中國文化軟實力在美國的展現：以十二個孔子學院為案例 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語博士學程 International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University (NCCU). 博士論文. 治 Doctoral 政 Dissertation 大. 立. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. 中國文化軟實力在美國的展現：以十二個孔子學院為案例. sit. y. Nat. China’s Cultural Soft Power in the United States:. n. al. er. io. A Case Study of Twelve Confucius Institutes. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 指導教授: 趙建民 Advisor: Chien-min Chao 研究生：孫紹正 Candidate: Shao-cheng Sun. 中華民國 105 年 3 月 March 2016.

(2) Abstract This research assumes that China’s cultural soft power relies on language teaching and cultural programs of the Confucius Institutes (CIs). The study selects twelve Confucius Institutes in the United States (U.S.) for analysis; examines their language courses and outreach programs; and analyzes how they contribute to China’s cultural soft power. This dissertation asks two central questions. The first question is, what. 政治大. are the positive and negative views on the CIs in the U.S.? The answer is that. 立. the CIs in the U.S. are seen with a considerable degree of ambivalence. The. ‧ 國. 學. CIs are attractive for universities seeking engagement with China, but they are also viewed as a threat. The supporters claim that knowledge and skill. ‧. gained at a CI will equip students to be more employable. To critics, the CIs. sit. y. Nat. are situated at campuses serving the interests of the Chinese Communists.. er. io. They are concerned that the CIs’ presence on campuses would interfere with. n. academic freedom. Theasecond question is, how effective v are the CI’s project in shaping China’s. i l C n h e ntheg answer image? Here c h i Uis not. very effective. For CI. students, the vocabulary they used to describe China has changed from the negative (boredom, alien, foot-binding, and communism) to the positive terms (advanced, amazing, cool, and diligent). The proportion of those with positive views of China moves up, and those with negative views go down. However, average Americans know very little about the CI. Even when they hear about the CI, most Americans are suspicious about Beijing’s intention to set up the Institute. In view of negative views from media and scholars, many Americans do not trust CI and hold a pessimistic view on China. i .

(3) The main conclusion of the study is that China’s cultural soft power has gathered limited momentum in the U.S. through the CIs. Although the improvement of China’s image can’t be achieved by CIs alone, they have made some initial contributions to smoother relations between the two countries.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. ii . i n U. v.

(4) Acknowledgements Writing this dissertation is one of the most rewarding academic journeys in my life because along the road I have received educational and personal assistance from many good Samaritans. Without them, this work would not have become a reality. Here, I would like to express my heart-felt appreciation and gratitude for their invaluable help. I am especially indebted to my dissertation committee members for their academic advices. My advisor, Professor Chien-min Chao, instructs me with a clear direction in outlining the framework and for revising the work. Because he has. 政治大. encouraged me to produce the best research possible, I will carry this attitude in mind. 立. when pursing academic career. Honorary Professor Leonardo Chu, an extremely wise. ‧ 國. 學. and well-informed scholar, enlightened my understandings of China’s image building and soft power. He generously provided much insight into this dissertation various. ‧. aspects. It was such an enjoyment to listen and learn from him. Professor Ping-Yin. y. Nat. Kuan, a warm and intellectual teacher, helped me formulate research questions. He. sit. shared with me how to conduct interviews in the U.S. Professor Simon Chang gave. n. al. er. io. me a clear guidance on how to improve my dissertation. His suggestions during my. i n U. v. oral defense were extremely helpful and greatly improved the quality of this work.. Ch. engchi. Professor David Holm kindly wrote me a letter of recommendation to the Ministry of Science & Technology. With his support, I can continue to conduct a research in the U.S. He also shares with me his valuable, first-hand experience in the Australian Confucius Institutes. Most importantly, he carefully reviewed my dissertation and offered many valuable suggestions. The seven months of research in the U.S. is such a beautiful experience due greatly in part to the interaction and guidance from the teachers and interviewees. First of all, I would give my heartfelt thank to Professor Shale Horowitz at University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee. I enjoy our times of mutual discussion on how to improve the quality of my research. Professor Barrett L. McCormick from Marquette iii .

(5) University also informed me a lot of insightful analysis and reflections about Confucius Institutes in the U.S. The relationship I respect the most is the one with Miss Joan Moeller, a respected and retired English teacher, who spent more than two months carefully proofreading my writings. At least twice a week, she would discuss with me and correct my writings. Without her kind help, this work would not have been possible. I am also very grateful for the valuable input from my interviewees at various university Confucius Institutes. During my stay in the U.S., I also receive much spiritual nourishment from teachers at the Lutheran Memorial Chapel and Eastbrook Church. These teachers. 治政 Zimmerman, and Shane Martin. With their love and 大care, our family has had a 立 wonderful time in the U.S. include Bessie Fick, Rev. Dr. Kenneth Wieting, Tim Albers, Pastor Adam Shidler, Dan. ‧ 國. 學. In this acknowledgement I would also like to thank my family. The unconditional. ‧. love of my parents has been the greatest source for pushing me further. My deceased father, Zhi-Peng Sun, had always encouraged me to work hard and to achieve. Nat. sit. y. excellence. My mother, Yu-Zhao Xie, had to suffer through our long absences. Her. er. io. values imbued the importance of education within me. Without her, this degree would. al. v i n Chome taking care of my mother and our we wereUoverseas. My thanks also go to h e nwhile gchi n. not be possible. I would also like to extend my gratitude to my sister Joy Sun for. my children, Michael and James; they are the source of my joy and pride. While I. spend long hours doing research, they behaved extremely well. I hope they will grow up to value the importance of education. Of course, I wish to express my appreciation to my wife Anna Liao for her self-sacrificing care and nurture of the family and for the countless hours chauffeuring me to different states for interviews. Thus I dedicate this work with deepest gratitude for her love and support. Most important, I give thanks to our Heavenly Father for giving the strength to complete my second Ph.D. and pray that He continues to guide my next steps for His glory. iv .

(6) Table of Contents Abstract……..……………...……………..……..………………………………………i Acknowledgements..………………….……..………………………………………iii List of Tables……..…………….……….……..………………………………………v Chapter I Introduction…………….………..………………………………………1 1.1 The problem statement……….………….………………………………………6. 政治大 1.3 Literature review…….……………….……………………………………….. 13 立 1.2 Methodology………………….……….………………………………………. 12. ‧ 國. 學. 1.4 Structure of the study…………………………………………………………...26. ‧. 1.5 Summary………………………………..……….……………………………...28. sit. y. Nat. Chapter II Theoretical Framework…………...……............…………………..30. io. n. al. er. 2.1 The soft power resources………………….……………………………………31. i n U. v. 2.2 Conceptualizing cultural soft power………………..…………………………..38. Ch. engchi. 2.3 Operationizing cultural soft power…………….……….………………………49 2.4 Research method…….………….……………………………………………...59 2.5 Summary……….………..……………………………………………………...60. Chapter III China’s Cultural Soft Power Strategy and the Confucius Institutes……..…………………………………………………...…62 3.1 The evolution of China’s cultural policy……….…….………………………...64 3.2 The Confucius Institute project…………….………….……………………….72 v .

