中國菁英政治中的女性流動 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. 治政碩士論文大. 立Master’s Thesis. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 sit. y. Nat. 中國菁英政治中的女性流動. er. io. Promotion under the Glass Ceiling?. n. a. v. l C in Chinese Politics, Female Elite Mobility 1997-2017 ni. hengchi U. Student: Marta Cruz Liñeira Advisor: Chien-wen Kou. 中華民國 105 年 9 月 September 2016.

(2) 中國菁英政治中的女性流動. Promotion under the Glass Ceiling? Female Elite Mobility in Chinese Politics, 1997-2017 Student: Marta Cruz Liñeira Advisor: Chien-wen Kou. 研究生：顧梅指導教授：寇健文. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. 學. 碩士論文. Nat. y. ‧. A Thesis. sit. ‧ 國. 立. 治政國立政治大學大. n. al. er. io. Submitted to International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific. Ch. Studies. e. i. i n U. v. n g c hUniversity National Chengchi In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in China Studies. 中華民國 105 年 9 月 September 2016.

(3) Acknowledgments Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Chien-wen Kou of the Political Science Department at National Cheng chi University (NCCU) for his support of my thesis research and for his guidance. Besides my advisor, I would also like. 政治大 and Leadership Department at National Taiwan Normal University (NTNU), Research 立 fellow Wen-Hsuan Tsai of Institute of Political Science at Academica Sinica and Assistant to acknowledge the rest of my thesis committee: Prof. Hsin Hao Huang of Civic Education. ‧ 國. 學. professor Chelsea Chia-chen Chou of Graduate Institute of National Development at National Taiwan University (NTU), for their participation and insightful comments.. ‧. I would also like to thank my friend Charmaine as the second reader of this thesis,. sit. y. Nat. I am gratefully indebted to their valuable comments on this thesis.. io. and invaluable assistance.. al. er. My sincere thanks also goes to Rocio, Anxo and Sergio for their precious support. n. iv n C To Basak, for supportingh me throughout writing e n g c h i U the thesis and helping me in some many things. Last but not the least, I would like to thank to my dear friend Leyla for one year of laughs and stories, this experience would have not been the same without you.. I.

(4) Dedication. To my father. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. II.

(5) Abstract This thesis is an analysis of mobility in Chinese elite politics from a gender perspective and provides information on the women who break the so-called “glass ceiling” within the Chinese political system. It aims specifically to identify the prevailing. 政治大 their mobility rates, within. characteristics or attributes of female elite cadres to find possible links, if any, between. 立 institutionalization of Chinese politics. these characteristics and. the context of increasing. ‧ 國. 學. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. politics.. ‧. Key words: gender, Chinese elite, mobility, attributes, institutionalization, Chinese. n. iv n C 關中國的政治體制內的女性棈英幹部被稱為“玻璃天花板”的資訊。本文意旨在專業 hengchi U 本文從中國精英政治的性別角度提出女性幹部遷調分析，並提供如何突破有. 鑑別女性幹部的特質或屬性，來找其可能的連結，如果有這些特質的話，如何在中國政治逐步制度化的範圍內，分析出這些特質和女性幹部的遷調速率之關係。. 關鍵詞：性別，中國的精英階層，流動性，屬性，制度化，中國政治。. III.

(6) Table of Contents. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION. 1. 政治大. 1.1. Research question and its importance. 立. 1. 1.2 Literature review. 5. ‧ 國. 學. 1.2.1 Studies on Chinese elite politics. Nat. er. io. sit. 1.2.3 Female Chinese political elite and mobility. y. ‧. 1.2.2 Chinese political elite and mobility. 5 6 8. 1.2.4 A comparative study: female elite mobility in other countries. 12. n engchi U. 14. n. al. 1.3 Main argument. Ch. 1.4 Research design. iv. 15. 1.4.1 Case selection. 15. 1.4.2. Data sources. 20. 1.4.3. Research method. 21. 1.4.4. Research limitations. 24. IV.

(7) 1.5 Structure of the thesis. 25. CHAPTER 2: MAIN ARGUMENT. 26. 2.1 From hypothesis to definition of variables. 26. 2.2 Variables and their operationalization. 28. 政治大 CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CONNECTIONS IN CHINESE 立. ‧ 國. 學. ELITE POLITICS. 3.1 Institutionalization context in Chinese elite politics. 36 36 43. Nat. er. io. sit. y. ‧. 3.2 Connections and its importance on Chinese elite politics. CHAPTER 4: ATTRIBUTES AND MOBILITY OF FEMALE ELITE IN CHINESE. n. al. POLITICS. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 4.1 A descriptive statistical analysis (univariate). 45 45. 4.1.1. Some features on attributes of female elite in Chinese politics. 45. 4.1.2. Mobility rate: a general overview. 51. 4.1.3. Relevant cases. 55. V.

(8) CHAPTER 5: TESTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTRIBUTES OF CHINESE FEMALE ELITE AND TYPES OF MOBILITY. 56. 5.1 An inferential statistical analysis (bivariate). 56. 5.1.1 Test of independence. 56. 5.1.2 Others statistical methods of data analysis. 69. 立. CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS. 政治大. 70. ‧ 國. 學. 6.1 Answering the research question and secondary information. 70. 6.2 Double glass ceiling. 72. ‧. APPENDIX C. y. sit er. al. n. APPENDIX B. io. APPENDIX A. Nat. REFERENCES. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 75 86 87 88. VI.

(9) List of Tables. Table 1.1 Average (%) female-male in CPC institutions (1977-2013). 政治大. 10. Table 3.1 Name list of female members of CC (1997-2017). 21. Table 2.1 Variables according to their function in the research. 27. Table 2.2 Attributes of female elite in Chinese Politics. 29. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Table 3.1 Average (%) of female in the CPC (15th to 18th) Central Committee. Nat. io. n. al. 55. er. Table 4.1 Relation of mobility rate, age and seniority by CC. sit. y. 43. Table 5.1 Relation of mobility and nationality. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 58. Table 5.2 Test of independence (nationality and mobility). 59. Table 5.3 Relation of mobility and province. 60. Table 5.4 Test of independence (province and mobility). 61. Table 5.5 Relation of mobility and level of education. 61. Table 5.6 Test of independence (educational level and mobility). 62. VII.

(10) Table 5.7 Relation of mobility and major. 62. Table 5.8 Test of independence (major and mobility). 63. Table 5.9 Relation of mobility and Party school studies. 63. Table 5.10 Test of independence (Party school studies and mobility). 64. Table 5.11 Relation of mobility and party work experience. 64. 政治大 Table 5.13 Relation of mobility and government work experience 立. 65. Table 5.14 Test of independence (Government work and mobility). 66. Table 5.15 Relation of mobility and firm/finance/ industrial bureau experience. 66. Table 5.12 Test of independence (Party work and mobility). ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. 67 67. er. io. Table 5.18 Test of independence (Expert work and mobility). sit. Table 5.17 Relation of mobility and expert work experiences. y. Table 5.16 Test of independence (Firm/ finance/ industrial bureau and mobility). 65. 68. Table 5.19 Relation of mobility and ideology work experiences. 68. Table 5.20 Test of independence (Ideology and mobility). 69. Table 5.21 Relation of mobility and PLA/police/law work experience. 69. Table 5.22 Test of independence (PLA/ police/ law and mobility). 70. Table 5.23 Relation of mobility and mass organization work experience. 70. Table 5.24 Test of independence (Mass organization and mobility). 71. Table 6.1 Independent variables and their frequencies. 72. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. VIII.

