The American factor across the Taiwan strait

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(1)The American Factor Across the Taiwan Strait. A Master Thesis Presented to the International Master Program in China Studies. National Chengchi University Taipei. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 Thesis Advisor:. Nat. er. io. sit. y. Dr. Ming Lee (NCCU). n. Thesis a Committee Members:. iv. n Dr. lEdward C I-hsin Chen (TKU) hengchi U. Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu (NCCU). In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Art. By Dimitri Bruyas Nov. 24, 2011.

(2) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(3) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Chapter 1: Introduction The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. 政治大. 學. Chinese in Taipei, the arms have been symbols of moral support. To the United States, providing arms to Taiwan has been symbolic of our fiat that the Chi1 nese must settle Taiwan’s status peacefully.”. ‧. ‧ 國. “For the Chinese in Beijing, arms sales have been a recurring symbolic re立 minder that the United States stands against their ruling on Taiwan. For the. With the recent signing of an economic cooperation pact between Taiwan and China, cross-. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. process.. sit. strait relations have entered a new era that could eventually make rapprochement a peaceful. i n U. v. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which is a free trade agreement in. Ch. engchi. substance if not in name, is initially aimed at normalizing cross-strait economic relations, though it could further raise the issue of a possible freeze on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. After all, if Taipei and Beijing are actively working on burying the hatchet, should the United States change its long-standing policy of providing weapons to Taiwan? Recall that the U.S. government’s decision to sell more than US$6 billion worth of military equipment to Taiwan earlier this year set off furious reprisals from Chinese authorities who summoned the U.S. ambassador and defense attaché in China and threatened to punish U.S. companies that make and sell weapons to Taiwan.2. 1. 2. Charles T. Cross, Born a Foreigner: A Memoir of the American Presence in Asia (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 263. Peter Hsiao, “Wanted: A true statesman for Taiwan,” The China Post (2010/2/4). [Accessed Online] http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/letters/2010/02/04/243608/Wanted-A.htm/. 1.

(4) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Even though the proposed arms deal included nothing more than two Osprey mine-hunting ships, 60 Black Hawk helicopters, night vision gear, missiles, machine guns and ammunition, radar equipment and information technology, Beijing had no hesitation in saying that Washington is attempting to keep China divided to promote U.S. strategic interests.3 So, why does the United States sells arms to Taiwan in the first place? From the outset of the Second World War, Washington acted as a buffer between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and entered in an alliance with General Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) in fighting against the Japanese Imperial Army. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, on June 25, 1950, U.S. President Harry S. Truman. 政治大 by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 立. ordered the Seventh Fleet to take position in the Taiwan Strait to prevent an assault on the island. ‧ 國. 學. In the midst of the Cold War, Washington still opposed operations that might lead to a major war involving the United States and would divert too much of ROC’s strength away from the. ‧. defense of Taiwan. Beginning in 1954, Chiang pressed Washington for a defense treaty, which U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed on December 10, 1954 (中美協防條約), to re-. y. Nat. io. sit. place the executive order for the Seventh Fleet protection.. n. al. er. America’s support for the KMT regime, nonetheless, eroded in about 25 years with the signa-. i n U. v. ture of the Shanghai Communiqué (上海公報) in February 1972 and the Sino-American nor-. Ch. engchi. malization of January 1, 1979, which had serious impacts on Taiwan’s security. In order to soften the blow of the normalization, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relation’s Act (與台灣關係法, TRA) on January 26, 1979 and prepared the way for America’s continuous support, in terms of future arms sales and nongovernmental ties with Taiwan. The TRA further pushed through the signature of the August, 17 1982 Joint Communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan (中[共]美八一七公報) that provided for an open-ended American commitment based solely on Taiwan’s defensive needs.. 3. Cara Anna, “China: Taiwan Arms Sales Harm National Interest,” Abc News International & AP (2010/1/31). [Accessed Online] http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9709332. 2.