(7) 3.3 Confucius Institutes’ approaches to disseminate cultural soft power…….…….82 3.4 The global expansion of Confucius Institutes………….………….…………...87 3.5 Summary………………..…………….………………………………………...92. Chapter IV Confucius Institutes in the United States…………………...…94 4.1 Confucius Institutes’ project in the United States…….………………….…….95 4.2 Confucius Institutes’ status in the United States…….………..………………..99 4.3 Summary……………….…………………………………….………………..115. 治政 Chapter V Views on the Confucius Institutes 大 in the United States.......119 立 ‧ 國. 學. 5.1 The Confucius Institutes’ reception in the United States………..….…………120 5.2 The effectiveness of Confucius Institutes in promoting soft power……..……138. ‧. 5.3 Summary………….…………………..……………………………………….143. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. Chapter VI Conclusion…………….………...………..………………………….147. v. n. 6.1 Findings……………………….…………………………...……….…………147. Ch. engchi. i n U. 6.2 Answers to the research questions……………………………………….……151 6.3 Summary………….……..…………………………………………………….152. Appendix I Interview Guides……………………….…………………………..154 Appendix II The Basic Background of the Interviewees……..…………..158 Appendix III Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes…160 Appendix IV Glossary……………………………………………………...……..169 References………...………………………………………………………………..172 vi . .

(8) Tables 1. Annual numbers of setup of CIs and CCs (Table I)……………………...……………54 2. Annual numbers of students’ enrolment (Table II)……………………………………55 3. Annual numbers of the Chinese proficiency test takers (Table III).………………..…55 . 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. vii . i n U. v.

(9) Chapter I Introduction In international relations, power means one state having the ability to influence the behavior of other states. The power can take both a hard and a soft form. The former would be one state changing the behavior of another state by threatening them. The latter would be a state changing the behavior of another state by enticing them.1 Joseph Nye, an American professor at Harvard University, coined the term “soft power” in the late 1980s, defining it as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than. 政治大 political ideals, and foreign policies. When the policies of a country are seen as legitimate 立. coercion.”2 He argues that soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture,. ‧ 國. 學. in the eyes of others, soft power is enhanced.3 Nye’s soft power concept has provided a novel idea for strategists to use to cope with a changing international environment after. ‧. the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the demise of the Cold War, international system. sit. y. Nat. had undergone a transitional period. Hard power (military and economy), dominant in the. io. al. er. past, has gradually lost its grip in leading global affairs, while soft power, focused on. n. culture, is on the rise. Many countries have started to embark on the soft power strategy in global competition.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Soft power as a recent concept in international affairs is long rooted in Chinese culture and society. The idea of soft power dates back to ancient Chinese philosophers such as Laozi (604 BC - 531 BC), who said: “Water is fluid, soft, and yielding. But water. 1. 2. 3. Shryll Whittaker, China’s Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives (South Orange: Seton Hall University Master Thesis, 2013), p. 24. Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 25. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p.1. 1.

(10) will wear away rock.” 4 After Joseph Nye proposed the soft power theory, China’s academic circles accepted this idea. Research on this relevant topic has also become a fad. Although there is no unanimous definition of soft power, most Chinese scholars would agree that culture is the core component.5 They claim that, after two thousand years of practice Confucianism represents the essence of China’s cultural soft power and that it is embedded in Chinese society. Developed from the teachings of Confucius, Confucianism is characterized as a system of social and ethical philosophy. It built on an ancient religious foundation to establish the social values, and institutions of traditional Chinese. 政治大 understood to contribute to the establishment of a harmonious society. 立. society. Confucianism is focusing on morality and interpersonal ethics, which is 6. Given that. ‧ 國. 學. Confucianism has been practiced in daily life, Chinese people can embrace the concept in the power of culture as their non-coercive strength.7. ‧. As China’s national comprehensive power continues to strengthen, its soft power is. Nat. sit. y. becoming an indispensable form of global competition. Chinese strategists observe that. n. al. er. io. the prior great powers, such as the Roman Empire, Imperial Britain, and the United States. i n U. v. (U.S.), relied not simply on coercive power but also on attractive values and cultural. Ch. engchi. influence. They argue that the declining U.S. power can be attributed to its waning soft power brought about by the unpopularity of unilateralism, reduced attention to cultural diplomacy, and the war waged in the Middle East.8 The former General Secretary of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hu Jintao is a strong advocate of prioritizing the soft. 4. 5. 6 7. 8. Priscilla Roberts ed., Going Soft? The US and China Go Global (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2014), p. 60. Zhang Pei, “The International System Transition and the Construction of China’s Soft Power,” International Forum (Winter 2008), pp: 34-47. Judith A. Berling, “Confucianism,” Asian Religions, Vol.2, No. 1 (Fall 1982), p. 5. Mingjiang Li, ed., Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (Lanham: Lexington-Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), p.25. Ibid., pp. 497-498. 2.

(11) power strategy into foreign policy agenda and of knitting it with “scientific development” 9 of national strategy in attempting to garner a broader international support.10 Several Chinese scholars (such as a political theorist Wang Huning, a professor at the Party School of the CCP Men Honghua, and a former director of the Shanghai Institute Yu Xintian) have come up with innovative ideas to bolster China’s soft power. One such idea is that the harmonious world11 of the foreign policy under Hu Jintao should be promoted as a globally shared value to ascend into a morally high ground in the. 政治大. world. Another idea is that China should transform itself from a participant to an active. 立. establisher in the international system to wield greater influence in leading international. ‧ 國. 學. institution reform. A third proposal is that the Chinese government should improve its image and embed Chinese culture in the international system to win over “hearts and. ‧. minds” of other countries. The aim of these suggestions is to showcase China’s soft. Nat. sit. y. power so that Chinese character of foreign policy can be a leading force in directing the. n. al. er. io. future international system. Beijing has increased its influence with more approaches by. i n U. v. using a combination of culture, diplomacy, and participation in multinational organizations.12. Ch. engchi. 9. The scientific development concept is the official guiding socio-economic ideology of China incorporating sustainable development, social welfare, a humanistic society, and, ultimately, the creation of a harmonious society. 10 Jacques DeLisle, “Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Competition and U.S. Policy,” ORBIS, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2010), p. 493. 11 In September 2005, President Hu Jintao called for a harmonious world concept at the summit for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. He expounded on the concept by making a four-point proposal: 1) multilateralism should be upheld to realize common security; 2) mutually beneficial cooperation should be upheld to achieve common prosperity; 3) the spirit of inclusiveness must be upheld to build a world where all civilizations coexist harmoniously and accommodate each other; and 4) the UN needs rational and necessary reform to maintain its authority. Please see Zou Keyuan, “Building a Harmonious World: A Mission Impossible?” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2012), p. 74. 12 Whittaker, China’s Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives, p. 29. 3.