(11) List of Figures. Figure 1.1 China’s Leading Political Institutions. 18. 政治大. 18. Figure 1.3 The K-means algorithm. 23. ‧ 國. 立. 學. Figure 1.2 Organization chart of the Party-state and its main organs of power. Figure 4.1 Percentage of women born in administrative divisions of the PRC. 48. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. IX.

(12) List of Graphs. Graph 4.1 Nationality of female cadres by percentage and CC. 47. 政治大. Graph 4.2 Educational level of female cadres by total percentage. 立. Graph 4.3 Educational level of female cadres by percentage and CC. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. 50 51. er. io. sit. Graph 4.6 Party school studies by percentage and CC. Graph 4.7 Career backgrounds of female cadres by percentage and CC. n. al. i n C Graph 4.8 A general overview ofhmobility e n grate chi U. v. 50. ‧. Graph 4.5 Percentage of female cadres with a major by CC. 49. y. Graph 4.4 Total percentage of major studies among female cadres at CC. 49. 52 53. Graph 4.9 Dispersion graph of the mobility rate. 54. Graph 4.10 Mobility rate by CC of CPC. 54. Graph 4.11 The mean of seniority by CC. 55. Graph 4.12 The mean of age by CC. 55. Graph 4.13 Low mobility rate versus high mobility rate. 56. X.

(13) INTRODUCTION. 1.1 Research question and its importance Mao Zedong´s oft-repeated adage that “women hold up half of the sky” is still in. 政治大 at the reality of China’s political structures proves different. 立. use today by some government officials in China (Wallis, 2006). However, a closer look. ‧ 國. 學. Women still engage in political life in lower numbers than men. According to the National Working Committee on Children and Women under the State Council (NWCCW), in 2007, there were 15 million females in the cadre and personnel system in China, making. ‧. up 38% of the total (Xinhua, 2016). The phrase “cadres and personnel system” was first. y. Nat. used in a political report of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of China. sit. (CPC) for its 13th National Congress. It’s a combination of two terms: the cadre system and. n. al. er. io. the personnel system, more commonly referred to as the “cadres”. The term “cadres” refers. iv n C or technologically h e n g c hspecialized i U posts. to personnel in Party and government organs, enterprises and service units who assume leadership, management procedures (Wang, 1994).. through predetermined. The gender gap in the CPC starts at the grass roots level (from the number of affiliates to the CPC) to eventually reflect in the upper echelons (the peak of the CPC´s hierarchy), where the disparity is more obvious. In 2011, the number of women affiliates to the CPC was 19.25 million out of a total 82.602 million members which constitutes 23,3% of the total members (China Today, 2016). However, according to Yu and Liu (2010) the proportion of female delegates in the four main political institutions -- National People´s Congress (NPC), Chinese People´s Consultative Conference (CPCC), Central Committee 1.

(14) of Communist Party of China (CCCPC) and, Politburo (PB)-- from 1954 to 2002 “(..) does not even reach the amount to one fourth of the total, not to say half”. Gender inequality in Chinese politics is an undeniable fact. This, then, begs the question: Is there a reason behind the symbolic presence of women in the decision-making circle? A selection bias? Is there a “glass ceiling” in Chinese politics? The term “glass ceiling” was used for first time in 1984 by Gay Bryant in his book The Working Woman Report: Succeeding in Business in the 80’s. In sociology and gender. 政治大. studies, the “glass ceiling” refers to the limiting career advancement of women within organizations. It is a psychological ceiling that makes it difficult for women to be promoted.. 立. In consonance with Cotter, Hermsen, Ovadia and Vanneman (2001) there are four. ‧ 國. 學. characteristics that concur to the existence of a “glass ceiling”: “ (…) a gender difference that is not explained by other job-relevant characteristics of the employee, a gender. ‧. difference that is greater at higher levels of an outcome than at lower levels of an outcome, a gender inequality in the chances of advancement into higher levels, not merely the. y. Nat. proportions of each gender currently at those higher levels and, a gender inequality that. er. io. al. sit. increase over the course of a career”.. n. Despite the fact that there is obvious discrimination against women and a gender. Ch. i n U. v. gap within Chinese politics, the focus of this study is not to investigate gender imbalances,. engchi. but merely to increase existing knowledge on women who have broken the “glass ceiling” and have reached top leadership positions within the party-state. The main research question therefore is: Do the attributes of female elites influence their mobility within the CPC? Linked to this question, the secondary research focus will look at the profiles of the women who are promoted, whether these promotions are strategic or random, and whether these women share certain attributes that make them more successful than others? In addition, it will research the speed of upward mobility for. 2.

(15) individual women, the patterns of mobility, and how the “glass ceiling” is affecting their political careers? Thus far the study of elites has focused on the analysis of family backgrounds, career backgrounds and values (Hoffmann-Lange, 2006). In the case of Chinese political elite, extensive literature provides insights on the standard profile of elite members in terms of political connections, career histories, and official statements regarding ideology and Party role. However, due to the small number of female elite members, the majority of studies focus on men (Chow, Zhang, & Wang, 2004).. 政治大. This leaves a gap in the information available for the profiling of female elite. 立. members. In order to further understanding on female elite mobility, it is important to. ‧ 國. 學. understand how these women are breaking the “glass ceiling”. This thesis, therefore, could be useful in closing the leadership gap and fostering greater gender equality within the CPC.. ‧. The importance of the research question also links to the concept of “political opportunity structure”. According to Rootes (1999) “political opportunity structure” can. y. Nat. sit. be defined as “the constraints and opportunities configured by the institutional. er. io. arrangements and the prevailing patterns of political power which are the inescapable contexts of political action”. MacAdam (2004) defines it as “a multi-dimensional concept. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. that allows the researcher to analyze some of the reasons for a social movement’s success. engchi. or failure”. And, it includes four elements: “(…) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that undergird a policy, the presence or absence of elite allies, the state’s capacity and propensity for repression”. Even though the term “political opportunity structure” has only been used in the analysis of social movements, considering feminism, as both a political and a social movement that seeks to achieve gender equality in society, then it is possible to infer that “political opportunity structure” as the inescapable circumstances surrounding a political 3.

(16) landscape, a sort of window of opportunity, in this case the institutionalization of the Chinese political elite may be influencing a more favorable political opportunity structure for women’s interest. Afshar (1996) underlines that the character of women’s self-representation and the “political opportunity structure” do not exist independently of each other. As Randall (1998) states “woman can seize opportunities presented, but their intervention will simultaneously be constrained and even shaped by the character of these political openings”.. 政治大. Evidence accredit that the greater women representation is; the better represented their interests are (Sapiro, 1981)(Markham, 2013). Markham does not clearly define what. 立. he means by the term “women’s interest,” but for the purpose of the research, women’s. ‧ 國. 學. interest can be defined as overcoming of the gap between men and women in any sphere of the society.. ‧. So, the political opportunity structure not only could decrease the political participation gap between genders, it could also set a more pro-feminist political agenda,. y. Nat. sit. by appointing ¨femocrats¨1 to power political positions that will promote policies related. er. io. to women’s issues (Randall, 1998). As party-state the CPC has already made big strides in the so-called “state-sponsored feminism”. Howell (1998) claims that “for ideological and. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. political reasons socialist states (referring to Soviet Union and China) have placed issues. engchi. of women’s oppression and exploitation firmly on the official agenda”. This can be seen for example, in the Chinese case through the foundation and development of the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) (Howell, 2003). The party-state support is significant because the opportunities and the period in which these opportunities emerge have led to the advancement of women in the party and in the society (Jie, Bijun , & Mow, 2004).. 1. Feminists who achieve positions of influence within the government or in the bureaucracy as known as “femocrats”. Scandinavian countries present the majority of the cases. 4.

