Chapter V Views on the Confucius Institutes in the United States
5.1 The Confucius Institutes’ reception in the United States
the Chinese language;5 knowledge and skill gained at a CI will equip students to be more employable.6 Many U.S. universities agree to host CIs because of the financial incentives.
Without Hanban’s assistance, some institutions might not have the funding to start their Chinese language programs.7 American academics and journalists have debated various aspects of the CI. Since domestic public opinion is the driving force in crafting U.S.
foreign policy, how CI projects are perceived in the U.S. will determine how successful Chinese soft power will be. If mass media and scholars frame the CIs favorably, these language institutes will be an important asset to Chinese foreign policy.8 The section below examines how the mass media, CI personnel, scholars, and general public view CIs in the U.S.
5.1 The Confucius Institutes’ reception in the United States
The CIs serve as China’s major soft power drive to increase the number of foreigners coming to admire Chinese culture. Chinese top leaders praised the CI program for its important role in enhancing understanding and friendship across the world.9 The self-praise atmosphere, however, is clouded by increasing criticism.10 The CIs in the U.S.
are considered with an uncertain degree of ambivalence. They are attractive to universities seeking engagement with China but also viewed as a potential threat to
5 Christopher R. Hughes, “Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the Cultural,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 50, Issue 4 (2015), p. 45.
6 Chen, Jia, “US Confucius Institutes gather,” China Daily, September 30, 2013, p.1.
7 When then-Senator Richard Lugar asked then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton why the U.S. did not open more centers in China to emulate the work of the CIs, Clinton responded, “We don’t have that kind of money in the budget.” See Mike Gonzalez, “China’s Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC,” The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder #2986
on Asia and the Pacific, February 5, 2015,<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/02/chinas-public-opinion-warfare-how-our-culture-i
ndustry-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-prc>( accessed January 2, 2016).
8 Whittaker, China’s Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives, p.1.
9 Shannon Tiezzi, “The Future of China’s Confucius Institutes,” The Diplomat, September 30, 2014,
<http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/the-future-of-chinas-confucius-institutes/>( accessed January 2, 2016).
10 Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “A Spoiled Anniversary: China Reacts to Confucius Institute Controversy,” China Brief, Vol.14, Issue 19 (October 10, 2014), p.1.
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academic freedom.11 Tensions surfaced with a series of incidents starting in 2012. In March at that year, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee held a hearing on Chinese propaganda efforts (including CIs) in the U.S.12 An amendment of the working visa policy issued by the State Department on May 24 stated that any faculty working in a university through a J-1 visa who teaches students of elementary or secondary school is violating visa rules. If enacted, 51 CIs teachers would have to leave the U.S. by June 30.
Chinese media characterized the U.S. directive as a sudden attack on CIs. The State Department backtracked, claiming the move was an administrative error, and promised that no Chinese teacher would be forced to leave the U.S.13 The House Committee held another hearing in December 2014 on whether academic freedom is threatened by China’s influence, with the CI receiving particular attention.14 The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) called for universities to cease their involvement in the CIs. Several universities have stepped away from their affiliation with the CIs. For example, the University of Chicago suspended negotiations for the renewal of the CI, and Pennsylvania State University announced it would end cooperation with the CI.15 The CI has seemingly become another source of friction in U.S.-China relations.16
The American CIs have triggered a round of debates and have been under scrutiny as many academics argue that Beijing-funded institutes wind up restricting academic freedom at their host universities.17 There have also been allegations of CIs monitoring
11 Wang Danping and Bob Adamson, “War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA,” The Asia-Pacific Education Researcher, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 2014), p. 225.
12 Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes – Quo Vadis?” The Diplomat, December 21, 2014,
<http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/confucius-institutes-quo-vadis/>(accessed Feb 2, 2015).
13 Wang Danping and Bob Adamson, “War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA,” p. 226.
14 Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes – Quo Vadis?”
<http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/confucius-institutes-quo-vadis/>(accessed Feb 2, 2015).
15 Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “A Spoiled Anniversary: China Reacts to Confucius Institute Controversy,” p. 2.
16 Wang and Adamson, “War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA,” p. 226.
17 Shannon, “The Future of China’s Confucius Institutes,”
<http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/the-future-of-chinas-confucius-institutes/>(accessed January 2, 2016).
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Chinese students abroad and attempting to advance China’s political agenda.18 Some supporters, however, say that CIs could help increase cultural exchange and better understanding of two major powers. The following further illustrates positive and responses towards the CIs in the U.S.