(12) Beijing’s leaders have prioritized the cultural soft power strategy into China’s foreign policy agenda to garner a broader international support.13 Hu Jintao noted at the CCP’s Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group Meeting on January 4, 2006, that the increase of China’s international influence rests on hard power such as the economy, science and technology, and defense as well as on soft power such as culture.14 Hu further highlighted the importance of cultural soft power at the 17th and 18th CCP Congress in 2007 and in 2012 respectively, addressing culture as the crucial component in enhancing national comprehensive power. Hu argued that China urgently needs to. 政治大 content of cultural soft power with Chinese characteristics. They acknowledge that 立. upgrade its cultural soft power.15 Chinese officials and scholars have also enriched the. ‧ 國. 學. cultural soft power is critical to China’s image building, at the forefront of which is the Confucius Institute. The reason for Beijing’s use of Confucius’s name to brand the. ‧. language-training Institutes is that the harmony and idea found in the philosophy of. sit. y. Nat. Confucius, a renowned educator and thinker, are rooted in Chinese cultural traditions.16. n. al. er. io. Following the examples of western countries of promoting languages and culture. i n U. v. overseas such as the British Council, Alliance Française, the Goethe Institute, and the. Ch. engchi. Japan Foundation, the CI concept represents a means of promoting Chinese soft power worldwide. CIs develop a range of various programs designed to develop interest for foreigners in studying Chinese society and language and creating stronger personal and. 13 14 15. 16. DeLisle, “Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Competition and U.S. Policy,” p. 493. Li, Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics, p.1. “Hu Jintao’s Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” People’s Daily Online, December 25, 2007, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/67507/6429849.html>(accessed October 1, 2014). “Full text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress,” Xinhua, November 17, 2012, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259_7.htm>(accessed October 1, 2014). Hanban, 2006 Annual Report (Beijing: Hanban, 2006), p. 9. 4.

(13) institutional relationships.17 The target country of this study, the U.S., has been chosen for several reasons. First, Chinese leaders have frequently claimed that the improvement of China-U.S. relations is the top priority for China’s foreign policy. Another reason is that the U.S. has the largest number of Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Confucius Classrooms (CCs) around the world. A third reason is that the Chinese government has poured the most resources into American CIs, whose functions are the most well-established of all programs. Finally, Chinese leaders are most concerned about responses from the U.S. During their official. 政治大. visits in the U.S., the Chinese leaders would pay visits to CIs (for example, on January 21,. 立. 2011, President Hu Jintao paid a visit to the CI in Chicago) to show their supports of. ‧ 國. 學. forging a closer cultural interaction between the U.S. and China.. ‧. Since 2004, when the first CI in the U.S. was launched (at the University of Maryland), its development has taken off rapidly because the influx of CI’s dollars. y. Nat. io. sit. continues to come at a time when the U.S. government funding for language studies has. n. al. er. been slashed. 18 Other factors of booming include the following: the CIs provide a. Ch. i n U. v. platform for students to learn Chinese language and culture; Chinese guest teachers paid. engchi. by the PRC government were a major benefit to their universities; Hanban (Zhongguo Guojia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao Xiaozu Bangongshi, the colloquial abbreviation for the Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language), the Confucius Institute Headquarters, provides the free textbooks and teaching materials.19. 17. 18. 19. Sirirat Ngamsang and John Walsh, “Confucius Institutes as Instruments of Soft Power: Comparison with International Rivals,” Journal of Education and Vocational Research, Vol. 4, No. 10 (Oct 2013), p. 302. Elizabeth Redden, “Confucius Says,” Inside Higher Ed, January 1, 2012, <http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/04/debate-over-chinese-funded-institutes-american-univ ersities>(accessed March 28, 2016). Muriel M. Zhou, School-University Partnership in Teaching the Mandarin Chinese Language: The Confucius Institute Experience (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Ph.D. Dissertation, 2011), pp. 39-40. 5.

(14) Since China has vigorously promoted the cultural soft power through CIs in the U.S., the operation of these Institutes deserves in-depth studies; and examining the contents of language and cultural programs of selective CIs is also necessary. In the introductory chapter, the author proposes the problem statement; explains the methodology of this research; reviews literature of China’s soft power concept and CIs; states potential contributions; and lays out chapters’ arrangement. 1.1 The problem statement. 政治大 behavior has become a worldwide spotlight; and learning Mandarin Chinese is becoming 立. As China increases its influence in world politics and economy, China’s international. ‧ 國. 學. more popular. Chinese strategists have thus advised Beijing’s authorities to provide multiple channels for foreigners interested in Chinese culture. Utilization of CIs has given. ‧. Beijing’s leaders a new thinking in the crafting of cultural diplomacy.20 According to the. sit. y. Nat. Hanban (under the Ministry of Education)— the agency financing the CI’s activities —. io. al. er. its objectives are to promote the study of Chinese language and culture, to improve. n. relationships between China and other countries, to develop multiculturalism, and to. v i n CTohachieve these objectives, e n g c h i U Hanban provides grants. foster global peace and harmony.21. to sponsoring organizations in China and overseas for the creation of CIs abroad.22. Since 2004, the year of the first CI establishment (in South Korea), overseas CIs have been widely and rapidly growing. Until March 2016, 500 Confucius Institutes and 980 Confucius Classrooms had been opened in 123 countries and regions worldwide,. 20. 21. 22. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Policy Brief, Vol. 47 (June, 2006), p.3. “About Us,” Confucius Institute Online, September 27, 2011, <http://english.chinese.cn/article/2011-09/27/content_342613.htm>(accessed June 2, 2014). Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani and Joseph A. Ilacqua, “Confucius Institutes: Distributed Leadership and Knowledge Sharing in a Worldwide Network,” The Learning Organization, Vol. 16, No. 6 (2009), p. 473. 6.

(15) with over a million registered students.23 China has sent a total of approximately 50,000 language teachers and volunteers overseas. The number of people studying Chinese on a global scale has risen to 100 million.24 Beijing believes that the CIs can generate several benefits for the nation. First is the expansion of China’s international influence. Courses provided by the CIs can help foreign students’ understandings about China that can subsequently promote a positive image and bolster its influence in the world. Second is the enhancement of China’s cultural uniqueness. The Institute showcases the positive facets of Chinese culture,. 政治大. contributing to foreigners’ increasing interests in that culture (i.e. in medicine, art, and. 立. gastronomy). Third is the expansion of China’s diplomatic arena. The setup of CIs is. ‧ 國. 學. largely based on universities’ cooperation between China and hosting countries. The government can utilize the CIs as a useful platform for justifying China’s foreign policy.. ‧. The Institutes are described as Hu Jintao’s cultural soft power initiatives, designed to. Nat. sit. y. influence perceptions of China. Li Changchun, a member of the Politburo Standing. n. al. er. io. Committee, claimed CIs as an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.25. Ch. i n U. v. The CIs have gathered momentum in China’s foreign policy. For example, the U.S.. engchi. Deputy Secretary of State, Judith McHale, gave credits to the CIs in cementing U.S. and China relations during the National Chinese Language Conference 2010 held from April 22nd to 24th in Washington D.C. She stated that Chinese language teaching exerts not only an effect on the cultivation of international talents but also an extended influence on the. 23. 24. 25. Hanban, “About Confucius Institute,” Hanban Website, <http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm>(accessed March 29, 2016). Hanban, “Confucius Institutes Worldwide Celebrate Confucius Institute Day,” Hanban Website, October 10, 2014,<http://english.hanban.org/article/2014-10/16/content_557341.htm>(accessed September 2, 2015). “A Message from Confucius: New Ways of Projecting Soft Power,” The Economist, October 10, 2009, <http://www.economist.com/node/14678507>(accessed April 20, 2013). 7.