(17) 1.2 Literature review 1.2.1 Studies on Chinese elite politics The study of Chinese political elite has often been defined by researchers and specialists in the field as extremely difficult, even daunting, a hard task or simply as a challenge. (Goldstein, 1994; Zheng S. , 2005). The iron discipline of the CPC, its official narrative and a general mistrust among its members generate an opaque and inaccessible. 政治大. environment for foreign researchers in Chinese politics. It is quite complicated even to glimpse how the elite operates in its decision-making process or the power struggles within. 立. the Party. Such opacity of Chinese politics and its elite is more commonly known as a. ‧ 國. 學. “black box”.. Teiwes ( 2015), in his review of the developments and mistakes in this field of. ‧. research made by Western scholars in the past, argues that it “has been possible to penetrate the “black box” to varying degrees in different periods as new sources have become. Nat. sit. y. available, although the results have been always limited”.. al. er. io. Since the 1970´s there has been a sharp increase of elite studies, mainly around four. v. n. themes: factionalism, generational politics, technocracy and political institutionalization. Ch. i n U. (Kou & Zang, 2014).These four themes look to explain Chinese elite politics through a. engchi. certain model, using concepts as basic tools for the analysis of Chinese elite politics. The first model, the factional model, considers power struggles and the role of factions in Chinese politics. For Nathan (1973) factions are “clientelistic”, in other words they are formed through favor exchange while Tang Tsou (1995) includes other ties such as family, colleagues, etc. …and prefers the term “informal groups”. The second model, the generational school or generational analysis states that there is common viewpoint that defines members of the elite. Similar background and experiences formed a common viewpoint among elite members. Generational school 5.

(18) defines “generation” not as biological age but the year a cadre joined the CPC (Yahuda, 1979). The technocratic model deals with elite replacement after the economic reform when a new generation of better educated and younger officials was recruited and promoted (Li & White, 1988), while the political institutionalization model focuses on the set rules and norms for elite recruitment and decision-making that followed the Hu Jin-tao period (Zang, 2005; Bo, 2007).. 治政 1.2.2 Chinese political elite and mobility 大立 ‧ 國. 學. There were fundamental changes to China’s political elite structure in the era of economic reform. The need to bring about economic changes and the lack of leaders to oversee these changes led to a massive elite renewal. The revolutionary cadres,. ‧. traditionally recruited from poor peasants with a low level of education, were replaced by. sit. y. Nat. bureaucratic technocrats with a high level of education (Lee, 1991). It can be inferred then,. io. er. that once the requirements for new leaders changed, so did the mobility patterns. Walder (1995) establishes two paths for political elite mobility, (…) “one path. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. requires both educational and political credentials and leads to administrative posts with. engchi. high prestige, considerable authority and clear material privileges; the second path requires educational but not political credentials, and leads to professional positions with high occupational prestige but little authority and fewer material privileges”. These two roads to power lead to two very different destinations for political elites; the administrator and the professional (Zang, 2004). On the other hand, Kou (2011) remarks how members of the elite educated abroad aren’t eligible to work in certain fields within the party-state due to the fact that they are deemed ideologically tainted and not trustworthy.. 6.

(19) Bo (2007) in his analysis of Chinese elites, combines the arguments of both Walder in his study and asseverates that despite the importance of educational credentials, the dominant profile of political elites is not technocratic, but provincial leadership. He argues that local government-party management experience and economic criteria have become key factors in elite mobility. In other words, a provincial leader is valued by the economic performance of his region (GDP), and his ability to implement and enforce policies during his term (Landry, 2008). The new branch in China’s elite politics is the provincial leaders whose number among the elite has increased substantially, representing more than half of. 政治大 Another part of the debate in the study of Chinese elites concerns the causes of 立 upward mobility. In opposing to the use of GDP as a key factor, other authors argue that the total membership in the Sixteenth Central Committee of the CPC.. ‧ 國. 學. provincial revenue collection, educational qualifications and factional ties play a more important role in elite ranking (Shih, Christopher, & Liu, 2012).. ‧. Other author argue that loyalty and ideological backgrounds still play a major role. y. Nat. in the promotion of elites, highlighting the political screening these cadres are subjected to. sit. before becoming party elites (Bian, Shu, & Logan, 2001) and, the importance of the Party-. al. er. io. patronage in individual career mobility (Li & Walder, 2001).. n. iv n C h emobility these studies on the subject of female i U Most of the research only briefly n g c ishdoubtful. The vast majority of the subjects on those studies are men. The applicability of. refers to female elite members due to the small number of women in the elite. The conclusions in this regard are more anecdotal than robust.. 7.

(20) 1.2.3 Female Chinese political elite and mobility According to Hershatter (2004) interest in research focused specifically on women’s issues in China has emerged in the past two decades. And, as Chow, Zhang and Wang (2004) state “entering the new millennium in China, women's studies and the sociology of women/gender, though still in their early formation, have undergone a shift from applied, policy-oriented fields for solving women's problems to more theoretically relevant and empirically grounded fields incorporating a gender perspective”.. 政治大 The largest part of the studies about mobility and China’s elite politics has not been 立. However, female mobility in Chinese elite politics has not been widely studied yet.. addressed from a gender perspective but rather a general overview. The main topics in this. ‧ 國. 學. regard are: Women’s political participation, studies focused on barriers of entry, and female leadership (Li & Zhang, 1994). Those focused on women’s political participation. ‧. in particular, are centered singularly on comparing female leaders with their international. y. Nat. counterparts, rather than on mobility.. sit. Women’s political participation in China has fluctuated since the founding of the. al. er. io. CPC. Communist ideology under Mao promised women’s emancipation and the. n. iv n C U women´s overall status in China transformation and state socialism CPC have hunder eng c h i raised. constitution of China endorsed gender equality (Guo & Zheng, 2008). Social. (Davin, 1976). The spectacular economic development of China in the recent thirty years has consolidated the role of women in society.. Nonetheless, the social differences between genders didn’t cease, as reflected in the analysis of political elites (Su, 2006). One reason of this could be, as Gilmartin (1993) claims, that the CPC was formed as an eminently patriarchal party, dominated by men. The struggle for the emancipation of women remained as a sub-discourse of communist and nationalist ideology. Marxist ideology itself focuses on men as subjects under the capitalist. 8.

(21) system, and seeks the emancipation of women in their proletarian condition, not as a woman. According to Rosen (1995) women’s political participation in the echelons of power peaked during the Cultural Revolution due to the chaotic “momentum” the Chinese politics was experiencing in which women were appointed as elites for reasons of personal loyalty (Yu & Liu, 2010). By the 1980s, the number of women in elite positions declined dramatically and only began to increase slightly again with the institutionalization of the party-state in the Deng Xiaoping era. This incremental process of institutionalization did. 政治大 competition, changing the criteria and the processes to promote leaders to the top political 立 order (Miller, 2008). In this new scenario power struggles between factions or informal. not only affect the processes of leadership decision making but the dynamics of leadership. ‧ 國. 學. groups are limited, and the former discretionary in promoting charges has been reduced, giving more importance to meritocracy than personal loyalty (Nathan, 2003). And, as it has. level and seniority in party membership (Zang, 1998).. Nat. y. ‧. been stated early, new profiles of Chinese elite politics are defined by a higher educational. sit. And yet, the number of women in political management or decision making. al. er. io. positions is still low (Zeng, 2014). Women as public leaders at the top level (organs or. iv n C represented (Table 1.1). The highest percentage ofUwomen is at lower level position, hengchi drastically decreasing upward, to a top without female representation. n. institutions with high power and authority capacity in the party –state) are under-. 9.

