CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.5 Structure of the thesis
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1.5 Structure of the thesis
The first chapter of this research includes introductory information on China and women political participation, a detailed explanation of the research question and a justification of its selection, a profuse literature review in relation to the Chinese political elite, major standard profiles of elite members and mobility, a look to political elite from a gender perspective and comparative information. The introductory chapter also includes a summary of the main argument of the thesis and the research design –case selection, data sources, research method and research limitations--.
The second chapter explains the main argument of the thesis starting from the main hypothesis to the various variables and their operationalization into indicators.
The third chapter addresses the institutional context in Chinese politics, giving extensive information on cadre management system, affirmative action and so on. It also defines the role of political connections or informal politics in the given context.
The fourth chapter contains a descriptive analysis of the attributes and mobility of female elites in Chinese politics. The analysis of these variables is exemplified through numerous graphics which represent general overviews as well as trends over time.
The fifth chapter includes an inferential analysis of the relationship between attributes of female elites in Chinese politics and types of mobility. It tests the various hypothesis using test of independence.
The sixth and last chapter states the main findings of the research, argues specific types of discrimination that female cadres suffer during their career and proposes measures for its correction.
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2.1 From hypothesis to definition of variables
The present study starts from the central hypothesis that attributes or characteristics of an elite group (in this case a female elite group), as well as the organizational structure (in which these women develop their careers) and political connections are affecting their political mobility.
The hypothesis is based on the literature review on elites and mobility specifically by China scholar Xiaowei Zang in his book Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China. Zang (2004) identifies mobility rate as “the speed with which individuals (cadre) climb the political hierarchy, which to some degree is a measure of the skills and qualities most highly valued by the top party leadership”. He also claims that “mobility rate is the outcome of the joint work of human capital and organizational characteristics...difference in promotion speeds reflects both structural and individual characteristics. (…) Personal attributes are certainly important, but they operate within the confines of the opportunity structure”.
From his statements, it can be deduced that attributes influence promotion opportunities (understood as status attainment) and mobility (speed of promotion), organizational structure (institutionalization of Chinese elite politics) shape the structure opportunity (setting age limits for promotions, demanding a minimum educational level…) and, political connections make the path to the top easier.
It is assumed that the three variables (attributes of female elite, institutionalization of Chinese elite politics and political connections) influence the dependent variable (mobility rate). The difference among the three variables is the degree of influence and measurement.
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Attributes of female elite are specific, observable, measurable and directly related to mobility rate. Institutionalization and political connections are embedded in Chinese politics. Meanwhile, institutionalization can be measured and at the same time provide a time frame, but political connections can only be defined conceptually. One of the hurdles faced in doing this research was lack of access to the necessary information to study and to operationalize political connections into an indicator.
Hence, this research aims to study only the relationship between attributes of female elite and mobility. Others variables that may affect mobility are considered extraneous such as institutionalization and political connections.
Extraneous variables are not rare and “can affect the measurement of study variables and the relationship among these” (Laerd Dissertation, 2016). An extraneous variable is by definition any variable other than the independent variable that may influence a change in the dependent variable and that the researcher was not intentionally studying in the research. An extraneous variable can be classified as a control variable, when the researcher controls the variable, but doesn´t intend to examine it, and as a confounding variable, when the variable that is recognized before the study or during the study cannot be controlled by the researcher.
In order not to jeopardize the internal validity of the study, a clear differentiation between variables was made.
Table 2.2 Variables according to their function in the research
Variables according to their function in the research
Dependent variable Mobility rate
Independent variable Attributes of female elite
Control variable Institutionalization of Chinese elite politics
Cofounding variable Political connections
Source: my own elaboration.
