting with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan. Under the direction of the Presidential Office, the Korean Foreign Ministry refused to cooperate in concluding EEZ and fisheries talks until Japan officially acknowledged Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo (Bong 2002: 103-105, 120-121).
Kim later ordered his cabinet to develop Dokdo as a tourist site capable of supporting human habitation in order to use the islets as a baseline for South Korean EEZ, boosted the number of military guards on the islets and directed military forces to practice repelling enemy vessels approaching the islets (Min 2010: 87).
4.2.2 Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003)
Upon taking office, Kim Dae-jung is widely noted for taking steps to improve Korea’s relationship with Japan. As noted in the previous chapter, Kim signed on with the New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership Towards the Twenty-First Century with Prime Minister Obuchi in his first visit to Japan in 1998 that expanded trade and cultural relations.
Regarding Dokdo in particular, Korea put aside the sovereignty issue by finally accepting a long-standing offer from Japan for a new fisheries agreement in January 1999, though it must be noted that this was primarily motivated by “economic collapse and dire need for emergency loans from Japan” (Min 2010: 91). Moreover, given popular opposition to the agreement, South Korea declined to implement the joint regulatory measures (Van Dyke 2002: 297, 405).
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Otherwise, Korea-Japan state-level relations were generally cool but not cold during Kim Dae-jung's administration.
4.2.3 Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008)
Like Kim Dae-jung before him, Roh entered office pledging not to escalate tensions with Japan. The initial strategy of the administration was the pursuit of a notion of "Peace and Prosperity in the Era of Northeast Asia," (Kim 2005) with Japan and Korea even celebrating 2005 as the “Year of Friendship.”
Despite this, the South Korean national post office inflamed the sensitive situation when in 2004 it issued special stamps depicting the Dokdo islets. Japan issued its own Takeshima-themed stamps and then lodged a formal complaint with the Universal Postal Union (Min 2010:
93).
Japan in turn escalated the situation further in 2005 when the Shimane Prefectural Council officially declared February 22 “Takeshima Day,” and urged the national government to reclaim the islets, and then Japan’s ambassador to Seoul reiterated the claim (Faiola 2005). This was followed up by Japan’s Ministry of Education approving middle school textbooks that claimed Dokdo is Japanese territory. Once again, violent demonstrations erupted throughout Korea, with multiple individuals chopping off their fingers in protest, an attempted self-immolation, burning and defecating on Japanese flags, and local authorities in the city of Taegu even redirecting traffic so that vehicles would have to drive over a Japanese flag (Demick 2005).
These incidents - Japan’s shift to the nationalist right coupled with Korea’s emotional domestic politics - marked a shift Roh Moo-hyun’s policy orientation toward Japan. In response, the Roh administration adopted a more hard-line, populist approach toward regarding history and
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
territorial issues. At least 4 points that reflected Roh’s new policy approach have been identified (Kim 2005):
1. an announcement that he would respond firmly to Japanese attempts to justify its history of imperialism and occupation
2. declaration of an aggressive “diplomatic war” that would continue to raise the issue until a solution acceptable to the Korean people was in place
3. a written message defending Dokdo to the people of Korea which was subsequently posted on the homepage of the Presidential Office
4. Korea formally announced its opposition to Japan's bid for permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council, claiming that Japan isn’t qualified because it hasn’t sufficiently reflected on its past imperialism
In other words, rather than striving to minimize conflict between the two countries, the Roh administration took numerous steps that heightened tension with Japan, thereby making him popular domestically but making it more difficult to resolve this difficult territorial issue. Its a case of conservative nationalism on one side fueling conservative nationalism on the other side.
4.2.4 Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013)
Tokyo initially attempted to steer relations back on track after Lee Myung-bak’s election.
Japan offered a bilateral meeting to discuss Dokdo on the sidelines of the ASEAN regional security summit in Singapore, but Korea rejected the offer (Al Jazeera 2008).
Later, Japan and Korea continued to escalate tension between each other. On 2011, officials from Japan’s Democratic Party for the first time attended Shimane prefecture’s Takeshima Day event (Ko 2011). This was soon followed up by Japan’s Ministry of Education
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
issuing new middle school textbooks that again claimed Dokdo belongs to Japan, and described South Korea’s administration of the islets as “illegal occupation” (Seldon: 2011: 8).
Lee Myung-bak continued the populist policy shift set by his predecessor Roh Moo-hyun.
The following year in 2012 Lee became the first Korean president to officially visit Dokdo. At this time, Lee was embroiled in a serious corruption scandal that hurt his popularity (Choe 2012). After his controversial visit to Dokdo however, his domestic popularity quickly rose again (Yokota 2012). Numerous analysts have observed that Lee was strategically using populism over Dokdo to showcase his nationalist credentials in order to deal with the corruption scandals he was facing (Kim 2012).
After Lee’s highly publicized visit, Japan offered to settle the issue by proposing in 2012 that the two nations officially take the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Korea declined the offer (Reuters 2012).
