2 Literature Review
2.6 Language Education
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youngsters.”79 According to the essay, teachers also gave their personal things to the students, and treated the students as though they were their own children. This contrasts with Linda Tsung’s essay (to be discussed below), in which Uyghur students who struggled with Mandarin were called “not very bright” by their Han teachers.80
Predictably, Our Good Han Mothers touts the successes of the teachers. It speaks of overcoming ethnic differences and becoming one under the banner of China.
“Different ethnic groups, different languages, and different souls – all fused together here.”81
This article embellishes so much that it has no academic value whatsoever.
However, it is useful in that it shows us what the PRC government would like readers to think about its education system. It is a piece of modern propaganda, revealing the PRC’s desire to present a magnanimous education system and a united China.
The political message of unity is so blunt that it is impossible to miss.
2.6 Language Education
Both the PRC and the Uyghurs take language education very seriously. Scholars and many Uyghurs associate language with the preservation of Uyghur identity. There is a real fear among Uyghurs that if they (or their children) learn Mandarin, their own language and culture will suffer. Timothy Grose cites interviews in which Uyghur university students say that the more they learned Chinese, the more alienated they
79 Tao Jiaqing and Yang Xiaohua, 2010. p. 68
80 Linda Tsung, Minority Languages, Education and Communities in China (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p. 140
81 Tao Jiaqing and Yang Xiaohua, 2010. p. 69
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felt from their own cultures.82 In Dislocating China, Dru Gladney also stresses the importance of language learning in the assimilation of ethnic minorities. He states it very simply: “To learn Chinese is to become Chinese.”83 PRC scholars are aware of this concern. One PRC scholar, Lin Shujiao (林 淑 娇), discusses this in an essay on problems facing bilingual education. Lin points out the worry that if Chinese is paramount in Uyghur classrooms, they will lose their cultural identity. The essay expresses similar worries about language; if Uyghur students spend more time learning Mandarin, will they be able to speak as well in their mother tongue?84
Regardless, the PRC clearly wants to convince Uyghurs of the importance of leaning Mandarin. Ku Erban (窟 尒 班), a Uyghur academic in the PRC, points out that Chinese is the common language used all over the PRC. He argues that in China, Mandarin is the language of business, economics, and politics.
Concern on this matter is justified. After all, culture and language are closely intertwined. If the Uyghurs lose their language, their culture will suffer as well.
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James A. Millward also comments on the importance of language in both politics The article’s message is clear: if Uyghurs want to be a part of this century, they will have no choice but to learn Mandarin.
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and national identity. He points out that the PRC has changed the Uyghur writing system three times in 30 years. That is an extraordinarily large amount of change.
He goes on to argue – rather persuasively – that the change in language policy clearly reflects the PRC’s political motives. For example, he points out that the first change was meant to “…reduce the appeal of Islamic texts and improve access to scientific and educational materials published in the Soviet Union.”86 A later change reflected the rift the between the PRC and the USSR.87
Linda Tsung, from the University of Hong Kong, wrote a book titled Minority Languages, Education and Communities in China. The author found her chapter on
Xinjiang to be intelligent, informative, and highly useful. In all the reading the author has done for this thesis, this chapter has been among the most valuable.
It certainly seems true that the PRC’s language policies reflect political realities.
For her research, Tsung visited a school that combined the min kao min (民 考 民) and min kao Han (民 考 漢) systems. A min kao min school, also called a
minority school, is exclusively for ethnic minorities. The medium of instruction is the minority language, and minority culture is emphasized. A min kao Han school, also called a Chinese school, is a traditional PRC school. In these schools, most of the students are Chinese, and Mandarin is the only language used.
86 James A. Millward, 2007. p. 234
87 James A. Millward, 2007. p. 235
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Interestingly, Tsung reported some policies that created resentment. Uyghur students in the school were required to learn Mandarin, but Han students did not have to learn Uyghur.88
In a very revealing section, Tsung interviewed Uyghur academics. She spoke with people who studied at both min kao min and min kao Han schools. The results were most interesting. Uyghurs who studied at Chinese schools stated that they were grateful because they had better job opportunities later on in life. However, as children they struggled because classes were taught in Chinese, a language they did not understand well at the time. They reported feeling afraid, and being mocked by the Chinese children.
