Chapter I Introduction
1.3 Literature review
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the U.S. public view on China.43
The writer has reviewed all the official websites and many annual reports of the CIs in the U.S. Based on the available information and focus of this study (cultural soft power), this dissertation for analysis has narrowed down and selected twelve CIs. This section also explores their language programs and cultural activities as well as responses from CIs’ students and participants.
This dissertation first clarifies key variables: the effectiveness of China’s cultural soft power strategy (dependent variable) and cultural diplomacy such as promotion of language teaching courses and cultural dissemination programs through CIs (independent variables). This research dissects how cultural diplomacy influences China’s cultural soft power. The writer then reports results and assesses their implications. Despite the information collection limitation (particularly the insufficient budget for visiting other CIs), the generalization can be done. If we have a clear research scope, we can still make an overall analysis of a particular case.44
1.3 Literature review
Cultural soft power has been embraced by Chinese scholars and leaders because it appears to be an alternative to power politics.45 Research has been carried out by a plethora of well-known experts, usually in major universities (including Tsinghua and Fudan), research centers (for instance, the Central Party School), and relevant branches of
43 The data analysis in this study followed the two phases. The first phase entails classifying, comparing, and combining material from the interviews to extract meaning and implication. The second phase figures out what data mean by building toward description. Please see Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S.
Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (Second Edition) (London: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 13.
44 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3 (September 1971), p. 691.
45 Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 81.
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the government (such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The products of their analyses have appeared in leading academic and policy journals.46 Unlike Nye’s focus on the efficacy of soft power in achieving foreign policy goals, Chinese scholars frequently refer to a domestic context. For example, political analyst Yu Keping argues that education, the psychological and physical condition of the people, technology, culture, social cohesion, and socio-economic development are all sources of soft power.47 Wang Huning considers soft power under the following six aspects: political system, national spirit, the international image of society, foreign strategy, the capability of the international system, science and technology development. Liu Jie, a scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, views soft power resources including: core values, political systems, culture, philosophy, and the national spirit.48 This dissertation has taken most of the recent literature from journals, books, official documents, and the CIs’ website. The following section categorizes the literature into either China’s soft power concept or Confucius Institutes.
1.3.1 China’s soft power concept
China’s scholars attempt to craft their own soft power strategy with Chinese characteristics. Although related studies have increased, there is no shared definition of what soft power actually means.49 On the whole, scholars’ writings focus mainly on two parts: China’s soft power concept and its relations with foreign policy.
The Soft Power Research Group of Beijing University conducted a study on the practice of soft power in China. The highlight of their researches states that the key to
46 Joel Wuthnow, “The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 44, No. 2 (June 2008), p. 2.
47 Li, ed., Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics, p. 28.
48 Ibid, p. 22.
49 Shaun Breslin, “The Soft Notion of China’s Soft Power,” Asia Programme Paper (February 2011), p. 2.
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understanding soft power is to know relations between soft power and hard power. The hard power lays the foundation of the soft power. For China, its economic development is not only the core of hard power but also a solid basis for cultivating soft power. Hard power sustained by economic power could be beneficial to boost soft power, but its contribution is limited.50 In order to enhance China’s soft power, Men Honghua states that the philosophy of soft power can be enriched by addressing the important resources of culture, China’s development model, international institutions, and international image.51 Mingjiang Li proposes an approach positive use soft power’s resources. He contends that if a country uses the resources in a prudent way in its relations with other countries, it will win reciprocity. If a country has the ability to make proposals in multilateral institutions that the international community regards as beneficial, it gains soft power.52
“Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics,” written by two researchers from Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Bonnie Glaser and Melissa Murphy, summarizes their findings. First, international observers have raised the concern of the expansion of China’s soft-power influence. Second, soft power is a hot topic in China.
The mainstream intellectual view is that culture is the core resource of a state’s power.
The view has been embraced by China’s leadership. Third, despite strong interest at the highest circles, China has yet to develop a comprehensive and coherent national soft-power strategy. Finally, as China expands its national power and assumes a bigger role on the international stage, it is possible that Beijing will promote the China
50 Beijing Daxue Zhongguo Ruan Shili Ketizu (Chinese Soft Power Research Group of Beijing University),
“Ruanshili Zai Zhongguo De Shijian Zhi Yi―Ruanshili Gainian,” (One of the Practice of Soft Power in China—the Concept of Soft power), People’s Daily Online, March 5, 2008,
<http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49157/49165/6957188.htm>(accessed March 3, 2014).
