A scientific theory of international relations

Yet, Kenneth Waltz claims to deduce the nature of international politics exclusively from cer-tain structural properties of the anarchical environment within which states coexists, rather than from any assumptions about man, or power-maximization premises about states. In short, Waltz claims that insufficient attention was and is paid to the external context of state action as an au-tonomous determinant of state behavior, since “the prominent characteristic of international politics, however, seems to be the lack of order and of organization.”³¹

3.1 A scientific theory of international relations

Compare with Morgenthau, Waltz claims that theory is purely an instrumental tool. In this re-spect, he carefully distinguishes between laws and theories as qualitatively distinct kinds of knowledge. On the one hand, laws are observable propositions which establish relations be-tween variables. Waltz thus points out that a law is “based not simply on a relation that has been found, but one that has been found repeatedly.”³²

Conversely, if laws describe relations between phenomena, theories explain those relations.

Laws and correlations do not describe anything, and their inductive accumulation cannot, by themselves, result in theory.

“ […] facts do not speak for themselves, because associations never contain or conclu-sively suggest their own explanation, the question must be faced.”³³

A theory therefore explains laws and provides an indispensable link between facts and proposi-tions expressing probabilistic relaproposi-tions between these facts. Waltz further argues that “a theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connections among its parts.”³⁴

On the other hand, unlike Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz maintains that theories do not describe reality or make truth-claims. Instead, they simplify reality by artificially isolating certain factors and forces from a multitude of innumerable possible factors that may be relevant to account for a specific range of behavior, and by aggregating disparate elements, according to specified theo-retical criteria.³⁵

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The ultimate aim is therefore “to find the central tendency among a confusion of tendencies, to seek the propelling principle [and] to seek the essential factors.”³⁶

Nevertheless, what are the criteria for evaluating competing theories? According to Kenneth Waltz, the criteria for evaluating competing theories are not in terms of truth or falsity, but ac-cording to their explanatory utility. For reference, since theories are different from the reality they seek to explain, one cannot distinguish between true and false theories.

“ If truth is the question, then we are in the realm of law, not of theory.”³⁷

Obviously, theories should specify the empirical referents for the concepts contained in their deductive hypotheses, and they should also specify how variables are associated within these hypotheses. Theories themselves cannot be tested directly, but only indirectly through the hy-potheses they generate.

“ Rigorous testing of vague theory is an exercise in the use of methods rather than a useful effort to test theory.”³⁸

In this context, what is the validity of a theory? What are the theoretical limits? According to Kenneth Waltz, the validity of a theory depends on its ability to explain and predict a broad range of behavioral patterns but not policy-making processes.

First, regarding the validity of theories, the assumptions made by Waltz about the interests, sur-vival motives and unitary nature of states do not themselves have to be accurate. Waltz recog-nizes on the contrary that states are not unitary actors at all. However, he argues that these as-sumptions are the only necessary ones in a systemic theory that tries to explain behaviors as a result of structural conditions rather than state’s foreign policies.³⁹

From a theoretical point of view, as long as most states, including the most powerful, conform to the dictates of anarchy and engage in power-balancing behavior, the assumptions are valid ones.

Second, Waltz also points out that given his strict distinction between levels of analysis, his theory only explains the expected impact of structure on systemic behavior, not policy-making processes.

36 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Op. Cit., p. 10.

37 Ibid., p. 9.

38 Ibid., p. 16.

39 Martin Griffiths, Op. Cit., p. 84.

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In other words, Waltz’s theory does not explain how specific states will respond to structural conditions in particular historical circumstances. Structure constraints and incentives may some-times be outweighed by unit-level incentives and constraints because the theory explains simi-larity of behaviors, not differences.

“ The theory leads to many expectations about behaviors and outcomes. From the theo-ry, one predicts that states will engage in balancing behavior, whether or not balanced power is the end of their acts. From the theory, one predicts a strong tendency toward balance in the system. The expectation is not that a balance, once achieved, will be maintained, but that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or anoth-er.”⁴⁰

Finally, how do we test a theory? Once again, Waltz denounces Morgenthau. He rejects the strategy of “successive confirmation of hypotheses” derived from theories. Waltz argues that these do not prove a theory’s validity, since there may be historical or future exceptions which may confound it. Waltz also rejects strict falsification criteria, since a theory only gives rise to expectations, which are some what general and indeterminate. So, what does Kenneth Waltz recommend to do?

First, Waltz stresses that tests may be carried on by examining structurally comparable, although not necessarily identical realms.

“ Structural theories, moreover, gain plausibility if similarities of behavior are observed across realms that are different in substance but similar in structure, and if differences of behavior are observed where realms are similar in substance but different in struc-ture.”⁴¹

In other words, “reasoning by analogy is permissible where different domains are structurally similar.”⁴²

Second, Waltz also claims that “hard confirmatory tests” should be applied given the problemat-ic nature of behavior whproblemat-ich can be inferred from the theory, and therefore the inapplproblemat-icability of strict falsification.

Unlike Morgenthau, who illustrates his so-called universal laws of the balance of power, Waltz rejects the nineteenth-century period because of the absence of deep ideological cleavages.⁴³

40 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Op. Cit., p. 128.

41 Ibid., p. 123.

42 Ibid., p. 89.

43 Martin Griffiths, Op. Cit., p. 85.

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