3. CASE STUDY I: WATER SHORTAGE IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
3.3. ANALYSIS
This section of the thesis is dedicated to the analysis of Indo-Pakistani water interactions over the Indus River Basin under the Indus Water Treaty. The analysis consists of several parts:
First, it sums up the background chapter and presents the important events on a timeline, starting with the partition of British India in 1947, and ends with the start of a new round of IWT negotiations.
Second, it uses the TWINS matrix to present and then re-evaluate the nature of the transboundary water interactions. It uses official documents and news reports to create a narrative of water interactions, and challenges the prevailing opinion that, until recently, Indio-Pakistani water relations under the IWT have been a success story.
The last part aims to seek out the reasons for these interactions, and it does so by examining the two actors and their relative power. The argument is that the power asymmetry creates a unique downstream-upstream riparian dialogue.
The timeline below visualizes the information that was presented in the previous subchapter. This presentation of information could lead us to a conclusion that after two
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relatively short-standing agreements, the Indus Water Treaty managed to survive three major Indo-Pakistani wars over the last fifty years. So far, the treaty is still in place, despite Modi’s controversial move in October 2016, when he decided to suspend the annual meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission. After months of uncertainty, the leaders of both countries got together in Islamabad and started a new round of negotiations. These latest developments in March 2017 give hope for survival of the IWT, however, so far neither government has commented on the content or nature of the meeting.
Figure 8 Timeline of important events in the Indo-Pakistani water interactions
In applying the TWINS matrix, the first step is to transfer the timeline information to the two-dimensional matrix. The timeline gives us an accurate representation of the sequence;
however, it might mislead us into thinking that periods with different agreements in place were times of no conflict. Therefore, in addition to the information that a timeline can give us, the matrix draws reader’s attention to the previously unseen aspects – the coexistence of conflict and cooperation.
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Figure 9 TWINS representation 1: Timeline of important events in the Indo-Pakistani water interactions
Point 1 represents the post-partition situation between August and December 1947. The water scarcity issues are just another aspect of conflict between the two new states.
Hostilities occur even (but not exclusively) over the rare water resources. India and Pakistan both acknowledge the issue of water scarcity, and deal with it on a domestic level, so their actions are not coordinated or cooperative.
Point 2 marks the Standstill Agreement of December 1947, which established first regulations regarding the sharing of Indus waters between India and Pakistan. The agreement alleviated the conflict, but due to its temporal nature, failed to remove water security from the political agenda. Both sides were aware of the still-existing differences of opinions and the very short time they had to resolve them – the Standstill Agreement was to expire on March 31, 1948.
Point 3 shows us what happened immediately after the agreement expired: on April 1, 1948, India shut off water supplies to Pakistan. Prior to that event, neither side made an
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effort to negotiate a new deal or even to extend the Standstill Agreement, so India could legally stop supplying water, thus sending a clear message to Pakistan: no agreement, no water.
Point 4 takes us to May 4, 1948, when India and Pakistan signed the Inter-Dominion Accord. Faced with the merciless reality of India’s water politics, Pakistan initiated a new round of negotiations. Due to time limitations, the Inter-Dominion Accord mostly followed the previous Standstill Agreement, with some minor changes. The short text of the agreement quickly recaps the situation, showing that India’s East Punjab believes to have sole ownership of the Indus waters, while West Punjab under Pakistan references international law to support its river claims. The accord this states that in exchange for payments, India will keep releasing water to Pakistan, but slowly decrease the amounts, to allow Pakistan enough time to a smooth transition to tapping other water sources.
(Commonwealth Legal Information Institute 1948) The urgency of the situation pushed Pakistan to sign an accord that was clearly not in their best interest. Due to their ongoing dissatisfaction with the agreement provisions, the Inter-Dominion Accord was seen as another temporal solution, and despite setting up a water regulation system, it is questionable if it actually formed common norms or goals, therefore the author argues that the agreement can be classified as ad-hoc joint action. Two years after the agreement was signed in 1948, negotiations were started to find a more permanent solution based on shared goals and norms.
Point 5 is a considered a milestone in Indo-Pakistani water interactions – the Indus Water Treaty. After almost a decade of negotiations, the IWT was signed on September 19, 1960. It established new regulations, joint data sharing and revision bodies, as well as
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conflict resolution mechanisms. In contrast with the previous two agreements, the IWT really does seem to have established common norms and actions to achieve the ultimate goal, water security. The treaty provided safeguards even in times of three Indo-Pakistani wars, and was therefore seen as a shining example of transboundary water cooperation.
The matrix shows that overall, the treaty did not remove the water security issues from the political agenda. However, it did prevent securitization or hostilities over the Indus River and its tributaries. The treaty has been in place for nearly 60 years, but events in 2016 have brought some serious strains over the treaty’s implementation.