51 Men Honghua, “Zhongguo Ruanshili Pinggu Baogao(shang),” (Chinese Soft Power Assessment Report), Guoji Guancha (International Observation), Vol. 2 (2007), pp.15-26.
52 Li, ed., Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics, p. 7.
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development model.53 Another U.S. scholar, Joel Wuthnow, in his paper “The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse” describes that the discourse on soft power within China’s strategic studies community offers a window into Chinese thinking about non-coercive strategy. Wuthnow provides an assessment of the discourse, covering the conceptualization of soft power development as a key component of China’s grand strategy. Three mechanisms through which soft power can support China’s long-term growth have been discussed: the efforts to earn international understanding of its Confucian heritage; the involvement of China’s leadership position in the developing world; and the policies through which China can enhance its image as a responsible power.54 Two Korean scholars, Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, investigate China’s soft power strategy and resources by focusing on three areas: the developmental model, foreign policy, and civilization. They conclude that China’s recognition of soft power and its application to national policies is an important factor in explaining China’s improving image and increasing influence in Asia.55
Competitions in soft power have laid the cornerstone to build a new international system. Chinese strategists are exploring innovative approaches in its rise in international politics. There have been several notable elements of these approaches in China’s diplomatic practice, including softer rhetoric, promotion of culture abroad, and image building.56 The idea of soft power figures crucially in the story of China’s re-emergence as a global power. China has embarked on its quest for an image makeover.57 “China’s
53 Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, “Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics,” in McGiffert, (ed.) Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States (October 5, 2009), p. 10.
54 Joel Wuthnow, “The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse,” pp. 1-28.
55 Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, “China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects, Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 3, (May/June 2008), pp. 453-472.
56 Li, ed., Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics, p.1.
57 Jian Wang, (ed.) Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 1-14.
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Harmonious World: Theory and Significance,” written by Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu, finds that peace and development have become China’s grand strategy for the fourth generation leaders. The harmonious world theory is a diplomatic strategy that is designed to pave the way for building a new world order. While intending to construct overseas CIs as the core of cultural foreign policy, China has tried to build a soft power policy that can realize its foreign policy objective to project image of peaceful rise.58 With changes of identity and interests interacting between China and the world, Hu Jintao has advocated the notion of a harmonious world to create a collective identity of the world.59 Shulan Ye, an instructor at the Department of Politics at East China Normal University, argues that China has the possibility to rise peacefully and become the regional leader by peaceful means if it can commit to constructing a regional identity by drawing from the strength of its culture in conjunction with western values.60 Yu Xintian claims that soft power is a powerful instrument for representing national culture in the international community and should be regarded as an essential resource of crafting foreign policy. China should value the interests of foreign countries and accordingly put forth proposals on strengthening soft power by seeking a feasible approach of win-win cooperation.61
Hu Jintao’s administration has employed Chinese traditional culture and modern art to engage in exchanges and cooperation with other countries.62 One of the approaches to
58 Chao Chien-min and Hsu Chih-chia, “Zhonggong Di Sidai Lingdao Jiti de Hexie Shijieguan Lilun yu Yihan” (China’s Harmonious World: Theory and Significance) Yuanjing Jijinhui Jikan (Prospect Quarterly), Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 27-28.
59 Tang Jiang-Yu, “Jiangou Zhong De Hexie Shijie—Hexie Shijie Linian de Jiangou” (Harmonious World in Construction—An Observation of the Concept of Harmonious World from the Perspective of Constructivism), Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of University of International Relations), Vol.
3 (2008), pp. 7-12.
60 Ye Shulan, Rising China’s Regional Policy in East Asia: A Constructivist Perspective (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Baptist University Ph.D. Dissertation, August 2010).
61 Yu Xintian, “Soft Power Construction and China’s Foreign Strategy,” International Studies, Vol. 2 (2008), pp. 15-20. Yu Xintian, “The Role of Soft Power in China’s External Strategy,” Global Review (2007), pp.
113-127.