(16) overall interests of U.S.-China relations; and she added that the U.S. government will join forces with the society and educational institutions as well as enhance cooperation with CIs.26 The CIs have also received praises from Chinese and foreign media. On December 18, 2008, the People’s Daily selected the Confucius Institute the “10 Major Events” that took place since the Chinese economic reform. World-renowned mass media such as New York Times, Financial Times, CNN, and the BBC have also credited the CIs as being the most successful product of PRC in helping other countries to understand China.27 Although the official aim of CIs is purely education and promotion of friendly. 政治大. relations with other countries in nature, the language institutes are not without suspicions. 立. from international society. Media and scholars see the CIs as an attempt to exert Chinese. ‧ 國. 學. political control. With those critics, the CI programs have been the subject of controversy during its global expansion. Their arguments include 1) infringing on academic freedom:. ‧. China’s contributions to host universities give Beijing too much leverage over those. Nat. sit. y. institutions. The sizeable grants coming with the establishment of CIs could make. n. al. er. io. universities more susceptible to pressures from Beijing. 2) Advancing political purpose: A. i n U. v. Taiwan independence activist, Ming-min Peng, accuses that a college or a university. Ch. engchi. where a CI is established has to sign a contract in which it supports a “one China” policy.28 3) A Trojan horse scheme: James Paradise notes that CIs may be viewed as Chinese “Trojan horses.” Paradise argues, CIs are part of a broader soft power projection in which China is attempting to win hearts and minds for political purposes. 29 4). 26. 27. 28 29. Hanban, “The 3rd National Chinese Language Conference Held in Washington,” Confucius Institute Bimonthly, Vol. 8 (Beijing: Editorial Office of Confucius Institute, 2008), p.14. “Telling the Story and Spreading the Voices of China – the Confucius Institute Builds a “Spiritual Express Train” Connecting China with the People of the World,” Hanban News, December 30, 2015, <http://english.hanban.org/article/2015-12/30/content_628684.htm> (accessed March 26, 2016). Peng Ming-min, “China picks pockets of academics worldwide,” Taipei Times (31 May 2011), p. 8. Steven W. Mosher, “Confucius Institutes: Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics,” Testimony Presented to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 8.

(17) Propaganda tool: The CIs are governed by representatives from Hanban and foreign partners, but the Chinese political system tends to conceal the extent of its influence. According to one Chinese professor, he claims that the CIs are part of propaganda system that is directed at external audiences.30 Some countries have banned or restricted the CI for fear of China’s political penetration. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs opposed the setup of CIs in universities, arguing that they were nothing more than a Chinese design to spread its soft power — widening influence by using culture as a propaganda tool. The Japanese. 政治大. government has reservations as well. Of the more than 20 CIs that Hanban has been able. 立. to set up in Japan, all are at private universities. Government-funded public universities. ‧ 國. 學. have refused to play host to the CIs.31 In 2006, China and Malaysia had prepared to establish CIs in Malaysian universities through “semi-official” form. Malaysia, where. ‧. 61% of the population is Muslim, did not agree with using the name of “Confucius. Nat. sit. y. institute” for registration for they thought the CI has religious colors. After compromise. n. al. er. io. on both sides, there was agreement to establish the Chinese Language Institute, which has. i n U. v. the same education function as the CI but not the name.32 On May 17, 2012, the directive. Ch. engchi. sent by the U.S. State Department to universities which sponsor CIs states that any academics at university-based institutes who were teaching at the elementary- and secondary-school levels were violating the terms of their visas and had to leave at the end. 30 31. 32. March 28, 2012, <http://pop.org/content/confucius-institutes-trojan-horses-chinese-characteristics> (accessed December 1, 2015). Interviewee 1. Mosher, “Confucius Institutes: Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics.” <http://pop.org/content/confucius-institutes-trojan-horses-chinese-characteristics>(accessed December 2, 2015). Hao Chuan, “Legal Consideration on the Confucius Institute Development Process,” Higher Education of Social Science, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2013), p. 17. 9.

(18) of the current school term in June.33 On May 24, the State Department called the original directive sloppy and arranged the appropriate visa categories for Chinese teachers, without their needing to leave the country.34 In April 2014, over 100 professors at the University of Chicago signed a petition calling for the University Senate Council vote against renewing the university’s CI contract, arguing that the Hanban should not control the hiring of teachers.35 In September, the University of Chicago suspended negotiations to renew its CI contract. 36 Soon after the University of Chicago’ announcement, Pennsylvania State University stated that it would discontinue hosting a CI at the end of 2014, when the contract expired.37. 立. 政治大. Despite critics’ charge that CIs act as a platform for espionage and political purposes,. ‧ 國. 學. several scholars argue that the major mission of CIs is mainly for language teaching and cultural expansion. For example, Peter Mattis, an editor of China Brief at the Jamestown. ‧. Foundation (an American think tank), argues that the CIs are not being used for espionage. Nat. sit. y. because the institutes offer no benefit to China’s intelligence apparatus. China’s. n. al. er. io. intelligence services have already used diplomats, journalists, civic organizations, and. i n U. v. businessmen in their clandestine operations.38 Therefore, it would be unwise for China to. Ch. engchi. use the CIs to engage in intelligence collecting that might tarnish its reputation as an. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. Karin Fischer, “State Department Directive Could Disrupt Teaching Activities of Campus-Based Confucius Institutes,” the Chronicle of Higher Education, May 21, 2012, < http://chronicle.com/article/State-Department-Directive/131934/ >(accessed December 2, 2015). Victoria Nuland, “State Department Daily Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, May 24, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/05/190847.htm#CHINA>(accessed December 1, 2015). Elizabeth Redden, “Rejecting Confucius Funding,” Inside Higher Ed, April 29, 2014, <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/29/chicago-faculty-object-their-campuss-confucius-insti tute>(accessed December 2, 2015). “Statement on the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago,” Chicago News, September 25, 2014, <http://news.uchicago.edu/article/2014/09/25/statement-confucius-institute-university-chicago>(accesse d December 2, 2015). “Confucius Institute update,” Penn State College of Liberal Arts, December 1, 2014, <http://www.la.psu.edu/news/confucius-institute-update>(accessed December 2, 2015). Peter Mattis, “Reexamining the Confucian Institutes,” The Diplomat, August 2, 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/china-power/reexamining-the-confucian-institutes/> (accessed March 3, 2014). 10.

