中國大陸的維吾爾教育與整合政策--一個批判性的分析 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. y. China’s Uyghur Strategy of Education and Integration: A. n. er. io. al. sit. Critical Analysis. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Student: Vincent Stoia (石民生) Advisor: Dr. Chang Jiunn Yih 張駿逸. 中華民國 100 年 06 月 June, 2011 1.

(2) China’s Uyghur Strategy of Education and Integration: A Critical Analysis. 研究生：Vincent Stoia (石民生) 指導教授：Dr. Chang Jiunn Yih 張駿逸. 治. 立. 政國立政治大學. 大. ‧ 國. 學. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程碩士論文. ‧. n. A Thesis. Ch. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. i Un. v. Submitted to International e Master’s in China Studies i n g c hProgram National Chengchi University In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For Master’s Degree in China Studies. 中華民國 100 年 06 月 June, 2011 2.

(3) China’s Uyghur Strategy: Education and Integration. A Master’s Thesis. National Chengchi University. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. n. v CIn hPartial FulfillmentU n i e n gfor c hthei Degree of of the Requirements Master of Art. by Vincent Stoia June 3, 2011. 3.

(4) Acknowledgements The author is deeply indebted to Dr. Chang Jiunn Yih for taking me on as his student and guiding me through the daunting process of writing a thesis. Even when he was very busy, Dr. Chang was always receptive and helpful. difficult subject was an invaluable resource to me.. His expertise on this. The author is also grateful to. Professors Chou Hui Min and Chang Lan Hung for taking the time to read my thesis and provide valuable insights.. 立. 政Thanks治also to大the. other professors and. ‧ 國. 學. administrators at NCCU, all of whom helped me through the challenging and very enjoyable experience of obtaining a master’s degree.. ‧. The author is also eternally thankful to the Georg Eckert Institute in Brunswick,. sit. y. Nat. After spending months hunting for history textbooks from the PRC and. io. n. al. er. Germany.. i Un. v. coming up empty, I contacted the Institute. Although they didn’t know me at all,. Ch. engchi. they sent me texts that proved priceless.. They did so free of charge, spending a great. deal of time finding the correct materials and then sending them to me.. 4.

(5) Abstract About eight million Uyghurs live in the People’s Republic of China.. Many. Uyghurs are hostile to Chinese rule. Xinjiang, the province in which most Uyghurs live, has long been a spot of violence and controversy.. The Chinese government has. employed a variety of means to pacify the Uyghurs and integrate them into mainstream society. It has used violence, propaganda, economic incentives, and. 政治大. education. This thesis will examine the use of education in that strategy.. 立. Chinese policymakers hope that education will raise Uyghur standards of living,. ‧ 國. 學. support China’s preferred historical interpretations, and make Mandarin the common. ‧. language in Xinjiang. This thesis examines three parts of China’s education strategy:. y. Nat. er. io. sit. preferential policies (傾斜政策), language education, and history education. This is done through examining Chinese White Papers, textbooks used in Chinese classrooms,. n. al. i n C U h edone publications by analysts, and studies hi n gbycacademics.. v. The goal was to discover. how much success China has had in using education to integrate the Uyghurs. This thesis has found that while progress has been made, the PRC has not achieved its goal of using education to integrate the Uyghurs into mainstream society. In fact, its attempts have often had the opposite affect, alienating and angering many Uyghurs.. 5.

(6) TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction………………………………………………………………..8 1.1 Xinjiang……………………………………………………………...8 1.2 The Uyghurs…………………………………………………………9 1.3 The History of China and Xinjiang………………………………….10 1.4 The Importance of Xinjiang.………………………………………..13 1.5 Education in Xinjiang....……………………………………………17 1.6 Limitations………………………………………………………….18 1.7 Motivation………………….……………………………………….18 2 Literature Review…………………………………………………………22 2.1 Xinjiang and China…..…..…………………………………………22 2.2 China and Its Ethnic Minority Groups……………………………...23 2.3 China and Ethnic Separatism……………………………………….29 2.4 Ethnic Minorities and Education...…………………………………30 2.5 Preferential Policies………………………………………………....32 2.6 Language Education………………………………………………...36 2.7 History Education…………………………………………………..44 3 Preferential Policies for Uyghurs ………….…………………………….48 3.1 Conclusion………………………………………………………….66 4. Language Education……………………………………………………..70 4.1 Conclusion………………………………………………………….85 5 History Education………………………………………………………..92 5.1 Textbooks…………………………………………………………..98 5.2 Textbook #1………………………………………………………...99 5.3 Textbook #2……………………………………………………...…101 5.4 Textbook #3………………………………………………………...103 5.5 Textbook #4………………………………………………………...106 5.6 Observations on the Textbooks…………………………………….107 5.7 Recommendations………………………………………………….111 6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………….114 7 Bibliography……………………………………………………………..122. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 6. i Un. v.

(7) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 7. i Un. v.

(8) Chapter 1. Introduction The purpose of this paper is to explore the various ways in which the People’s Republic of China (hereafter: PRC) uses education to assimilate Uyghurs into Chinese society.. The author has identified three important elements of the PRC’s strategy to. assimilate the Uyghurs: affirmative action (eg: preferential policies for the Uyghurs), language education, and the historical/political content of education in the PRC. The. 政治大. author will explore each of these issues, and try to understand the impact that they are. 立. having on the Uyghurs, particularly those living in Xinjiang. The author will assess. ‧ 國. 學. whether or not the PRC is succeeding in its goal to use education as a means of. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 1.1 Xinjiang. ‧. turning the Uyghurs into loyal Chinese subjects.. Xinjiang, also known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is in the northwest. al. n. iv n C h e n g region It is the largest administrative c h i inUChina, spanning more than 1.6. of the PRC.. million square kilometers. 1. Despite its size, however, Xinjiang is sparsely populated.. Its indigenous Turkic and Muslim people number about eight million, accounting for less than one percent of China’s population. 2 isolated places.. It is also one of the world’s most. Certainly, it is quite far from Beijing, the PRC capital. One author. 1. China Global Times, Brief Introduction http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/truexinjiang/basic-facts/2009-07/445481.html accessed May 29th 2011 2 Stanley W. Toops, The Demography of Xinjiang, in Xinjiang, China’s Muslim Borderland (M.E. Sharpe, 2004) p. 17 8.

(9) points out that Xinjiang’s “…western and southern borders are closer to Baghdad or New Deli than to Beijing.” 3. As we will see, this distance from China proper has had. a major influence on Xinjiang’s development. 1.2 The Uyghurs The largest ethnic group in Xinjiang is known at the Uyghurs.. Historians generally. categorize the Uyghurs as being descended from “…the formerly nomadic, later. 政治大. settled, oasis-dwelling people who spoke a Turkish dialect.” 4. 立. However, it is difficult. to place all of the Turkic Muslims living in Xinjiang into the broad classification of. ‧ 國. 學. ‘Uyghur.’ Dru Gladney points out that people now known as ‘Uyghurs’ are in fact a. ‧. Nat. io. misnomer.. The term ‘Uyghur’ is itself something of a. sit. family lineage than to their ethnicity. 5. y. Many so-called Uyghurs feel a stronger connection to their oasis and. It fell into disuse around the 16th century.. al. er. divided group.. It was revived in 1921, when. n. iv n C h eleaders it was chosen by a delegation of local i U in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. n g cat ha conference The term, which means ‘unity,’ was applied to the diverse oasis dwelling peoples of Xinjiang. 6. It has since become the common nomenclature used by the PRC, as well. as a rallying point for nationalists seeking a common identity. The origin of the Uyghur people is an endlessly controversial subject, because. 3. S. Fredrick Starr, Introduction, Xinjiang, China’s Muslim Borderland (M.E. Sharpe, 2004) p. 3 Dru Gladney, Dislocating China (C. Hurst & Co., 2004) p. 208 5 Justin Rudelsen and William Jankowiak, Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang in Flux, Xinjiang, China’s Muslim Borderland (M.E. Sharpe, 2004) p. 303 6 Justin Rudelsen and William Jankowiak, 2004. pp. 302-303 4. 9.

