國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Chapter 5: Conclusion
The constraints of the structure on human nature
“[…] the current president has called the relationship with China a strategic partnership. I believe our relationship needs to be redefined as one as competitor. Competitors can find areas of agreement, but we must make it clear to the Chinese that we don’t appreciate any attempt to spread weapons of mass destruction around the world, that we don’t appreciate any threats to our friends and allies in the Far East. This president is one who went to
Chi-na and ignored our fiends and allies in Tokyo and Seoul. He sent a chilling sigChi-nal about the definition of friendship.”1
Although the governments in Taipei and Beijing disagree on the role Washington should play in the cross-strait stalemate, we have demonstrated that the United States has played an important role in their evolving relationship since the 1950s.
Taiwan has expressed a continuing interest for supply of arms, firm opposition to any use of force in the Taiwan Strait, and avoidance of pressure to negotiate on PRC terms, While China has long warned that the United States has been interfering in China’s internal affairs or encour-aging the island’s split from the mainland.
For more than 60 years, the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity has successfully made sure that Washington can deter China from its declared willingness to use force to achieve political con-trol over Taiwan or deter the self-ruled island to declare independence from the mainland.
1 Governor George W. Bush, Presidential candidate, CNN Transcript, Larry King Live: South Carolina Repub-lican Debate, accessed on line at: http://transcriPts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0002/15/lkl.00.html, February 15, 2000.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Earlier this month, ruling Kuomintang Legislator Lin Yu-fang (林郁方) received yet another
“ambiguous message” from Washington, regarding Taiwan’s request to purchase either diesel-electric submarines or F-16 C/D aircraft.
Even if the U.S. has not openly rejected the aircraft sale, Washington has not yet decided on Taiwan’s requests and is offering the same old alternatives, such as helping Taiwan upgrade its aging F-16 A/B aircraft.
Whatever the Taiwanese legislator told the U.S. officials that the recently signed economic co-operation framework agreement (ECFA) between Taiwan and China is aimed at improving rela-tions between the two sides and creating a stable, peaceful and prosperous situation across the Taiwan Strait.
The U.S. officials’ reactions to the agreement were nothing but polite. They expressed hopes that it would offer benefits to other countries in East Asia and the United States; they expressed support for Taiwan’s efforts in seeking international recognition, particularly its bid to join the International Civil Aviation Organization.
But, as long as peace and stability can be preserved in the Taiwan Strait, should strategic ambi-guity be the only U.S. dual deterrence policy toward the security issue in the Taiwan Strait?
With countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, Japan and Ko-rea preparing to dismantle trade barriers with one another, why should Taipei shy away from cutting a trade deal with Beijing?
Thanks to Taiwan’s “flexible diplomacy” with China, Foreign Minister Timothy Chin-tien Yang (楊進添) recently remarked that both sides of the Taiwan Strait have also stopped their “tug-of-war” to win over diplomatic allies.
The Bush Administration and now the Obama Administration have also welcomed the stabiliza-tion of Beijing-Taipei relastabiliza-tions. Recall that the continuing comments by Chairman Raymond Burghardt of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) have suggested that the rapidly growing ties between Taiwan and China do not undercut the American strategic interests in the western Pacific.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
In March 2009, for instance, Burghardt said that the U.S. was very heartened by the new atmos-pherics across the Taiwan Strait, calling it something that made Washington “comfortable.”
According to Richard C. Bush, former AIT chairman and director of the Brookings Institution’s Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, the ECFA will further help Taiwan become part of the Asian economic integration and avoid marginalization in the region.
Most experts also anticipate that China’s rise to the superpower status could affect the United States and Taiwan’s economic development. In this eventuality, seeking to join international economic and trade organizations is a feasible approach for Taiwan to maintain its economic momentum.
If U.S. policy towards Taiwan and China is deliberately ambiguous, in order to give Washington more flexibility in responding to any dangerous situation in the Taiwan Strait, there are at least two points on which the U.S. policy is unambiguous: Taiwan’s unilateral declaration of inde-pendence and China’s use of force to resolve the cross-strait issue.