Uyghur teachers had to pass a Mandarin proficiency test, but Han teachers did not have to pass a Uyghur test. This is common: Uyghurs have to learn Mandarin, but Han Chinese almost never learn Uyghur, even in Xinjiang.
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According to Tsung, Uyghurs who studied in minority schools also reported pros and cons. On the one hand, they did not have to struggle with a language they did not understand. They became completely fluent in Uyghur.90
Tsung gives a scathing criticism of minority education in Xinjiang. She claims On the other hand, they did not learn Chinese well and had problems later in their academic careers.
88 Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 136
89 Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 144
90 Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 145
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that Han Chinese policymakers and teachers dismiss Uyghur students as lazy.91 She reveals an interesting problem in the system. According to Tsung, authorities do not provide enough resources to Uyghur students, and then look down on those students for not succeeding. However, Tsung claims, the problem is not that the Uyghur students are lazy or stupid. The problem is that they are not given the same resources that Han children receive.92
There was a great deal more of use in this chapter. It also discusses the possibility that authorities are making Mandarin the only useful language, while simultaneously making Uyghur useless for economic advancement.
If Tsung’s criticisms are accurate, they reflect troubling problems of both racism and discrimination.
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In Separate but Loyal, Wenfang Tang and Gaochao He conduct an interesting survey of minority students in the PRC. They include an interesting discussion on the differences between theory and practice in language education. The authors point out that on paper, the policy is very clear: “The 1995 Education Law states that the Han language is the basic language of instruction. Ethnic minority schools can Tsung recommends providing more resources for Uyghur students and minority schools.
The author found this chapter most useful and intelligent. The author plans to refer to it often in this thesis.
91 Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 153
92 Linda Tsung, 2009. pp. 152-154
93 Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 152
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use their own language as the teaching language, but they are required to teach Mandarin at some point before the seventh grade.”94 They go on to state, however, that while the classrooms they observed did indeed teach in the minorities’ language, the situation was often very confused. Bureaucratic conflicts between the Ministry of Education in Beijing and the Ethnic State Affairs Council influence the classrooms.
The former group, they say, favors the use of Mandarin, while the latter favors instruction in the local ethnic language.95
Ma Rong, a professor at Peking University, writes a very interesting essay titled Bilingual Education for China’s Ethnic Minorities. While perhaps not entirely
accurate, the author’s tendency was to view Dr. Ma as a voice of the PRC government.
He outlines some of the very difficult challenges that come with trying to implement a bilingual education system. Some of the difficulties he cites are finding qualified teachers and making sure that material taught in minority languages is up to national standards.
From this we can determine that language instruction in the PRC is often hazier than the laws would indicate.
Imagine trying to introduce the vocabulary of modern science so that it fits properly into the languages of several dozen large and small minority groups so that one could compile complete sets of texts for
94 Wengang Tang and Gaochao He, Separate but Loyal: Ethnicity and Nationalism in China, (East-West Center, 2010) p. 19
95 Wengang Tang and Gaochao He, 2010. p. 20
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subjects such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology geography and history…and this will give an idea of the difficulty of the project.96
Dr. Ma also speaks of the PRC concept ‘unified diversity.’ The author took this to mean that the country is unified in the sense that everyone speaks Mandarin, and diverse because minority groups still speak their own languages at the local level. Whether this is a practical goal or idealism is something the author would like very much to discover.
For its part, the PRC, not surprisingly, speaks of a bi-lingual education system in which both languages are respected and promoted. Concerning language education in the next decade (2010-2020), the official PRC website has this to say:
Efforts shall also be made to advance bilingual teaching, open Chinese language classes in every school, and popularize the national common language and writing system. However, minority groups' right to be educated in their native languages shall also be respected and ensured…97
Certainly, this statement gives the appearance of tolerance and an eagerness to foster local Uyghur culture.
