CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1. Research question and its importance
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research question and its importance
Mao Zedong´s oft-repeated adage that “women hold up half of the sky” is still in use today by some government officials in China (Wallis, 2006). However, a closer look at the reality of China’s political structures proves different.
Women still engage in political life in lower numbers than men. According to the National Working Committee on Children and Women under the State Council (NWCCW), in 2007, there were 15 million females in the cadre and personnel system in China, making up 38% of the total (Xinhua, 2016).The phrase “cadres and personnel system” was first used in a political report of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) for its 13th National Congress. It’s a combination of two terms: the cadre system and the personnel system, more commonly referred to as the “cadres”. The term “cadres” refers to personnel in Party and government organs, enterprises and service units who assume leadership, management or technologically specialized posts through predetermined procedures (Wang, 1994).
The gender gap in the CPC starts at the grass roots level (from the number of affiliates to the CPC) to eventually reflect in the upper echelons (the peak of the CPC´s hierarchy), where the disparity is more obvious. In 2011, the number of women affiliates to the CPC was 19.25 million out of a total 82.602 million members which constitutes 23,3%
of the total members (China Today, 2016). However, according to Yu and Liu (2010) the proportion of female delegates in the four main political institutions -- National People´s Congress (NPC), Chinese People´s Consultative Conference (CPCC), Central Committee
‧
of Communist Party of China (CCCPC) and, Politburo (PB)-- from 1954 to 2002 “(..) does not even reach the amount to one fourth of the total, not to say half”.
Gender inequality in Chinese politics is an undeniable fact. This, then, begs the question: Is there a reason behind the symbolic presence of women in the decision-making circle? A selection bias? Is there a “glass ceiling” in Chinese politics?
The term “glass ceiling” was used for first time in 1984 by Gay Bryant in his book The Working Woman Report: Succeeding in Business in the 80’s. In sociology and gender studies, the “glass ceiling” refers to the limiting career advancement of women within organizations. It is a psychological ceiling that makes it difficult for women to be promoted.
In consonance with Cotter, Hermsen, Ovadia and Vanneman (2001) there are four characteristics that concur to the existence of a “glass ceiling”: “ (…) a gender difference that is not explained by other job-relevant characteristics of the employee, a gender difference that is greater at higher levels of an outcome than at lower levels of an outcome, a gender inequality in the chances of advancement into higher levels, not merely the proportions of each gender currently at those higher levels and, a gender inequality that increase over the course of a career”.
Despite the fact that there is obvious discrimination against women and a gender gap within Chinese politics, the focus of this study is not to investigate gender imbalances, but merely to increase existing knowledge on women who have broken the “glass ceiling”
and have reached top leadership positions within the party-state.
The main research question therefore is: Do the attributes of female elites influence their mobility within the CPC? Linked to this question, the secondary research focus will look at the profiles of the women who are promoted, whether these promotions are strategic or random, and whether these women share certain attributes that make them more successful than others? In addition, it will research the speed of upward mobility for
‧
individual women, the patterns of mobility, and how the “glass ceiling” is affecting their political careers?
Thus far the study of elites has focused on the analysis of family backgrounds, career backgrounds and values (Hoffmann-Lange, 2006). In the case of Chinese political elite, extensive literature provides insights on the standard profile of elite members in terms of political connections, career histories, and official statements regarding ideology and Party role. However, due to the small number of female elite members, the majority of studies focus on men (Chow, Zhang, & Wang, 2004).
This leaves a gap in the information available for the profiling of female elite members. In order to further understanding on female elite mobility, it is important to understand how these women are breaking the “glass ceiling”. This thesis, therefore, could be useful in closing the leadership gap and fostering greater gender equality within the CPC.
The importance of the research question also links to the concept of “political opportunity structure”. According to Rootes (1999) “political opportunity structure” can be defined as “the constraints and opportunities configured by the institutional arrangements and the prevailing patterns of political power which are the inescapable contexts of political action”. MacAdam (2004) defines it as “a multi-dimensional concept that allows the researcher to analyze some of the reasons for a social movement’s success or failure”. And, it includes four elements: “(…) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that undergird a policy, the presence or absence of elite allies, the state’s capacity and propensity for repression”.
Even though the term “political opportunity structure” has only been used in the analysis of social movements, considering feminism, as both a political and a social movement that seeks to achieve gender equality in society, then it is possible to infer that
“political opportunity structure” as the inescapable circumstances surrounding a political
‧
Chinese political elite may be influencing a more favorable political opportunity structure for women’s interest.Afshar (1996) underlines that the character of women’s self-representation and the
“political opportunity structure” do not exist independently of each other. As Randall (1998) states “woman can seize opportunities presented, but their intervention will simultaneously be constrained and even shaped by the character of these political openings”.
Evidence accredit that the greater women representation is; the better represented their interests are (Sapiro, 1981)(Markham, 2013). Markham does not clearly define what he means by the term “women’s interest,” but for the purpose of the research, women’s interest can be defined as overcoming of the gap between men and women in any sphere of the society.
So, the political opportunity structure not only could decrease the political participation gap between genders, it could also set a more pro-feminist political agenda, by appointing ¨femocrats¨1 to power political positions that will promote policies related to women’s issues (Randall, 1998). As party-state the CPC has already made big strides in the so-called “state-sponsored feminism”. Howell (1998) claims that “for ideological and political reasons socialist states (referring to Soviet Union and China) have placed issues of women’s oppression and exploitation firmly on the official agenda”. This can be seen for example, in the Chinese case through thefoundation and development of the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) (Howell, 2003). The party-state support is significant because the opportunities and the period in which these opportunities emerge have led to the advancement of women in the party and in the society (Jie, Bijun , & Mow, 2004).
1 Feminists who achieve positions of influence within the government or in the bureaucracy as known as
“femocrats”. Scandinavian countries present the majority of the cases.
‧
1.2.1 Studies on Chinese elite politics
The study of Chinese political elite has often been defined by researchers and specialists in the field as extremely difficult, even daunting, a hard task or simply as a challenge. (Goldstein, 1994; Zheng S. , 2005). The iron discipline of the CPC, its official narrative and a general mistrust among its members generate an opaque and inaccessible environment for foreign researchers in Chinese politics. It is quite complicated even to glimpse how the elite operates in its decision-making process or the power struggles within the Party. Such opacity of Chinese politics and its elite is more commonly known as a
“black box”.
Teiwes ( 2015), in his review of the developments and mistakes in this field of research made by Western scholars in the past, argues that it “has been possible to penetrate the “black box” to varying degrees in different periods as new sources have become available, although the results have been always limited”.
Since the 1970´s there has been a sharp increase of elite studies, mainly around four themes: factionalism, generational politics, technocracy and political institutionalization (Kou & Zang, 2014).These four themes look to explain Chinese elite politics through a certain model, using concepts as basic tools for the analysis of Chinese elite politics.
The first model, the factional model, considers power struggles and the role of factions in Chinese politics. For Nathan (1973) factions are “clientelistic”, in other words they are formed through favor exchange while Tang Tsou (1995) includes other ties such as family, colleagues, etc. …and prefers the term “informal groups”. The second model, the generational school or generational analysis states that there is common viewpoint that defines members of the elite. Similar background and experiences formed a common viewpoint among elite members. Generational school