On the long run, however, the recent warming of Taipei-Beijing relations demonstrates that the situation in the Taiwan Strait is not determined by American policy, even if it plays some role.
Whether the two parties engage in dialogue or confrontation does not lie with the U.S. dual de-terrence strategy, but with the two former archenemies’ confidence with respect to the negotia-tion process.
In this respect, U.S. President George H. W. Bush’s decision of selling 150 advanced aircrafts (F-16 A/B) to Taiwan in September 1992 had serious consequences for the Taipei and Beijing sides as they both lost a measure of confidence in the commitments previously made.
Contrary to all expectations, the controversial decision bolstered President Lee Teng-hui’s (李 登辉) position in negotiations with China throughout the 1990s. It also torpedoes the Kuomin-tang administration’s first secret negotiations with the communist regime, which led to the im-portant “unofficial” meetings between the PRC and ROC senior public figures, Wang Daohan (汪道涵) and Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫) in Singapore in April 1993. Without notice, the very foun-dations of Taiwan-China relationship were shaken.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Now, if Washington is still hesitant in authorizing the sale of F-16Cs and F-16Ds, it is fine. But Taipei, Beijing and Washington should further commit to improve the international trade envi-ronment in order to create a deeply-rooted community of interests.
In this respect, an important factor that has influenced the cross-strait stalemate since the end of World War II is human nature. U.S. Scholar James Mann demonstrates in his book “About Face” the limited role actors eventually play in the cross-strait issue. U.S. Presidents Carter, Reagan, H. Bush, Clinton and W. Bush all came to the White House determined to change the direction or style of American policy towards China. None of them were actually able to main-tain the status quo.
Just as Kissinger conducted intensely personalized and secret diplomacy with Beijing, so did Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Just as the Nixon Administration had allowed China policy to be plagued by nasty competition between the U.S. National Security Council and the State Department, so did Carter Administration.
James Mann further shows that all these problems resulted from the longevity of the Kissingeri-an approach to China. While Kissinger left office in 1976, he is still considered to have exerted a powerful hold over American policy toward China well into the 1990s.
In this respect, Alan Romberg claims that President George H. Bush was an opportunist.2 In a letter to Deng Xiaoping dated of September 30, 1981, Bush underlined the principle of one-China with Beijing, while two years earlier he was speaking of reestablishing official relations with Taiwan.
Besides, we stressed in our research how the structure of the system made it difficult for the leaders in China, the United States or Taiwan to evade the inherent structural constraints of a bipolar or unipolar system.
First, we demonstrated that Washington balanced the threat to a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait stalemate, not for fun but because of structural concerns. In a bipolar system, each great power aligns with other powers in order to balance the threat and power. For reference, the bi-polar system is considered the most stable because both great powers strive to maintain it.
2 Alan Romberg, Op. Cit., p. 132.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
When Reagan restated the strong U.S. interest in a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues and made clear the connection to Taiwan arms sales, the U.S. president obviously meant to focus on a peaceful process, though Taipei’s reaction was that Washington had sold out Taiwan.
Second, we have also explained that as Taiwan evolves into a new business operation hub in the Asia-Pacific region after signing the economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China, the government should actively seek FTAs with member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States in particular. Without a doubt, Taiwan needs to enhance its economic competitiveness through interdependence with mainland China and the United States, among others.
In the meantime, the island still needs to strengthen itself military in order to raise the cost of coercion and ensure some degree of deterrence vis-à-vis China’s PLA.
Finally, Taiwan also needs to strengthen its democratic system so that the legislature and mass media serve the public better and avoid the continuous polarization of Taiwan’s society. The growing pragmatism in public opinion regarding the recurrent clashes between the ruling and opposition parties’ lawmakers suggest that Taiwan public would welcome more constructive politics and closer relationship with the United States.