(10) this question relates to the legitimacy of both PRC and separatist claims to Xinjiang. Scholars, however, do tend to agree on some things. northwestern Mongolia. 7 originally Muslims.. The Uyghurs originated in. Contrary to popular belief, the Uyghurs were not. The first Uyghurs were Buddhists.. converting to Islam until the 12th century. 8. They did not begin. The process lasted until the 17th century. 9. The belief that Uyghurs have always been Muslim is one of many misconceptions about them.. 立. 政治大. 1.3 The History of China and Xinjiang. ‧ 國. 學. China has had a strong interest in Xinjiang for a very long time.. Around the year. ‧. 139 BCE, the Han Empire was clashing with the Xiongu, a “…confederation of. y. Nat. The battlefront between the Han and the Xiongu was. n. al. primarily southern Xinjiang.. er. io. China, and Zhungaria.” 10. sit. Altaic-speaking tribes, [that] formed an empire encompassing Mongolia, northwest. iv n C h ethis During n gperiod, c h itheUHan had a military presence in. Xinjiang, but did not control it completely. 11. After the Han Chinese divided the. Xiongu, 12 another confederation of nomads, called the Ruanraun, established an empire and ceded control of Xinjiang to an Iranian nomad empire called the. 7. James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, Political and Cultural History Through the Late 19th Century , in Xinjiang, China’s Muslim Borderland (M.E. Sharpe, 2004) 8 James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, 2004. p. 40 9 James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, 2004. p. 40 10 James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, 2004. p. 35 11 Justin Rudelsen and William Jankowiak, Xinjiang, China’s Muslim Borderland (M.E. Sharpe, 2004) p. 36 12 James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, 2004. pp. 35-36 10.

(11) Hephthalites. 13. After the Hepthalites fell in 560 AD, a primarily Turkic empire from. Mongolia became the power of the day in Xinjiang.. There were other interested. parties as well, all trying to wield influence over the region: “…powers based in Tibet and in the west, from Arabia to western Turkistan, entered into a new geopolitical struggle that would eventually engulf the oases of southern Xinjiang.” 14 major influence of the Han Chinese in Xinjiang came in 60 BC. 15. The first. After dealing a. 政治大. strong blow against the Xiongnu, the Han established military farms in the area,. 立. giving itself a strong presence there.. However, strife in China proper often diverted. ‧ 國. 學. Han attention from the ‘western regions.’ While it is true that the China established. ‧. a presence in 60 AD, the following three centuries were more of a battle for control. y. Nat. er. io. sit. than a time of Chinese dominance.. Later, the Tang Dynasty attempted to wield influence in the Xinjiang region.. al. n. iv n C h eChinese The Tang were different from previous n g c hin ithatUthose living in the west became more “Turkicized.” 16. Texts describe Chinese leaders from this time as enjoying. Turkic music and food, and wearing Turkic clothing. 17. Through shrewd political. maneuvering, the Tang wielded a great deal of indirect influence over Xinjiang.. 13 14 15. James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, 2004. p. 37 James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, 2004. p. 37 James A Millward Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (Columbia University Press, 2007) p.. 22 16 17. James A. Millward, 2007. p. 33 James A. Millward, 2007. p. 32 11.

(12) However, after a Tang military defeat at the Battle of Talas, (751 AD) 18 and peasant rebellions in China proper, 19 the Tang Dynasty withdrew from Xinjiang. China was not to have a presence in Xinjiang for the next thousand years. 20. In the fifteenth. century, missions from Xinjiang presented tribute to Beijing in return for supplies and trade opportunities.. James Millward says that “…these exchanges of goods…fall. within the ‘tribute system’ model familiar to students of Chinese history.” 21 He goes. 政治大. on to tell us that although some previous and modern Chinese scholars cite this as. 立. evidence of Xinjiang’s submission to Chinese rule, the relationship was more complex.. ‧ 國. 學. In fact, he says, it was more an exchange between equals. The Chinese concept of a. ‧. io. sit. While China did have a strong influence over Xinjiang. er. Nat. over territorial claims.. y. tribute system is unfamiliar to most westerners, and has thus led to disagreements. during this period, Chinese claims of complete sovereignty are an exaggeration.. al. n. iv n C U empire in 1884.22 h eXinjiang The Qing Dynasty incorporated n g c hintoi the. Because. the Qing Dynasty fell less than 30 years later, this constitutes a very brief, shaky period of control. In the 1930s and again in the 1940s, Uyghur nationalists took advantage of political instability and established the East Turkestan Republic.. 18. The. Dru Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Harvard University Press, 2004) 19 James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, 2004. p. 39 20 James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, 2004. p. 39 21 James A. Millward, 2007. pp. 72-73 22 The China Institute, From Silk to Oil. p. 18 http://www.chinainstitute.cieducationportal.org/cimain/wp-content/themes/chinainstitute/pdfs/educatio n/fromsilktooil_pdf2.pdf accessed March 21st, 2011 12.

(13) first republic was brought down by the Kuomintang, the second by the CCP.. This. long, tenuous history can easily be manipulated by both Uyghur and Chinese nationalists. People on both sides of the conflict selectively use history to support their cause for Xinjiang independence or PRC dominance. The purpose of this historical narrative is to emphasize two points.. First, PRC. claims that Xinjiang has been an integral part of China for thousands of years are a. 政治大. gross oversimplification.. Second, Xinjiang has held high strategic value for a very. long time.. 立. It is therefore no surprise that it has also been a place of frequent strife. ‧ 國. 學. and conflict, up to the present day.. ‧. 1.4 The Importance of Xinjiang. y. Nat. er. io. sit. The PRC’s official Xinjiang website has the following quote on its home page: “Since the Western Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 24 A.D.), it [Xinjiang] has been an inseparable. al. n. iv n C 23 h e nnation.” part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese China’s texts and statements on gchi U. Xinjiang are laced with such bold, uncompromising statements. place such high importance on Xinjiang?. Why does China. Why does the PRC reject all arguments. that deviate from its official line? Firstly, Xinjiang is inhabited by the Uyghurs, a people ethnically and culturally different from the Han Chinese of China proper. 23. Fifty-five officially recognized. The Government of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, History and Development of Xinjiang http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/10018/10008/00015/2005/22699.htm accessed February 22nd, 2011 13.

(14) ethnic minority groups live within the PRC’s borders. 24. China has always proven. anxious to control its minority peoples, some of whom are hostile to Chinese rule. The PRC clearly fears a domino effect; if Xinjiang splits, what will happen to Tibet, Mongolia, and Taiwan? Secondly, Xinjiang is in a strategically sensitive spot.. At no point was this. more evident than during the Sino-Soviet Split of the 1960s and 1970s.. Xinjiang. 政治大. borders Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan,. 立. The Uyghurs are culturally closer to Russia, as well as to the. 學. ‧ 國. India, and Tibet. 25. newly independent states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, than they are to. ‧. China.. China learned this lesson the hard way during the Great Leap Forward. y. Nat. Faced with famine and reorganization into communes, much. io. sit. debacle of 1958-1961.. er. of Xinjiang’s ethnic population fled across the border into Russia. 26. al. The PRC. n. iv n C U disloyal, and they are likely clearly views the non-Han peoplesh ofeXinjiang h imostly n g c as correct.. 24. Colin Mackerras, China’s Minority Cultures: Education and Integration Since 1912 (Longman, 1995) p. 3 25 S. Frederick Starr, Xinjiang, China’s Muslim Borderland (M.E. Sharpe, 2004) p. XV 26 James A. Millward and Nabijan Tursun, Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884-1978 in Xinjiang, China’s Muslim Borderland (M.E. Sharpe, 2004) p. 94 14.