(22) Table 1.1 Average (%) female-male in CPC institutions (1977-2013). Average (%) female-male in CPC institutions (1977-2013) CPC institutions. Proportion of women. Proportion of men. Politburo Standing Committee. 0%. 100%. Politburo. 2,7%. 97,3%. Central Committee. 立. State Council. 政治大5,2% 6,3%. 94,8% 93,7% 95,7%. National People´s Congress. 21,4%. 89,6%. ‧. ‧ 國. 15,3%. 學. Chinese People´s Consultative Conference. Source: data derived from (Sissokho, 2014) and my own elaboration.. sit. y. Nat. io. er. At the same time, the aforementioned economic development increases the access to higher education for women, bringing them to new required profiles and, the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. implementation of affirmative action addresses this progress (Guo & Zhao, 2009).. engchi. Regarding to CPC and female cadres, many studies are centered on barriers of entry. Authors look into the causes and reasons for the traditional and persistent low political participation of women. To become part of the core of leaders it is obviously necessary to be a member of the CPC. For example, the rate of membership to the CPC is lower among women; they represent less than a quarter of the total members of the CPC (China Today, 2016). Among the causes, it must be remarked that Chinese society has been historically a patriarchal society, Chinese culture and philosophy distinguish between a public sphere 10.

(23) dominated by men and a private sphere dedicated to women (nú zhǔ nèi, nán zhǔ wài). Many traditional Chinese expressions represent men as superior being. Religion, especially the current revival of Confucianism, plays a role too. Another factor is the culture of social relationships and networking (guānxì) in which Chinese politics is viewed as an old boy’s club where male patronage is key to promotion. Unequal access to education, particularly in rural areas, the post-Mao era economic reform and its consequences that enlarged the gender gap in education, lack of family support, inability to reconcile family life and work, economic dependence and. 政治大 More women seem 立to reach higher levels of power in private companies than in. susceptibility to sexual harassment are cited as potential causes (Jie, Bijun , & Mow, 2004).. ‧ 國. 學. state-own companies, state administrations or political positions. (Goodman, 2004). In the public sphere, they usually are relegated to nominal positions of authority and are responsible for like health, welfare, education, women and children issues (Pittinski & Zhu,. ‧. 2005). Then, there is gender division labor or discrimination at work; women are prescribed. sit. y. Nat. feminine roles of household into the public domain.. Some papers argue that Chinese elite focus on economic growth have caused the. io. al. er. abandonment of the prior China’s state feminism. Though, this is arguable; since the. n. iv n C h e&nZheng, training female cadre policies (Guo i Uthe number don’t hide the truth, the g c h2008), economic reform, the party-state has implemented numerous affirmative actions and. disproportionality men-women in CCP institutions is wide (Yu & Liu, 2010).. Studies about female leadership in China describe the political reality of these women. They are mainly dedicated to do women’s work (fù nù gōngzuò), namely, they are usually in charge of agencies or organizations related to children or women issues (Rosen, 1995). Other authors, such as Zeng (2014) argues that China has developed many regulations and affirmative actions to raise the number of women in political positions, but. 11.

(24) Guo & Zhao (2009) declare that ambiguity in regulating affirmative action makes it an inefficient tool. Su (2006) adds to this argument by stating that women in power structures are doubly discriminated against; they are being used to fill a quota on basis of their gender and belonging to minority groups, such as ethnic minorities, intellectuals and members of Democratic league. These women also face greater chances to abandon their careers because the “three rites of passage” -- falling in love, getting married and having children (Jie, Bijun , & Mow, 2004).. 立. 政治大. 1.2.4 A comparative study: female elite mobility in other countries. ‧ 國. 學. To find comparative studies on female political elite mobility carries an inevitable difficulty; defining the Chinese regime and finding a similar one. The first intent would be. ‧. the pursuit of studies on female mobility in post-communist countries (former Soviet Union. sit. y. Nat. members), nevertheless, it would not be an appropriate comparison. Former Soviet Union countries liberalized their economic and political systems and, although their democratic. io. al. er. essence is questionable (Freedom House reports, 2014) due to its drift toward an. n. iv n C essays and research on women h and politics in post-communist European countries are engchi U authoritarian presidentialism, are still being considered democracies. For this reason, the. focused mainly on the analysis of parliaments and the proportion of female political leaders in them, the effects of the electoral system on female political participation and, factors influencing their presence (Montgomery & Matland, 2003) (Wolchik, 1989).. The most suitable comparison would be one party-state countries like Cuba, Singapore or Vietnam. Cuba, a one party-state communist country, has undergone a timid economic liberalization in the past years: promoting foreign investment, developing new projects and allowing the opening of small business. Studies on female political mobility in Cuba are wider and more reachable than in other countries (like Vietnam). 12.

(25) Alvarez, director of the Center of Women studies in Cuba, in her essay Mujer y Poder en Cuba (1998) summarizes the main studies existing on female elite and political power in Cuba. According to her, research in Cuba about women's access to leadership positions can be classified into those that inquire about women's barriers to access to decision-making in different spheres of economic, political and social, and those studying particularly about the female representation in People's Power bodies. Both research fields point out that to reach decision- making positions in the Partystate, the women’s barriers of entry differ from men’s barriers. Particularly, women face. 政治大 political power positions, they have a higher rate of abandonment (their career) because 立 economic crises and instabilities affect their careers more (Stephen, 2013). society discrimination and have more difficulties to access to education. Once, they get the. ‧ 國. 學. Despite the existence of numerous affirmative actions, there is still a low promotion of female cadres to senior positions, generally due to a common belief that women cannot. ‧. handle a private life and a demanding public job at the same time (Diaz & Caram, 1996).. y. Nat. If the position to which they aspire, requires direct votes (some bodies of People's Power. sit. are selected), it is still less likely to be selected or promoted. The level of demands that are. al. er. io. imposed on women to be selected is so high that the chosen ones are well above the average. iv n C educational background than their male counterpartsU h e n g c h i (Alvarez, 1998). n. of the male counterpart capabilities. To hold the same rank level, they usually have a higher. 13.

(26) 1.3 Main argument In summary, the object of this research is female elite cadres and personnel system of the CPC. The main purpose is to assess the possible relationship between characteristics or attributes of female elite and their mobility rates, within the context of increasing institutionalization of Chinese elite politics. This research is both descriptive and explicative. It attempts to identify the prevailing characteristics or attributes among the female elites and aims to find links. 政治大 The research takes into account the institutionalization of Chinese politics and the 立. between these characteristics and the types of mobility in the CPC.. importance of the political connections in Chinese context. So, it also provides secondary. ‧ 國. 學. information on affirmative action, and cadres and personnel system management policies, and addresses the survival of political connections or informal politics.. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 14.