5.1.1 Positive views
The reason for the CI’s growth is the rising demand for Chinese language learning, reflecting the glowing promise of the Chinese economy. In the U.S., Chinese has emerged as a must-have language. Hanban provides lucrative incentives to the host institution such as start-up costs, annual payments over a five-year period, and teachers’ salaries. Other incentives include students’ tours to China; funding research on China; dining with university presidents on visits to China; air travel and hotels, etc.19 In 2006, the U.S.
College Board signed an agreement with the Hanban to engage the two countries in a variety of activities to promote Chinese programs. The College Board president, Gaston Caperton, commented that Chinese language and culture is an excellent way to promote international exchange. Michael Hill, the director of the Program in Chinese at the University of South Carolina, claimed, “without the CI, I don’t see how we could offer our current array of courses. Students have benefited from working with experienced instructors from our partner school.”20 These statements show positivity in terms of attitude and demonstrate American expectation to have engagement with China. The effect of such collaborations has expanded, and the influence of CIs is felt in diverse
18 Interviewee 13. Steven W. Mosher, “Confucius Institutes: Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics,”
Mar 28, 2012, Testimony Presented to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations House Committee on Foreign Affairs, p.2.
19 Garcia, “Scholarly Subversion or Innocuous Instruction? The Confucius Institute Debate,”
<http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2015/01/19/scholarly-subversion-or-innocuous-instruction>(accessed January 2, 2016).
20 Stephen Levine, Matteo Mecacci, Michael Hill, Zha Daojiong, Stephen Hanson, Mary Gallagher, “The Debate Over Confucius Institutes in the United States,” Foreign Policy, July 11, 2014,
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/11/the_debate_over_confucius_institutes>(accessed January 2, 2016).
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dimensions in American society.21
According to one survey taken by CIs’ students at Bryant University and the University of Massachusetts, the vocabulary used to describe China had moved away from terms such as boring, alien, foot-binding, and communism to beautiful, advanced, amazing, cool, and hard work. The proportion of those with “very positive” views of China has moved from 33% up to 52%, and those with “negative” or “slightly negative”
views of the PRC has moved down from 28% to 3%.22 Defending academic freedom
While the institute exists (thanks to a grant from Hanban), its governance remains solely within a university’s influence. Quite a few scholars describe the fears regarding CIs as unfounded. According to Richard Saller, Stanford University’s dean of Humanities and Sciences, Hanban has no input on staffing or curriculum. Their gift is like any other endowment gift. Saller emphasized, “We don’t let them constrain any of our academic freedom.”23 Professor John Mark Hansen, chair of the Board of Directors of University of Chicago, said in a statement, “Academic freedom has always been a paramount value at the University of Chicago, and faculty members here are deeply committed to free inquiry…That’s as true of faculty members who participate in the work of the CI.” Dali Yang, director of the CI at the University of Chicago, said, “Chinese instructors apply to work with Hanban. The nominees are then interviewed and selected by University faculty and teach the same curriculum as other instructors. The faculty has the right to reject nominated CI instructors.”24 The director of Columbia’s CI, Liu Lening, stated, “CI is
21 Wang and Adamson, “War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA,” p. 230.
22 Hughes, “Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the Cultural,”
p. 72.
23 Michael Gioia, “Forbes accuses Stanford of collaborating with Chinese spies via Confucius Institute,”
<http://www.stanforddaily.com/2014/10/24/forbes-accuses-stanford-of-collaborating-with-chinese-spies-via-confucius-institute/>(accessed January 23, 2016).
24 Ibid.
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committed to academic integrity and that it would reject any attempt by Hanban to censor its research.”25
In countering the AAUP calling on all universities hosting CIs to cease contracts with Hanban, Stephen Hanson, the CI director at the College of William and Mary, responded that he has not experienced any self-censorship from Hanban. Lectures and conferences on subjects like the Tiananmen protests, the status of Tibet and Taiwan, and Falun Gong take place on campuses.26 Edward McCord, the director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University, also disagrees with the AAUP.27
“We’ve not ever had the experience of anybody telling us, don’t talk about that, or, this is a sensitive topic, avoid that,” said Ken Hammond, a co-director of the CI at New Mexico State University. The CI boards tend to have 50-50 representation from the American university and its Chinese partner university. There is no way that CI is getting orders from Hanban.28 Deborah Pierce, director for Webster University’s CI, said, “I was a professor for 30 years and would never, ever agree to anything that I felt meddled with academic freedom and would not be involved in anything where that was the case.”
