3 Preferential Policies for Uyghurs
5.7 Recommendations
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propaganda machine.
5.7 Recommendations
The following suggestions, while admittedly too general, could improve the PRC’s system.
1. Give a fair an accurate portrayal of history.
The foreign settlement of any area, whether it is the Americas, Africa, Asia or Australia, is in large part a history of crime, theft, and bloodshed. It is the author’s understanding that for a long time history books in the United Stated glossed over atrocities committed by white settlers. None of this whitewashing convinced American minorities. Instead the obvious lies only created more resentment, making minorities feel even more like second class citizens. While the neutrality of current American textbooks is still open to question, these materials have come a long way in the last fifty years. Admissions of crimes have not led to greater unrest. People who want to will always manage to manipulate history to suit their purposes, just like some will always manipulate the Bible for the same reasons. An honest discussion of history will not change that. By presenting a fair and honest historical account, the PRC will greatly increase its credibility.
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2. Stop objectifying minorities.
The PRC portrayal of minorities as colorful, innocent and brave is both insulting and inaccurate. It suggests that the makers of these texts have made no effort to understand the people they are discussing. Furthermore, as Dru Gladney tells us, these portrayals breed resentment among Uyghurs, who as Muslims understandably do not like being portrayed as “erotic.”215
3. Present history from both the minority and Han perspectives
Nobody likes to feel that their identity is being manipulated or repressed. If the PRC were to give its ethnic minorities a real chance to flourish and express their cultural heritage, perhaps it would create goodwill.
The government’s current allowance of cultural expression is not enough. Indeed, it seems like a token gesture and reinforces the “colorful and innocent” fallacy. The PRC needs to stop viewing the most trivial ethnic expression as a separatist threat and allow its people to be what they want to be.
When presenting the history of Xinjiang, the PRC should include the Uyghurs (as well as all other minority groups with a history there) along with the Han. The texts that the author read presented everything from a Han point of view. There was nothing about the Uyghurs, except for the reverent ways in which they viewed the Han.
215 Gladney, 1998. p. 110
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4. Eliminate politics from history.
These texts never stop reinforcing the idea that Xinjiang is part of China. The books make no effort at neutrality whatsoever. If a text is laced with sentences like
“this proves Xinjiang is a part of China” and “their return to the motherland was glorious,” it is impossible to take them seriously. These texts read more like a legal argument than a historical narrative. This approach can anger minorities, delude the Han, and draw the ridicule of foreigners. It serves no positive purpose that the author can see.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion
This paper has covered a wide range of issues in a limited space. We have looked at the history of Xinjiang and its people, as well as political issues that affect the region today. We have taken a broad survey of PRC policy and Uyghur reactions to that policy. Any conclusions or suggestions that the author draws from this work are bound to be too general. The author can only share the observations made during the research of these last months, and then share some conclusions and suggestions.
While they are sure to be flawed, the author hopes that his thoughts will shed light on this interesting and crucial subject.
Have PRC education policies helped integrate the Uyghurs into China proper?
This is a difficult question to answer, because we can only guess at what the central government’s goals really are. If the government only wishes to strengthen its hold on Xinjiang and keep the Uyghurs under its thumb, then it has certainly achieved some success. If the government is sincere about integrating the Uyghurs as equals rather than simply assimilating them, then it has a lot of work to do.
From a security standpoint, the central government has clearly strengthened its grip on Xinjiang. The Western Development Program, which has cost more than 200 billion yuan, was partly implemented for the purposes of extending central control over the western regions. Certainly the vast development of infrastructure
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and security networks has helped the PRC keep an eye on Xinjiang. The days of Xinjiang and Tibet being a distant frontier are ending. China is forcing its grip around these areas, albeit not always with subtlety.
However, the PRC has not succeeded in its goal of using education to integrate the Uyghurs. At best, its policies have been ineffective and left the Uyghurs unsatisfied. At worst, they have been counterproductive and created in the Uyghurs a feeling of being under siege from outsiders. We see evidence of this in the continued unrest in Xinjiang which, despite the PRC’s paranoid claims, comes from Uyghur discontent and not foreign instigators. All of the secondary sources that the author has read also point to a lingering discontent among the Uyghurs. They appear to feel marginalized and persecuted; frankly, the author doesn’t believe they are wrong. If the PRC cannot satisfy Uyghur misgivings, no amount of military muscle will quell discontent there. The central government may be able to put down uprisings with relative ease. However, every incident causes the PRC to lose face at a time when it is emerging as a world player.
The PRC does deserve some credit. The standard of living has gone up in Xinjiang, albeit more for the Han than for the Uyghurs. Furthermore, as we have seen, literacy has increased impressively, as have salaries and health standards.
There is more work to be done, however, particularly to ensure that improvements are
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reaped equally and not only by the Han. The central government must build upon the progress it has made, rather than simply tout numbers that stress success.
What is required is a massive overhaul of the PRC’s approach to the Uyghurs and Xinjiang. Despite PRC claims to the contrary, it is the author’s impression that its ultimate goal is the complete assimilation of the Uyghur people. Towards Xinjiang, the central government has adopted a conquest mentality. Instead of guns and artillery, it is using Han immigrants and propaganda. As long as the central government treats Xinjiang like an enemy territory that needs to be conquered, Uyghurs and others will understandably view the Han government with hostility.
The PRC must adopt policies that embrace Uyghurs as equal partners. Until it does this, any reforms will be fundamentally flawed.
Preferential policies are a good start. Used effectively, affirmative action can level the playing field and counterbalance handicaps caused by past injustices. The PRC does deserve credit for making education more widely available to Uyghurs.