(27) 1.4 Research design 1.4.1 Case selection Definition of “elite” The object of study of this research was the female elite in Chinese politics. To identify the study sample, first it was necessary to define the term “elite” and second, to identify the political elite in China through a specific method.. 治政 began with classical theories mainly promoted by 大 Pareto, Mosca and Michels. And it 立20 century with the further development of two different study continued in the middle of Elite studies have been a rich area of research since early past century. Their origin th. ‧ 國. 學. perspectives; unitarian tradition and pluralist tradition.. Classical elite theories remark that “elite” is comparable to a real class; the ruling. ‧. or dominant class. Its structure constitutes its strength and enables its members to stay in. y. Nat. power. There are many links that bind together the members of ruling elite. Links ensure a. sit. sufficient unity of thought and a characteristic cohesion of a class group. Equipped with. al. er. io. powerful economic means, elite is further ensured by unity, political power and cultural. iv n C U “elite”. According to him: hone Pareto (1991) was the first i term e ntogdefine c hthe n. influence on the disorganized majority (Putnam, 1976).. “there are two layers of the population, the lower layer or the non-select class and, the upper stratum, the select class or elite is divided, in turn, into two, the select class of government and non-government elite class”. Mosca (2004) preferred the term “ruling class” and described as: “minority of influential people in the management of public affairs, to which most people give them, of willingly or unwillingly, the leadership”.. 15.

(28) On the other hand, Michels (2009) focused his studies on what he called “oligarchy”. He stated that: “the organization is what gives rise to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the leaders over the constituents, of the delegates over delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy”. Since then, many authors, based on the idea of the essential role of elites in society, have developed variations on the same elementary concept. Although, there is no single notion of the term “elite”, all the definitions highlight the existence of a minority in a. 政治大. context of superiority over a majority.. 立. Thomas Dye (1976, p. 12)defines elite members as those who hold:. ‧ 國. 學. “the formal authority to direct manage, and guide programs, policies, and activities of the major corporate, governmental, legal, educational, civic and cultural institutions in the. ‧. nation”.. Although, he refers to the American elite members, his definition has been used in. y. Nat. al. Identifying the elite in Chinese politics. er. io. sit. the development of the present research to address the Chinese political elite.. n. iv n C Following the definition of elite in the Chinese case is U h the e nterm h i identifying g c“elite”,. next step. Generally speaking, there are three predominant methods in order to identify. elite: reputational analysis, decision-making analysis, and positional analysis. The first one, reputational analysis gives importance to the informal relations and connections among the individual actors in power. Its method is based on querying informants on who are the power holders in a specific organization or process. The second one, decisional analysis is focused on decision-making process to find out who influences a specific activity; who are the actors involved. The third and last method, positional analysis is widely used, is the. 16.

(29) identification of power positions within formal political institutions to understand power relations among elite. Those who hold power positions are assumed to be the elite (Putnam, 1976). For purposes of this study, positional analysis was chosen to identify the political elite in the People´s Republic of China (PRC), dismissing the other two approaches for several reasons. In the case of reputational analysis, the development of the method requires researcher to know insiders with a clear knowledge of the organization or the political processes. They will be considered the informants. Nevertheless, access to top. 政治大. leaders is extremely difficult in socialist states.. 立. Decisional analysis isn´t suitable for the Chinese political system because the. ‧ 國. 學. decision-making process occurs behind closed doors. It isn´t possible to know who has taken a specific decision or who has successfully passed certain policy.. ‧. In addition, positional analysis is the most appropriate method to develop the present research given that in the Chinese political system status empowers the person;. y. Nat. sit. political position defines power limitations of the person who hold that position. Because. composition of them.. al. er. io. of that, it´s so important to study political formal institutions and the organizational. n. iv n C In accordance with Hoffman-Lange U 4), “identifying an elite sample by h e n g c(2006, h i pág.. using the positional method requires prior research into the organizational and positional. structure of the national political system before a list of elite positions.” Therefore, for purposes of this research some particularities of the Chinese political system must be considered before identifying the elite sample. PRC is a socialist republic lead by a single party, Communist Party of China (CPC). PRC´s 1982 constitution referenced the CPC leadership of the nation without detailing the legal basis for the CPC power. CPC has been in command in China since 1949. Although Chinese political institutions have evolved during this time, CPC still is the power source 17.

(30) of the various institutions of the state. As the figure 1.1 shows (see Appendix A), CPC dominates the leading political institutions in China and, hence, it dominates the Chinese political system as a whole. Within PRC, power state is exercised by CPC, Central People´s government and their provincial and local representation. General Secretary of CPC holds ultimate power over the state and the government. He is the Premier; the head of the state and the government. Based on the domain of the Party over state institutions, and without going into elaborate details on the Chinese political system, it can be extrapolated that China's. 政治大 elite; the CPC highest political positions members. 立. political elite is CPC´s elite. So, the tem “elite” in Chinese politics would mean the ruling. ‧ 國. 學. In using the positional method, the difficulty arises from stating what organ within the party-state holds the power. Often the real function of these organs within the CPC is. ‧. far from its nominal function (Lawerence & Martin, 2013). Then, what are the organs that represented the highest authority in the ruling party? As figure 1.2 shows (see Appendix. sit. y. Nat. A), there are three CPC top leadership bodies: the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC),. io. er. the Politburo (PB) and the Central Committee (CC) in descending order. The study sample was the group of women members of CC2. The reasons to choose. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. this organ are several: it has a real function (not only nominal function), it plays an. engchi. important role by choosing the elite of the CPC, the most powerful group with an important. 2. CC is a political body. It is one of the highest authority within the party, but doesn’t exercise its authority as a legislative body would do. It contains the leading figures, and it’s considered the place where debate on decision-making takes places (Dreyer 2000). It 205 full members and 171 alternate members. Members are elected from the elite of Party officials with a Party standing of minimum five years by the National Congress (NC) of CPC for a tenure of five years. When NC isn´t in session, CC leads the work of the Party and its external relations. (Sullivan, 2012). Under its supervision are: the General Affairs Office, the Organization Department, the Publicity Department, The International Liaison Department, the United Front Work Department and the 18.

(31) number of women among its members 3 and, the PSBC and PB members must be CC members first. If the aim of this study was to only measure the political participation of women in the Chinese elite, the analysis of the National People’s Congress (NPC) would have been chosen for this purpose. This body is considered the legislative body and therefore has been compared with parliaments in Western political systems. However, because of the uniqueness of the Chinese system, NPC study has no. 政治大. relevance in this case. The goal was not to study women political participation or women visibility on politics, analyzing an organ with nominal power, but studying the path of. 立. women who have reached the real exercise of power (understood as decision-making. ‧ 國. 學. capacity); the effective representation; a real calculus on equality. The research analyzed female members, full and alternate members included, of. ‧. four CC: 15th CC, 16th CC, 17th CC and 18th CC, what meant a time line from 1997 to 20174. The total number of women members of these four CC was 125, but due to many of them. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. Appendix A).. sit. had been members of several CC, the final number narrowed down to 73 women (see. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Policy Research Office (China.org.cn, 2015). It meets in Plenary sessions convened by PB, at least once a year. (Li C. , 2012). PBSC an PB members are selected from its ranks members. 3. There aren´t women among the seven PBSC members and only 2 among the twenty-five PB members. 4 15th CC tenure was from 1997 to 2002 and so on, 16th CC from 2002 to 2007, 17th CC from 2007 to 2012 and, 18th CC from 2012 to 2017. 19.

