Chapter I Introduction
1.1 The problem statement
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Since China has vigorously promoted the cultural soft power through CIs in the U.S., the operation of these Institutes deserves in-depth studies; and examining the contents of language and cultural programs of selective CIs is also necessary.
In the introductory chapter, the author proposes the problem statement; explains the methodology of this research; reviews literature of China’s soft power concept and CIs;
states potential contributions; and lays out chapters’ arrangement.
1.1 The problem statement
As China increases its influence in world politics and economy, China’s international behavior has become a worldwide spotlight; and learning Mandarin Chinese is becoming more popular. Chinese strategists have thus advised Beijing’s authorities to provide multiple channels for foreigners interested in Chinese culture. Utilization of CIs has given Beijing’s leaders a new thinking in the crafting of cultural diplomacy.20 According to the Hanban (under the Ministry of Education)— the agency financing the CI’s activities — its objectives are to promote the study of Chinese language and culture, to improve relationships between China and other countries, to develop multiculturalism, and to foster global peace and harmony.21 To achieve these objectives, Hanban provides grants to sponsoring organizations in China and overseas for the creation of CIs abroad.22
Since 2004, the year of the first CI establishment (in South Korea), overseas CIs have been widely and rapidly growing. Until March 2016, 500 Confucius Institutes and 980 Confucius Classrooms had been opened in 123 countries and regions worldwide,
20 Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Policy Brief, Vol. 47 (June, 2006), p.3.
21 “About Us,” Confucius Institute Online, September 27, 2011,
<http://english.chinese.cn/article/2011-09/27/content_342613.htm>(accessed June 2, 2014).
22 Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani and Joseph A. Ilacqua, “Confucius Institutes: Distributed Leadership and Knowledge Sharing in a Worldwide Network,” The Learning Organization, Vol. 16, No. 6 (2009), p.
473.
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with over a million registered students.23 China has sent a total of approximately 50,000 language teachers and volunteers overseas. The number of people studying Chinese on a global scale has risen to 100 million.24
Beijing believes that the CIs can generate several benefits for the nation. First is the expansion of China’s international influence. Courses provided by the CIs can help foreign students’ understandings about China that can subsequently promote a positive image and bolster its influence in the world. Second is the enhancement of China’s cultural uniqueness. The Institute showcases the positive facets of Chinese culture, contributing to foreigners’ increasing interests in that culture (i.e. in medicine, art, and gastronomy). Third is the expansion of China’s diplomatic arena. The setup of CIs is largely based on universities’ cooperation between China and hosting countries. The government can utilize the CIs as a useful platform for justifying China’s foreign policy.
The Institutes are described as Hu Jintao’s cultural soft power initiatives, designed to influence perceptions of China. Li Changchun, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, claimed CIs as an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.25
The CIs have gathered momentum in China’s foreign policy. For example, the U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State, Judith McHale, gave credits to the CIs in cementing U.S. and China relations during the National Chinese Language Conference 2010 held from April 22nd to 24th in Washington D.C. She stated that Chinese language teaching exerts not only an effect on the cultivation of international talents but also an extended influence on the
23 Hanban, “About Confucius Institute,” Hanban Website,
<http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm>(accessed March 29, 2016).
24 Hanban, “Confucius Institutes Worldwide Celebrate Confucius Institute Day,” Hanban Website, October 10, 2014,<http://english.hanban.org/article/2014-10/16/content_557341.htm>(accessed September 2, 2015).
25 “A Message from Confucius: New Ways of Projecting Soft Power,” The Economist, October 10, 2009,
<http://www.economist.com/node/14678507>(accessed April 20, 2013).