(15) Located near the newly formed states of the former USSR, Xinjiang is in a strategically sensitive location.. 立. 政治大. al. er. io. sit. So far, 122 minerals have been discovered there, including an. estimated 730 million tons of iron ore.. It is home to more than 30% of the nation’s. iv n C Its petroleum andhnatural i U are estimated at around 30 e n ggas c hreserves n. coal reserves.. It has grazing land, and land. y. Nat. suitable for forestry.. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Thirdly, Xinjiang is abundant in natural resources.. billion tons. 27 With China’s increasing need for energy, Xinjiang’s importance becomes clear. Xinjiang is important to the PRC for another reason: nationalism. consensus is that Chinese nationalism is on the rise.. The general. Directly tied to this nationalism. is a quasi-religious drive to regain territory lost during the so-called century of. 27. China Through a Lens, http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/139230.htm accessed February 22nd, 2011 15.

(16) humiliation. 28. With the decline of Chinese socialism, the PRC needs a new. philosophy to maintain its legitimacy. 29. Many scholars maintain that it has turned to. two things: improving the standard of living, and appealing to popular nationalism. Simply put, territory is a hugely important issue to many Chinese people.. If the. Chinese public perceived the CCP as going soft on Xinjiang, Tibet or Taiwan, what would the consequences be?. No Chinese leader wants to be remembered as the one. 政治大. who allowed a piece of national territory to break away; it would be devastating to. 立. any leader’s legacy. These reasons constitute just a small overview of why the PRC. ‧ 國. 學. views Xinjiang with great apprehension, and considers it vastly important.. ‧. Nat. er. io. the same fate.. The PRC is determined to avoid. sit. apprehension – the collapse of the Soviet Union.. y. Furthermore, PRC policy makers watched with great interest – and. According to Ann Maxwell Harris and Minglang Zhou, the PRC was. al. n. iv n C 30 shocked “…by the role that ethnichrelations e n g played c h i inUthe Soviet downfall.”. They. go on to say that the PRC government drew a crucial lesson from the collapse of the USSR: in order to ensure its survival, the PRC had to fully incorporate all of its 55 minority groups into mainstream society. 31. It is the author’s opinion that education. plays a key role in the PRC’s integration strategy. 28. Dingxin, Zhao, Nationalism and Authoritarianism: Student Government Conflicts During the 1999 Beijing Student Protests in Asian Perspective. (Volume 27, no. 1., 2003) p. 6 29 Dingxin Zhao, 2003. p. 6 30 Ann Maxwell Hill and Minglang Zhou Affirmative Action in China and the US (Palgrave Macmillen, 2009) p. 8 31 Ann Maxwell Hill and Minglang Zhou, 2009. p. 10 16.

(17) 1.5 Education in Xinjiang In any nation, education is essential to assimilating minority groups into mainstream society.. Education can raise the minority standard of living.. It can give. opportunity to younger generations who may be more prone to causing civil unrest. Education can teach the majority’s language to minorities, thus integrating them further.. Perhaps most importantly, education can present the central government’s. 政治大. version of history and politics to the minorities.. 立. national integration project.” 32. 學. ‧ 國. Dru Gladney states that “Education plays a privileged role in executing China’s Since the 1990s, the PRC has dramatically increased. ‧. Nat. According to a report by the United. io. sit. schools, and about 1,300 primary schools. 33. y. its education budget in Xinjiang. In 1949, Xinjiang had one college, nine secondary. er. Nations, by 2000 the region had 20 colleges and 2,000 secondary schools. 34. al. n. iv n C U 18.77 that in h 2008 e nalone, g c hiti invested. PRC government claims. Xinjiang’s education system. 35. The. billion yuan into. If we accept the argument that the PRC is using. education to integrate Uyghurs, then its astronomical education budget indicates how seriously it is taking this project.. 32. Dru Gladney, 2004. p. 261 China Global Times, Xinjiang Undergoes Unprecedented Changes in Education http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/truexinjiang/basic-facts/2009-09/470284.html accessed January 21st, 2011 34 http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/database/chinadata/xinjiang.html accessed March 21st, 2011 35 White Paper on Development and Progress in Xinjiang. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ethnic/2009-09/21/content_8717461_5.htm, accessed March 21st, 2011 33. 17.

(18) 1.6 Limitations This paper often uses the terms “Han Chinese” and “Uyghurs.” These are of course very diverse groups, with Uyghurs numbering over eight million, and Han Chinese more than one billion.. Within these two groups are subgroups that differ vastly in. opinion, culture, religion, and so on. This is particularly true of the Han Chinese. The author acknowledges that the term “Han Chinese” is something of a. 政治大. generalization that disregards the vast diversity of that group.. 立. While such a. generalization is a shortcoming of this paper, the author hopes to accurately document. ‧ 國. 學. the overall effects that China’s education program is having on both groups.. ‧. Another limitation to this study is the lack of fieldwork. This study is dependent. y. Nat. While. er. io. sit. on documentary analysis, rather than on interviews done in the field.. interviews done in the field would have been a strong contribution to this study,. al. n. iv n C distance and financial constraints h made e nthis h i U The author acknowledges g cimpossible. the lack of fieldwork as a shortcoming to this thesis. 1.7 Motivation. It is the author’s opinion that in the 21st century, Xinjiang and the Uyghurs will play a crucial role on the world stage.. As we have already seen, the PRC government is. deathly serious about strengthening its hold on Xinjiang and controlling the Uyghurs. China is emerging as a world power.. A major question mark will be its ability to. 18.

(19) consolidate its territory. Because of Xinjiang’s location, it is also greatly important to Russia, a potentially reemerging superpower. Because the Uyghurs are Muslims, and because they concern the PRC, they are also of great interest to the United States. This, of course, is particularly true after the attacks of September 11, 2001. they like it or not, the Uyghurs are becoming key world players.. Whether. The author thinks. that Tibet is a very serious issue that merits scholarly attention and international concern.. 立. Xinjiang, however, never seems to be discussed by Americans.. The same. 學. ‧ 國. West.. 政治大. The author also feels that Tibet receives a great deal of sympathy from the. Americans who put ‘Free Tibet’ bumper stickers on their cars never say a thing about. ‧. Xinjiang or the Uyghurs.. Nat. sit er. io. It is the author’s impression that the PRC government views them. al. n. for the Uyghurs.. y. This lack of attention is troubling, because that the 21st century will be difficult. with suspicion and mistrust.. iv n C U face possible extinction. h elanguage Their n g c handi identity. Xinjiang’s location makes it an ideal smuggling point for heroin and other narcotics. The world’s two largest sources of heroin are the golden crescent countries of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, and the golden triangle countries: Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand.. When drugs produced in these areas are shipped to Europe,. they go through Xinjiang. 36. Uyghurs have suffered a great deal from this.. 36. Mostly. Kuo Ray Mao and Kay Kei-ho Pih. The New Silk Road: Central Asia’s New Narcotics Trade Route and the Radicalization of Marginalized Minorities in China. (Standing Group Organised Crime, 2006) 19.

(20) as a result of spiraling heroin use among poor Uyghurs, more than 60,000 people in Xinjiang have HIV/AIDS. 37. More than 85% of people with HIV/AIDSin Xinjiang. are Uyghurs. 38 The danger to Uyghur society is every bit as serious as that which faces the Tibetans and the Mongolians. Because of this, the author feels that studying the Uyghur predicament is both right and crucial.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 37 38. Ch. engchi. Kuo Ray Mao and Kay Kei-ho Pih., 2006. Kuo Ray Mao and Kay Kei-ho Pih., 2006. 20. i Un. v.


