3 Preferential Policies for Uyghurs
3.1 Conclusion
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to be that they are second class citizens, being pushed out and exploited by the dominant Han. As we have seen, even with preferential policies in place, economic realities still make it hard, if not impossible, for Uyghur families to pay for school.
Furthermore, Linda Tsung tells us that Chinese schools (min kao Han schools) are better equipped and receive more resources.153
3.1 Conclusion
It is therefore not surprising that Timothy Grose and other scholars report that Uyghurs feel the system is unfair.
So far, preferential policies have not helped integrate the Uyghurs into the PRC.
This is not to say that the policies have been useless. On the contrary, they appear to have had some positive effects. We can see this through a dramatic increase in literacy rates, school enrollment, and the number of schools in Xinjiang. However, preferential policies have failed to overcome certain realities. Firstly, all the free education in the world will not satisfy the Uyghurs if there are no good jobs available after they graduate. If Han migration continues and ‘outsiders’ take all of the good jobs, preferential policies will do nothing, and resentment will continue to simmer.
Secondly, preferential policies will not help if Uyghurs continue to feel that Han students receive better treatment. If Han students have English class and Uyghur students do not, how will Uyghurs believe that preferential policies are sincere?
153 Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 140
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Thirdly, preferential policies do not solve other problems discussed in this chapter, such as religious discrimination and racist attitudes of some Han teachers.
If conscientiously applied, these policies could help in the future. As we have already seen, the largest complaint among Uyghur students is not religion or language, but a lack of good jobs. Right now, the PRC claims that it streamlines minority students into technical positions that are waiting for them upon graduation. While this may be true, complaints from Uyghurs tell us that not enough is being done.
However, the ray of light for the PRC is that if it can find jobs for the Uyghurs, it will go a long way towards making them content citizens of China.
The PRC government cannot simply throw money at this problem and then publish white papers that only focus on achievements and ignore shortcomings. By publishing pie-in-the-sky reports with flowery language, the PRC is only proving that it is unwilling to be fair and objective. Preferential policies must be part of a larger plan that deals with issues of Han migration, cultural respect, and economic equality.
The author thinks that the following steps will go a long way toward making preferential policies more effective.
• The PRC must provide trained, skilled teachers for minority schools. If Han teachers are reluctant to live in the ‘countryside,’ the PRC can solve that problem by training more Uyghur teachers.
• The PRC must ensure that minority schools have the same resources that
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Han schools have.
• The PRC must find a way to respect Islam in minority schools. If Uyghur students and parents feel that they face religious discrimination, preferential policies will not make them happy.
If these goals are accomplished, preferential policies could perhaps work. They could help the Uyghurs by giving them more economic opportunity. They could also help the PRC government achieve its ultimate goal of integrating the Uyghurs into the motherland. The PRC must make preferential policies a small part of an overall plan that attacks the systemic social problems in Xinjiang. If it does not, then preferential policies will continue to be token and empty gestures, meant to pacify the Uyghurs rather than improve their lives.
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Chapter 4. Language Education
This chapter will explore the PRC’s language education policies, and the effects that these policies are having on the Uyghurs. What strategies is the PRC using to spread Mandarin among its Uyghurs? What language options do Uyghur students and their parents have? Are the PRC’s official statements of respecting language genuine? Are there any differences between theory (the PRC’s pledges of respecting language) and practice (what actually goes on in the classroom)? What are the PRC’s ultimate goals? How do Uyghurs view current education trends?
Are the PRC’s language policies integrating the Uyghurs and making them viable citizens of China proper, or are they alienating them?
Language education is vitally important to any government’s attempts to integrate its minorities into mainstream society. Arienne M. Dwyer states that
Though language policy rarely makes headlines, it is a central tool in national consolidation, and permeates all aspects of society…It shapes the media, education system, and provides a rallying point for or against ethnic identity.154
Language is strongly linked to ethnic and national identity. It is a sensitive issue for several reasons. People often value their native language as a link to their culture. Taiwan is a good example. Since 1949 the ruling Kuomintang Party (KMT) placed a strong emphasis on teaching Mandarin to the local population
154 Arienne M. Dwyer, 2005. p. 6
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(benshen ren). This was vital to the KMT’s strategy of “sinicizing” Taiwan.