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operationalize the dependent variable in an indicator (mobility rate) Zang´s definition of mobility rate (or speed of promotion) in state socialism (2004) has been used:- The rate of mobility = (𝑎𝑔𝑒+𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦1 at the first CC of CPC to which the person joined)
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Zang uses Kenneth Farmer´s definition of mobility rate in the Soviet Union (Zang, Elite dualism and leadership selection in China, 2004): “the length of the “wait” between an individual´s first acceptance of a party or government position and his or her first election to the Central Committee of Communist party” and, improve it by adding an extra factor, biological age. Zang´s indicator was chosen because it brings together two concepts:
promotion, defined as status attainment (cadre reach the elite by being elected to CC of CPC) and, mobility, determined as the speed of promotion (the difference of years since she joined the CPC until she was first elected to the CC of CPC).
It should be noted that age is calculated as her biological age at the year she was elected for first time to CC of CPC. Seniority reflects the numbers of year since she first joined the CPC until she was elected for first time to CC of CPC. It is worth to mentioned because some women among the sample group have been members of several CC. For this reason, and despite the fact the main focus of the research includes four CC (15th ,16th ,17th and 18th), a new group was added in order to make the analysis more accurate. So, the data will show the mobility rate of five groups:
- Previous CC of CPC (before 1997) - 15th CC of CPC (1997-2002)
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- 16th CC of CPC (2002-2007) - 17th CC of CPC (2007-2012) - 18th CC of CPC (2012-2017)
Independent variable
The independent variable of the research was the attributes of female elite.
Although it was not one variable, but a several ones (one for each main characteristic of female elite in Chinese politics) under a generic term. The so-called attributes of female elite include information regarding to demographic characteristics, educational backgrounds and, career backgrounds. To operationalization of this variable, an extensive model was applied to the biographical data on women members of the four CC.
Table 2.3 Attributes of female elite in Chinese Politics
Attributes of female elite in Chinese Politics
Demographic characteristics Educational backgrounds Career backgrounds
Nationality Educational level Government work
Province Major Party work
Party school Expert work
Firm work Ideology PLA/police/law
Mass organizations work Source: my own elaboration.
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China is a country of many nationalities, a total of 56 different ethnic groups have been officially identified. Han ethnicity (汉 族) is the largest group in the country, constituting approximately the 92% of the population. Due to the high number of nationalities, the research only considered whether the women were Han or non-Han.
Those who were non-Han were not classified into their specific minority groups.
1. Hypothesis
It has been observed that there is a high number of females belonging to minority nationalities (non-Han) among the political elite in China. As an example, in the 18th CC of CPC, there is a total number of 33 women, eight belonging to minority nationalities, (24.2%), while of the total number of the 356 men, only 21 belong to minority nationalities, (5.9%). This may confirm the statement made by Su (2006) that women are used to fill two quotas at once (quotas addressed to women and quotas addressed to minorities).
Keeping in mind that non-Han women are used to fill two quotas at once, while Han women can´t, the first hypothesis suggests that non-Han women would have a higher promotion opportunity and, therefore a higher mobility rate (the fast runners) than Han women.
1. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between nationality and mobility rate.
Non-Han women have a higher mobility rate than Han women.
Province
In Chinese culture, there is a difference between ancestral home (祖籍) and birth place(出生地). Ancestral home refers to the geographic area where the family of someone is from, while birth place indicates the geographic area where someone was born. These two are not always coincident. The research used the ancestral home instead of the birth
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includes 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities, 2 special administrative regions and 1 claimed province5.2. Hypothesis
In his book Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949, Bo (2002) declares that political mobility of a cadre is determined by his locality´s financial contribution to the central budget. The richer a province is; the greater chances of mobility the cadre has. According to this, members of CC are more likely to be from the major provinces in the East region. Where the richest municipalities are, and there are a greater prosperity, land area and a higher population density (Shih, Christopher, & Liu, 2012).
2. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between ancestral home (province) and mobility rate. Women from East provinces have a higher mobility rate than women from others provinces.
Educational backgrounds Educational level
Educational level describes the higher level of education achieved by the cadre, including high school, 3-year college, bachelor or 4-year college, master program (MA) and a doctorate (PhD).