(22) Chapter 2.. Literature Review. The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of scholarly opinions relevant to this thesis. First, the author will look at some important issues concerning Xinjiang. Then, it is essential to consider the PRC’s relations with its various ethnic minority groups, not only the Uyghurs.. Next, the issue of ethnic separatism will be examined.. Finally, the author will touch upon the three elements of education to be discussed in. 政治大. this paper: preferential policies, language education, and history content in education.. 立. 2.1 Xinjiang and China. ‧ 國. 學. In his book on Xinjiang, Eurasian Crossroads, James A. Millward stresses the He uses the word ‘betweenness’ to describe. y. Nat. Located in the crux of three major regions (East Asia,. er. io. sit. Xinjiang’s crucial location. 39. ‧. importance of Xinjiang’s geography.. South Asia, and Russia), Xinjiang is, according to Millward, a crossroads.. al. n. iv n C argues that Xinjiang’s location hashhelped e n gshape c h iits Uhistory. China and Russia.. He also. It is a buffer between. It serves as a trade route between Asia and Europe.. His. arguments about the importance of Xinjiang’s geography are very compelling. As an example of Xinjiang’s ‘betweenness,’ Millward also stresses the influence that nearby cultures have had on Xinjiang. 40. He claims that Xinjiang has absorbed. religious, economic, and cultural traits from China, India, Tibet, and Mongolia. 41 39 40 41. James A. Millward, 2007. p. 1 James A. Millward, 2007. p. 48 James A. Millward, 2007. p. 48 22.

(23) This is perhaps inevitable, considering Xinjiang’s location and the diverse variety of peoples who have occupied it. 2.2 China and its Ethnic Minority Groups In his book, China’s Minority Cultures, Colin Mackerras provides a good overview of non-Han peoples living in China. Fifty-five officially recognized minority groups live in China, but they only comprise about eight percent of the population. 42. It is. 政治大. important to note that these 55 groups do not represent all of the minorities in China.. 立. The current classifications have not changed since the 1970s 43, and the PRC based. ‧ 國. 學. them on Joseph Stalin’s model of ethnic minority classification. 44. Many other ethnic. ‧. groups have applied for official minority status, but the government has only. Nat. The PRC’s. er. io. sit. y. recognized one since laying out its original classification system. 45 reasons for refusing minority status to other groups have never been clear.. al. n. iv n C h e minority Mackerras points out that China’s i U differ from one another quite n g c hgroups. substantially.. He states, “Their [the minorities’] living places range from the very. high and dry planes of Tibet to the tropical regions of Hainan.” 46. He goes on to. point out that minorities differ from one another in ethnicity, language, religion, and culture. 47 42 43 44 45 46 47. Some minorities have assimilated quite thoroughly into mainstream. Colin Mackerras, 1995. p. 3 Colin Mackerras, 1995. p. 3 Dru Gladney, 1998. p. 109 Colin Mackerras, 1995. p. 3 Colin Mackerras, 1995. p. 4 Colin Mackerras, 1995. p. 4 23.

(24) Chinese culture.. The Hui are a good example.. Although they are Muslims and a. recognized minority group, the Hui live in Chinese cities, work with the Han, and have largely accepted being a part of Chinese society. 48 spectrum are the Tibetans and the Uyghurs.. On the opposite end of the. Although this is a general statement, it. is the author’s impression that the majority of ethnic minorities in China are content to be a part of the PRC. Dru Gladney argues that Han 政治大. How do Han Chinese view ethnic minorities?. 立. literature, media, and education tend to depict ethnic minorities as “exotic and erotic”. ‧ 國. 學. others. 49 He also argues that Han Chinese tend to view minorities as being in need of. ‧. education and culture. Gladney claims that the PRC media depicts ethnic minorities. y. Nat. er. io. sit. as colorful and innocent, dancers and singers happily living under their benevolent and more sophisticated Han superiors.. Although this paper is focused on the. al. n. iv n C h ethenauthor influence of education on Uyghurs, i U resist making the following g c hcannot observation: if Dr. Gladney’s argument is valid, then it is fair to say that regardless of how it influences ethnic minorities, the PRC’s education system is effective on mainstream society. Ildiko Beller-Hann’s essay, Temperamental neighbors: Uyghur-Han Relations in. 48 49. Dru Gladney, 1998. p. 110 Dru Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities” in. The Journal of Asian Studies, 1994, p. 93 24.

(25) Xinjiang, Northwest China, examines the interaction between everyday Han and Uyghurs living in Xinjiang.. He visits an oasis town called Urukzar, which has a. large number of both Han and Uyghur residents.. His observations focus on the. perceptions that the two sides have of one another, both positive and negative.. It is. an interesting study on how stereotypes develop, and on how normal people coexist in an environment often fraught with social tension.. 政治大. Shan Wei and Chen Gang wrote an essay titled The Urumqi Riots and China’s. 立This essay was useful in that it discussed and criticized. the government’s approach to Xinjiang.. 學. ‧ 國. Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang.. The opening pages of this article relate the. ‧. seriousness of Xinjiang: the authors point out that after the Urumqi riots in 2009, PRC. Nat. The. er. io. sit. y. president Hu Jintao cut short his visit to Europe and returned to the PRC. 50. essay also points out that the PRC rejected calls for mediation from Turkey, saying. al. n. iv n C that the issue was an internal one. hThis PRC’s desire to keep any and all i U e nreflects g c hthe foreign influence away from Xinjiang.. Although these writers are from Singapore,. their views seemed to support the PRC stance. Even when the writers criticized PRC policy, they appeared to support the ultimate goal of integration.. The article. cited preferential policy as a source of tension, claiming that it bred resentment among the Han Chinese.. The article argues that preferential policies give unfair treatment. 50. Shan Wei and Chen Gang, The Urumqi Riots and China’s Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang (East Asian Policy, July/September, 2009) p. 15 25.

(26) in favor of the Uyghurs.. The writers even go so far as to imply reverse. discrimination against the Han. This view is too simple and broad. The writers also argue very persuasively that the PRC must treat religion with genuine respect. They claim that until the PRC respects Islam, any preferential policies will be ineffective. The author agrees with this point entirely, and will discuss it later in this thesis.. 政治大. Nicolas Becquelin’s essay Staged Development in Xinjiang discusses the next. 立. phase of the PRC’s settlement of Xinjiang.. While his essay does not relate directly. ‧ 國. 學. to the topic of education, it is valuable for its insights into China’s ‘Open Up the West’. ‧. drive.. y. Nat. er. io. In that decade, the PRC made huge strides in migrating Han settlers. al. n. the 1990s. 51. sit. Becquelin argues that China’s current strategy is a continuation of what began in. into Xinjiang, developing. iv n C h e ninfrastructure, Xinjiang’s g c h i U and. exploiting its natural. resources. What we are seeing now, he says, are the PRC’s attempts to consolidate its gains from the 1990s.. This reflects the slow and methodical approach that the. PRC has to its western development strategy. Interestingly, Becquelin notes a shift in the PRC’s rhetoric towards Xinjiang. He says that before the 1990s, the PRC denied that it was deliberately sending Han. 51. Nicolas Becquelin, Staged Development in Xinjiang, in China’s Campaign to “Open Up the West:” National, Provincial and Local Perspectives (The China Quarterly, 2004) p. 44 26.