Point 6 shows us how, after the Uri attack in September 2016, Modi’s rhetoric and actions of suspending the Permanent Indus Commission have shifted the interaction back to the domain of securitization. So far, the water supply to Pakistan has not been cut off (and as we have seen in the previous chapter’s Pakistan would interpret this as an act of war), but it is safe to say that official statements show the common norms and goals might not be there anymore. We can observe this in both Pakistan and India’s statements, referring to the other side as the “terrorist side”, thus clearly differentiating between their supposed values and norms. At the same time, India’s goals have started leaning towards providing the local population with water and if necessary, this goal could override the IWT.
The first TWINS matrix showed the conflict and cooperation aspects of Indo-Pakistani interactions since 1947. The next one will take a better look at the events under the Indus Water Treaty, with aim to accurately present the nuanced interactions and oppose the prevailing view that ITW is solely a matter of cooperation.
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Some of the statements used for this part of the analysis have been taken from the Indian Pakistani government websites, although it is worth mentioning that their online press release databases only go as far back as 2000. For that reason, the author decided to complement the official statements with news reports, and to focus mostly on the 21st century and most recent developments between 2000 and 2017.
One of the first recorded disputes is that of the Salal Dam in 1987, which was eventually amicably resolved through bilateral negotiations. Some other projects, such as the Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, and the Baghligar Dam on Chenab River started a much longer dispute, straining the countries’ relations from mid-1990’s up until now, with Pakistan opposing its construction, but not being able to prevent it. In 2006, Indian government issued a press release regarding the Tulbul Navigation Project, explaining its legality as a navigation facility (as opposed to storage facility, as claimed by Pakistan) and its non-consumptive use of water, thus posing no threat to downstream Pakistan’s water availability. (Government of India 2006)
In light of the post Uri Modi rhetoric, Islamabad has restated its concerns over using this dam as an instrument of coercion. (Dr. Shaheen 2010, The Times of India 2004) The 1988 floods that hit India and Pakistan, revealed even more issues on water management, thus starting a separate round of public accusations and, eventually, agreement on sharing water data to prevent future devastating floods. (Dartmouth University 2003)
Securitization act has been present in many official statement and speeches, thus shifting the Indus Water Treaty from a political agenda towards securitized issue. Between 2009 and 2017, Pakistan has been continuously accusing India of manipulating or even breaching the Indus Water Treaty. With the supporting statement from the UN (e.g. the
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world is on the brink of the first water war), Pakistani officials and people have been accusing India of illegally storing Pakistan’s water. The government warned that such actions could fuel extremism, terrorism, or even war, however, India responded that the post Mumbai terrorist attacks period is not the time to be discussing water issues, when India is already being threatened from within Pakistan. In addition to that, the Indian government’s press release described the theft allegations as “baseless”. (The Independent 2009, Government of India 2010) The water theft accusations continued in 2011, adding that India has been benefitting from the unjust IWT provisions, mostly by dam construction works on Chenab River. Pakistan government representatives and U.S.
diplomatic envoys to India and Pakistan seemingly agreed that these dams would put further strain on the Indo-Pakistani relations, while India denied having received any flow reduction concerns from the Pakistani government. (Pakistan Today 2011, Pakistan Today 2011) Members of the Pakistani parliament have continued with their rhetoric, e.g.
saying India aims to make Pakistan a barren land and destroy Pakistan’s agriculture, by blatantly violating the IWT. Therefore, Pakistan could brace itself for future famine, unless something was done to address the issue. (Pakistan Today 2012, Pakistan Today 2012, Pakistan Today 2013) The government press release confirmed these fears and pointed at three main factors for water scarcity: Indus Water Treaty, decline in transboundary flows into Pakistan, and population growth. (Government of Pakistan 2014) The media went on with blaming India for destructive floods, again with the supposed goal of destroying Pakistan’s agriculture. (Pakistan Today 2014, Pakistan Today 2014) It is noteworthy here that Narendra Modi came into power in 2014, and as already described in the background subchapter, he started a much more responsive rhetoric, compared to the previously relatively silent Indian government.
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After the Uri attack in September 2016, Modi’s statements to use water as a weapon against Pakistan’s terrorism were met by (unsurprisingly) strong opposition from the downstream neighbor. In November 2016, Pakistan even warned against such coercive measures and instruments of war at the UN Open Debate of the Security Council on
“Water, Peace and Security”. (Government of Pakistan 2016) While India talked about questioning and revising the Indus Water Treaty, Pakistan firmly stood its ground of keeping the treaty without any modifications (Pakistan Today 2016), which seems to be in contradiction with their previous statements where they blamed the treaty for the water scarcity issues.