3. Hypothesis
Since late 70´s, educational credentials have become a prerequisite of entry and promotion (Wang, 1994). The “four changes” cadre policy set up four criteria regarding cadre recruitment and promotion: revolutionary stand, youth, education, and specialization (gémìng huà niánqīng huà zhīshì huà zhuānyè huà) (Zhou, 2010). Educational level is a
5The mentioned map reflects PRC´s administrative divisions according to CCP´s vision of PRC.
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key factor for the political career of elite members.
3. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between educational level and mobility rate.
Women with a higher educational level have a higher mobility rate than women with a lower educational level
Major
Major refers to academic discipline pursued by a college student or the field that a student decides to specialize in. 文科 and 理工科 are two terminologies used to distinguish between the major in social sciences and humanities and the major in natural science and engineering. It should be mentioned that women with a lower educational level do not have a major.
4. Hypothesis
Even though, Bo (2007) in his portrayal of the members of 16th CC minimizes the number of graduates in natural science and engineering among the elite, others authors (Li
& White, 1988) (Lee, 1991) argue that the common profile in Chinese political elite is the technocrat and, technocrats by definition (Bo, 2007) met the academic requisite of having a degree in natural science and engineering.
4. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between major and mobility rate.
Women with a major in natural science and engineering have a higher mobility rate than women with a major in social sciences and humanities.
Party school
The Party School of the CC of the CPC so called Central Party School is located in Beijing, and it is the highest education institution of the CPC, which only trains officials for the CPC (Shambaugh, 2008).
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5. Hypothesis
An exploratory analysis of the biographical data showed that women that received a degree in social science and humanities or a training from the Party School, they had already developed their career in some degree, namely, they had already joined the work force and the CPC. They may be considered more “red” than “expert”. Based on the above mentioned literature (Li & White, 1988) (Li C. , 2001) (Lee, 1991), the research proposes that women with no Party school experiences (with a profile closer to an expert or technocrat) would have a higher mobility rate.
5. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between Party school experiences and mobility rate. Women with no-Party school experiences have a higher mobility rate than women with a major in social sciences and humanities.
Career backgrounds
The research is focused on the variety of career experiences instead of the main careers, using the seven functional clusters with which Zang (2004) classified the career histories of Chinese leaders. Their career experiences are determined based by the length and significance (status, rank) of their work experiences. Each cadre has more than one career.
Department of Propaganda and United Front Work Department (UFWD) are included in the variable labeled as ideology work. UFWD consist of eight minor political parties and the All- China Federation of Industry and Commerce, nonetheless, it has been reported as a tool of CPC to control and to ideologize non CPC cadres (Pieke, 2009). Mass organization work includes Communist Youth League (CYL), ACWF, trade unions, sports related organizations and various mass organizations.
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conjunction of any of them) play a role in mobility patterns (high or low mobility).6.1 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between party work and mobility rate. Women with Party work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.
6.2 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between government work and mobility rate.
6.3 Women with government work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.
6.4 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between industrial bureau/finance work and mobility rate. Women with industrial bureau/finance work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.
6.4 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between expert work and mobility rate.
Women with expert work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.
6.5 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between ideology and propaganda work and mobility rate. Women with ideology or propaganda work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.
6.6 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between PLA/police work/law work and mobility rate. Women with PLA/police work/law work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.
6.7 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between mass organizations work and mobility rate. Women with mass organizations work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.
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The control variable of this research is the institutionalization of Chinese elite politics, referring to CPC cadre policy. The operationalization of this variable was made through the theoretical description of it, and the delimitation of its temporality.
The term “institutionalization” in Chinese elite politics has been defined by Kou and Zang (2014) as “the creation and persistence of a set of widely accepted mechanisms regulating leader exit entry and decision-making”. The accepted mechanisms shape a new organizational structure, affecting the odds of political mobility of elite members.