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overall interests of U.S.-China relations; and she added that the U.S. government will join forces with the society and educational institutions as well as enhance cooperation with CIs.26 The CIs have also received praises from Chinese and foreign media. On December 18, 2008, the People’s Daily selected the Confucius Institute the “10 Major Events” that took place since the Chinese economic reform. World-renowned mass media such as New York Times, Financial Times, CNN, and the BBC have also credited the CIs as being the most successful product of PRC in helping other countries to understand China.27
Although the official aim of CIs is purely education and promotion of friendly relations with other countries in nature, the language institutes are not without suspicions from international society. Media and scholars see the CIs as an attempt to exert Chinese political control. With those critics, the CI programs have been the subject of controversy during its global expansion. Their arguments include 1) infringing on academic freedom:
China’s contributions to host universities give Beijing too much leverage over those institutions. The sizeable grants coming with the establishment of CIs could make universities more susceptible to pressures from Beijing. 2) Advancing political purpose: A Taiwan independence activist, Ming-min Peng, accuses that a college or a university where a CI is established has to sign a contract in which it supports a “one China”
policy.28 3) A Trojan horse scheme: James Paradise notes that CIs may be viewed as Chinese “Trojan horses.” Paradise argues, CIs are part of a broader soft power projection in which China is attempting to win hearts and minds for political purposes.29 4)
26 Hanban, “The 3rd National Chinese Language Conference Held in Washington,” Confucius Institute Bimonthly, Vol. 8 (Beijing: Editorial Office of Confucius Institute, 2008), p.14.
27 “Telling the Story and Spreading the Voices of China – the Confucius Institute Builds a “Spiritual Express Train” Connecting China with the People of the World,” Hanban News, December 30, 2015,
<http://english.hanban.org/article/2015-12/30/content_628684.htm> (accessed March 26, 2016).
28 Peng Ming-min, “China picks pockets of academics worldwide,” Taipei Times (31 May 2011), p. 8.
29 Steven W. Mosher, “Confucius Institutes: Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics,” Testimony Presented to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
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Propaganda tool: The CIs are governed by representatives from Hanban and foreign partners, but the Chinese political system tends to conceal the extent of its influence.
According to one Chinese professor, he claims that the CIs are part of propaganda system that is directed at external audiences.30
Some countries have banned or restricted the CI for fear of China’s political penetration. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs opposed the setup of CIs in universities, arguing that they were nothing more than a Chinese design to spread its soft power — widening influence by using culture as a propaganda tool. The Japanese government has reservations as well. Of the more than 20 CIs that Hanban has been able to set up in Japan, all are at private universities. Government-funded public universities have refused to play host to the CIs.31 In 2006, China and Malaysia had prepared to establish CIs in Malaysian universities through “semi-official” form. Malaysia, where 61% of the population is Muslim, did not agree with using the name of “Confucius institute” for registration for they thought the CI has religious colors. After compromise on both sides, there was agreement to establish the Chinese Language Institute, which has the same education function as the CI but not the name.32 On May 17, 2012, the directive sent by the U.S. State Department to universities which sponsor CIs states that any academics at university-based institutes who were teaching at the elementary- and secondary-school levels were violating the terms of their visas and had to leave at the end
March 28, 2012, <http://pop.org/content/confucius-institutes-trojan-horses-chinese-characteristics>
(accessed December 1, 2015).
30 Interviewee 1.
31 Mosher, “Confucius Institutes: Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics.”
<http://pop.org/content/confucius-institutes-trojan-horses-chinese-characteristics>(accessed December 2, 2015).
32 Hao Chuan, “Legal Consideration on the Confucius Institute Development Process,” Higher Education of Social Science, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2013), p. 17.
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of the current school term in June.33 On May 24, the State Department called the original directive sloppy and arranged the appropriate visa categories for Chinese teachers, without their needing to leave the country.34 In April 2014, over 100 professors at the University of Chicago signed a petition calling for the University Senate Council vote against renewing the university’s CI contract, arguing that the Hanban should not control the hiring of teachers.35 In September, the University of Chicago suspended negotiations to renew its CI contract.36 Soon after the University of Chicago’ announcement, Pennsylvania State University stated that it would discontinue hosting a CI at the end of 2014, when the contract expired.37
Despite critics’ charge that CIs act as a platform for espionage and political purposes, several scholars argue that the major mission of CIs is mainly for language teaching and cultural expansion. For example, Peter Mattis, an editor of China Brief at the Jamestown Foundation (an American think tank), argues that the CIs are not being used for espionage because the institutes offer no benefit to China’s intelligence apparatus. China’s intelligence services have already used diplomats, journalists, civic organizations, and businessmen in their clandestine operations.38 Therefore, it would be unwise for China to use the CIs to engage in intelligence collecting that might tarnish its reputation as an
33 Karin Fischer, “State Department Directive Could Disrupt Teaching Activities of Campus-Based Confucius Institutes,” the Chronicle of Higher Education, May 21, 2012,
< http://chronicle.com/article/State-Department-Directive/131934/ >(accessed December 2, 2015).