(32) 1.4.2 Data sources The data was retrieved from two databases available online: Chinese Political Elites Database (Chinese Political Elites Database, 2016) and China Vitae (China Vitae, 2016). Both are resources of biographical information on Chinese leaders in the party-state. And they were the search tools used to facilitate this depth research, along with a wide bibliography and others online resources.. 政治大. Both sources have been used to cross-examine the information. Even though both database gathered similar information on political elite member in China, they aren´t. 立. exactly the same.. ‧ 國. 學. Chinese Political Elites Database (NCCU top university program led by DP. Kou) collected information including names (Chinese and Roman alphabet), age, place of birth,. ‧. nationality, birth and dead time, education backgrounds, work experience. Its coverage comprises four thousand biographical data cases, and it is limited temporarily to cases after. sit. y. Nat. 1966.. al. er. io. China Vitae gathered similar type of information and also, includes travels and. n. iv n C more completed on number of cases, U has more details in the particular h e nandg China i vitae h c cases.. appearances of the members of the elite in great detail. Chinese Political Elites Database is. Both of them have been used to complete the information. In case of discrepancy between the information resulting from the two databases, the information provided by Chinese Political Elites Database has been chosen to use over the one generated by China Vitae.. 20.

(33) Missing cases and missing values As it has been explained earlier, the object of study, the number of women on four committees, were 122. Given the fact that many of them participate in several committees the number was narrowed down to 73 women. Of the initial 73 women in the sample, 7 were discarded. Four of them due to a general lack of information (Qian Chuanxiu, Wang Ruzhen, Cao Shumin, Song Liping), one due to the inability to authentication her (Wulan), and the remaining two cases because. 政治大. there was no information about the date of joined the CPC (Hu Xiaolian, Jiang Xiaojuang) making impossible to calculated their mobility rate. These seven cases were the only. 立. missing cases.. ‧ 國. 學. In the collection of information, it was observed missing values, however, these missing values were not crucial to the calculations of the study so that the subjects were. ‧. not discarded of the sample. The final number of cases is 66 (see Appendix B).. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 1.4.3 Research method A two phases study. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The research is methodologically quantitative; it is based on statistical analysis. Even though quantitative in nature, there is also a qualitative approach to other variables such as the institutionalization of Chinese elite politics and political connections. One purpose of statistical analysis is to take a large quantity of data on a category of persons or objects and summarize this information in a few exact mathematical figures, tables or graphs. Descriptive statistics explains how many observations were recorded and how often it occurred in the data or category of observations. 21.

(34) A second purpose of statistical analysis is to draw mathematical conclusions by relating the characteristics of a group of people or objects. This type of analysis is called statistical inferential and is calculated to show cause-effect relationships, so as to test scientific hypotheses and theories. In the development of the present research, statistical analysis with both purposes (descriptive and inferential) was used. The first phase of the study was a univariate descriptive analysis and the second phase a bivariate inferential analysis.. 政治大 A descriptive statistical analysis (univariate) 立. ‧ 國. 學. In the first phase descriptive statistical analysis of each variable (univariate) was done. In it, a general overview of the dependent variable, a comparison by CC and several. ‧. main features related to the independent variables, was reported.. In addition, in the case of the dependent variable (mobility rate), the K-Means. y. Nat. sit. algorithm was used. It is a cluster analysis, a variety of multivariate analysis of. al. er. io. interdependence, which aims to classify a group of individuals or objects (in this case. n. female elite members) in a small number of groups or clusters in which each object belongs. Ch. i n U. to the cluster with the nearest mean (D´Ancona, 2001).. engchi. v. The optimal number of clusters leading to the greatest separation (minimal intracluster variance) isn´t known, it must be computed from the data. After comparing the outcomes of several runs with an increasing number of clusters, it was decided to classify female cadre into two types (low mobility and high mobility) depending on their individual mobility rate. These groups are mutually exclusive; internally, as homogeneous as possible and, defined by the K-Means algorithm, based on the following formula:. 22.

(35) Figure 1.3 The K-means algorithm. 立. 政治大. Source: (K-Means Clustering, 2015).. ‧ 國. 學. To make the classification, the program called Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB) has been used. The resulting classification of a female elite in two types of mobility is. ‧. represented in this study in a graph automatically generated by MATLAB.. sit. y. Nat. MATLAB is a software tool that allows mathematical programming in a high level programming language itself (language M). It is widely used by the community of. io. n. al. er. scientists and engineers. It has numerous functions, the most basic are focused on matrix. i n U. v. manipulation, data representation and implementation of algorithms.. Ch. engchi. An inferential statistical analysis (bivariate) The second part of the data analysis is to contrast the hypothesis above mentioned through test of independence. The function of the test of independence is to contrast hypothesis in non-linear distribution samples. It is used for categorical variables where it is not possible to apply the classical methods of statistical inference, such as linear regression. It is a contingency table of disjoint sets. It measures the relationship between. 23.

(36) two variables of one same sample or population and their significance (if they are independent or not).. 1.4.4 Research limitations The main limitation of this research was the impossibility of including the political. 政治大 mentioned earlier, the present research aims to evaluate the potential relationship between 立 attributes of female elite and their mobility rates, within a context of institutionalization of connections or informal politics and evaluating them with regards to mobility. As. ‧ 國. 學. Chinese elite politics. Although, there has been an institutionalization of Chinese elite politics, reflected in the set of rules and norms for recruitment, promotion and exit and. ‧. retirement of cadres and decision-making process, the importance that political connections or informal politics still play in Chinese politics cannot be ignored.. y. Nat. io. sit. Several studies prove that in Chinese politics there exists an interaction between. al. er. informal networks and the Party´s institutionalization. As Kou (2014) states in China,. n. iv n C phenomenon, nevertheless, the failure the necessary information in this regard, h e ntoggather chi U “informal politics are imbedded in institutional context”. The research acknowledges this. and the lack of validity of the said information, and the inability to delimit the effect and. scope of political connections made it necessary to exclude it from the analysis. The present study addresses the existence of political connections as a confounding variable and defines it, but does not include them in the analysis. Other limitations of this research are: The scarce literature available in English on Chinese elite political mobility from a gender perspective, the difficulty of gathering the data, since one of the databases is in Chinese (Chinese Political Elite Database), and the opacity of Chinese politics. 24.

(37) 1.5 Structure of the thesis The first chapter of this research includes introductory information on China and women political participation, a detailed explanation of the research question and a justification of its selection, a profuse literature review in relation to the Chinese political elite, major standard profiles of elite members and mobility, a look to political elite from a gender perspective and comparative information. The introductory chapter also includes a summary of the main argument of the thesis and the research design –case selection, data sources, research method and research limitations--.. 政治大 hypothesis to the various variables and their operationalization into indicators. 立 The third chapter addresses the institutional context in Chinese politics, giving The second chapter explains the main argument of the thesis starting from the main. ‧ 國. 學. extensive information on cadre management system, affirmative action and so on. It also defines the role of political connections or informal politics in the given context.. ‧. The fourth chapter contains a descriptive analysis of the attributes and mobility of female elites in Chinese politics. The analysis of these variables is exemplified through. Nat. sit. y. numerous graphics which represent general overviews as well as trends over time.. io. er. The fifth chapter includes an inferential analysis of the relationship between attributes of female elites in Chinese politics and types of mobility. It tests the various. n. al. Ch. hypothesis using test of independence.. engchi. i n U. v. The sixth and last chapter states the main findings of the research, argues specific types of discrimination that female cadres suffer during their career and proposes measures for its correction.. 25.