‧
Bernkopf Tucker, Nancy (Ed.), Dangerous Strait: The U.S. - Taiwan - China Crisis (New York: Columbia University, 2005)
Bracken Paul, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power (New York: Harper Col-lins, 1999)
Burchill, Scott et al., Theories of International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan (3rd Edition), 2005
Bush, George W. H. & Scowcroft, Brent, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1998)
Bush, Richard C., Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 2005)
Bush, Richard C., Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 2005)
Clinton, Bill, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004)
Clough, Ralph N. (1999), Cooperation and Conflict in the Taiwan Strait (Oxford: Rowman
& Littlefield)
Crane, Gregory, Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity: The Limits of Political Realism (Berkley: University of California Press, 1998)
Dunne, T. & Kurki, M & Smith, S. (Eds.), International Relations: Discipline and Diversi-ty (New York: Oxford UniversiDiversi-ty Press)
Edwards, Alistair & Townsend, Jules (Eds.), Interpreting Modern Political Philosophy:
from Machiavelli to Marx (New York: Palgrave, 2002)
Goldstein, Avery, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Se-curity (Stanford, California: Stanford University press, 2005)
Goldstein, Steven M. & Johnston, Alistair I. & Ross, Robert S. (Ed.), Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999)
Grene, David, Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War (Vol. I & II) (Toronto, Canada: Uni-versity of Michigan, 1959)
Harisson, Ross, Hobbes, Locke and Confusion’s Masterpiece: An Examination of Seven-teenth-century Political Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
‧
Ikenberry, G. John, America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2002)
Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy (New York: touchstone, 1995)
Lampton, David M., Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations (1989-2000) (Berkley: University of California Press, 2001)
Lee, David Tawei, The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act: Twenty Years in Retrospect (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)
Leng, Tse-keng, The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development across the Taiwan Strait (Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1996)
Lijun, Sheng, China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002)
Mann, James, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Vintage Books, 1998)
Morgenthau, Hans, J., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985 (6th Edition))
Posen, Barry, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the two World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984)
Rogers, G. A. S. (Ed.), Leviathan: Contemporary Responses to the political Thheory of Thomas Hobbes (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press, 1995)
Romberg, Alan D., Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003)
Rosen, M. & Wolf, J. (Eds.), Political thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) Ross, Robert S. & Nathan, Andrew J., The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress (New York:
Norton, 1998)
Roy, Denny, Taiwan: A Political History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003)
Shambaugh, David, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (Berkley: University of California Press, 2002)
Skinner, Quentin & Price, Russell (Ed.), Machiavelli: The Prince (Cambridge, UK: Cam-bridge University Press, 1988)
Su, Qi [蘇起], The Danger Becomes Green: From the "State-to-State" to the "One Coun-try on each side" policy [危險邊綠：從兩國論到一邊一國] (Taipei: Tianxia Culture [天 下文化], 2003)
Tsang, Steve & Tien, Hung-mao (Eds.), Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for Chi-na (New York: St. Martin Press, 1999)
‧
Tyler, Patrick, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China (New York: A Century Founda-tion Book, 1999)
Vogel, Ezra (Ed.), Living with China: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Norton, The American Assembly, 1997)
Walt, Stephen, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987)
Zhang, Ya-chung [張亞中], Mainland China and Relations across the Taiwan Strait [中國 大陸與兩岸關係概論] (Taipei: SC Publication, 2000)
Zhao, Suisheng (Ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait (London: Routledge, 1999)
Revue Articles
Bellany, Ian, “Defensive Arms and the Security Dilemma: A Cybernetic Approach,” Jour-nal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 3. (Aug., 1996), pp. 263-271.
Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D. & Straffin, Philip D. Jr., “The Geometry of the Arms Race,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Dec., 1979), pp. 567-588.
Christensen, Thomas J. & Snyder, Jack, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Al-liance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2. (Spring, 1990), pp. 137-168.
Christensen, Thomas J. & Snyder, Jack, “Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances,”
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4. (Dec., 1997), pp. 919-922.