(5) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Today, if Taiwan authorities don’t want to buy large amounts of offensive weapons anymore, the United States cannot force anyone to purchase them. In fact, the Bush administration and now the Obama administration have welcomed the changes that President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) approach has brought to cross-strait relations over the last two years. The stabilization of Beijing-Taipei relations is especially benefiting Washington: It has one less problem to worry about and does not need to engage in dual deterrence anymore. Well, if we examine the impact of the recent developments in the Taiwan Strait from a military perspective, should the U.S. cede political and economic influence in the Asia Pacific region to China without careful consideration?. 政治大. The Chinese military has long said that the PLA would accelerate the buildup of its conventional and nuclear arsenal to form a credible deterrent and develop a credible missile force corre-. 立. sponding to the needs of winning a war.4. ‧ 國. 學. Such military buildup in the Asian Pacific region should matter to the United States which has long made weapons available to Taiwan’s leaders so that they have confidence to go to the ne-. ‧. gotiating table with China from a position of strength.. y. Nat. sit. President Ma also stressed last April that China has to remove or actually dismantle its more. er. al. n. accord.5. io. than 1,500 missiles targeting Taiwan as a prerequisite for further talks on a cross-strait peace. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. According to Randy Shriver, however, the Obama administration appears to be “on the verge of altering an approach to Taiwan and to the Asia-Pacific region as a whole” that has served the United States’ interests well.6 In an article published in the Washington Times on July 9, 2010 the former U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia lamented that the Obama administration has gone to great lengths “to deny that a Taiwan arms-sales freeze is in place” and continue “a fiction that Taiwan has not formerly requested more F-16 fighters.”. 4. 5. 6. Kyodo News Network staff writer, “China Accelerates Planning for Space Command,” Global Security Newswire (2010/6/10). [Accessed Online] http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100616_6561.php Ralph Jennings, “Taiwan says China has 1,500 missiles aimed at island,” Reuters (2009/2/13). [Accessed Online] http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-37994220090213 Randy Shriver, “Taiwan faces two Chinas,” The Washington Times (2010/7/9). [Accessed Online] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/9/taiwan-faces-two-chinas/. 3.

(6) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Without a doubt, U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense is still a core element of Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity through which the U.S. has neither explicitly committed itself to protect Taiwan, nor explicitly rejected such commitment for more than sixty years. The TRA is equally ambiguous on whether the U.S. would come to Taiwan’s aid and, in this eventuality, under what conditions it would do. As Sino-American scholar Pan Zhongqi puts it, strategic ambiguity was rather designed to introduce uncertainty into Taipei and Beijing’s decision making “to prevent them from changing the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.”7. 1.. Research Topic. 政治大. As economic integration is likely to further affect the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, if Taipei. 立. has a sense of self confidence in its relationship with China, Washington should carefully take. ‧ 國. 學. into consideration the impact of various amounts of strategic ambiguity it pumps into its relationship with Taiwan and China in the post-ECFA era.. ‧. The island is on its way to become a business operation hub in the Asia-Pacific region and Pres-. y. Nat. ident Ma is actively seeking free trade agreements (FTAs) with member nations of the Associa-. sit. tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States in particular. The planned. n. al. er. io. FTAs could help the long-term growth of Taiwan’s export-reliant US$390 billion economy.8. Ch. i n U. v. The Obama administration is at a crossroads in redefining its relationships with Taiwan and. engchi. China. As President Ma further aims to liberalize the island’s economic relations with China, should the United States be involved in the cross-strait issue in a more proactive fashion? Contrary to the recent comments of the deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, David Shear, should Washington enhance its economic relationships with Taiwan?. 7. 8. Pan Zhongqi, The Dilemma of Deterrence: US Strategic Ambiguity Policy and its Implications for the Taiwan Strait (Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center, February-April 2001), p. 7. [Accessed Online] http://www.stimson.org/china/pdf/dilemmadeterrence.pdf The China Post news staff, “Taiwan, U.S. must work together towards an FTA,” The China Post (Taipei, 2010/7/11). [Accessed Online] http://www.chinapost.com.tw/editorial/taiwan-issues/2010/07/11/264129/Taiwan-US.htm. 4.

