CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CONNECTIONS IN CHINESE
3.1 Institutionalization context in Chinese elite politics
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INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CONNECTIONS IN CHINESE ELITE POLITICS
3.1 Institutionalization context in Chinese elite politics
The institutionalization of Chinese elite politics, referring to CPC cadre policy, is the control variable of the research. It affects mobility by setting requirements to political power access and promotion. To operationalize the variable, it is necessary to set the theoretical description of it, and the delimitation of its temporality.
Following the definition of institutionalization proposed by Kou and Zang (2014) the author understand the term “institutionalization” in elite politics as the creation and persistence of a set of widely accepted mechanisms regulating leader exit entry and decision making. Namely, the set of written rules and unwritten norms that affect both the processes of leadership decision making and the dynamics of leadership competition, changing the criteria and the processes to promote leaders to the top political order (Miller, 2008) and thereby, creating a new “political opportunity structure”.
The “Four Modernizations of socialism” (of economy, agriculture, development of science and technology, and national defense) was advertised by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964. Despite of this, it wasn’t until 1978, after the dead of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four, when Deng Xiaoping boosted the economic openness (Chow G. , 2004). An economic reform of this magnitude (the shift of a planned economy to a market) needed new qualified political and bureaucratic elite with the knowledge and capacity to implement it and to be willing to do it.
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As it has already been highlighted in the literature review, Li (2001) claims before the economic reform (1949-1978) CPC cadres were recruited and promoted “based on seniority in joining the Party and the Revolution, such as taking part in the Long March and the Anti-Japanese War; ideological commitment to Marxism and Mao Zedong though;
political loyalty and activism in the class struggle, and; class background from a proletarian family”. The profile of those cadres was not accurate for the new task. CPC needed develop a system to attract a younger and with technical skills cadre to renew the elite.
The political structure would be adapted to the requirements of the economic reform (Dickson, 2010). In August 1980, Deng Xiaoping gave a speech on “Reform of the Party and State leadership”. He stated that the priority should be the economic reform, but in order to do it and keep the power the CPC should also initiated a political reform (zhī huā).
A major step of the political reform and therefore, in the political institutionalization of Chinese elite was the implementation of the “four changes” cadre policy. The idea was proposed by Deng Xiaoping, when he pointed out that cadres were not in a favorable condition to help realize the Four Modernization of socialism. The “four changes” refers to making cadres more revolutionary, younger, more knowledgeable and more specialized. And to ensure the elite renewal, Chinese authorities developed a system of cadre retirement. During 1982 organ reforms, it was implemented for the first time on a nation-wide basis. Up to this day, this cadre policy remains a guiding policy for cadre work.
(Lisheng 1994).
The political institutionalization implied three big consequences on Chinese politics and one outcome. The consequences were: first, position means power (no power without position); second, institutional loyalty became more important than personal loyalty; and, third, political existence have also institutionalized, due to mandatory retirement age system (Bo, 2007). The natural outcome of this was a more stable regime
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with power balancing and more predictable future scenarios. The CPC achieved to maintain its monopoly of the power and ensure its future.
In spite of the beginning of the institutionalization of Chinese elite politics was in 1980 with Deng Xiaoping´s speech on “Reform of the Party and State leadership”, the research analyzes female mobility in a shorter period of time, from 1997 to 2017. The reason is that even though the beginning of the political institutionalization was in 1980, the implementation of cadre policies, especially those related to female cadres happened later on.
Main cadre system policies
Cadre policies affects the mobility of cadre by setting requirements of entry, promotion and exit. Those requirements are based mostly in age and level of studies.
Since 90´s, several regulations concerned to the selection and appointment of leading cadres have been issued:
- ¨Interim Regulations on Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres¨ (1995).
- ¨Development Program Concerning the Establishment of a National Party and State Leadership for 1998-2003¨ (issued in 1998).
- ¨Program to Deepen the Cadre Personnel System¨ (2000).
- ¨Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres (issued in 2002 to replace 1995´s regulations).
Among the set of requirements to promote and to exit, it must be noted a peculiar phenomenon, the cadre retirement system establishes different ages regarding to the gender of the cadre. Women are obliged to retire to earlier ages than men. Although, the ages
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established depend on the job position on the Party-state, for female cadres the age requirement to retire is usually five years earlier than for male cadres. Namely, if the age limit for promote or retirement for a man is at 60 years old, for a woman is usually at 55 years old.