(27) settlers to Xinjiang in order to colonize it. 52. The PRC previously claimed that any. increased Han population in Xinjiang was due to “seasonal migrants.” 53. Now,. policy makers speak openly of the ‘sinicization of Xinjiang,’ and see Han migration as an integral part of that strategy.. He cites a PRC article which “…explicitly. acknowledged that the state was now aiming at fostering increased migrations to national minority areas in order to dilute the ethnic populations in the border areas and strengthen national unity.” 54. 政治大. It is possible that this reflects the PRC’s growing. 立. confidence in its ability to control the region.. ‧ 國. 學. Becquelin tells us that according to Marxist theory, an increased standard of. ‧. In other words, if minorities have more economic. Nat. n. al. The. er. io. PRC argument for some time. PRC’s perception.. This has, Becquelin says, been the official. sit. opportunity, they won’t cause trouble.. y. living will quell ethnic tensions.. Becquelin now cites another interesting change in the. Ch PRC now. eacknowledges ngchi. i Un. v. that increased development in. Xinjiang will create more ethnic strife and unrest. 55. In Becquelin’s mind, this. change in PRC rhetoric is very significant. Michael Friderich wrote an essay titled Uyghur Literary Representations of Xinjiang Realities. In it, he looks at Uyghur literature in order to disseminate how the Uyghurs perceive themselves. He also makes interesting observations on how 52 53 54 55. Nicolas Becquelin, 2004. p. 54 Nicolas Becquelin, 2004. p. 54 Nicolas Becquelin, 2004. p. 60 Nicolas Becquelin, 2004. pp. 60-61 27.

(28) the Uyghurs view their relationships with China, the West, and nearby Islamic elements.. Friederich argues that Uyghur poets fear that their culture is under. attack. 56. He points out that writing poems about Uyghur culture and history. resemble a “high-wire act.” 57. Anything written by Uyghurs about culture or history. comes under intense Chinese scrutiny.. Because of political sensitivities, this can. hardly be surprising.. 政治大. Also interesting were Friderich’s comments on cultural isolation.. 立. He argues. that location and politics have led the Uyghurs to feel cut off from the rest of the. ‧ 國. 學. world.. Firstly, anything that the Uyghurs get from the West comes via China.. It is. ‧. translated by Chinese scholars and – one can assume – scrutinized very closely before. Nat. y. being passed on to Xinjiang. 58 unwilling to read in Chinese.”. n. al. makes it difficult to absorb. er. io. sit. Some Uyghurs are, Friederich claims, “…unable or If texts are only provided in Mandarin, this surely. i n C 59 U h e nfrom anything h i West. g cthe. v. Secondly, contact with. neighboring Islamic nations is, of course, closely monitored and generally discouraged.. 56. Michael Frederich, Uyghur Representations of Xinjiang Realities, in Situating the Uyghurs Between China and Central Asia (Ashgate Publishing, 2007) p. 94 57 Michael Frederich, 2007. p. 94 58 Michael Frederich, 2007. p. 102 59 Michael Frederich, 2007. p. 103 28.

(29) 2.3 China and Ethnic Separatism Many different parties are directly concerned with the issue of ethnic separatism. These parties include the PRC, minority groups living in the PRC, certain foreign governments, and countless scholars.. Needless to say, the agendas of these groups. vary wildly. However, they all tend to agree on one point: the Chinese government treats ethnic separatism with the utmost seriousness.. Most scholars agree that a. 政治大. major motivation for the Western Development Project, a venture costing billions of. 立. evidence supporting this claim is quite strong.. The. 學. ‧ 國. dollars, is the desire to tighten central control over Xinjiang and Tibet. 60. ‧. Certainly, the PRC has proven willing to use violence in reaction to anti-Han. y. Nat. io. sit. This happened in Xinjiang in 1990, as well as in Tibet, just before. the 2008 Olympic Games. 61. al. er. demonstrations.. In Ethnic Minorities and Globalization, Colin. n. iv n C h e n gthec issue Mackerras argues that sensitivity towards of ethnic separatism pushes the hi U PRC’s foreign policy. He cites this sensitivity as an explanation of why the PRC was staunchly opposed NATO intervention in Kosovo. 62. Generally, the PRC government. does not support foreign intervention in other countries, Mackerras says, because it. 60. Harry Lai China’s Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, and Prospects (Modern China, 2002) 61 New York Times, Tibetan Riots Spread Outside Region http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/world/asia/16iht-tibet.4.11148124.html accessed February 22nd, 2011 62 Colin Mackerras, 2003. p. 39 29.

(30) fears foreign intervention within its own borders. 63. Clearly, the PRC does not want. to see a precedent that could one day justify intervention in a problem area like Tibet or Xinjiang. 2.4 Ethnic Minorities and Education Gerald Postiglione’s essay, National Minority Regions, is an interesting study on researching minority education in the PRC.. In addition to talking about the. 政治大. challenges of research in China, Postiglione also provides some interesting. 立. observations on minority dissatisfaction with the education system.. 學. ‧ 國. The author. found Postiglione’s observations about theory versus practice especially useful.. He. ‧. Nat. In other words, the central government. er. io. sit. different from what happens in reality.. y. points out that the PRC’s theory of education in minority regions is often very. claims that it is implementing fair policies, and it has laws that are supposed to ensure. al. n. iv n C h e nnotgthe In reality, however, that is often i UFor example, Postiglione says c hcase.. that.. that in theory, minorities may run their own schools, but in practice “…their actual autonomy may be severely restricted…minority groups can run their own schools, but they must abide by all regulations set down by the central government.” 64 Postiglione also talks about the differences between theory and practice concerning two other important issues: language education and financial aid. He points out that while 63. Colin Mackerras, 2003. p. 39 Gerald A.Postiglione, National Minorities: Studying School Discontinuation in The Ethnographic Eye: An Interpretive Study of Education in China (Falmer Press, 2000) p. 54 64. 30.

(31) minority languages may be used in schools, there “…may not be enough trained teachers who can teach in these languages.” 65 to financial aid.. Postiglione also applies this problem. While the central government does provide extra funds for minority. areas, parents still “…must find ways of covering fees for food and clothing, and of overcoming separation anxiety.” 66. Many western academics touch on the issue of. theory versus practice in the PRC’s ethnic minority policies.. 政治大. Finally, Postiglione illuminates some of the many difficulties in researching. 立. Field work can be difficult for Han researchers,. because many minorities tend to view them as outsiders. 67. 學. ‧ 國. minority education in China.. Minorities may be more. ‧. welcoming to a researcher who is not Han Chinese; however, very few foreigners. Nat. Finally,. er. io. sit. y. speak the minority language, and that creates an impediment to research. 68. Postiglione points out that in dealing with teachers in minority schools (most of whom. al. n. iv n C are Han), getting straight answers h canebe He claims that they may simply n difficult. gchi U support Party policy or give answers that they think the researcher wants to hear.. 65 66 67 68. Gerald A. Postiglione, 2000. p. 54 Gerald A. Postiglione, 2000. p. 54 Gerald A. Postiglione, 2000. p. 66 Gerald A. Postiglione, 2000. p. 67 31.

(32) 2.5 Preferential Policies In a book on affirmative action in China, Ann Maxwell Hill and Minglang Zhou state that China uses preferential treatment to “…redress historic inequalities among ethnic groups, [and] to reduce the potential for ethnic conflict.” 69. The existing scholarship. tends to agree that the PRC has provided significant financial incentives to reward loyalty from ethnic minorities.. An essay on China’s hard and soft policies points out. 政治大. that, “Soft measures (including education) are designed to win favor among the. 立. Uyghur population and facilitate acculturation into Chinese society.” 70. The author. ‧ 國. 學. believes that this reflects a growing sophistication in China’s policies toward Xinjiang.. ‧. Nat. io. sit. They must mix incentives in as well.. er. control the Uyghurs.. y. It seems that the PRC government has concluded that brute force is not enough to. Zhu Zhiyong’s article Higher Education Access and Equality Among Ethnic. al. n. iv n C U Minorities in China sheds light onh how current challenges in its e nthegPRC c hisi handling education system.. Dr. Zhu, a professor at Beijing Normal University, explains a. phenomenon familiar to those who study modern China: economic growth has led to greater inequalities.. He argues that ethnic minorities have borne many of these new. financial burdens, and that this can be seen in higher education.. He points out that. “…the percentage of ethnic minority students enrolled in higher education is still 69. Ann Maxwell Hill and Minglang Zhou Affirmative Action in China and the US (Palgrave Macmillen, 2009) p. 1 70 Justin Rudelsen and William Jankowiak, Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang in Flux, in Xinjiang, China’s Muslim Borderland (M.E. Sharpe, 2004) p. 301 32.