96 Ma rong, Bilingual Education for China’s Ethnic Minorities (Chinese Education & Society, Volume 40, number 2, 2007) p. 11
97 The Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, China Vows Stronger Support for Education for Ethnic Minority Groups http://www.gov.cn/english/2010-07/30/content_1667226.htm accessed February 22nd, 2011
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Among western scholars, however, there is a strong skepticism concerning China’s bilingual education system. In his essay Separate but Loyal, Timothy Grose says that some researchers “...argue that the rhetoric of bilingual education is based on half truths, and that China’s covert policy is, in fact, monolingualism.”98 In China’s Minority cultures, Colin Mackerras argues that while the official PRC policy is to
promote the use of minority language, everyday practice often deviates from that policy.99
Nicolas Becquelin has interesting observations on the PRC’s linguistic policies.
He notes the implementation of Modern Standard Chinese in Xinjiang, as well as Mandarin’s becoming the medium of instruction of almost all subjects at Xinjiang University.
Among western scholars and certainly among human rights activists, the general perception is that bilingual education is something of a sham, meant to sugarcoat the real policy of marginalizing the ethnic minorities’ language and ultimately, their culture as well.
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98 Timothy Grose, 2008. p.19
According to Becquelin, instituting Modern Standard Chinese is meant to achieve two things. First, it will placate the Uyghurs by giving them more economic opportunity through better Mandarin. Secondly, it will help to further assimilate them into the PRC.
99 Colin Mackerras, 1995. p. 144
100 Nicolas Becquelin, 2004. pp. 61-62
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These secondary sources begin to reveal a pattern. The implementation of Mandarin at Xinjiang University, the use of Modern Standard Chinese in Xinjiang, and increased Mandarin in minority schools all point to one trend. It is beginning to look as though the PRC’s goal is to supplant the Uyghur language and give the Uyghurs no choice but to learn Mandarin.
2.7 History Content
The historical and political content of education in the PRC is far and away the most relevant topic to this paper. After all, regardless of whether they favor separatism, acculturation, or something else, everyone involved in the Xinjiang issue must have a keen interest in historical perception. There can be no doubt as to where the PRC stands on this issue. The official stance of the PRC is that “Xinjiang…has been an inalienable part of China from ancient times. In 60 B.C., Xinjiang officially became a part of China’s territory.”101
At the other extreme we find the views of East Turkestan independence supporters. An anti-China website, provocatively titled ‘eastturkestan.net,’ states
This sentiment appears in one form or another all over the PRC’s official web sites, white papers, government statements, and so on.
101 The Government of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, About Xinjiang, http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/10050/10051/10020/article.html accessed February 22nd, 2011
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bluntly that “East Turkestan is not a part of China.”102 It goes on to say the following: “…between 206 B.C. and 1759 A.D., East Turkestan was able to maintain its independence…During the periods when it was linked to the Turkish Hun and Gokturk khanates, local administration lay entirely in the hands of the people of East Turkestan. Between 751 and 1216 it was totally independent.”103
Academics tend to favor a gray area. Western historians emphasize that the history of Xinjiang is long and complicated, and is now being manipulated by both sides for political purposes. For example, in an essay titled Contested Histories, Gardner Bovingdon says, “The party-state has long relied on official histories to justify its political and military control over Xinjiang…”
As with the PRC’s claims, this web site’s interpretation of history has a clear political agenda.
104 Bovingdon goes on to
point out that Uyghur nationalists are also eager to use historical interpretations for their own purposes. “…Uyghur nationalist histories have provided a charter for Uyhgur identity, underscored the centrality of Islam in Uyghur life, and offered Uyghurs both precedent and warrant for their resistance to Chinese rule.”105
102 Harun Yahya, Communist China’s Policy of Oppression in East Turkestan
All the western academics that the author read tend to support Bovingdon’s arguments.
http://www.harunyahya.com/e_turkestan03.php accessed February 22nd, 2011
103 Harun Yahya, http://www.harunyahya.com/e_turkestan03.php accessed February 22nd, 2011
104 Gardner Bovingdon, Contested Histories, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (M.E. Sharpe, 2004) p. 353
105 Gardner Bovingdon, 2004. p. 353
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We can therefore make the following conclusions about academic opinions towards PRC and Uyghur interpretations of history. First, academics are generally skeptical of both sides’ versions of history. However, scholars tend to be more hostile towards the PRC version. Second, everyone involved (ie: the PRC, the Uyghurs, and interested outside observers) agrees that the PRC is using history education as a means of integrating the Uyghurs into Chinese society. Finally, given the prevalence of Uyghur views that oppose the PRC line, we can conclude that by and large, the Uyghurs are not buying into the PRC version of Xinjiang’s history.