(38) MAIN ARGUMENT. 2.1 From hypothesis to definition of variables The present study starts from the central hypothesis that attributes or characteristics of an elite group (in this case a female elite group), as well as the organizational structure (in which these women develop their careers) and political connections are affecting their political mobility.. 立. 政治大. The hypothesis is based on the literature review on elites and mobility specifically. ‧ 國. 學. by China scholar Xiaowei Zang in his book Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China. Zang (2004) identifies mobility rate as “the speed with which individuals (cadre) climb the political hierarchy, which to some degree is a measure of the skills and qualities. ‧. most highly valued by the top party leadership”. He also claims that “mobility rate is the. y. Nat. outcome of the joint work of human capital and organizational characteristics...difference. sit. in promotion speeds reflects both structural and individual characteristics. (…) Personal. From his. al. iv n C statements, ithcan be deduced U e n g c h i that attributes n. structure”.. er. io. attributes are certainly important, but they operate within the confines of the opportunity influence promotion. opportunities (understood as status attainment) and mobility (speed of promotion), organizational structure (institutionalization of Chinese elite politics) shape the structure opportunity (setting age limits for promotions, demanding a minimum educational level…) and, political connections make the path to the top easier. It is assumed that the three variables (attributes of female elite, institutionalization of Chinese elite politics and political connections) influence the dependent variable (mobility rate). The difference among the three variables is the degree of influence and measurement. 26.

(39) Attributes of female elite are specific, observable, measurable and directly related to mobility rate. Institutionalization and political connections are embedded in Chinese politics. Meanwhile, institutionalization can be measured and at the same time provide a time frame, but political connections can only be defined conceptually. One of the hurdles faced in doing this research was lack of access to the necessary information to study and to operationalize political connections into an indicator. Hence, this research aims to study only the relationship between attributes of female elite and mobility. Others variables that may affect mobility are considered extraneous such as institutionalization and political connections.. 政治大 variables and the relationship among these” (Laerd Dissertation, 2016). An extraneous 立 Extraneous variables are not rare and “can affect the measurement of study. variable is by definition any variable other than the independent variable that may influence. ‧ 國. 學. a change in the dependent variable and that the researcher was not intentionally studying in the research. An extraneous variable can be classified as a control variable, when the. ‧. researcher controls the variable, but doesn´t intend to examine it, and as a confounding variable, when the variable that is recognized before the study or during the study cannot. y. Nat. sit. be controlled by the researcher.. al. er. io. In order not to jeopardize the internal validity of the study, a clear differentiation. n. between variables was made.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Table 2.2 Variables according to their function in the research Variables according to their function in the research. Dependent variable. Mobility rate. Independent variable. Attributes of female elite. Control variable. Institutionalization of Chinese elite politics. Cofounding variable. Political connections. Source: my own elaboration. 27.

(40) 2.2 Variables and their operationalization Dependent variable The dependent variable of the study was the mobility of female elite. To operationalize the dependent variable in an indicator (mobility rate) Zang´s definition of mobility rate (or speed of promotion) in state socialism (2004) has been used:. -. The rate of mobility = ( person joined). -. 立. 1 𝑎𝑔𝑒+𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦. at the first CC of CPC to which the. 政治大. Zang uses Kenneth Farmer´s definition of mobility rate in the Soviet Union (Zang,. ‧ 國. 學. Elite dualism and leadership selection in China, 2004): “the length of the “wait” between an individual´s first acceptance of a party or government position and his or her first. ‧. election to the Central Committee of Communist party” and, improve it by adding an extra factor, biological age. Zang´s indicator was chosen because it brings together two concepts:. sit. y. Nat. promotion, defined as status attainment (cadre reach the elite by being elected to CC of CPC) and, mobility, determined as the speed of promotion (the difference of years since. io. al. er. she joined the CPC until she was first elected to the CC of CPC).. n. iv n C h eSeniority elected for first time to CC of CPC. i U the numbers of year since she first n g c hreflects. It should be noted that age is calculated as her biological age at the year she was. joined the CPC until she was elected for first time to CC of CPC. It is worth to mentioned because some women among the sample group have been members of several CC. For this reason, and despite the fact the main focus of the research includes four CC (15th ,16th ,17th and 18th), a new group was added in order to make the analysis more accurate. So, the data will show the mobility rate of five groups: -. Previous CC of CPC (before 1997). -. 15th CC of CPC (1997-2002). 28.

(41) -. 16th CC of CPC (2002-2007). -. 17th CC of CPC (2007-2012). -. 18th CC of CPC (2012-2017). Independent variable The independent variable of the research was the attributes of female elite. Although it was not one variable, but a several ones (one for each main characteristic of female elite in Chinese politics) under a generic term. The so-called attributes of female. 政治大. elite include information regarding to demographic characteristics, educational backgrounds and, career backgrounds. To operationalization of this variable, an extensive. 立. model was applied to the biographical data on women members of the four CC.. ‧ 國. 學. Table 2.3 Attributes of female elite in Chinese Politics. ‧. Attributes of female elite in Chinese Politics. Educational level. Government work. er. al. n. Province. Career backgrounds. sit. Nationality. io. Educational backgrounds. y. Nat. Demographic characteristics. i n C h Major engchi U Party school. v. Party work Expert work Firm work Ideology PLA/police/law Mass organizations work. Source: my own elaboration. 29.

(42) Demographic characteristics Nationality China is a country of many nationalities, a total of 56 different ethnic groups have been officially identified. Han ethnicity (汉族) is the largest group in the country, constituting approximately the 92% of the population. Due to the high number of nationalities, the research only considered whether the women were Han or non-Han. Those who were non-Han were not classified into their specific minority groups. 1. Hypothesis. 政治大 nationalities (non-Han) among 立 the political elite in China. As an example, in the 18. It has been observed that there is a high number of females belonging to minority th. CC. of CPC, there is a total number of 33 women, eight belonging to minority nationalities,. ‧ 國. 學. (24.2%), while of the total number of the 356 men, only 21 belong to minority nationalities, (5.9%). This may confirm the statement made by Su (2006) that women are used to fill two. ‧. quotas at once (quotas addressed to women and quotas addressed to minorities).. y. Nat. Keeping in mind that non-Han women are used to fill two quotas at once, while. sit. Han women can´t, the first hypothesis suggests that non-Han women would have a higher. er. al. n. women.. io. promotion opportunity and, therefore a higher mobility rate (the fast runners) than Han. Ch. i n U. v. 1. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between nationality and mobility rate.. engchi. Non-Han women have a higher mobility rate than Han women. Province In Chinese culture, there is a difference between ancestral home (祖籍) and birth place(出生地). Ancestral home refers to the geographic area where the family of someone is from, while birth place indicates the geographic area where someone was born. These two are not always coincident. The research used the ancestral home instead of the birth 30.

(43) place, and to indicate the province it used a PRC´s administrative divisions map that includes 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities, 2 special administrative regions and 1 claimed province5. 2. Hypothesis In his book Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949, Bo (2002) declares that political mobility of a cadre is determined by his locality´s financial contribution to the central budget. The richer a province is; the greater chances of mobility the cadre has. According to this, members of CC are more. 政治大 are, and there are a greater prosperity, land area and a higher population density (Shih, 立. likely to be from the major provinces in the East region. Where the richest municipalities Christopher, & Liu, 2012).. ‧ 國. 學. 2. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between ancestral home (province) and mobility rate. Women from East provinces have a higher mobility rate than women from. ‧. others provinces.. y. Nat. al. er. io. Educational level. sit. Educational backgrounds. n. Educational level describes the higher level of education achieved by the cadre,. Ch. i n U. v. including high school, 3-year college, bachelor or 4-year college, master program (MA) and a doctorate (PhD).. engchi. 3. Hypothesis Since late 70´s, educational credentials have become a prerequisite of entry and promotion (Wang, 1994). The “four changes” cadre policy set up four criteria regarding cadre recruitment and promotion: revolutionary stand, youth, education, and specialization (gémìng huà niánqīng huà zhīshì huà zhuānyè huà) (Zhou, 2010). Educational level is a. 5. The mentioned map reflects PRC´s administrative divisions according to CCP´s vision of PRC. 31.