Point 1 on the TWINS matrix representation below shows us how the IWT established common norms, but left the water issues on the political agendas in both countries. Many of the disputes that have arose since 1960 have either securitized water issues, but kept the common norms (e.g. Salal Dam) as represented by point 2, or securitized the issue and regressed to common goals, with different preferred and even pursued approaches to the issue. These cases, represented with point 2’, include flood management, and India’s hydropower construction on Chenab River, etc. Similar to the TWINS matrix above, point 3 shows us how, after the Uri attack in September 2016, Modi’s rhetoric and actions of suspending the Permanent Indus Commission have shifted the interaction back to the domain of securitization. So far, the water supply to Pakistan has not been cut off, and the technical data sharing mechanism are still there, however, the PIC has been suspended and as discussed in the first TWINS representation above, the common goals and norms seem to have dissolved.
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Figure 10 TWINS representation 2: Indo-Pakistani water interactions under the IWT
The two TWINS representations of Indo-Pakistani water interactions show us that while there have been improvements on cooperation, some aspects of conflict have continued on, with little hope for their resolution. One of the questions that come to mind is: has the treaty given all that it possibly could, and has now become outdated? If so, why has it not been renegotiated, to accommodate the increasing demand, climate change, etc.? The next paragraph will dive into the power asymmetry, in hope that the two countries relative economic and military power can explain why the treaty remains in its original and perhaps already obsolete form. The relative power will be outlined in this section, and the used to compare the power asymmetry in the Indo-Bangladeshi water interactions (Chapter 4).
The financial power can be understood by looking at the two countries’ GDP. According to the World Bank data from February 2017, measured in millions of international dollars, India ranks number three in the world, with the GDP value of 7,998,278. On the other hand, Pakistan sits 21 places lower, with GDP value of 946,667. (World Bank 2017) This massive difference can explain why India can invest much more money into infrastructure
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development projects, and why Pakistan is suspicious of these (compared to their) projects that could store humongous amounts of river water.
Military power is an important factor in Indo-Pakistani conflict-ridden relations.
According to the World Bank, in 2015 India spent 2.4% of its total GDP on military expenditure, while Pakistan spent 3.6%. (World Bank 2017) Both countries possess nuclear weapons, making war even more of an extremely undesirable outcome. (Arms Control Association 2017) It is worth mentioning, that in addition to Pakistan’s military power, there are certain terrorist groups who have put water security on their agenda.
(Stanford University 2016, The Telegraph 2010) According to Modi’s rhetoric and vilification of Pakistani terrorism, hardly any benefits could be expected from terrorism activities to coerce India into releasing more water.
INDICATOR INDIA PAKISTAN
POPULATION2 (2015)
1,311,050,530 188,924,870
GDP (2017)3 7,998,278 946,667
MILITARY EXPENDITURE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS (2017)6 YES YES
Figure 11 Summary table: India and Pakistan socioeconomic indicators
India’s alliance with Afghanistan was already mentioned in the previous subchapter, so it is important to add that Pakistan has strong regional allies as well. China and Pakistan
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have been working together on a series of economic and development projects, knows as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). India has already raised its concerns over this project, and the Sino-Pakistani friendship could also pose a problem in water supplies to India – the Indus and its tributaries originate in China-administered Tibet, making China the ultimate upper riparian. Because there are no bilateral agreements between China and India, China could answer India’s unilateral actions targeting Pakistan’s water security, by responding in an equal measure, while at the same time not breaching any agreements. (Al Jazeera 2017, Pakistan Today 2016)
Last but not least, the population growth in both countries means that the demand for water resources will continue to rise. In 2015, the population of India grew at a rate of 1.2%, and 2.1% in Pakistan. (World Bank 2017) It is therefore unsurprising, that the politicians need to reassure their voters and convince them that water security (as one of the most tangible issues for Pakistani and Indian people) is one of their top priorities.
Modi’s strongly worded opinions on this issue could also have helped in his 2017 Assembly Election campaign,
Looking at the information presented above, India seems to be relatively stronger in terms of both finance and military power, in addition to having the geographic advantage of an upper riparian. However, Pakistan does have a powerful regional ally in China, as well as the internationally accepted treaty to use as a defense mechanism. If Pakistan is not willing to go into war over water resources, their best option is to hold India accountable in the international arena and, much to India’s discontent, keep involving third parties in dispute resolution process. While renegotiating the treaty to meet the needs of present times would be beneficial to both India and Pakistan, it seems that so far, both states prefer to stay with the original agreement. The difference between the two countries’
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position seems to be that India wishes to exploit it to the legal maximum, and Pakistan opposed any increases in India’s water consumption, even if they are in line with the agreement.