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Chapter 3. Preferential Policies for Uyghurs
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the preferential policies that the PRC has implemented regarding Uyghur education. What policies have the PRC put in place, and why? What positive effects have been achieved? What are the drawbacks?
Are the PRC’s policies really meant to create change, or do they serve another agenda?
Are preferential policies improving the Uyghurs’ education, economic opportunities, and upward mobility? How do the Uyghurs themselves view these policies? All of these issues lead to the fundamental question posed in this chapter: are the PRC’s preferential policies quelling unrest and integrating the Uyghurs into China proper?
Preferential policies have been implemented by modern states all over the world.
Ann Maxwell Harris and Minglang Zhou have this to say about preferential policies.
These policies “…have widely been adopted by modern states to redress historic inequalities among ethnic groups, to reduce to potential for ethnic conflict, and, at times, to enhance opportunities for the dominant group itself.”106
The PRC has implemented a great deal of preferential policies for ethnic They go on to say that the PRC is no exception. Preferential policies are a popular means of integrating into the state minority groups who feel marginalized by government and mainstream society.
106 Ann Maxwell Hill and Minglang Zhou, 2009. p.1
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minorities. Guarantees of these policies are written into the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy.”107
Government subsidies for minority schools
The laws were drafted in 1984, and amended in 2001. The following is a list of minority rights that are guaranteed by law in the PRC (it should be noted that these laws apply to all of the 55 recognized minority groups):
Lower admissions standards for minority university applicants. An elaborate
points system determines how much benefit a minority applicant receives. It is based on the minority applicant’s gender, ethnicity, financial background, and so
on.108
The development of specialized schools for minority nationalities
More career opportunities for minority university graduates
It seems fair to state that the PRC’s reasons for implementing these policies are no different from the reasons of any other national government. By giving the Uyghurs more economic opportunity, the central government is attempting to pacify them and integrate them into the motherland. The PRC’s approach to the so-called minority issue seems to be more sophisticated than it was before. Policymakers have apparently concluded that keeping the Uyghurs under control through mere force is
107 Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Autonomy
http://www.novexcn.com/regional_nation_autonomy.html, accessed April 18th, 2011
108 Barry Sautman, Preferential Policies for Minorities in China: The Case of Xinjiang (University of Hong Kong, Division of Social Science, 1997) p. 16
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not sufficient. They have decided to mix in incentives for loyalty as well. Colin Mackerras states that the PRC is attempting to raise the standard of living among minorities, thus making them “…less prone to rebellious movements.”109
In every country that has preferential policies, debates exist as to the merits of those policies. Certainly in the United States, the author’s home country, affirmative action is an endlessly controversial topic. Affirmative action in the United States was first implemented in 1954, when the American Supreme Court ruled that racial segregation in schools was unconstitutional.
The PRC’s preferential policies are half of a two part strategy. On the one hand, the PRC takes a zero-tolerance approach to ethnic separatism. As we have seen in both Xinjiang and Tibet, the PRC will not hesitate to use violence when it perceives a threat from minorities in its borders. On the other hand, the PRC appears eager to entice ethnic minorities through education incentives and a higher standard of living.
110 American affirmative action requires
“…agencies and institutions to make every effort to seek out qualified candidates from every possible source – but to focus especially on individuals…from underrepresented groups – to compete for limited resources in education, employment, and business.”111
“…agencies and institutions to make every effort to seek out qualified candidates from every possible source – but to focus especially on individuals…from underrepresented groups – to compete for limited resources in education, employment, and business.”111