(44) key factor for the political career of elite members. 3. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between educational level and mobility rate. Women with a higher educational level have a higher mobility rate than women with a lower educational level Major Major refers to academic discipline pursued by a college student or the field that a student decides to specialize in. 文科 and 理工科 are two terminologies used to distinguish between the major in social sciences and humanities and the major in natural science and. 政治大. engineering. It should be mentioned that women with a lower educational level do not have. 立. a major.. ‧ 國. 學. 4. Hypothesis. Even though, Bo (2007) in his portrayal of the members of 16th CC minimizes the. ‧. number of graduates in natural science and engineering among the elite, others authors (Li. y. Nat. & White, 1988) (Lee, 1991) argue that the common profile in Chinese political elite is the. al. er. io. a degree in natural science and engineering.. sit. technocrat and, technocrats by definition (Bo, 2007) met the academic requisite of having. v. n. 4. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between major and mobility rate.. Ch. i n U. Women with a major in natural science and engineering have a higher mobility rate. engchi. than women with a major in social sciences and humanities. Party school The Party School of the CC of the CPC so called Central Party School is located in Beijing, and it is the highest education institution of the CPC, which only trains officials for the CPC (Shambaugh, 2008).. 32.

(45) 5. Hypothesis An exploratory analysis of the biographical data showed that women that received a degree in social science and humanities or a training from the Party School, they had already developed their career in some degree, namely, they had already joined the work force and the CPC. They may be considered more “red” than “expert”. Based on the above mentioned literature (Li & White, 1988) (Li C. , 2001) (Lee, 1991), the research proposes that women with no Party school experiences (with a profile closer to an expert or technocrat) would have a higher mobility rate.. 政治大. 5. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between Party school experiences and mobility. 立. rate. Women with no-Party school experiences have a higher mobility rate than. ‧ 國. 學. women with a major in social sciences and humanities.. ‧. Career backgrounds. The research is focused on the variety of career experiences instead of the main. y. Nat. careers, using the seven functional clusters with which Zang (2004) classified the career. io. sit. histories of Chinese leaders. Their career experiences are determined based by the length. al. iv n C U Work Department h eand of Propaganda n gUnited c h iFront n. career. Department. er. and significance (status, rank) of their work experiences. Each cadre has more than one (UFWD) are. included in the variable labeled as ideology work. UFWD consist of eight minor political parties and the All- China Federation of Industry and Commerce, nonetheless, it has been reported as a tool of CPC to control and to ideologize non CPC cadres (Pieke, 2009). Mass organization work includes Communist Youth League (CYL), ACWF, trade unions, sports related organizations and various mass organizations.. 33.

(46) 6. Hypothesis For the purpose of the research, each one of them was used as a variable and a hypothesis was stated in order to find out if a determined career experiences (or the conjunction of any of them) play a role in mobility patterns (high or low mobility). 6.1 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between party work and mobility rate. Women with Party work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without. 6.2 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between government work and mobility rate. 6.3 Women with government work experiences have a higher mobility rate than. 政治大 6.4 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between industrial bureau/finance work and 立 women without.. mobility rate. Women with industrial bureau/finance work experiences have a. ‧ 國. 學. higher mobility rate than women without.. 6.4 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between expert work and mobility rate.. ‧. Women with expert work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.. y. Nat. sit. 6.5 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between ideology and propaganda work and. al. n. higher mobility rate than women without.. Ch. er. io. mobility rate. Women with ideology or propaganda work experiences have a. i n U. v. 6.6 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between PLA/police work/law work and. engchi. mobility rate. Women with PLA/police work/law work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without. 6.7 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between mass organizations work and mobility rate. Women with mass organizations work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.. 34.

(47) Extraneous variables Control and confounding variables The control variable of this research is the institutionalization of Chinese elite politics, referring to CPC cadre policy. The operationalization of this variable was made through the theoretical description of it, and the delimitation of its temporality. The term “institutionalization” in Chinese elite politics has been defined by Kou and Zang (2014) as “the creation and persistence of a set of widely accepted mechanisms regulating leader exit entry and decision-making”. The accepted mechanisms shape a new. 政治大. organizational structure, affecting the odds of political mobility of elite members.. 立. The institutionalization of Chinese elite politics is a gradual process, beginning in. ‧ 國. 學. 1980, with Deng Xiaoping‘s speech on “Reform of the Party and State leadership” and still unfinished. It isn’t clear for the author if the process will continue its consolidation, and will delve into new rules. It has been set from 1980 to the present, but a shorter period of. ‧. time was chosen to analyze (1997-2017)6. This is because institutionalism as the measures. y. Nat. taken for the promotion of female officials have been implemented gradually, the outcome. sit. of these can’t be immediate. In order to observer the results of it, the research analyzed a. al. er. io. shorter period of time. Referring to institutionalization, the “four changes” cadre policy,. iv n C regulatory framework and legislation included. U h e are n chi g The cofounding variable is the connections. As it was mentioned early, despite the n. and any norm derived of this policy, and the affirmative action (specific for female cadre),. actual process of institutionalization of Chinese elite politics, it cannot be dismissed the role of connections or informal politics. Nonetheless, to pursue a delimited object of research, the study did not step into the theoretical debate informal politics versus factionalism, but it tried to cover all possibilities, taking into account the importance of personal connections with the only intention of offering a broader picture of the CPC reality.. 6. Time period from 1997 to 2017 comprises four CC: 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th. 35.

(48) INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CONNECTIONS IN CHINESE ELITE POLITICS. 3.1 Institutionalization context in Chinese elite politics. 政治大. The institutionalization of Chinese elite politics, referring to CPC cadre policy, is the control variable of the research. It affects mobility by setting requirements to political. 立. power access and promotion. To operationalize the variable, it is necessary to set the. ‧ 國. 學. theoretical description of it, and the delimitation of its temporality. Following the definition of institutionalization proposed by Kou and Zang (2014). ‧. the author understand the term “institutionalization” in elite politics as the creation and persistence of a set of widely accepted mechanisms regulating leader exit entry and. y. Nat. sit. decision making. Namely, the set of written rules and unwritten norms that affect both the. al. er. io. processes of leadership decision making and the dynamics of leadership competition,. n. changing the criteria and the processes to promote leaders to the top political order (Miller,. Ch. i n U. v. 2008) and thereby, creating a new “political opportunity structure”.. engchi. The “Four Modernizations of socialism” (of economy, agriculture, development of science and technology, and national defense) was advertised by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964. Despite of this, it wasn’t until 1978, after the dead of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four, when Deng Xiaoping boosted the economic openness (Chow G. , 2004). An economic reform of this magnitude (the shift of a planned economy to a market) needed new qualified political and bureaucratic elite with the knowledge and capacity to implement it and to be willing to do it.. 36.