34 Victoria Nuland, “State Department Daily Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, May 24, 2012,
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/05/190847.htm#CHINA>(accessed December 1, 2015).
35 Elizabeth Redden, “Rejecting Confucius Funding,” Inside Higher Ed, April 29, 2014,
<https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/29/chicago-faculty-object-their-campuss-confucius-insti tute>(accessed December 2, 2015).
36 “Statement on the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago,” Chicago News, September 25, 2014,
<http://news.uchicago.edu/article/2014/09/25/statement-confucius-institute-university-chicago>(accesse d December 2, 2015).
37 “Confucius Institute update,” Penn State College of Liberal Arts, December 1, 2014,
<http://www.la.psu.edu/news/confucius-institute-update>(accessed December 2, 2015).
38 Peter Mattis, “Reexamining the Confucian Institutes,” The Diplomat, August 2, 2012,
<http://thediplomat.com/china-power/reexamining-the-confucian-institutes/> (accessed March 3, 2014).
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educational organization. Other scholars (such as Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani, and Joseph A. Ilacqua) also defend CIs. Their research findings show that Hanban does not dictate the curricular design of a language or cultural program. The teaching materials provided by Hanban have been designed to meet students’ learning needs and are not intended for propaganda purposes. Hanban can’t control the contents of a lecture series or the design of a festival program. The CI at the University of Rhode Island sponsored a series of lectures. Among the invited speakers was a well-known sinologist from Yale, who openly criticized Chinese government. For the annual Chinese New Year festivals, sponsored by the CI at Bryant University, Consulate Generals from both China and Taiwan have attended. By diplomatic protocol, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs would boycott any event which has invitations extended to delegates from Taiwan.39 Though financially sponsored by Beijing’s government, the CIs focus on the dissemination of culture and avoid from being labeled as the tool of propaganda.40
There are debates whether the CIs are neutral scholarly institutions or an attempt by Beijing to control what people know about China. While supporters praise the CIs’
achievements, some view their fast expansion as an aggressive and political strategy of
39 Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani and Joseph A. Ilacqua, “Confucius Institutes: Distributed Leadership and Knowledge Sharing in a Worldwide Network,” p. 474.
40 Liang Cai and Lilei Song, “Kongzi Xueyuan: Quanqiu Tixi Xia Zhongguo Zhishi Quanli De Waihua”
(Confucius Institute: The Externalization of Chinese Knowledge under the Global System), International Prospect, Vol. 9 (November/December, 2010). There are problems arising in CIs. 1) Institute puts too much emphasis on quantities rather than qualities of teaching thus hindering the progress of promoting China’s soft power. 2) Some institutions and universities have viewed CIs as a tool to upgrade their organizational status and to make profits that could tarnish the Institutes’ reputation. 3) Textbooks of the CIs are mainly edited and provided by universities from China. Some of textbooks lack local characteristics because of having an insufficient knowledge of cultural background. Please see Ding Zhongyi and Wei Xing, “Confucius Institute: China’s Soft Power Construction,” Theory and Reform, Vol.
5 (2011), pp. 122-125. For the above reasons, some Chinese scholars have proposed the following suggestions. First, the promotion of China’s soft power through the CIs should be based on the peaceful development policy to realize national strategy. Second, the CIs should devote its efforts to promoting Chinese culture, dodging from profit-seeking, and becoming a showcase of contemporary China’s achievements. Please see Zhang Xiping, “Jianlun Kongzi Xueyuan De Ruanshili Gongneng,” (Soft Power Function of Confucius Institute), Shijie Hanyu Jiaoxue (World Chinese Language Teaching), Vol.
1 (June 2007), pp. 3-5.
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