Although the details differ, the same thing is happening in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Mongolia.
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the central government’s language policy in minority education has gone through several phases. Policies towards the Uyghurs have always reflected political realities. Internal issues, particularly domestic unrest, have influenced the PRC’s attitudes. International relations, particularly with the USSR in the 20th century, have also shaped PRC policy a great deal.155
In 1949, the PRC adopted a relatively open and tolerant approach towards minority languages. Arienne M. Dwyer states that “Shortly after the inception of the People’s Republic of China, language policies in China’s border regions was responsive to local conditions and arguably one of the more flexible in the world.”
Even with the demise of the Soviet Union, the author believes that the trend of linguistic policy reflecting political realities continues today.
156
155 James A. Millward, 2007. p. 235
This openness, however, did not last long. The Great Leap Forward brought about a radicalization that ended linguistic plurality. The Cultural Revolution produced even greater intolerance of minority customs and language, which were attacked by the red guards as feudal. A monolingual approach was stressed that lasted until the
156 Arienne M. Dwyer, 2005. p. ix
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end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976. The lack of a stable policy that respects minority languages has led to Uyghur distrust of the PRC’s current intentions.
The PRC’s treatment of written Uyghur script has been no less chaotic. James Millward tells us that from 1949 to 1984, the PRC changed the Uyghur writing system three times (see literature review). Consistent with the rest of the PRC’s language policies, the writing system seems to have changed with the political times.
For example, when Sino-Soviet relationships were warm, the PRC used a Uyghur writing system similar to the Turkic system used in the USSR. After relations soured, the PRC shifted to its own, distinct system. 157 Here again we see an example of the PRC’s language policies creating distrust among the Uyghurs. Some scholars report that many Uyghurs believe these inconsistencies were introduced to create a rift between Uyghur generations.158
According to the law of the PRC, all minority languages are taught and respected.
A PRC white paper states this in lengthy but clear terms:
The author can think of no way to verify this suspicion. It does, however, demonstrate the severe mistrust against which the PRC is struggling.
[PRC laws]…enshrine in legal form the freedom and right of ethnic minorities to use and develop their own spoken and written languages.
Whether in the fields of judicature, administration, education, etc., or in political and social life, the spoken and written languages of ethnic
157 James A. Millward, 2007, pp. 234-236
158 Dru Gladney, 1994. p. 197
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minorities are broadly used.159
This statement is consistent with others issued by the PRC. The running theme is encouragement of ethnic cultural expression, as long as it does not stir up the wrong kind of nationalism. Fei Xiaotong calls this “…ethnic pluralism within the organic configuration of the Chinese nation.”160
Currently, most Uyghurs seem willing to admit that Mandarin is a must for finding work. A PRC survey done in Xinjiang supports this. The survey asked three questions of University students: 1. Is it easier to get a job if you can speak Mandarin?; 2. If you are fluent in both languages, is it easier to get promoted?; 3. If you are fluent in both languages, can you make more money? The essay states that Certainly the PRC wishes to be seen as respecting ethnic nationalities, but the central government has shown itself anxious to control all cultural expression. The PRC no doubt prefers the kind of ethnic expression described by Dru Gladney. This is harmless cultural expression, done under the umbrella of the PRC. It is the author’s impression that the government walks the same fine line with language. PRC policymakers must know that if they force Mandarin on the Uyghurs too much, they will receive resentment and resistance.
The author thinks that they would like to push Mandarin on the Uyghurs, but do it in a way so as not to seem like bullies.
159 http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/8.htm, accessed April 18th, 2011
160 Zhao Zhenzhou, (China’s ethnic dilemma, Chinese Education and Society, 2010) p. 3
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respondents answered ‘yes’ to all of these questions.161
As to be expected, there is a large chorus of voices criticizing the PRC’s policy.