Christensen, Thomas J., “Posing Problems without Catching up: China’s Rise and Chal-lenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4. (Spring, 2001), pp. 5-40.
Forde, Steven, “International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and neorealism,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2. (Jun., 1995), pp. 141-160.
Friedberg, Aaron L., “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” Inter-national Security, Vol. 18, No. 3. (Winter, 1993-1994), pp. 5-33.
Glaser, Charles L., “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Secu-rity, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 50-90.
Gries, Peter Hays & Christensen, Thomas J., “Power and Resolve in U.S. China Policy,”
International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2. (Autumn, 2001), pp. 155-165.
Jervis, Robert, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” World Politics, Vol. 41, No.
2. (Jan., 1989), pp. 183-207.
Jervis, Robert, “Realism in the Study of World Politics,” International Organization, Vol.
52, No. 4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics. (Autumn, 1998), pp. 971-991.
‧
Jervis, Robert, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,”
International Security, Vol. 24, No. I. (Summer, 1999), pp. 42-63.
Legro, Jeffrey W. & Moravcsik, Andrew, “Is Anybody Still a Realist? International Secu-rity, Vol. 24, No. 2. (Autumn, 1999), pp. 5-55.
Lind, Jennifer M. & Christensen, Thomas J., “Spirals, Security, and Stability in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4. (Spring, 2000), pp. 190-200.
Mansfield, Edward D. & Snyder, Jack, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” Inter-national Security, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Summer, 1995), pp. 5-38.
McClaran, John P., “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: Implications for the Future of the Sino-U.S. Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 4. (Jul. –Aug., 2000), pp. 622-640.
Mearsheimer, John J., “A Realist Reply,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. I. (Summer, 1995), pp. 82-93.
Mearsheimer, John J., “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 5-49.
Nalebuff, Barry, “Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No.
3. (Apr., 1991), pp. 313-335.
O’Hanlon, Michael, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security, Vol.
25, No. 2. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 51-86.
Roe, Paul, “The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a Tragedy,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 2. (Mar., 1999), pp. 183-202.
Snyder, Glenn H., “Deterrence and Power,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4, No.
2. (Jun., 1960), pp. 163-178.
Snyder, Glenn H., “Prisoner’s Dilemma an Chicken Models in International Politics,” In-ternational Studies Quarterly, l 15, No. I. (Mar., 1971), pp. 66-103.
Snyder, Glenn H., “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No.
4. (Jul., 1984), pp. 461-495.
Snyder, Jack & Sagan, Scott D., “The Origins of Offense and the Consequences of Coun-terforce,” International Security, Vol. II, No. 3. (Winter, 1986-1987), pp. 187-198.
Taliafeno, Jeffrey W., “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,”
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3. (Winter, 2000-2001), pp. 128-161.
Vasquez, John A., “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Nontraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposi-tion,” The American Political Science Review, Vol.. 91, No. 4. (Dec., 1997), pp. 899-912.
W. Simon, Sheldon, “Alternative Visions of Security in the Asia Pacific,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 3. (Autumn, 1996), pp. 381-396.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
v
Waltz, Kenneth N., “Evaluating Theories,” The American Political Science Review, Vol.
91, No. 4. (Dec., 1997), pp. 913-917.
Waltz, Kenneth N., “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol.
25, No. l. (Summer, 2000), pp. 5-41.
Wolf., Reinhard & Weede, Erich & Enterline, Andrew J. & Mansfield., Edward D. &
Snyder, Jack, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security, Vol.
20, No. 4. (Spring, 1996), pp. 176-207.
