3. CASE STUDY I: WATER SHORTAGE IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
3.4. POLICY RECOMMENDATINS
According to the international community, and even the two involved countries, the water issues over the Indus River Basin between India and Pakistan were settled in 1960, and have since only been a matter of compliance with the Indus Water Treaty provisions.
However, the past decade has shown that the continuous increase of water demands on one hand, and the unresolved tensions between the two countries have proven that the treaty in itself does not build sufficient trust for meaningful and sustainable cooperation.
The Indus Water Treaty therefore provided the two states with water in the past, but has gradually become less efficient. This increasing water shortage has then fed the existing lack of trust on both sides, leading up to the height of water tensions since the September 2016 Uri attack. The author believes that the main reasons for the IWT’s failure are:
The treaty does not accommodate the changing conditions, and with that, it pushes
the countries towards unilateral and borderline interpretations of the treaty provisions. The treaty has never been updated, thus still relying on the same data as when it was signed, despite having monthly data sharing mechanism in place.
The treaty and its supporters have been focusing on how the treaty has survived
wars, instead of evaluating its primary function: to provide both sides with sufficient amounts of water. For the sake of building overall peace, any action that could lead to another round of lengthy negotiations has been discouraged, until post Uri-attacks Modi’s rhetoric.
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First recommendation is therefore to reconsider the treaty’s provisions and start a fresh round of (multilateral) negotiations. India’s incentives to renegotiate the treaty seem obvious: the population has been growing7 and with it water consumption needs for drinking, agriculture, energy, etc. So far, India has not even fully utilized its legal shares, however, it is important to remember that the water allocations were decided half a century ago, when water availability and needs were different from today’s. What used to be reasonable amount of India’s legal water shares in 1960, might mean water catastrophe for the downstream Pakistan today. At the same time, any drastic measures on the Indian side could be interpreted as acts of war, not only by the government, but also by the many militant groups. Terrorism seems to be the key factor for the future of IWT. Narendra Modi has made it clear, that Pakistan’s efforts to stamp out terrorism will be reflected in the water sharing reality between the two states. (Global Risk Insights 2016)
Pakistan has a great incentive to renegotiate the treaty as well, however, the official statements referenced in the previous chapters suggest that for now, both countries support the current IWT. The experience of lengthy negotiations might have left a bitter memory, thus making the option of going through another similar process an unlikely choice. The rational choice for India, under current conditions, is to capture as much of water resources as legally possible, while for Pakistan, their preferred rational choice seems to be appealing to the international community. (Government of Pakistan 2017) An alternative needs to be offered: a multilateral, basin-wide agreement that would first and foremost provide the dependent local communities with enough water, and then provide for the region as a whole. More emphasis should be put on benefit sharing and given the circumstances, a third-party mediator might be required for successful planning and implementation. To achieve this, Pakistan should keep putting pressure on India through
7 In 2015, the growth rate was 1.2%. (World Bank 2016)
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international institutions and try to engage its ally China to persuade India into a new round of negotiations.
With IWT, the length of the process seems to have led to a “bad agreement is better than no agreement” attitude, which should not be the case in the future. India’s reluctance to enter into multilateral agreements might be changed by China’s increasing hydro-project planning on many rivers, including the rich Himalayan sources that feed the whole South Asia. Another issue that must be addressed here is China’s general rejection of joint water management concepts, and support for upper-most riparian’s absolute power over transboundary waters. (Chellaney 2013) Unless India accepts multilateral approaches and perhaps even uses its leverage to convince China to join, India has no guarantee that China will keep letting sufficient amounts of water flow downstream, when resource capture could solve many of China’s own domestic water issues – and at the same time, heavily impact India.
To make the new agreement more sustainable, it should contain the following mechanisms: flexible allocation strategies; drought provisions; amendment and review procedures; and joint management institutions. (Cooley, Christian-Smith and Gleick 2009) These mechanism would ensure both India and Pakistan sufficient amounts of water, thus alleviate water-related social tensions within and between the two countries.
Before starting the new, basin-wide multilateral agreement negotiations, the two countries need to first review and modify the existing IWT, so that it could serve them during the transition period. The modified IWT should rely on the new water availability and demands data, and take into account possible future scenarios (e.g. impact of climate change). While India seems to prefer status-quo, it should be reminded that the IWT cannot accommodate its growing needs and at the same time uphold international
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cooperation on the issue. Breaching the agreement would seriously impact India’s position in the international arena, therefore renegotiating and complying with a treaty are the most rational choice.
On the domestic level, the two governments should continue, and perhaps accelerate, transitioning to less water-intensive crops and industries, and build their economic growth around the concept of sustainable development. Less water demand will lead to less tension surrounding the limited resources.
Another challenge that should be stopped immediately is privatization and commercialization of water resources. In Pakistan, Nestlé has already launched a business of buying groundwater and selling it back as their bottled product Pure Life.
(Rosemann 2005) One of the possible solutions would be to include water in the constitutional rights, thus preventing private ownership and unequitable access to the scarce water resources.
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