4.2.5 Park Geun-hye (2013-2017)
During the 2013 Independence Memorial service in Seoul, newly elected Park Geun-hye proclaimed, "The historical perspective of aggressor and victim cannot be changed, even though a thousand years pass by. It is incumbent on Japan to have a correct understanding of history and take on an attitude of responsibility in order to partner with us in playing a leading role in East Asia in the 21st century" (Park 2013). As this was just one month after she took office, so clearly she wasn’t starting her presidency hoping to boost ties with Japan.
Later that year Park attended a Coast Guard ceremony for the launch of a new Dokdo patrol ship. During the ceremony, she vowed "we will never tolerate any challenges to our sovereignty over all of the Republic of Korea's islands, continental shelves and exclusive
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
economic zones," adding that "defending Dokdo is to defend the pride of the Republic of Korea"
(Yonhap News Agency 2013). Either Park is herself a nationalist, or she knows how to use nationalism to build public support just as her presidential predecessors did.
Oddly, after refusing to meet or even speak with Japanese Prime Minister Abe throughout her time in office, Park Geun-hye in her final months in office suddenly held a friendly summit meeting in November 2015, just a month before her abrupt announcement of the comfort women deal with Tokyo. In the meeting she stated she’d like to "work together toward creating an atmosphere that is conducive to holding friendly summit meetings more frequently" (Minegishi 2015).
Nevertheless, observers have noted that due to her father’s collaboration with Japanese occupiers during the colonial period, Park tended to use nationalism and anti-Japanese rhetoric to legitimize herself as a trustworthy patriot (McGill 2014). Again, Korea’s politicians exploit nationalism for political profit.
4.3 Analysis
According to the analytical framework used in this thesis, Korea’s handling of the Dokdo issue must be analyzed to determine the extent to which they have remained committed to middlepowerism in three key areas: multilateralism, compromise and exercising leadership toward peaceful resolution.
4.3.1 Multilateralism
Does Korea favor multilateral solutions on the Dokdo dispute in order to show itself as a good international citizen? Japan first proposed in September 1954 that the sovereignty of Dokdo be referred to the International Court of Justice, made a second offer in 1962 during ministerial
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
talks, and a third most recent offer in 2012 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015). The ROK rejected each of Japan’s offers to peacefully settle the conflict using a well-established multilateral organization. Perhaps this is because domestic politics may make it politically infeasible for the Korean government to consider ICJ adjudication, or perhaps it is because they don’t want to bring any legitimacy to Japan’s claims.
Whatever the reason, Korea is adamantly declaring sovereignty over a disputed territory, but then consistently objecting to the established procedures of international law in order to solve the problem. Judging from this, Korea is either unable or unwilling to pursue multilateral behavior typical of middle power foreign policy on this issue.
4.3.2 Compromise
When there’s a chance to make a deal with Japan on Dokdo, does Korea offer or accept negotiations, or shun compromise altogether? On a few occasions, Korea has extended olive branches to the Japanese, but in many of these instances either the state or civil society took steps that invalidated those efforts. The 1996 talks on establishing joint fishing agreement around Dokdo were a step in the right direction that got sidelined by the government’s provocative decision to begin building facilities and expand the military presence on the islets. Then the acceptance of Japan’s offer in 1999 to resume talks on a new fisheries agreement was terminated because of strong domestic opposition.
In other cases, the possibility of compromise has been altogether rejected, as when Korea turned down Japan’s offer to discuss Dokdo at the ASEAN security summit. Additionally, the current official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs couldn’t be more clear about the possibility of compromise: “Dokdo is an integral part of Korean territory, historically,
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
geographically and under international law. No territorial dispute exists regarding Dokdo, and therefore Dokdo is not a matter to be dealt with through diplomatic negotiations or judicial settlement.”9
So the ROK has made some limited attempts at compromise, but domestic nationalism and subsequent counterproductive policies nullified those actions, and an anti-compromise policy perpetually dominates the official government stance. Korea is both unwilling and unable to seek genuine compromise.
4.3.3. Leadership
Has Korea taken the initiative to move the Dokdo dispute in the direction of peace &
stability? Generally, the answer here must be negative. Domestic nationalism has constrained the actions of the ROK government in the few instances where it tried to take positive steps with Japan in the past. At other times, the government continued to take a hardline stance and make provocative actions even in cases when it was open to negotiation.
In addition, Korea’s leaders also tend to play up the Dokdo issue for political gain whenever domestic support is low, as in the case with Roh Moo-hyun’s policy shift toward populism and Lee Myung-bak’s visit to the islets, or as a way to legitimize themselves, as with Park Geun-hye’s appeal to nationalist rhetoric in order to distance herself from father who infamously collaborated with colonial Japan. This means that Korea is overall both unable and unwilling to seek lead this dispute toward a stable and peaceful outcome.
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK. “The Government’s Basic Position.”
http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/dokdo/government_position.jsp
‧
國立 政 治 大 學