Legal frame
Back to the women and their chances on Chinese elite sphere, it should be mentioned first the legal frame and other regulations that women are subjected. Hershatter (2004) asserts that China has legislated gender equality, and recite the laws guaranteeing gender equality:
- “Marriage Law, 1950, women and men are guaranteed virtually the same legal rights with respect to marriage.
- Law of Succession ,1985, men and women are equal in their right to inheritance - Compulsory Education Law, 1986, all children aged six years and over must attend school to receive compulsory education through grade nine regardless of their sex, nationality, and race.
- General Rules on Civil Law,1986, women enjoy the same civil rights as men - Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women, 1992, women’s rights are equal to men’s in political, economic, cultural, and social life, and with regards to property and employment”.
The political inclusion of women has benefited from gender-related institutions, policies and laws. Since 90’s, the Chinese party-state has sponsored affirmative actions and joined to several conventions and bill referring women’s rights. In 1979, China signed the
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Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW), also known as international bill of rights for women. CEDAW is a legally binding “gender norm to build national institutions both formal and informal to guarantee gender equality in all spheres without reservation” promoted by United Nations (UN).
In 1995, China hosted the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. The reason of hosting was that after the Tiananmen incident and, the almost collapse of CPC, the party-state needed regain the trust and clean its image. Hosting this kind of event would give the impression of a modern China.
Its success is debatable; only two foreign leaders attended, majority of attendance were people already working on women’s issues. But it had a tangible impact on the highlighted the importance of making policy and research this gender by scholars and, moreover the authorities relaxed the measures that regulated the formation of advocacy groups, so eighteen new advocacy groups were formed (Zheng W. , 1996).
As well in this period of time (90’s to nowadays) a favorable legislation and divers policies have been developed like the amendments of the 1992 women’s rights law, it codified women’s rights including freedom of speech, the right to vote and seek public office, compulsory education through grade nine (the same as for boys) and equal rights for women and men to contract farmland and housing and to obtain employment (Zuckerman, Blikberg, & Cao, 2000) and the National policy on women development in 1995.
Affirmative action
Affirmative action is defined in a broad sense as an active effort (through legislation or policies) to improve the opportunities for members of minority groups or women. It is designed to increase the number of people from historically underrepresented groups
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within businesses, institutions and other areas of society. It is a means to countering historical discrimination against a particular group. In the field of study in question, affirmative action is understood as policies carry on by the CPC within the government and the party to increase the number of women in the public sphere.
To accelerate women political participation, the party-state has promoted the selection/training female cadres (2005), has created an action plan so called quotas (2000-2009), has implemented the 30% critical benchmark (temporal affirmative solution) and has incremented gradually the proportion of women in the National People’s Congress.
According to Guo and Zheng (2008), other important measures taken are:
- “Program for Women Development in China (1995-2000) (2001-2010) - Measures and actions for implementation of gender policies
- Specific rules spelt out in various documents relating to personnel appointments by the central Organization Department (COD) of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), such the Program on Deepening the Reform of Cadre and Personnel System from 2001 to 2010, which supplement particular needs for women in different areas”.
Despite the efforts, as it has been mentioned in the literature’s review in the past 30 years, after dropping drastically (during 80’s), the number of female leaders tends towards stabilization, for example the statistical range of female leaders in the CPC Central Committee (15th to 18th) is between 7.3% and 10%. This stability or stagnation, as the numbers are still low in comparison with men, could be the verification of ineffectiveness of affirmative action to break the glass ceiling.
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Table 3.1 Average (%) of female in the CPC (15th to 18th) Central Committee
15th Central Committee 7,3%
16th Central Committee 7,6%
17th Central Committee 10%
18th Central Committee 8,7%
Source: data derived from Chinavitae.com, statistics of my won elaboration.
CPC has stated numerous times its willingness to promote gender issues, nevertheless the effectiveness of its policies are doubtful. Why does the party-state have this ambiguous behavior?
Regarding to the promotion of affirmative action and pro-female cadre policies, the reason behind could be Party's persistent attempts to include every group or movement within. Generally speaking, state organizations along with radical civil organizations make the change. CPC does not tolerate the existence of movements or organizations that can challenge its dominance. As part of its survival strategy, and in its effort for legitimacy, it embraces these demands (Dickson, 2010). CPC becomes a unifying element, representative of all interest of groups historically disadvantaged (women, student labor unions…). It does not leave room for the development of the civil society. As example of this, the use that Communist movements (in Soviet countries and in China) have made of women, requesting their support and efforts in times of need and crisis, then again relegated them to family life (Wolchik, 1989) (Gilbert, 1973). In addition, to search for further legitimation through representation of a large group like women and the intent to stand as a country at the forefront could be other feasible reasons.