Critics charge that the PRC’s bilingual policy is a myth, meant to disguise the real agenda of cultural genocide. Uyghur Human Rights Project makes the following accusations. “Employing the term “bilingual” education, the PRC is, in reality, implementing a monolingual Chinese language education system that undermines the linguistic basis of Uyghur culture.”
Uyghurs are clearly aware of the need to learn Mandarin.
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• Removing Uyghur students from their cultural environment
The same report goes on to accuse the PRC of:
• Eliminating Uyghur as the language of instruction in Xinjiang
• Not giving Uyghur parents the right to choose what language their children
study
• Increasing tension between Uyghurs and Han Chinese
While the author cannot say that the PRC is intentionally committing cultural genocide, there are certainly some troubling problems with the language education system in Xinjiang. As we have seen with preferential policies, there is a difference
161 祁佛, 新疆和田地區雙語教育實踐成果綜述(Education & Teaching Research, 2008) pp. 115-116
162 Uyghur Human Rights Project, p. 1
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between theory and practice. In theory, minority language rights are guaranteed by PRC law. In practice, the truth appears to be quite different. Greater realities outside the classroom harm efforts to implement bilingual education. These include financial issues, racism, Han chauvinism, and Han migration into Xinjiang. As the author will attempt to prove, bilingual education is not making the Uyghurs content citizens of the PRC. Instead, pressure to learn Chinese appears to be alienating many Uyghurs, making them more hostile to the central government.
In theory, Uyghur parents have two options. They can either send their children to minority schools (min kao min) or Chinese schools (min kao Han). In minority schools, the minority language is the medium of instruction. Chinese is taught as a second language, starting in the third year of primary school. Students must take a Chinese proficiency test every two years. They may take college entrance exams in their own language.163
The other option for Uyghur students are Chinese schools (min kao Han). These All of the students in min kao min schools are minorities.
The benefits of minority schools are that students can learn in their native language, and thus avoid extra pressures that would come with learning in a difficult second language. Furthermore, in minority schools, students remain closer to their native culture and identity.
163 Timothy Grose, 2008. pp. 122-123
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resemble more traditional Han schools. In min kao Han schools, Mandarin is the medium of instruction. Teachers are usually minorities, but they are not allowed to use their native language in the classroom.164
This brings us to a very sad and troubling option for Uyghur parents. They are being forced to choose between their cultural identity and their economic futures.
Linda Tsung reports that Uyghur parents who send their children to Chinese schools do so out of economic concerns, while those who send their children to minority schools do so out of cultural pride.
Min kao Han schools have both minority and Han students. The advantage of Chinese schools is economic.
Students learn Mandarin and thus have better chances of finding jobs after graduation.
165 Uyghurs who studied in minority schools
complained that their Mandarin was not good enough to help them find jobs.
Timothy Grose, who interviewed Uyghurs in Xinjiang on this subject, quoted several young Uyghurs as saying that without Chinese ability, their chances of finding a job were very low.166
164 Timothy Grose, 2008. pp. 122-123
The choice for Uyghur parents, then, seems to be obvious: send children to Chinese schools, so they have superior Mandarin and hence better job prospects. However, it is not that simple. Many Uyghur parents feel that by sending their children to min kao Han schools, they are alienating their children from
165 Linda Tsung, 2009. pp. 141-143
166 Timothy Grose, 2008. p. 128
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their own cultures. Justin Rudelsen and William Jankowiak state that “The decision of whether to send Uyghur children to Mandarin language or Uyghur language schools is the most difficult and painful facet of Uyghur acculturation in Xinjiang.”167
A survey in the PRC, conducted by a PRC scholar, reveals some interesting links between language and self identification. The goal of the survey was to discover if Uyghurs identified more with their Uyghur ethnicity or their Chinese nationality.
The study finds that the more Uyghurs can speak Chinese, the more they identify with the PRC. Conversely, those who do not speak Chinese well feel a weaker connection to China.