62 Yang Yu-Sheng, Zhonggong Waijiao Zhanlue Zhuanbian Yu Chuangxin 2002-2008—Ruanshili Waijiao
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promote China’s soft power is through the state-run China Central Television (CCTV) International.63 Since 2000, China has implemented the policy of outreach and has used media to exert its influence worldwide. According to international polls, there is an increasing trend in the developing countries which have a positive view of China.64 Soft Power and the Rise of China: an Assessment of China’s Soft Power in its Modernization Process, written by Sheng Ding, focuses on two subjects: the theoretical discussion of soft power and its assessment and an assessment of China’s soft power in its modernization process. The author concludes that China has achieved impressive gains in its overall level of soft power. Its successful development model has won global admiration while aiding in the development of a new affinity between China and the rest of Asia. Its new diplomacy has led to China’s more active and responsible participation in international affairs, which is increasing China’s agenda setting abilities and improving its national image. However, further expansion of China’s soft power is constrained both by its domestic political institutions and by those of international crises. More importantly, the rise of China is occurring at a time when the international system is undergoing a structural transformation, which inevitably complicates China’s efforts to project its soft power. However, China might have a long way to go before it possesses the level of soft power needed to make it a true global leader.65
As for China’s role in Asia, Philip Saunders, a scholar from the U.S. National Defense University, finds that educational contacts between China and Asia have
Zhanlue De Fensi (China’s Diplomatic Strategic Change and Innovation 2002-2008—Soft Power’s Diplomatic Strategy) (Taipei: Tamkang University Master Thesis, 2009).
63 Zhang Xiaoling, “China as an Emerging Soft Power: Winning Hearts and Minds through Communicating with Foreign Republic,” Discussion Paper, Vol. 35 (October 2008), pp. 1-18.
64 Zhong-Jian Deng and Yu-Nu Lu, “Zhongguo Dalu Ruanquanli De Fazhan yu Yingxiang” (The Development and Influence of China’s Soft Power), Quanqiu Zhengzhi Pinglun (Review of Global Politics), Vol. 21 (2008), pp.1-18.
65 Sheng Ding, Soft Power and the Rise of China: an Assessment of China’s Soft Power in its Modernization Process (New Jersey: The State University of New Jersey Ph.D. Dissertation, 2006).
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multiplied. Beijing supplements educational exchanges by supporting the establishment of CIs in Asia, and talented Chinese artists are beginning to win regional recognition.66 China is considered to be the primary economic patron of the small but strategically important countries such as Burma, Cambodia, and Laos; it also provides considerable economic aid to Indonesia and the Philippines.67 However, problems of “China’s New Colonialism” and the increased vigilance from the other powers in the area have begun to challenge Beijing.68 Chinese strategists thus recommend that the government should institutionalize the foreign aid mechanism and increase interactions between Chinese officials and the local governments.69
Achievements of the cultural soft power within China are reflected in the improvement of cultural system reform, cultural industries, and overseas cultural information dissemination. Despite Chinese culture having been taught by immigrant Chinese since WWII, the flourishing CIs in the recent past has helped more foreigners learn about Chinese culture. Although China’s cultural soft power may already be diffused, there is still much needed to be done. Scholar Zhang Guozuo has a few suggestions: establish a value system for socialism, promote Chinese culture, upgrade culture with scientific development, and shape national image through culture.70
The above literature primarily explores why China employs the soft power strategy
66 Philip Saunders, “China’s Role in Asia,” in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, edited International Relations of Asia (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 137-141.
67 Thomas Lum, Wayne M. Morrison, and Bruce Vaughn, “China’s Soft Power in Southeast Asia,” CRS Report for Congress (January 4, 2008).
68 Sheng Ding, “To Build A Harmonious World: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the Global South,”
Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2008), pp. 193-213.
69 Wei Xuemei, “Dui Tisheng Zhongguo Ruanshili de Sikao: Yi Dui Feizhou Yuanzhu Wei Shijiao”
(Thought on Promoting China’s Soft Strength: from the Perspective of Aiding to Africa), Fujian Xingzheng Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of Fujian Administration Institute), Vol. 4 (2010), pp. 66-71.
70 Zhang Guozuo, “Tisheng Woguo Wenhua Ruanshili de Zhanlue Sikao” (The Strategic Thinking of Enhancing China’s Cultural Soft Power), Qiushi (Seeking Truth), April 4, 2011,
http://www.qstheory.cn/tbzt/sqjlz/zgtsshzywh/qshqwg/201104/t20110427_78521.htm (accessed September 25, 2014).
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and what the benefits are of implementing this strategy. These studies commonly lack a theoretical perspective that restricts them from having much academic value. Nonetheless, they can still contribute to a better understanding of the reasons why Chinese highest circles choose soft power strategy.