(19) educational organization. Other scholars (such as Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani, and Joseph A. Ilacqua) also defend CIs. Their research findings show that Hanban does not dictate the curricular design of a language or cultural program. The teaching materials provided by Hanban have been designed to meet students’ learning needs and are not intended for propaganda purposes. Hanban can’t control the contents of a lecture series or the design of a festival program. The CI at the University of Rhode Island sponsored a series of lectures. Among the invited speakers was a well-known sinologist from Yale, who openly criticized Chinese government. For the annual Chinese New Year festivals,. 政治大 Taiwan have attended. By diplomatic protocol, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs would 立 sponsored by the CI at Bryant University, Consulate Generals from both China and. ‧ 國. 學. boycott any event which has invitations extended to delegates from Taiwan.39 Though financially sponsored by Beijing’s government, the CIs focus on the dissemination of. ‧. culture and avoid from being labeled as the tool of propaganda.40. Nat. sit. y. There are debates whether the CIs are neutral scholarly institutions or an attempt by. n. al. er. io. Beijing to control what people know about China. While supporters praise the CIs’. i n U. v. achievements, some view their fast expansion as an aggressive and political strategy of. 39. 40. Ch. engchi. Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani and Joseph A. Ilacqua, “Confucius Institutes: Distributed Leadership and Knowledge Sharing in a Worldwide Network,” p. 474. Liang Cai and Lilei Song, “Kongzi Xueyuan: Quanqiu Tixi Xia Zhongguo Zhishi Quanli De Waihua” (Confucius Institute: The Externalization of Chinese Knowledge under the Global System), International Prospect, Vol. 9 (November/December, 2010). There are problems arising in CIs. 1) Institute puts too much emphasis on quantities rather than qualities of teaching thus hindering the progress of promoting China’s soft power. 2) Some institutions and universities have viewed CIs as a tool to upgrade their organizational status and to make profits that could tarnish the Institutes’ reputation. 3) Textbooks of the CIs are mainly edited and provided by universities from China. Some of textbooks lack local characteristics because of having an insufficient knowledge of cultural background. Please see Ding Zhongyi and Wei Xing, “Confucius Institute: China’s Soft Power Construction,” Theory and Reform, Vol. 5 (2011), pp. 122-125. For the above reasons, some Chinese scholars have proposed the following suggestions. First, the promotion of China’s soft power through the CIs should be based on the peaceful development policy to realize national strategy. Second, the CIs should devote its efforts to promoting Chinese culture, dodging from profit-seeking, and becoming a showcase of contemporary China’s achievements. Please see Zhang Xiping, “Jianlun Kongzi Xueyuan De Ruanshili Gongneng,” (Soft Power Function of Confucius Institute), Shijie Hanyu Jiaoxue (World Chinese Language Teaching), Vol. 1 (June 2007), pp. 3-5. 11.

(20) China to gain world power status.41 Hence, the research questions for this dissertation are listed as follows: Q1: What are the positive and negative views on the Confucius Institutes in the United States? Q2: How effective of the Confucius Institutes in shaping China’s image in the United States? 1.2 Methodology. 政治大. The main goal of this study is to explore the effectiveness of China’s cultural soft. 立. power strategy through CIs in the U.S. using the twelve CIs as a particular case study.. ‧ 國. 學. Qualitative research is applied to offer an in-depth understanding and comprehensive analysis on China’s cultural soft power. The case study involves an in-depth examination. ‧. of a single event; it provides a systematic way of looking at events, collecting data,. Nat. io. sit. y. analyzing information, and reporting results.42. n. al. er. The data for empirical research are mainly from archival research of primary and. Ch. i n U. v. secondary sources and in-depth interviews. The dissertation is descriptive in nature and. engchi. illustrates what is happening and why it is happening. Field interviews are one way to collect opinions. Interviewees were asked questions based on their knowledge of and experience with the CI (Please see Appendix I). These data offer an insight into the perspective of current CIs’ status. This research also benefits by using existing surveys of. 41. 42. Shuai Li and Yanyin Zhang, “A Survey of the U.S. Confucius Institutes: Opportunities and Challenges in Promoting Chinese Language and Culture Education,” Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association, Vol. 48, No. 1 (February 2013), pp. 29-30. Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Third Edition) (London: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 13. 12.

(21) the U.S. public view on China.43 The writer has reviewed all the official websites and many annual reports of the CIs in the U.S. Based on the available information and focus of this study (cultural soft power), this dissertation for analysis has narrowed down and selected twelve CIs. This section also explores their language programs and cultural activities as well as responses from CIs’ students and participants. This dissertation first clarifies key variables: the effectiveness of China’s cultural soft power strategy (dependent variable) and cultural diplomacy such as promotion of. 治政 language teaching courses and cultural dissemination programs 大 through CIs (independent 立 variables). This research dissects how cultural diplomacy influences China’s cultural soft ‧ 國. 學. power. The writer then reports results and assesses their implications. Despite the. ‧. information collection limitation (particularly the insufficient budget for visiting other CIs), the generalization can be done. If we have a clear research scope, we can still make. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. 1.3 Literature review. sit. an overall analysis of a particular case.44. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Cultural soft power has been embraced by Chinese scholars and leaders because it appears to be an alternative to power politics.45 Research has been carried out by a plethora of well-known experts, usually in major universities (including Tsinghua and Fudan), research centers (for instance, the Central Party School), and relevant branches of. 43. 44. 45. The data analysis in this study followed the two phases. The first phase entails classifying, comparing, and combining material from the interviews to extract meaning and implication. The second phase figures out what data mean by building toward description. Please see Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (Second Edition) (London: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 13. Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3 (September 1971), p. 691. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 81. 13.

(22) the government (such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The products of their analyses have appeared in leading academic and policy journals.46 Unlike Nye’s focus on the efficacy of soft power in achieving foreign policy goals, Chinese scholars frequently refer to a domestic context. For example, political analyst Yu Keping argues that education, the psychological and physical condition of the people, technology, culture, social cohesion, and socio-economic development are all sources of soft power.47 Wang Huning considers soft power under the following six aspects: political system, national spirit, the international image of society, foreign strategy, the capability of the international system,. 政治大 Social Sciences, views soft power resources including: core values, political systems, 立. science and technology development. Liu Jie, a scholar at the Shanghai Academy of. ‧ 國. 學. culture, philosophy, and the national spirit.48 This dissertation has taken most of the recent literature from journals, books, official documents, and the CIs’ website. The. sit. y. Nat. Confucius Institutes.. ‧. following section categorizes the literature into either China’s soft power concept or. n. al. er. io. 1.3.1 China’s soft power concept. Ch. i n U. v. China’s scholars attempt to craft their own soft power strategy with Chinese. engchi. characteristics. Although related studies have increased, there is no shared definition of what soft power actually means.49 On the whole, scholars’ writings focus mainly on two parts: China’s soft power concept and its relations with foreign policy. The Soft Power Research Group of Beijing University conducted a study on the practice of soft power in China. The highlight of their researches states that the key to. 46. 47 48 49. Joel Wuthnow, “The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 44, No. 2 (June 2008), p. 2. Li, ed., Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics, p. 28. Ibid, p. 22. Shaun Breslin, “The Soft Notion of China’s Soft Power,” Asia Programme Paper (February 2011), p. 2. 14.