There can be little surprise, therefore, that Uyghurs feel their culture is under attack.
Likewise, there can be little surprise that Uyghurs resent their current situation. If Uyghurs feel that in order to find good jobs they must sacrifice their cultural identity, anger and unrest are inevitable results.
168
The trend now appears to be that more and more Uyghur parents are choosing min kao Han schools for their children. David Strawbridge states “There are now
The author recommends that the central government push Chinese on the Uyghurs more, and start Chinese language education at a young age for the students.
167 Justin Rudelsen and William Jankowiak, 2004. p. 313
168 常宝宁, 新疆南疆地區青少年國家認同影響因素實証研究 (2010)
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declining numbers of children attending ethnic schools…”169 This creates problems within Uyghur communities. If a Uyghur family sends their child to a min kao Han school, what will their peers think? The author’s impression is that they will be perceived as abandoning their culture. This can create divisions with Uyghur communities, and erode Uyghur solidarity at a time when it is sorely needed. Linda Tsung reports that Uyghur academics who studied in minority schools feel that those who studied in Chinese schools look down on them.170 Conversely, she reports that academics who studied in min kao Han schools complained that they faced resentment from colleagues who had studied in minority schools.171
As we have already seen, there are benefits to both Chinese and minority schools.
Uyghur students in Chinese schools learn Mandarin. Those in minority schools Consequently, there appears to be a growing divide between Uyghurs who have learned Mandarin and those who have not. Some Uyghurs who have learned Mandarin scorn those who have not, and look down on them. Those who remain close to their culture can become angry at their colleagues who have assimilated. Of course, the previous statement is a vast oversimplification. Feelings are far more complex and varied than that. Nevertheless, the author does think it illustrates the growing divide among Uyghurs, and the resentment created by that divide.
169 David Strawbridge, p. 3
170 Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 145
171 Linda Tsung, 2009. pp. 149-152
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retain their cultural identity. However, children in either school face difficulties in the classroom. Linda Tsung reports that Uyghur students in Chinese classes face difficulties because they are studying in a second language.172
Since they [Uyghur students in min kao Han schools] lacked Chinese when they entered school as children, they faced serious difficulties in learning and were often scared. They were under constant pressure of having to work harder simply to avoid falling behind Chinese classmates with whom they were expected to compete. Some even said that with those experiences, they “lost their childhood.”
She reports that Uyghur academics who studied in Chinese schools felt uncomfortable in class because they constantly had to catch up with their Han classmates:
173
Certainly, Uyghur students who study with mostly Han classmates in an all-Mandarin environment are bound to deal with feelings of inferiority. When the author taught English as a second language in Taiwan, he noticed that children who struggled with English were often self-conscious of their problems. A Uyghur student in a Chinese school would not only deal with problems of language, but would also be a racial minority. It is no surprise, then, that some of Linda Tsung’s interviewees reported being picked on by their Han classmates. Therefore, sending Uyghur students to Chinese schools does not seem to be a means of effective integration. Instead, it seems to alienate Uyghur students by making them feel inferior to their Han counterparts. Furthermore, placing Uyghur students in Han
172 Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 140
173 Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 144
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schools could give the Hans negative views of the Uyghurs. Impressionable Han children see Uyghur students struggling in class. At a young age, they would not understand the unfair challenges that Uyghur students face. They would only see that many or all of the Uyghur students struggle. This could help to enforce racist attitudes.
There is also the practical problem of communication. A PRC essay, written in Chinese by two Uyghur academics, states that few Han teachers can speak Uyghur, and few Uyghur students can understand their teachers well.174 Another PRC survey, conducted in a middle school in He Tian (和田) found that 96.3 % of the teachers spoke Uyghur as their first language. Teachers who mastered the four basic skills in Mandarin – reading, speaking, writing and listening – numbered 27.3%.
Twenty-two percent could speak and read Mandarin, but could not write it well.
Twenty-two percent could speak and read Mandarin, but could not write it well.