What is also needed, however, is an adequate number of jobs awaiting educated Uyghurs upon graduation. If the central government educates Uyghurs but does not provide them with decent work, it will create problems for itself. The discontent of unemployment could channel itself into political action.
Furthermore, preferential policies must be sincere. They must help all Uyghurs,
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rather than a token few. Linda Tsung’s excellent book on language education presents a convincing case that even with preferential policies in place, Uyghurs still receive an inferior education. If fewer resources are provided to minority schools, then preferential policies are meaningless. We have learned that part of the PRC’s strategy is to raise the standard of living through higher education. Zhu Zhiyong tells us that PRC policymakers believe more wealth will quell separatist feelings among minorities. It is therefore in the government’s best interests to ensure that all Uyghurs reap the benefits of affirmative action.
The situation of language education is troubling. The PRC has relegated Uyghur to a cultural relic with little economic value. The choice for Uyghur families is clear: learn Mandarin and prosper, or stick with Uyghur and fall behind.
Linda Tsung tells us that this choice is creating resentment among the Uyghurs, as well as divisions between those who embrace Mandarin, and those who do not. The author sees nothing wrong with teaching Mandarin to the Uyghurs. However, it must be done in addition to the teaching of Uyghur, rather than instead of it.
Furthermore, the insistence that Uyghur students learn Mandarin cannot deprive Uyghur children of the chance to learn English. Only by making Uyghur a financially relevant language can the PRC hope to solve this problem. Again, for this to happen, the planners in the PRC must move away from their conquest
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mentality and embrace a more equal approach.
There is light at the end of the tunnel for the PRC. If more jobs are created for young Uyghurs, discontent will be reduced. Beller-Hann tells us that the lack of good jobs is the biggest grievance of young Uyghurs. In order to solve this problem, the PRC must address the systemic flaws discussed in this thesis. The good news is that these problems can be solved, to the mutual benefit of all concerned parties.
The textbooks examined for this essay reveal some very troubling trends. They suggest that history education in the PRC exists only to justify political ends. The PRC cannot expect Uyghurs or outsiders to take it seriously when such transparently biased material is being taught in the classrooms. Although the author cannot say so for certain, he finds it hard to believe that young Uyghurs will accept such a history.
Instead, the PRC texts will likely only serve to anger the Uyghurs. Furthermore, young Han who accept this version of history will grow up and find themselves at odds with Uyghurs who do not. In this sense, the PRC’s official history could deepen ethnic divisions rather than relax them. Certainly from an ethical standpoint, presenting such a history is questionable. On a practical level, the PRC may be digging a deep hole for itself. As historians learn more about Xinjiang, the PRC may feel it cannot retreat from its original claims. It may feel obligated to defend its official histories, as we saw with the burning of books that dealt with the Tarim
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mummies.
In order for the PRC’s policies to bring about true integration, its leaders must ensure that minority culture is respected. This must be true both inside and outside the classroom. The PRC is doing itself no favors by ordering its teachers to oppose religion. The CCP may be atheist, but most Uyghurs are not. By attacking religion as feudal and a source of separatism, the PRC only makes Uyghurs feel more isolated.
Policymakers have to find some kind of middle ground in which religion and government policy are both respected. This cultural respect must extend to language and treatment of Uyghur culture in general.
As the author has already mentioned, educational reforms must be accompanied by reforms outside of the classroom as well. If problems outside of the classroom are not addressed, then any reforms in schools will ring hollow. Firstly, Han migration must be reduced. This would free up more jobs for Uyghurs, and ease tensions created by language issues. It would demonstrate to the Uyghurs that they are not under siege by the Han. It would not force Han culture on Uyghur classrooms.
Certainly, the Uyghurs are a diverse group and as such, some members of Uyghur society will benefit from China’s education initiative more than others will.
Those Uyghurs living in cities, with more access to higher education, will likely
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benefit more than those living in the countryside. Furthermore, Uyghur families with the means to pay for incidental costs like transportation, food, and school supplies will also benefit more than those who cannot. While this paper has admittedly lumped Uyghur society into one broad category, it is important to remember that China’s education initiatives will be different for everyone.
Furthermore, there must be a change to the education that Han Chinese receive as well. Current depictions of minorities instill within young Han feelings of superiority. The PRC cannot continue to portray ethnic minorities as colorful
‘others.’ Only by depicting Uyghurs accurately and respectfully can the PRC hope to combat great Han chauvinism. From a very young age, Han students must be taught to respect minorities and treat them as equals. Of course it is not easy to overhaul ingrained stereotypes. Countries around the world are making the effort, however, and the PRC must do so as well.
It is still too early to tell whether or not the PRC is achieving its goals and indeed, what those goals really are. Having said that, it still seems clear that current educational policies have not achieved the PRC’s goal of integrating the Uyghurs.
Instead, Uyghurs continue to feel frustrated and resentful towards the PRC. Whether or not this resentment will manifest itself in violence is impossible to tell.
Regardless, educational policies make the government appear shortsighted and
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unwilling to address or even acknowledge its ethnic relations problems. Until the PRC government approaches these problems with sincerity, its claims of being an equal, multinational society will always ring hollow.
What does the future hold for the Uyghurs? Uyghur leaders outside the PRC are understandably dismayed by the way things are going. Under pressure from Han migration and an unsympathetic government, the Uyghur identity could very well vanish. Certainly, PRC efforts to hollow out Uyghur culture and make it look benign could rob these people of their national identity. They may end up as mere poster children for China’s image of ethnic unity.
More than national unity or politics, the story of the Uyghurs is the most important part of this study. How much of a voice will the Uyghurs have in the future? How much of a say will they have in their own fate? When we consider the fact that Uyghurs have few real allies or sympathizers abroad, their future looks very bleak indeed.
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