The institutionalization of Chinese elite politics is a gradual process, beginning in 1980, with Deng Xiaoping‘s speech on “Reform of the Party and State leadership” and still unfinished. It isn’t clear for the author if the process will continue its consolidation, and will delve into new rules. It has been set from 1980 to the present, but a shorter period of time was chosen to analyze (1997-2017)6. This is because institutionalism as the measures taken for the promotion of female officials have been implemented gradually, the outcome of these can’t be immediate. In order to observer the results of it, the research analyzed a shorter period of time. Referring to institutionalization, the “four changes” cadre policy, and any norm derived of this policy, and the affirmative action (specific for female cadre), regulatory framework and legislation are included.
The cofounding variable is the connections. As it was mentioned early, despite the actual process of institutionalization of Chinese elite politics, it cannot be dismissed the role of connections or informal politics. Nonetheless, to pursue a delimited object of research, the study did not step into the theoretical debate informal politics versus factionalism, but it tried to cover all possibilities, taking into account the importance of personal connections with the only intention of offering a broader picture of the CPC reality.
6 Time period from 1997 to 2017 comprises four CC: 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th.
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INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CONNECTIONS IN CHINESE ELITE POLITICS
3.1 Institutionalization context in Chinese elite politics
The institutionalization of Chinese elite politics, referring to CPC cadre policy, is the control variable of the research. It affects mobility by setting requirements to political power access and promotion. To operationalize the variable, it is necessary to set the theoretical description of it, and the delimitation of its temporality.
Following the definition of institutionalization proposed by Kou and Zang (2014) the author understand the term “institutionalization” in elite politics as the creation and persistence of a set of widely accepted mechanisms regulating leader exit entry and decision making. Namely, the set of written rules and unwritten norms that affect both the processes of leadership decision making and the dynamics of leadership competition, changing the criteria and the processes to promote leaders to the top political order (Miller, 2008) and thereby, creating a new “political opportunity structure”.
The “Four Modernizations of socialism” (of economy, agriculture, development of science and technology, and national defense) was advertised by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964. Despite of this, it wasn’t until 1978, after the dead of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four, when Deng Xiaoping boosted the economic openness (Chow G. , 2004). An economic reform of this magnitude (the shift of a planned economy to a market) needed new qualified political and bureaucratic elite with the knowledge and capacity to implement it and to be willing to do it.
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As it has already been highlighted in the literature review, Li (2001) claims before the economic reform (1949-1978) CPC cadres were recruited and promoted “based on seniority in joining the Party and the Revolution, such as taking part in the Long March and the Anti-Japanese War; ideological commitment to Marxism and Mao Zedong though;
political loyalty and activism in the class struggle, and; class background from a proletarian family”. The profile of those cadres was not accurate for the new task. CPC needed develop a system to attract a younger and with technical skills cadre to renew the elite.
The political structure would be adapted to the requirements of the economic reform (Dickson, 2010). In August 1980, Deng Xiaoping gave a speech on “Reform of the Party and State leadership”. He stated that the priority should be the economic reform, but in order to do it and keep the power the CPC should also initiated a political reform (zhī huā).
A major step of the political reform and therefore, in the political institutionalization of Chinese elite was the implementation of the “four changes” cadre policy. The idea was proposed by Deng Xiaoping, when he pointed out that cadres were not in a favorable condition to help realize the Four Modernization of socialism. The “four changes” refers to making cadres more revolutionary, younger, more knowledgeable and more specialized. And to ensure the elite renewal, Chinese authorities developed a system of cadre retirement. During 1982 organ reforms, it was implemented for the first time on a nation-wide basis. Up to this day, this cadre policy remains a guiding policy for cadre work.
(Lisheng 1994).
The political institutionalization implied three big consequences on Chinese politics and one outcome. The consequences were: first, position means power (no power without position); second, institutional loyalty became more important than personal loyalty; and, third, political existence have also institutionalized, due to mandatory retirement age system (Bo, 2007). The natural outcome of this was a more stable regime
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with power balancing and more predictable future scenarios. The CPC achieved to maintain its monopoly of the power and ensure its future.
In spite of the beginning of the institutionalization of Chinese elite politics was in
In spite of the beginning of the institutionalization of Chinese elite politics was in