Pierce said Webster has never experienced any censorship from the institute when it came to human rights or political issues concerning China.29
Stanford University received $ 4 million from Hanban to fund an endowed professorship in Sinology, graduate student fellowships, and collaborative programming
25 Wang and Adamson, “War and Peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA,” p. 231.
26 Stephen I. Levine, Matteo Mecacci, Michael Hill, Zha Daojiong, Stephen E. Hanson, Mary Gallagher,
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/11/the_debate_over_confucius_institutes>(accessed January 2, 2016).
27 Thorpe, “The Future of Confucius Institutes in the U.S.,”
<http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/united-states-china-confucius-institutes-academic-freedom-culture-sh arp-seminar>(accessed January 2, 2016).
28 Elizabeth Redden, “Confucius Controversies,” Inside Higher ED, July 24, 2014,
<https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/07/24/debate-renews-over-confucius-institutes>(accessed January 2, 2016).
29 Cindy Liu, ed., “A tour of Confucius Institutes in the Americas,” China Daily, May 30, 2014,
<http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/30/content_17553900.htm>(accessed to January 2, 2016)..
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with Peijing University. Richard Saller said that during discussions of the gift Hanban expressed concern that the endowed professor might discuss “politically sensitive things, such as Tibet…We don’t restrict the freedom of speech of our faculty… I’ve had domestic donors walk away because of that, and in this case Hanban did not walk away.”30 He added that when he was provost at the University of Chicago, the French government established the France Chicago Center with a million dollar gift. “The consulate in Chicago was far more involved in trying to influence the nature of the programming for the purposes the French wanted to see, than Hanban has been for our program.”31
According to the Cconstitution and by Laws of CIs (Appendix III), the annual plans of local CIs must be submitted to Beijing for approval. “However, none of this has ever happened, Hanban has never told us what to do or not to do. No plans of CI events and research proposals have been rejected by Beijing,” say a chorus of CI directors.32 As the founder of the CI at the University of Texas A&M, Alan Kluver said, “I do not know a CI director who would agree to any programming that makes concessions to Beijing.”33 Wang Ban, chair of the department of East Asian languages at Stanford, said, “Critics presume that our CI is funded and is thus controlled by the Chinese government...The CI is funded by an endowment, half of which comes from the Hewlett Foundation, with no strings attached. Stanford faculty and administrators manage and make decisions for CI
30 Redden, “Confucius Says ...”,
<https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/04/debate-over-chinese-funded-institutes-american-uni versities>(accessed March 28, 2016).
31 Ibid.
32 Garcia, “Scholarly Subversion or Innocuous Instruction? The Confucius Institute Debate,”
<http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2015/01/19/scholarly-subversion-or-innocuous-instruction>(accessed January 2, 2016).
33 Gregory Lee, (ed.) “The Debate Over Confucius Institutes PART II,” China File Conversation, July 1, 2014,
<http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/debate-over-confucius-institutes-part-ii>(accessed March 28, 2016).
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events and programs.”34 Hanban has probably concluded that it reaps so much benefit from the CIs that if they do anything that might jeopardize their image, it is not worth doing.35
The CI personnel’s responses to criticisms from various American faculties and media are one-sided and biased. One of interviewees said U.S. media covering CIs are mostly negative because of their lack of understanding about CI’s actual functions and prejudice about the rise of China. He said few professors in his university were strong critics of China in the past. After they have an opportunity to teach in China, their image on China has dramatically changed. For example, one professor strongly opposed the CI instructors teaching credit courses. After visiting China as an exchange scholar, he finally changed his mind. He continued to elaborate, “Some elite universities claimed that having a CI in their campus interrupting their academic autonomy is not justifiable…Some professors did not receive grants from the Chinese government in conducting research.
They might have hostilities against the Chinese government funded institute in their campuses… Unfamiliarity raised hostility. That is why CI instructors serve as a bridge for narrowing down the differences between the two countries.”36
The CI teachers keep away from sensitive issues. One CI teacher said, “Our textbooks are purely for teaching Chinese language and introducing Chinese culture. We do not touch upon political issues. Only when students ask sensitive questions, we will base on our own understanding the answers. The answers do not necessarily represent government’s views.”37 One CI director said, “Our CI did not have the problem of
34 Qidong Zhang, “Stanford dean: Builds Bridges with CI,” China Daily USA, April 4, 2014,
<http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2014-04/04/content_17408050.htm>(accessed June 23, 2015).