(33) below the percentage of minorities in the nation’s population and has even fallen since 1998.” 71. He later points out something that many scholars touch upon: from the. very beginning of their education, young minorities are at a disadvantage because the central government provides schools in minority regions with less funding. 72 author shows a great deal of faith in the benefits of preferential policies.. The While. acknowledging that China has a controversial and imperfect system, he suggests that. 政治大. affirmative action has helped level the playing field for many ethnic minorities. The. 立. author is curious to discover whether or not this is a widely held belief in the PRC. ‧ 國. 學. government: that preferential policies and higher education can address economic. ‧. inequalities.. y. Nat. er. io. sit. Among western scholars there appears to be a healthy skepticism as to whether or not these policies actually reward Uyghurs who take advantage of them (or try to. n. al. take advantage of them).. iv n C For h example, e n g cTimothy h i UGrose. states that even with. scholarships and preferential admission policies, many Uyghurs are too poor to send their children to school. 73. Furthermore, Justin Rudelsen and William Jankowiak. argue that with education being so Han-centered, many Uyghur parents are reluctant to send their children to school, for fear that their ethnic identity will be. 71. Zhiyong Zhu, Higher Education Access and Equality Among Ethnic Minorities in China (Chinese Education and Society, Volume 43, Number 1, 2010) p. 4 72 Zhiyong Zhu, 2010. pp. 18-19 73 Timothy Grose, Educating Xinjiang’s Uyghurs: Creating Success or Achieving Unrest (University of Virginia, 2008) p. 9 33.

(34) compromised. 74. This likely reflects a wider mistrust of the PRC and its intentions.. The author also found Gerald Postiglione’s comments on preferential policies as a means of national integration very interesting. He says that minorities admitted to universities have a “higher visibility” and serve as a model for younger minorities. 75 This is part of the PRC’s strategy of rewarding loyalty. If a student is loyal to the government, he or she will be rewarded.. This will be done in a very visible manner,. 政治大. as a message to other minorities about the advantages of loyalty.. 立. For its part, the PRC is always eager to promote the strides made in minority. ‧ 國. 學. education since 1949. It seems that every official white paper or web site touts. ‧. rising literacy rates, higher standards of living, and a growing number of universities. y. Nat. er. io. sit. in Xinjiang. A white paper, released by the PRC in 2009, is a typical example. Titled Development and Progress in Xinjiang, it points out that before 1949,. al. n. iv n C 76 “Xinjiang had but one college, ninehsecondary e n g cschools, h i U and 1,355 primary schools.”. The same paper goes on to point out that nine year education in Xinjiang is now compulsory, and illiteracy has been “eliminated.” Such flowery language and bright reporting is typical of the PRC’s take on ethnic minority education. As will be discussed later, however, significant progress has been made in some areas.. 74. Justin Rudelsen and William Jankowiak, 2004. p. 313 Gerald A. Postiglione, 2000. p. 59 76 True Xinjiang, Xinjiang Undergoes Unprecedented Changes in Education, http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/truexinjiang/basic-facts/2009-09/470284.html accessed February 22nd, 2011 75. 34.

(35) Our Good Han Mothers speaks of the impact that Han Chinese teachers have had on their Uyghur middle school students.. The essay paints an idealized picture, to say. the least. In fact, from beginning to end, the language borders on absurdity. It is a clear and unintentionally humorous example of what the PRC would like outsiders to think of its education system in Xinjiang. The essay opens with Uyghur middle school students returning home after a The young Uyhgurs love their 政治大. semester in boarding school with their Han teachers.. 立. Han teachers so much that they cannot bear to leave them.. “The youngsters crowded. ‧ 國. 學. around the teachers, vying to give their beloved teachers a last hug, their smiling eyes. ‧. brimming with tears, breasts heaving lightly, clasped hands unwilling to let go.” 77. y. Nat. er. io. sit. Our Good Han Mothers suggests that the Uyghur children were uncivilized before they came under the wings of their Han teachers. It argues that the Han. al. n. iv n C U one student as saying “I’m teachers saved them and gave themha e future. h i quotes n gItceven happier here than I am at home!” 78 The essay also depicts the Han Chinese teachers as loving and nurturing.. It. states that the teachers sacrificed their time, money, and health to help the students. They “…willingly gave up their rest days to pair up with and coach the Xinjiang. 77. Tao Jiaqing and Yang Xiaohua “Our Good Han Mothers” in Chinese Education and Society (Volume 43, Number 3, May-June 2010) p. 65 78 Tao Jiaqing and Yang Xiaohua, 2010. p. 66 35.

(36) youngsters.” 79. According to the essay, teachers also gave their personal things to the. students, and treated the students as though they were their own children.. This. contrasts with Linda Tsung’s essay (to be discussed below), in which Uyghur students who struggled with Mandarin were called “not very bright” by their Han teachers. 80 Predictably, Our Good Han Mothers touts the successes of the teachers.. It. speaks of overcoming ethnic differences and becoming one under the banner of China.. 政治大. “Different ethnic groups, different languages, and different souls – all fused together. 立. The political message of unity is so blunt that it is impossible to miss.. 學. ‧ 國. here.” 81. This article embellishes so much that it has no academic value whatsoever.. ‧. Nat. It is a piece of modern propaganda, revealing. er. io. sit. to think about its education system.. y. However, it is useful in that it shows us what the PRC government would like readers. the PRC’s desire to present a magnanimous education system and a united China.. n. al. Ch 2.6 Language Education. engchi. i Un. v. Both the PRC and the Uyghurs take language education very seriously. Scholars and many Uyghurs associate language with the preservation of Uyghur identity.. There is. a real fear among Uyghurs that if they (or their children) learn Mandarin, their own language and culture will suffer.. Timothy Grose cites interviews in which Uyghur. university students say that the more they learned Chinese, the more alienated they 79. Tao Jiaqing and Yang Xiaohua, 2010. p. 68 Linda Tsung, Minority Languages, Education and Communities in China (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p. 140 81 Tao Jiaqing and Yang Xiaohua, 2010. p. 69 80. 36.

(37) felt from their own cultures. 82. In Dislocating China, Dru Gladney also stresses the. importance of language learning in the assimilation of ethnic minorities. He states it very simply: “To learn Chinese is to become Chinese.” 83 this concern.. PRC scholars are aware of. One PRC scholar, Lin Shujiao (林淑娇), discusses this in an essay on. problems facing bilingual education.. Lin points out the worry that if Chinese is. paramount in Uyghur classrooms, they will lose their cultural identity. The essay. 政治大. expresses similar worries about language; if Uyghur students spend more time. 立. Concern on this matter is justified.. 學. ‧ 國. learning Mandarin, will they be able to speak as well in their mother tongue? 84 After all, culture and language are closely. ‧. intertwined. If the Uyghurs lose their language, their culture will suffer as well.. y. Nat. io. sit. Regardless, the PRC clearly wants to convince Uyghurs of the importance of. er. leaning Mandarin. Ku Erban (窟尒班), a Uyghur academic in the PRC, points out. al. n. iv n C h e nused that Chinese is the common language i Uthe PRC. g callh over. He argues that in. China, Mandarin is the language of business, economics, and politics. 85 The article’s message is clear: if Uyghurs want to be a part of this century, they will have no choice but to learn Mandarin. James A. Millward also comments on the importance of language in both politics 82. Timothy Grose, 2008. p.11 Dru Gladney, 1998. p. 264 84 林淑娇, 淺談新疆高校中的雙語教學政策(Charming China. 魅力中國, 2010) 83. 85. 窟尒班, 少數民族地區實行雙語教學的必要性 (The Language Teacher’s Friend. 2009). 37.