Yang, Chyan & Hung, Shiu-Wan, “Taiwan’s Dilemma across the Strait: Lifting the Ban on Semiconductor Investment in China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 4. (Jul. –Aug., 2003), pp. 681-696.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
vi
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Table of Content
Chapter 1: Introduction ___________________________________________ 1
1. Research Topic _________________________________________________________ 4 2. The Argument __________________________________________________________ 6 3. The Assumptions, Primary Goals and Strategies ______________________________ 7
4. Conceptual Framework ___________________________________________________ 8 4.1 Theoretical constraints of the international system __________________________ 9 4.2 Taiwan’s position in the international immunity ____________________________ 9 5. Literature Review ______________________________________________________ 10 5.1 Structural Realism, Anarchy and the International System ___________________ 10 5.2 Kenneth Walt and the Study of International Relations ______________________ 11 6. Methodology: Sources and Process ________________________________________ 12 6.1 Sources Classification _______________________________________________ 12 6.2 Methodological Barriers _____________________________________________ 13
Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework ________________________________ 15
1. Classical Realist Thinkers ________________________________________________ 16 1.1 Thucydides’ Account of the Peloponnesian War ___________________________ 16 1.2 St. Augustine and Human’s Nature _____________________________________ 18 1.3 Niccolo Machiavelli and the Role of the Leadership ________________________ 18 1.4 Thomas Hobbes and Anarchy __________________________________________ 19 2. Hans Morgenthau and the Balance of Power ________________________________ 19 2.1 Relations Between Individuals and Relations Among Nations _________________ 20 2.2 Autonomy of the Politics, Morality and Power ____________________________ 21 2.3 International Politics and the Balance of Power ___________________________ 22 3. Kenneth Waltz: Structural Aspects of the Balance of Power ___________________ 23 3.1 A scientific theory of international relations ______________________________ 24 3.2 Structure, Domestic and International Politics and Anarchy _________________ 27
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
3.3 Structures as Independent Determinants of Behavior _______________________ 28 3.4 Economic and Political Effects of Anarchy _______________________________ 29 3.5 Anarchy and Change ________________________________________________ 31 4. Stephen Walt: Alliance Politics and the Balance-of-Threat ____________________ 32 4.1 States’ Behavior in a Balance-of-Threats Theory __________________________ 33 4.2 Factors Influencing the Level of Threat __________________________________ 34 5. Barry Posen and the Buck-Passing Strategy _________________________________ 35 5.1 The Origins of War __________________________________________________ 36 5.2 The Number of Great Powers and Buck-Passing Behaviors __________________ 36
Chapter 3: Ambiguous Ambiguity _________________________________ 39
1. Strategic Ambiguity in Historical Perspective ________________________________ 40 1.1 The Second World War _______________________________________________ 40 1.2 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taipei _____________________________________ 41 1.3 Normalization of Sino-American relations ________________________________ 43 1.4 Taiwan Relations Act ________________________________________________ 45 1.5 F-16 Arms sales and Taiwan Strait crisis ________________________________ 49 1.6 ‘Three noes’ policy vs. ‘State-to-state’ theory _____________________________ 51 1.7 Washington-Beijing-Taipei relations in the 21st century _____________________ 52 2. The U.S. objectives in the Cross-Strait Stalemate _____________________________ 54 2.1 Commitment to Taiwan Defense ________________________________________ 55 2.2 Commitment to the ‘Status Quo’ _______________________________________ 55
Chapter 4: China’s Rise to Superpower Status _______________________ 59
1. Neorealism and the Sino-American Normalization ___________________________ 61 2.1 The Korean War and the Sino-Soviet Threat ______________________________ 61 2.2 The Jinmen Crises and the Rise of the Beijing Threat _______________________ 65 2.3 The Sino-Soviet Split and the Expansion of the Soviet Threat _________________ 67 2.4 Sino-American Normalization and the Balance of Power ____________________ 69 2.5 Arms sales to Taiwan ________________________________________________ 70 2. The American Factor in post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations ____________________ 72 2.1 The Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Rise of a Unipolar World ________________ 73
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
2.2 Balancing the United States ___________________________________________ 75 2.3 The signing of the ECFA _____________________________________________ 75 2.4 Washington views of the ECFA signing __________________________________ 79 3. Ma Ying-jeou’s pragmatic diplomacy ______________________________________ 81
Chapter 5: Conclusion ___________________________________________ 87 Bibliography ___________________________________________________ 92
‧
國立 政 治 大 學