35 Jennifer Hubbert, “Ambiguous States: Confucius Institutes and Chinese Soft Power in the U.S.
Classroom,” Academia.Edu,
<http://www.academia.edu/8957882/Ambiguous_States_Confucius_Institutes_and_Chinese_Soft_Power _in_the_U.S._Classroom>(accessed March 28, 2016).
36 Interviewee 14.
37 Interviewee 15.
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academic freedom. When we signed a contract with Chinese counterpart, it said the teachings adhered to the regulation of our university. The spending will abide by the State’s regulation…If the CI instructors teach credit courses, they have to be viewed and finalized by department Chair.”38 One interviewee said, “If the CI is located off-campus, the Chinese government can totally control the institute. However, the CI on campus can be under the monitoring of the faculty and administrators. They will keep a watchful eye on CI. There is thus no way for CI violating academic autonomy…Moreover, now the Chinese government seldom talks about CI enhancing soft power instead of focusing on education.”39
Obtaining appreciation about China
The CIs could help generate appreciation by connecting Chinese dreams with those of the rest of the world. Knowledge gained at a CI could help students to be more employable. Susan Pertel Jain, CI director at UCLA, emphasized that her institute is not only a platform for learning language but a platform for professionals in art to polish their professions in communicating with China. For Middle Tennessee State University (MTSU), CI’s impact went beyond language and culture. MTSU President Sydney McPhee said, “MTSU has carved out a space for CI to develop a Chinese music program.
The CI also helped MTSU’s research collaboration with Chinese counterparts. MTSU connected with Guangxi Botanical Garden in Nanning, to study the medicinal effect of Chinese herbs.”40 Richard Saller said, “CI is a bridge that promotes mutual understanding among Chinese and American people and academics, and benefits both Chinese and American cultures…The U.S.-China relationship is dependent on such understanding in today’s world simply because we cannot afford making any mistakes of
38 Interviewee 10.
39 Interviewee 14.
40 Cindy Liu, ed., “A tour of Confucius Institutes in the Americas,”
<http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/30/content_17553900.htm>(accessed December 1, 2015).
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Hanban describes itself as a public institution that goes all out in meeting the demands of foreign Chinese learners and contributing to the building of a harmonious world.42 “I do not know of any other government programs of any other countries that’s been so successful in 10 years...Hanban and CI have done more to improve the visibility and positive image of China than almost anything else,” said Wallce Loh, president of University of Maryland.43 Nine days a semester, the CI sends instructors to the Warren Regional Juvenile Detention Center to give the students a look into Chinese culture.
Rebecca Painter, the Center’s science teacher, said, “They supplement us with the fact that we can’t go out on field trips, so they bring it to us.”44 Wang Ban, chair of the department of East Asian languages at Stanford, said, “The CI at Stanford allows researchers in the U.S. to have an excellent platform of scholarly research and exchange with our Chinese colleagues in Beijing University and other Chinese universities.”45 The CIs can serve as a bridge to help Chinese people and foreigners know more about each other.
The immense growth in China’s economy and its global investment means there has been growing global interest in learning Chinese. After English, Chinese is now the second most widely used language on the internet. Those students who have gone through the courses would know more about China. The CI can provide the story in terms of
41 Qidong Zhang, “Stanford dean: Builds bridges with CI,” April 4, 2014, China Daily USA,
<http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2014-04/04/content_17408050.htm> (accessed June 23, 2015).
42 Gonzalez, “China’s Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC,” p.4.
43 Cindy Liu, Cai Chunying, Chang Liu, “A Tour of Confucius Institutes in the Americas,” China Daily, May 30, 2014,<http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/30/content_17553900.htm> (accessed December 1, 2015).
44 Mackenzie Mathews, “Confucius Instructors Teach Students in Detention Center,” Wkuherald, April 16, 2014,<http://wkuherald.com/news/article_612fb5c0-c5b7-11e3-a9af-001a4bcf6878.html>(accessed
44 Mackenzie Mathews, “Confucius Instructors Teach Students in Detention Center,” Wkuherald, April 16, 2014,<http://wkuherald.com/news/article_612fb5c0-c5b7-11e3-a9af-001a4bcf6878.html>(accessed