(38) and national identity. He points out that the PRC has changed the Uyghur writing system three times in 30 years. That is an extraordinarily large amount of change. He goes on to argue – rather persuasively – that the change in language policy clearly reflects the PRC’s political motives. For example, he points out that the first change was meant to “…reduce the appeal of Islamic texts and improve access to scientific and educational materials published in the Soviet Union.” 86. A later change reflected. It certainly seems true that the PRC’s 政治大. the rift the between the PRC and the USSR. 87. 立. language policies reflect political realities.. ‧ 國. 學. Linda Tsung, from the University of Hong Kong, wrote a book titled Minority. ‧. Languages, Education and Communities in China.. The author found her chapter on. y. Nat. er. io. sit. Xinjiang to be intelligent, informative, and highly useful. In all the reading the author has done for this thesis, this chapter has been among the most valuable.. al. n. iv n C U the min kao min (民 h aeschool For her research, Tsung visited h icombined n g cthat. 民) and min kao Han (民考漢) systems.. 考. A min kao min school, also called a. minority school, is exclusively for ethnic minorities.. The medium of instruction is. the minority language, and minority culture is emphasized. A min kao Han school, also called a Chinese school, is a traditional PRC school. In these schools, most of the students are Chinese, and Mandarin is the only language used.. 86 87. James A. Millward, 2007. p. 234 James A. Millward, 2007. p. 235 38.

(39) Interestingly, Tsung reported some policies that created resentment.. Uyghur. students in the school were required to learn Mandarin, but Han students did not have to learn Uyghur. 88. Uyghur teachers had to pass a Mandarin proficiency test, but Han. teachers did not have to pass a Uyghur test. This is common: Uyghurs have to learn Mandarin, but Han Chinese almost never learn Uyghur, even in Xinjiang. In a very revealing section, Tsung interviewed Uyghur academics.. She spoke. 政治大. with people who studied at both min kao min and min kao Han schools. The results. 立. were most interesting. Uyghurs who studied at Chinese schools stated that they were. ‧ 國. 學. grateful because they had better job opportunities later on in life.. However, as. ‧. children they struggled because classes were taught in Chinese, a language they did. y. Nat. er. io. the Chinese children. 89. sit. not understand well at the time. They reported feeling afraid, and being mocked by. al. n. iv n C U schools also reported pros According to Tsung, Uyghurs h who e nstudied g c hin iminority. and cons. On the one hand, they did not have to struggle with a language they did not understand.. They became completely fluent in Uyghur. 90. On the other hand,. they did not learn Chinese well and had problems later in their academic careers. Tsung gives a scathing criticism of minority education in Xinjiang.. 88 89 90. Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 136 Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 144 Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 145 39. She claims.

(40) that Han Chinese policymakers and teachers dismiss Uyghur students as lazy. 91 reveals an interesting problem in the system.. She. According to Tsung, authorities do not. provide enough resources to Uyghur students, and then look down on those students for not succeeding.. However, Tsung claims, the problem is not that the Uyghur. students are lazy or stupid.. The problem is that they are not given the same. resources that Han children receive. 92. If Tsung’s criticisms are accurate, they reflect. 政治大. troubling problems of both racism and discrimination.. 立. There was a great deal more of use in this chapter.. It also discusses the. ‧ 國. 學. possibility that authorities are making Mandarin the only useful language, while. ‧. simultaneously making Uyghur useless for economic advancement.. Tsung. Nat. y. 93. er. io. sit. recommends providing more resources for Uyghur students and minority schools. The author found this chapter most useful and intelligent. The author plans to refer to. n. al. it often in this thesis.. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. In Separate but Loyal, Wenfang Tang and Gaochao He conduct an interesting survey of minority students in the PRC.. They include an interesting discussion on. the differences between theory and practice in language education. The authors point out that on paper, the policy is very clear: “The 1995 Education Law states that the Han language is the basic language of instruction. Ethnic minority schools can 91 92 93. Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 153 Linda Tsung, 2009. pp. 152-154 Linda Tsung, 2009. p. 152 40.

(41) use their own language as the teaching language, but they are required to teach Mandarin at some point before the seventh grade.” 94. They go on to state, however,. that while the classrooms they observed did indeed teach in the minorities’ language, the situation was often very confused.. Bureaucratic conflicts between the Ministry. of Education in Beijing and the Ethnic State Affairs Council influence the classrooms. The former group, they say, favors the use of Mandarin, while the latter favors. 政治大. instruction in the local ethnic language. 95 From this we can determine that language. 立. instruction in the PRC is often hazier than the laws would indicate.. ‧ 國. 學. Ma Rong, a professor at Peking University, writes a very interesting essay titled. ‧. Bilingual Education for China’s Ethnic Minorities.. While perhaps not entirely. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. accurate, the author’s tendency was to view Dr. Ma as a voice of the PRC government.. i Un. v. He outlines some of the very difficult challenges that come with trying to implement a bilingual education system.. Ch. engchi. Some of the difficulties he cites are finding qualified. teachers and making sure that material taught in minority languages is up to national standards.. Imagine trying to introduce the vocabulary of modern science so that it fits properly into the languages of several dozen large and small minority groups so that one could compile complete sets of texts for. 94. Wengang Tang and Gaochao He, Separate but Loyal: Ethnicity and Nationalism in China, (East-West Center, 2010) p. 19 95 Wengang Tang and Gaochao He, 2010. p. 20 41.

(42) subjects such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology geography and history…and this will give an idea of the difficulty of the project. 96. Dr. Ma also speaks of the PRC concept ‘unified diversity.’ The author took this to mean that the country is unified in the sense that everyone speaks Mandarin, and diverse because minority groups still speak their own languages at the local level.. Whether this is a practical goal or idealism is. something the author would like very much to discover.. 政治大 For its part, the PRC, not surprisingly, speaks of a bi-lingual education 立. ‧ 國. 學. system in which both languages are respected and promoted. Concerning. io. sit. y. Nat. has this to say:. ‧. language education in the next decade (2010-2020), the official PRC website. n. al. er. Efforts shall also be made to advance bilingual teaching, open Chinese language classes in every school, and popularize the national common language and writing system. However, minority groups' right to be educated in their native languages shall also be respected and ensured… 97. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Certainly, this statement gives the appearance of tolerance and an eagerness to foster local Uyghur culture.. 96. Ma rong, Bilingual Education for China’s Ethnic Minorities (Chinese Education & Society, Volume 40, number 2, 2007) p. 11 97 The Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, China Vows Stronger Support for Education for Ethnic Minority Groups http://www.gov.cn/english/2010-07/30/content_1667226.htm accessed February 22nd, 2011 42.

(43) Among western scholars, however, there is a strong skepticism concerning China’s bilingual education system.. In his essay Separate but Loyal, Timothy Grose. says that some researchers “...argue that the rhetoric of bilingual education is based on half truths, and that China’s covert policy is, in fact, monolingualism.” 98. In China’s. Minority cultures, Colin Mackerras argues that while the official PRC policy is to promote the use of minority language, everyday practice often deviates from that policy. 99. 政治大. Among western scholars and certainly among human rights activists, the. 立. general perception is that bilingual education is something of a sham, meant to. ‧ 國. 學. sugarcoat the real policy of marginalizing the ethnic minorities’ language and. ‧. ultimately, their culture as well.. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. Nicolas Becquelin has interesting observations on the PRC’s linguistic policies.. i Un. v. He notes the implementation of Modern Standard Chinese in Xinjiang, as well as. Ch. engchi. Mandarin’s becoming the medium of instruction of almost all subjects at Xinjiang University. 100. According to Becquelin, instituting Modern Standard Chinese is. meant to achieve two things.. First, it will placate the Uyghurs by giving them more. economic opportunity through better Mandarin. assimilate them into the PRC.. 98. Timothy Grose, 2008. p.19 Colin Mackerras, 1995. p. 144 100 Nicolas Becquelin, 2004. pp. 61-62 99. 43. Secondly, it will help to further.