(23) understanding soft power is to know relations between soft power and hard power. The hard power lays the foundation of the soft power. For China, its economic development is not only the core of hard power but also a solid basis for cultivating soft power. Hard power sustained by economic power could be beneficial to boost soft power, but its contribution is limited.50 In order to enhance China’s soft power, Men Honghua states that the philosophy of soft power can be enriched by addressing the important resources of culture, China’s development model, international institutions, and international image.51 Mingjiang Li proposes an approach positive use soft power’s resources. He. 政治大 countries, it will win reciprocity. If a country has the ability to make proposals in 立 contends that if a country uses the resources in a prudent way in its relations with other. ‧. ‧ 國. soft power.52. 學. multilateral institutions that the international community regards as beneficial, it gains. “Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics,” written by two researchers from Center. Nat. sit. y. for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Bonnie Glaser and Melissa Murphy,. n. al. er. io. summarizes their findings. First, international observers have raised the concern of the. i n U. v. expansion of China’s soft-power influence. Second, soft power is a hot topic in China.. Ch. engchi. The mainstream intellectual view is that culture is the core resource of a state’s power. The view has been embraced by China’s leadership. Third, despite strong interest at the highest circles, China has yet to develop a comprehensive and coherent national soft-power strategy. Finally, as China expands its national power and assumes a bigger role on the international stage, it is possible that Beijing will promote the China. 50. 51. 52. Beijing Daxue Zhongguo Ruan Shili Ketizu (Chinese Soft Power Research Group of Beijing University), “Ruanshili Zai Zhongguo De Shijian Zhi Yi―Ruanshili Gainian,” (One of the Practice of Soft Power in China—the Concept of Soft power), People’s Daily Online, March 5, 2008, <http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49157/49165/6957188.htm>(accessed March 3, 2014). Men Honghua, “Zhongguo Ruanshili Pinggu Baogao(shang),” (Chinese Soft Power Assessment Report), Guoji Guancha (International Observation), Vol. 2 (2007), pp.15-26. Li, ed., Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics, p. 7. 15.

(24) development model.53 Another U.S. scholar, Joel Wuthnow, in his paper “The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse” describes that the discourse on soft power within China’s strategic studies community offers a window into Chinese thinking about non-coercive strategy. Wuthnow provides an assessment of the discourse, covering the conceptualization of soft power development as a key component of China’s grand strategy. Three mechanisms through which soft power can support China’s long-term growth have been discussed: the efforts to earn international understanding of its Confucian heritage; the involvement of China’s leadership position in the developing. 政治大 Two Korean scholars, Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, investigate China’s 立. world; and the policies through which China can enhance its image as a responsible power.54. ‧ 國. 學. soft power strategy and resources by focusing on three areas: the developmental model, foreign policy, and civilization. They conclude that China’s recognition of soft power and. ‧. its application to national policies is an important factor in explaining China’s improving. sit. y. Nat. image and increasing influence in Asia.55. n. al. er. io. Competitions in soft power have laid the cornerstone to build a new international. i n U. v. system. Chinese strategists are exploring innovative approaches in its rise in international. Ch. engchi. politics. There have been several notable elements of these approaches in China’s diplomatic practice, including softer rhetoric, promotion of culture abroad, and image building.56 The idea of soft power figures crucially in the story of China’s re-emergence as a global power. China has embarked on its quest for an image makeover.57 “China’s. 53. 54 55. 56 57. Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, “Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics,” in McGiffert, (ed.) Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States (October 5, 2009), p. 10. Joel Wuthnow, “The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse,” pp. 1-28. Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, “China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects, Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 3, (May/June 2008), pp. 453-472. Li, ed., Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics, p.1. Jian Wang, (ed.) Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 1-14. 16.

(25) Harmonious World: Theory and Significance,” written by Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu, finds that peace and development have become China’s grand strategy for the fourth generation leaders. The harmonious world theory is a diplomatic strategy that is designed to pave the way for building a new world order. While intending to construct overseas CIs as the core of cultural foreign policy, China has tried to build a soft power policy that can realize its foreign policy objective to project image of peaceful rise.58 With changes of identity and interests interacting between China and the world, Hu Jintao has advocated the notion of a harmonious world to create a collective identity of the world.59 Shulan Ye,. 政治大 China has the possibility to rise peacefully and become the regional leader by peaceful 立. an instructor at the Department of Politics at East China Normal University, argues that. ‧ 國. 學. means if it can commit to constructing a regional identity by drawing from the strength of its culture in conjunction with western values.60 Yu Xintian claims that soft power is a. ‧. powerful instrument for representing national culture in the international community and. sit. y. Nat. should be regarded as an essential resource of crafting foreign policy. China should value. io. er. the interests of foreign countries and accordingly put forth proposals on strengthening soft power by seeking a feasible approach of win-win cooperation.61. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Hu Jintao’s administration has employed Chinese traditional culture and modern art to engage in exchanges and cooperation with other countries.62 One of the approaches to. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. Chao Chien-min and Hsu Chih-chia, “Zhonggong Di Sidai Lingdao Jiti de Hexie Shijieguan Lilun yu Yihan” (China’s Harmonious World: Theory and Significance) Yuanjing Jijinhui Jikan (Prospect Quarterly), Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 27-28. Tang Jiang-Yu, “Jiangou Zhong De Hexie Shijie—Hexie Shijie Linian de Jiangou” (Harmonious World in Construction—An Observation of the Concept of Harmonious World from the Perspective of Constructivism), Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of University of International Relations), Vol. 3 (2008), pp. 7-12. Ye Shulan, Rising China’s Regional Policy in East Asia: A Constructivist Perspective (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Baptist University Ph.D. Dissertation, August 2010). Yu Xintian, “Soft Power Construction and China’s Foreign Strategy,” International Studies, Vol. 2 (2008), pp. 15-20. Yu Xintian, “The Role of Soft Power in China’s External Strategy,” Global Review (2007), pp. 113-127. Yang Yu-Sheng, Zhonggong Waijiao Zhanlue Zhuanbian Yu Chuangxin 2002-2008—Ruanshili Waijiao 17.

(26) promote China’s soft power is through the state-run China Central Television (CCTV) International.63 Since 2000, China has implemented the policy of outreach and has used media to exert its influence worldwide. According to international polls, there is an increasing trend in the developing countries which have a positive view of China.64 Soft Power and the Rise of China: an Assessment of China’s Soft Power in its Modernization Process, written by Sheng Ding, focuses on two subjects: the theoretical discussion of soft power and its assessment and an assessment of China’s soft power in its modernization process. The author concludes that China has achieved impressive gains in. 政治大 admiration while aiding in the development of a new affinity between China and the rest 立. its overall level of soft power. Its successful development model has won global. ‧ 國. 學. of Asia. Its new diplomacy has led to China’s more active and responsible participation in international affairs, which is increasing China’s agenda setting abilities and improving its. ‧. national image. However, further expansion of China’s soft power is constrained both by. sit. y. Nat. its domestic political institutions and by those of international crises. More importantly,. io. er. the rise of China is occurring at a time when the international system is undergoing a. al. structural transformation, which inevitably complicates China’s efforts to project its soft. n. v i n power. However, China might haveC ah long way to go before e n g c h i U it possesses the level of soft power needed to make it a true global leader.65. As for China’s role in Asia, Philip Saunders, a scholar from the U.S. National Defense University, finds that educational contacts between China and Asia have. 63. 64. 65. Zhanlue De Fensi (China’s Diplomatic Strategic Change and Innovation 2002-2008—Soft Power’s Diplomatic Strategy) (Taipei: Tamkang University Master Thesis, 2009). Zhang Xiaoling, “China as an Emerging Soft Power: Winning Hearts and Minds through Communicating with Foreign Republic,” Discussion Paper, Vol. 35 (October 2008), pp. 1-18. Zhong-Jian Deng and Yu-Nu Lu, “Zhongguo Dalu Ruanquanli De Fazhan yu Yingxiang” (The Development and Influence of China’s Soft Power), Quanqiu Zhengzhi Pinglun (Review of Global Politics), Vol. 21 (2008), pp.1-18. Sheng Ding, Soft Power and the Rise of China: an Assessment of China’s Soft Power in its Modernization Process (New Jersey: The State University of New Jersey Ph.D. Dissertation, 2006). 18.

