SUMMARY

This thesis explored the transboundary water interactions between India and two of its neighbours, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It first overviewed the literature on the link between environmental challenges, more specifically water scarcity, and conflict. In the case study chapters, the author discussed India’s water relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh, first briefly introducing the history behind the two cases, and then focusing on the two major treaties: Indus Water Treaty of 1960 and Ganges Water Sharing Treaty of 1996. The author aimed to re-evaluate the two treaties through Mirumachi’s TWINS framework of coexisting conflict and cooperation, and discuss if the treaties have been successful in providing sustainable solution.

5.2. IMPLICATIONS

The author followed the consensus that wars over water have not become part of the security reality yet, however, the thesis also argued that water shortage issues could exacerbate existing conflicts. Through the TWINS matrix, the author demonstrated that despite the prevalent appraisal of the two treaties, certain levels of conflict still exist. And while water has so far not been the sole reason for these three states to go to war, there have been some open hostilities in the past and recent tensions, that have at least partially been multiplied by water shortage. Examples include India’s pursuit of unilateral decisions to water security, domestic tensions within the states and even interstate environmental refugees and conflicts.

Furthermore, the power balance between the upper and lower riparian could help us understand why the situation has not been improved. In addition to the geographic

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disadvantage of downstream riparians, both Pakistan and Bangladesh are far behind India’s economic and military power. Of the two, Pakistan seems to have slightly more leverage due to its military power and regional allies, which could explain why Pakistan has been more proactive in trying to secure a better water-sharing agreement. At the same time, the emphasis here is on trying, since the existing IWT does not bring about a satisfactory solution. The water interactions between India and Pakistan do seem to be more conflictual than the case of India and Bangladesh, although it is not clear whether this is because of Pakistan’s power to make river claims, or overall thorny relationship between the two sides. On the other hand, due to its relative position next to the powerful Indian neighbor, Bangladesh is only now starting to use the power of international arena to demand its water shares and challenge India’s regional hydro hegemony.

In applying the concept of interactions to the transboundary water management and analyzing the relative power balance, the thesis offers an alternative approach to otherwise predominantly black-and-white analysis.

The common understanding that treaties prevent wars should not be confused with conflict resolution. Researching the two treaties’ provisions, developments after Modi’s election in 2014, and power asymmetry led to the conclusion that the treaties have failed to remove the water scarcity issue from political and even security agendas. The author believes that outdated data and provisions have contributed to this shortcoming, allowing India to strengthen its hydro-hegemonic position. This is shown in treating water as a bargaining chip (as in the case of Pakistan), and unilateral water withdrawals, that are still within the boundaries of the two treaties, but are known to harm the downstream riparians Pakistan and Bangladesh.

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While the two treaties provided some minimal safeguards, they have not adapted to the changing nature of water supply and demand. An outdated treaty encourages the two parties to look for grey areas and exploit them, thus contributing to growing mistrust and potential tensions. Lack of transparency in data sharing and water negotiations can also give rise to erroneous media reports and political manipulations, adding on the already boiling civil unrest in times of drought or floods. The provisions should therefore be amended to include sustainable water management, impact prevention and mitigation, as well as clear conflict resolution mechanisms: e.g. specify what causing harm to the other party means and how can it be related to the harm-causing party’s actions. The growing population is not only faced with a lesser supply, but also with pollution and privatization of the remaining water resources, which could be addressed at the level of international and domestic law, e.g. declaring access to safe water a constitutional right. While India has already done the first step in this direction by giving the Ganges strong legal protection, a holistic approach to the river conservation should be the ultimate goal.

Polluted river water is linked to food and human security, which is not only domestic in nature, but – much like the rivers itself – transboundary. Perhaps clearer demonstrations of this issue linkage would encourage the governments to strengthen their efforts, and encourage them to adopt a basin-wide approach to solving this problem. Involving independent and powerful intermediates could make sure the potential new treaties would not perpetuate status quo, heavily influenced by power asymmetry. As well captured in the quotation below:

“…a significant factor preventing war over water is that the actions of non-hegemonic states usually comply with the order preferred by the hegemon, whose

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superior power position effectively discourages any violent resistance against the order.” (Zeitoun and Warner 2006, 437)

Strong and independent multi-national institutions could help breach the existing discords, while making sure that all of the stakeholders are involved in shaping and then complying with the agreed-upon regulations. Both Nepal and China have their plans for hydro-developments and it would be unwise to treat those as a separate issue from downstream water usage. Most importantly, it would be beneficial to avoid bringing nationalistic ideas into water security domain. After all, water scarcity on either side of the border will inevitably impact the whole basin.