(44) These secondary sources begin to reveal a pattern.. The implementation of. Mandarin at Xinjiang University, the use of Modern Standard Chinese in Xinjiang, and increased Mandarin in minority schools all point to one trend.. It is beginning to. look as though the PRC’s goal is to supplant the Uyghur language and give the Uyghurs no choice but to learn Mandarin.. 2.7 History Content. relevant topic to this paper.. 學. ‧ 國. 政治大 The historical and political content of education in the PRC is far and away the most 立 After all, regardless of whether they favor separatism,. ‧. acculturation, or something else, everyone involved in the Xinjiang issue must have a. y. n. al. er. The official stance of the PRC is that “Xinjiang…has been an. io. stands on this issue.. There can be no doubt as to where the PRC. sit. Nat. keen interest in historical perception.. Ch. inalienable part of China from ancient times. a part of China’s territory.” 101. i Un. v. In 60 B.C., Xinjiang officially became. engchi. This sentiment appears in one form or another all. over the PRC’s official web sites, white papers, government statements, and so on.. At the other extreme we find the views of East Turkestan independence supporters. An anti-China website, provocatively titled ‘eastturkestan.net,’ states. 101. The Government of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, About Xinjiang, http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/10050/10051/10020/article.html accessed February 22nd, 2011 44.

(45) bluntly that “East Turkestan is not a part of China.” 102. It goes on to say the. following: “…between 206 B.C. and 1759 A.D., East Turkestan was able to maintain its independence…During the periods when it was linked to the Turkish Hun and Gokturk khanates, local administration lay entirely in the hands of the people of East Turkestan. Between 751 and 1216 it was totally independent.” 103. As with the. PRC’s claims, this web site’s interpretation of history has a clear political agenda.. 政治 Western historians emphasize that the 大. Academics tend to favor a gray area.. 立. history of Xinjiang is long and complicated, and is now being manipulated by both. ‧ 國. 學. sides for political purposes.. For example, in an essay titled Contested Histories,. ‧. Gardner Bovingdon says, “The party-state has long relied on official histories to. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. Bovingdon goes on to. er. justify its political and military control over Xinjiang…” 104. i Un. v. point out that Uyghur nationalists are also eager to use historical interpretations for their own purposes.. Ch. engchi. “…Uyghur nationalist histories have provided a charter for. Uyhgur identity, underscored the centrality of Islam in Uyghur life, and offered Uyghurs both precedent and warrant for their resistance to Chinese rule.” 105. All the. western academics that the author read tend to support Bovingdon’s arguments.. 102. Harun Yahya, Communist China’s Policy of Oppression in East Turkestan http://www.harunyahya.com/e_turkestan03.php accessed February 22nd, 2011 103 Harun Yahya, http://www.harunyahya.com/e_turkestan03.php accessed February 22nd, 2011 104 Gardner Bovingdon, Contested Histories, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (M.E. Sharpe, 2004) p. 353 105 Gardner Bovingdon, 2004. p. 353 45.

(46) We can therefore make the following conclusions about academic opinions towards PRC and Uyghur interpretations of history.. First, academics are generally. skeptical of both sides’ versions of history. However, scholars tend to be more hostile towards the PRC version.. Second, everyone involved (ie: the PRC, the. Uyghurs, and interested outside observers) agrees that the PRC is using history education as a means of integrating the Uyghurs into Chinese society.. 政治大. Finally, given. the prevalence of Uyghur views that oppose the PRC line, we can conclude that by. 立. and large, the Uyghurs are not buying into the PRC version of Xinjiang’s history.. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 46. i Un. v.


(48) Chapter 3.. Preferential Policies for Uyghurs. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the preferential policies that the PRC has implemented regarding Uyghur education. and why?. What policies have the PRC put in place,. What positive effects have been achieved?. What are the drawbacks?. Are the PRC’s policies really meant to create change, or do they serve another agenda? Are preferential policies improving the Uyghurs’ education, economic opportunities, and upward mobility?. 政治大. How do the Uyghurs themselves view these policies?. 立. All of. these issues lead to the fundamental question posed in this chapter: are the PRC’s. ‧ 國. 學. preferential policies quelling unrest and integrating the Uyghurs into China proper?. ‧. Preferential policies have been implemented by modern states all over the world.. y. Nat. er. io. sit. Ann Maxwell Harris and Minglang Zhou have this to say about preferential policies. These policies “…have widely been adopted by modern states to redress historic. al. n. iv n C inequalities among ethnic groups, htoereduce i U for ethnic conflict, and, at n g ctohpotential times, to enhance opportunities for the dominant group itself.” 106 that the PRC is no exception.. They go on to say. Preferential policies are a popular means of. integrating into the state minority groups who feel marginalized by government and mainstream society. The PRC has implemented a great deal of preferential policies for ethnic. 106. Ann Maxwell Hill and Minglang Zhou, 2009. p.1 48.

(49) minorities. Guarantees of these policies are written into the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy.” 107 1984, and amended in 2001.. The laws were drafted in. The following is a list of minority rights that are. guaranteed by law in the PRC (it should be noted that these laws apply to all of the 55 recognized minority groups): . Government subsidies for minority schools. . Lower admissions standards for minority university applicants.. 立. 政治大. An elaborate. points system determines how much benefit a minority applicant receives.. It is. ‧ 國. 學. based on the minority applicant’s gender, ethnicity, financial background, and so. ‧. on. 108. Nat. . More career opportunities for minority university graduates. er. sit. y. The development of specialized schools for minority nationalities. io. . al. n. iv n C It seems fair to state that the h PRC’s i Uimplementing these policies are e nreasons g c h for. no different from the reasons of any other national government.. By giving the. Uyghurs more economic opportunity, the central government is attempting to pacify them and integrate them into the motherland. The PRC’s approach to the so-called minority issue seems to be more sophisticated than it was before.. Policymakers have. apparently concluded that keeping the Uyghurs under control through mere force is 107. Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Autonomy http://www.novexcn.com/regional_nation_autonomy.html, accessed April 18th, 2011 108 Barry Sautman, Preferential Policies for Minorities in China: The Case of Xinjiang (University of Hong Kong, Division of Social Science, 1997) p. 16 49.

(50) not sufficient.. They have decided to mix in incentives for loyalty as well.. Colin. Mackerras states that the PRC is attempting to raise the standard of living among minorities, thus making them “…less prone to rebellious movements.” 109. The. PRC’s preferential policies are half of a two part strategy.. On the one hand, the PRC. takes a zero-tolerance approach to ethnic separatism.. As we have seen in both. Xinjiang and Tibet, the PRC will not hesitate to use violence when it perceives a On the other hand, the PRC appears eager to 政治大. threat from minorities in its borders.. 立. entice ethnic minorities through education incentives and a higher standard of living.. ‧ 國. 學. In every country that has preferential policies, debates exist as to the merits of. ‧. Certainly in the United States, the author’s home country, affirmative. Nat. Affirmative action in the United States. er. io. sit. action is an endlessly controversial topic.. y. those policies.. was first implemented in 1954, when the American Supreme Court ruled that racial. al. n. iv n C h e n g110c hAmerican segregation in schools was unconstitutional. i U affirmative action requires “…agencies and institutions to make every effort to seek out qualified candidates from every possible source – but to focus especially on individuals…from underrepresented groups – to compete for limited resources in education, employment, and business.” 111 The essential idea behind American affirmative action is to break down barriers of inequality in order to create a society where “…race no longer 109. Colin Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalization (Routledge Courzon, 2003) p. 38 Evelyn HuDehart, Racial Preferences in the United States, in Affirmative Action in China and the U.S (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) p. 215 111 HuDuhart, 2007. p. 215 110. 50.