(27) multiplied. Beijing supplements educational exchanges by supporting the establishment of CIs in Asia, and talented Chinese artists are beginning to win regional recognition.66 China is considered to be the primary economic patron of the small but strategically important countries such as Burma, Cambodia, and Laos; it also provides considerable economic aid to Indonesia and the Philippines.67 However, problems of “China’s New Colonialism” and the increased vigilance from the other powers in the area have begun to challenge Beijing.68 Chinese strategists thus recommend that the government should institutionalize the foreign aid mechanism and increase interactions between Chinese. 政治大. officials and the local governments.69. 立. Achievements of the cultural soft power within China are reflected in the. ‧ 國. 學. improvement of cultural system reform, cultural industries, and overseas cultural information dissemination. Despite Chinese culture having been taught by immigrant. ‧. Chinese since WWII, the flourishing CIs in the recent past has helped more foreigners. Nat. sit. y. learn about Chinese culture. Although China’s cultural soft power may already be. n. al. er. io. diffused, there is still much needed to be done. Scholar Zhang Guozuo has a few. i n U. v. suggestions: establish a value system for socialism, promote Chinese culture, upgrade. Ch. engchi. culture with scientific development, and shape national image through culture.70 The above literature primarily explores why China employs the soft power strategy. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. Philip Saunders, “China’s Role in Asia,” in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, edited International Relations of Asia (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 137-141. Thomas Lum, Wayne M. Morrison, and Bruce Vaughn, “China’s Soft Power in Southeast Asia,” CRS Report for Congress (January 4, 2008). Sheng Ding, “To Build A Harmonious World: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the Global South,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2008), pp. 193-213. Wei Xuemei, “Dui Tisheng Zhongguo Ruanshili de Sikao: Yi Dui Feizhou Yuanzhu Wei Shijiao” (Thought on Promoting China’s Soft Strength: from the Perspective of Aiding to Africa), Fujian Xingzheng Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of Fujian Administration Institute), Vol. 4 (2010), pp. 66-71. Zhang Guozuo, “Tisheng Woguo Wenhua Ruanshili de Zhanlue Sikao” (The Strategic Thinking of Enhancing China’s Cultural Soft Power), Qiushi (Seeking Truth), April 4, 2011, http://www.qstheory.cn/tbzt/sqjlz/zgtsshzywh/qshqwg/201104/t20110427_78521.htm (accessed September 25, 2014). 19.

(28) and what the benefits are of implementing this strategy. These studies commonly lack a theoretical perspective that restricts them from having much academic value. Nonetheless, they can still contribute to a better understanding of the reasons why Chinese highest circles choose soft power strategy. 1.3.2 China’s cultural diplomacy: Confucius Institutes In the 21st century, the cultural soft power has occupied a strategic high ground as reflected in the study of international relations theory and in the performance of the cultural renaissance throughout the world. Since the establishment of CIs, Chinese. 治政 scholars and officials have paid close attention to Institutes’ 大development. Several related 立 literature has been released. Huang Lianying’s article on Chinese Scholars Literature on ‧ 國. 學. Confucius Institute conducted a poll on related Chinese literature. Studies on CIs started. ‧. in 2005, and since then the research has gained more momentum. This body of literature can be classified into several categories: functional significance (31.93%), development. y. Nat. io. sit. issues and recommendations (19.33%), Institute management and operation (14.29%),. n. al. er. teaching content (14.29%), developmental status (10.92%), teacher-training (5.04%), the. Ch. i n U. v. teaching method (2.52%), and language teaching materials (1.68%).71. engchi. The CI adopts a “university to university co-established” approach and introduces socialist economic system with Chinese characteristics to other countries to gain recognition.72 Chinese scholar Wang Rui analyzes cultural communication and cultural heritage through overseas CIs. Wang’s findings suggest several primary reasons for the. 71. 72. Huang Lianying, “Guonei Xuezhe Kongzi Xueyuan Yanjiu de Wenxian Zongshu” (Chinese Scholars Literature on Confucius Institute), Oriental Enterprise Culture (Dongfang Qiye Wenhua), Issue 8 (April 2011), pp. 173-174. Liang Cai and Lilei Song, “Kongzi Xueyuan: Quanqiu Tixi Xia Zhongguo Zhishi Quanli De Waihua” (Confucius Institute: The Externalization of Chinese Knowledge under the Global System), Guoji Zhanwang (International Prospect), Vol. 9 (2010), pp. 38-49. 20.

(29) rapid development: China’s economic strength has become more robust; Chinese culture possesses a deep historical root; CIs can meet the increasing demands of Chinese language learners; Chinese government has been the strong sponsor for the expansion of Institutes.73 The Chinese Mandarin learning craze is rising around the world. The root cause for this phenomenon is the rapid growth of China’s economy. Two Chinese scholars, Hongqin Zhao and Jianbin Huang, argue that the Chinese language has emerged as a subject for research as well as an educational market. The enhancement and flexibility of. 政治大. language curriculum policy has led to the swift expansion of the CIs. The findings,. 立. however, indicate that it is unlikely that Mandarin Chinese will replace English as the. ‧ 國. 學. world’s most widely used language in the foreseeable future. Despite the fact that English will continue to be the dominant language in the world, the view that the Chinese. ‧. language is an essential component in the future unity of the world has been voiced.74 Fu. Nat. sit. y. Liping and Li Gang make a similar argument. They discovered that the CIs have. n. al. er. io. integrated the resources of cooperation between local (Mainland China) and foreign. i n U. v. universities, and that the cultural industry has enhanced cultural diplomacy to increase. Ch. engchi. soft power. Leaders must acknowledge that cultural soft power in the West still holds a dominant position, and China still has a long way to catch up.75 By the same token, the rising interest of foreigners in Chinese culture does not mean they agree with the CCP,. 73. 74. 75. Wang Rui, “Lun Kongzi Xueyuan Jianshe de Shidai Beijing yu Wenhua Yiyi” (Historical background and Cultural Significance of Confucius Institute) Shenyang Shifan Daxue Xuebao (Shenyang Normal University), Vol. 35, No. 2 (2011), pp. 136-138. Hongqin Zhao and Jianbin Huang, “China’s Policy of Chinese as a Foreign Language and the Use of Overseas Confucius Institutes,” Educ Res Policy Prac, Vol. 9 (2010), pp. 127-142. Fu Liping and Li Gang, “Kongzi Xueyuan Yu Zhongguo Wenhua Ruanshili De Tisheng” (Confucius Institute and the Ascending of the Cultural Soft Power of China), Nanjing Xiaozhuang Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of Nanjing Xiaozhuang College), Vol. 2 (March 2011), pp. 97-102. 21.