1.3.2 China’s cultural diplomacy: Confucius Institutes
In the 21st century, the cultural soft power has occupied a strategic high ground as reflected in the study of international relations theory and in the performance of the cultural renaissance throughout the world. Since the establishment of CIs, Chinese scholars and officials have paid close attention to Institutes’ development. Several related literature has been released. Huang Lianying’s article on Chinese Scholars Literature on Confucius Institute conducted a poll on related Chinese literature. Studies on CIs started in 2005, and since then the research has gained more momentum. This body of literature can be classified into several categories: functional significance (31.93%), development issues and recommendations (19.33%), Institute management and operation (14.29%), teaching content (14.29%), developmental status (10.92%), teacher-training (5.04%), the teaching method (2.52%), and language teaching materials (1.68%).71
The CI adopts a “university to university co-established” approach and introduces socialist economic system with Chinese characteristics to other countries to gain recognition.72 Chinese scholar Wang Rui analyzes cultural communication and cultural heritage through overseas CIs. Wang’s findings suggest several primary reasons for the
71 Huang Lianying, “Guonei Xuezhe Kongzi Xueyuan Yanjiu de Wenxian Zongshu” (Chinese Scholars Literature on Confucius Institute), Oriental Enterprise Culture (Dongfang Qiye Wenhua), Issue 8 (April 2011), pp. 173-174.
72 Liang Cai and Lilei Song, “Kongzi Xueyuan: Quanqiu Tixi Xia Zhongguo Zhishi Quanli De Waihua”
(Confucius Institute: The Externalization of Chinese Knowledge under the Global System), Guoji Zhanwang (International Prospect), Vol. 9 (2010), pp. 38-49.
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rapid development: China’s economic strength has become more robust; Chinese culture possesses a deep historical root; CIs can meet the increasing demands of Chinese language learners; Chinese government has been the strong sponsor for the expansion of Institutes.73
The Chinese Mandarin learning craze is rising around the world. The root cause for this phenomenon is the rapid growth of China’s economy. Two Chinese scholars, Hongqin Zhao and Jianbin Huang, argue that the Chinese language has emerged as a subject for research as well as an educational market. The enhancement and flexibility of language curriculum policy has led to the swift expansion of the CIs. The findings, however, indicate that it is unlikely that Mandarin Chinese will replace English as the world’s most widely used language in the foreseeable future. Despite the fact that English will continue to be the dominant language in the world, the view that the Chinese language is an essential component in the future unity of the world has been voiced.74 Fu Liping and Li Gang make a similar argument. They discovered that the CIs have integrated the resources of cooperation between local (Mainland China) and foreign universities, and that the cultural industry has enhanced cultural diplomacy to increase soft power. Leaders must acknowledge that cultural soft power in the West still holds a dominant position, and China still has a long way to catch up.75 By the same token, the rising interest of foreigners in Chinese culture does not mean they agree with the CCP,
73 Wang Rui, “Lun Kongzi Xueyuan Jianshe de Shidai Beijing yu Wenhua Yiyi” (Historical background and Cultural Significance of Confucius Institute) Shenyang Shifan Daxue Xuebao (Shenyang Normal University), Vol. 35, No. 2 (2011), pp. 136-138.
74 Hongqin Zhao and Jianbin Huang, “China’s Policy of Chinese as a Foreign Language and the Use of Overseas Confucius Institutes,” Educ Res Policy Prac, Vol. 9 (2010), pp. 127-142.
75 Fu Liping and Li Gang, “Kongzi Xueyuan Yu Zhongguo Wenhua Ruanshili De Tisheng” (Confucius Institute and the Ascending of the Cultural Soft Power of China), Nanjing Xiaozhuang Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of Nanjing Xiaozhuang College), Vol. 2 (March 2011), pp. 97-102.
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nor do they become less fearful of China’s rapid rise.76 Several Chinese scholars (Tseng Wen, Hong Gao, Ding Zhongyi, and Wei Xing) propose recommendations on how to improve China’s cultural soft power so as to beautify its image: the government should use the cultural soft power through CIs as its national strategic development; the Institutes should become institutionalized and flexible so that they can better promote Chinese culture.77
While Western powers are suspicious of China’s rise, Beijing urgently needs to be within a long-term peaceful and stable international environment for its goal of building a well-off society by 2020. Leadership realizes that if China wants to maintain its economic edge, it cannot rely solely on the development of its hard power. Instead, China should devote its efforts to cooperating with the major powers by displaying its softer sides of cultural power. The best approach would be strengthening cultural diplomacy through CIs.
Through cultural dissemination, China could build its credibility as a civilized country and reduce the political hostilities from the West in an attempt to influence agendas in the
Through cultural dissemination, China could build its credibility as a civilized country and reduce the political hostilities from the West in an attempt to influence agendas in the