(30) nor do they become less fearful of China’s rapid rise.76 Several Chinese scholars (Tseng Wen, Hong Gao, Ding Zhongyi, and Wei Xing) propose recommendations on how to improve China’s cultural soft power so as to beautify its image: the government should use the cultural soft power through CIs as its national strategic development; the Institutes should become institutionalized and flexible so that they can better promote Chinese culture.77 While Western powers are suspicious of China’s rise, Beijing urgently needs to be within a long-term peaceful and stable international environment for its goal of building a. 政治大. well-off society by 2020. Leadership realizes that if China wants to maintain its economic. 立. edge, it cannot rely solely on the development of its hard power. Instead, China should. ‧ 國. 學. devote its efforts to cooperating with the major powers by displaying its softer sides of cultural power. The best approach would be strengthening cultural diplomacy through CIs.. ‧. Through cultural dissemination, China could build its credibility as a civilized country. Nat. sit. y. and reduce the political hostilities from the West in an attempt to influence agendas in the. al. n. Washington Consensus.”78. er. io. Asia Pacific affairs, and finally reach the goal of “the Beijing Consensus replacing the. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. To minimize the fear of China’s threat and to realize the goal of well-off society, China is adopting a peace-oriented strategy through the use of CIs.79 James F. Paradise’s. 76. 77. 78. 79. Zhang Xiping, On Soft Power Capability of Confucius Institute (Taipei: Chengchi University Master Thesis, 2009). Tseng Wen, “The Study on China’s Wide-Spread Confucius Institutes—An Analysis of Soft Power,” Genamics Journal, Vol. 3 (2007). Hong Gao, “An Analysis of the Phenomenon of Global Mandarin Fever,” Asian Social Science, Vol. 7, No. 12 (December 2011), pp. 253-257. Ding Zhongyi and Wei Xing, “Confucius Institute: An Effective Platform for Soft Power Construction in China,” Theory and Reform, Vol. 5 (2011), pp.122-125. Hsieh Yu-yen, Dui Zhonggong Jiango Shijie Zhi Yanjin Yi Sheli Kongzi Xueyuan Weili (The Research on China Building A Harmonious World – A Case Study of the Establishment of Confucius Institute) (Taipei: Tamkang University Master Thesis, 2008). Ho Min-chih, Hu Jintao Shiji Zhonggong Wenhua Zhi Yanjiu Yi Kongzi Xueyuan Weili (The Research of China’s Cultural Diplomacy under Hu Jintao’s Period—An Case Study of Confucius Institute) (Taipei: 22.

(31) paper “China and International Harmony: the Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power” states that China is setting up Institutes to spread its language and culture and to increase collaboration with foreign academic institutions. China is projecting a more favorable image and re-assures the world that its intentions are benign. Its approaches include espousing theories of China’s peaceful rise and development and disseminating information through various government white papers and websites oriented toward foreign readers.80 There are two researches on the CIs in Germany and Thailand as a case study. Falk. 政治大. Hartig uses Confucius Institutes in Germany to discuss the concepts of cultural diplomacy. 立. and culture institutes as a conceptual tool to analyze CIs. This case study provides. ‧ 國. 學. empirical data to explore China’s image-shaping efforts in Germany.81 Hartig discovered that CIs are not only designed to teach language and promote culture but also aim to. ‧. balance the dominant American cultural influence. The Institutes also contribute, at least. Nat. sit. y. indirectly, to China’s foreign policy agenda.82 Olan Sumananusorn has used the soft. n. al. er. io. power perspective to analyze the relations between China and Thailand. The findings. i n U. v. show that the traits of China’s foreign policy are that Beijing has emphasized a. Ch. engchi. peace-oriented approach and cultural strategy to create a favorable international environment.83 The paper “Confucius Institutes: Distributed leadership and knowledge sharing in a worldwide network,” written by Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani, and Joseph A. Ilacqua,. 80. 81. 82 83. Ming Chuan University Master Thesis, 2009). James F. Paradise, “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power, Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July/August 2009), pp. 647-665. Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies, Vol. 17 (March 2012), pp. 53-76. Ibid., p. 57. Olan Sumananusorn, China’s Cultural Soft power toward Thailand in the 21st century: A Case Study of Confucius Institute (Taipei: Chengchi University Master Thesis, 2009). 23.

(32) focuses on CIs and assesses the applicability of theories of leadership and knowledge sharing to multinational organizations and worldwide networks. The research applies theoretical developments to analyze leadership and knowledge sharing of the successful CIs. The findings are that many similarities exist between the operations of the CIs and multinational businesses. For both, strategic goals are achieved through the promotion of global expansion and the management practices.84 The number of K-12 schools in the U.S. offering Mandarin Chinese has been growing. Muriel M. Zhou investigated how six U.S. secondary schools developed. 政治大. Mandarin Chinese programs through partnership with the CI at University X, and. 立. explored how the partnership helped those schools achieve their educational goals. The. ‧ 國. 學. study found that the partnership was complementary and cooperative in nature and the schools worked with the CI on a need-response basis. Working in the partnership as. ‧. “loosely coupled systems,” the schools enjoyed autonomy and flexibility, but they were. Nat. sit. y. challenged with much uncertainty and a lack of consistency and communication on a. n. al. er. io. regular basis. 85 Amy Stambach, a distinguished professor at the University of. i n U. v. Wisconsin-Madison, explored how CI teachers and U.S. students use language to identify. Ch. engchi. qualities of Chinese people and culture. The study argues that students’ and teachers’ contextualized use of language occurs in relation to their different yet naturalized assumptions about a commonly shared social world. The article offers the concept of linguistic hegemony to aid in understanding the multiple expressions of language form. 84. 85. Hsi Chang Li, Sam Mirmirani and Joseph A. Ilacqua, “Confucius Institutes: Distributed Leadership and Knowledge Sharing in a Worldwide Network,” The Learning Organization, Vol. 16 No. 6 (2009), pp. 469-482. Muriel M. Zhou, School-University Partnership in Teaching the Mandarin Chinese Language: The Confucius Institute Experience. 24.

(33) and use that emerge in CI programs.86 Confucius Institute project: China’s cultural diplomacy and soft power projection, written by Su-Yan Pan, applies the theory of cultural diplomacy to explore and explain the role and function of the CI project and its implications for understanding China’s soft power projection. This paper first presents the theories of soft power and cultural diplomacy as an analytic framework. It then delineates an interpretative illustration of the CI project as a platform for China’s cultural diplomacy. The paper argues that the CI’s project can be understood as a form of cultural diplomacy that is state-sponsored and. 政治大. university-piloted, a joint effort to gain China a more sympathetic global reception. As. 立. such, the project involves a complex of soft power techniques. However, it is not entirely. ‧ 國. 學. representative of soft power capability because the problems embedded in the project and in wider society run counter to the Beijing’s efforts to increase the CIs’ attractiveness and. ‧. popularity.87. y. Nat. io. sit. Presently the setup of CIs is at the developmental stage, with most studies on. n. al. er. Institutes focusing on the exploration of the mission and functions of Chinese culture. Ch. i n U. v. transmission in the international arena. The body of literature discussed in this chapter is. engchi. valuable for the understanding of China’s favoring the soft power strategy and the CIs, and for predicting their future trend. The relevant research on the relations between CIs and cultural soft power is, however, understudied, especially in terms of their operations in the U.S. Moreover, the literature presented in general lacks theoretical discussions. As such, the main purpose of this dissertation is to improve and to discuss further the. 86. 87. Amy Stambach, “Confucius Institute Programming in the United States: Language Ideology, Hegemony, and the Making of Chinese Culture in University Classes,” Anthropology & Education Quarterly, Vol. 46, Issue 1 (2014), pp. 55–70. Su-Yan Pan, Confucius Institute Project: China’s Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection (Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Institute of Education, 2013). 25.