(7) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. The latter expressed on July 7 his disappointment by the lack of progress the United States and Taiwan have made on trade issues in recent years, and in particular, on bilateral negations over beef imports.9 He also suggested that the Obama administration waits before resuming bilateral talks under the Trade Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) — often a precursor to a fullfledged FTA — that have been dormant since 2007. But, should Washington hold those talks hostage to market access to small amounts of American beef? Should Washington consider Taiwan’s improving relations with China as an inexorable movement through economic integration, political reconsideration and eventual unification? In fact, neither Beijing nor Taipei sees it that way. According to U.S. scholar Richard C. Bush III, the Chinese leadership agrees that Taiwan’s eventual unification is “a protracted and com-. 治政大 pens to negate the possibility that the PRC goal will be achieved.” 立. plex process.” What is important in the short- and medium-term, however, is that “nothing hap10. ‧ 國. 學. The scholar argues that the Taiwan public could be more likely to further support economic integration across the Taiwan Strait if it has a sense of self confidence, which requires selfstrengthening in a few key areas. The island needs to enhance its economic competitiveness. ‧. through interdependence with mainland China and the United States, in particular. According to. sit. y. Nat. the World Competitiveness Yearbook compiled by the Switzerland-based IMD Business School,. io. er. Taiwan’s rating surged from No. 23 to No. 8, the best the island has received so far.. al. v i n C h China’s PLA. InUa speech delivered at a seminar on sure some degree of deterrence vis-à-vis e n c h i Studies in Singapore last June, U.S. Asian security at the International Institute forgStrategic n. The island also needs to strengthen itself military in order to raise the cost of coercion and en-. Defense Secretary Robert Gates reaffirmed that the United States policy on selling defensive weapons to Taiwan remains unchanged despite China’s opposition. China has already 1,500 short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan11 and is also developing advanced weaponry ranging from anti satellite weaponry and cyber-attack capabilities to more conventional fighter jets and long-range missiles.. 9. 10. 11. AFP staff writer, “US rules out Taiwan FTA,” The Straits Times (2010/7/8). [Accessed Online] http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_550896.html/ Richard C. Bush III, “China-Taiwan: Recent Economic, Political, and Military Developments Across the Strait, and Implications for the United States,” The Brookings Institution (2010/3/18). [Accessed Online] http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2010/0318_china_economy_bush.aspx Bloomberg and CNA staff writers, “Taiwan near Patriot contract: Raytheon,” Taipei Times (2010/7/22), p. 1.. 5.

(8) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Finally, Taiwan needs to strengthen its democratic system so that the legislature and mass media serve the public better and avoid the continuous polarization of Taiwan’s society. The growing pragmatism in public opinion regarding the recurrent clashes between the ruling and opposition parties’ lawmakers suggest that Taiwan public would welcome more constructive politics and closer relationship with the United States.. 2.. The Argument. Taiwan clearly needs to enhance its economic competitiveness and strengthen itself military in order to raise the cost of coercion, ensure some degree of deterrence vis-à-vis China’s PLA and negotiate from a position of strength. But, with the current rapprochement between Taiwan and. 政治大 Washington’s longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity be challenged by the new political, 立 diplomatic and military implications resulting from the recent signing of the ECFA? Obviously, China, what role should U.S. play towards the cross-strait relationship? In other words, should. ‧ 國. 學. yes!. ‧. According to Taiwanese scholar Philip Yang, “Washington’s commitment to Taiwan’s security is predicated on the premise that Taiwan does not provoke Beijing with independence.”12 In this. Nat. sit. y. respect, “U.S. arms sales policies have constituted a strategic deterrent strategy aimed at main-. io. China.”13. er. taining Taiwan’s defensive capabilities and the balance of military power between Taiwan and. al. n. v i n C h has become a defective Such strategic ambiguity policy, however, e n g c h i U strategy since the gradual end of the deterrence dilemma and the resulting arms race. It is also counterproductive to U.S. primary goal, that is, “preventing the development of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait in which the United States would be compelled to choose between allowing Taiwan to be subjugated by military force or intervening with U.S. forces to prevent it.”14 While Washington has maintained. deterrence toward the two sides in balance for over 60 years, the continuous warming of crossstrait relations indicates that Washington has to find new ways to address the cross-strait stalemate.. 12. 13 14. Philip Yang, “Doubly Dualistic Dilemma: US Strategies towards China and Taiwan,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Volume 6 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 212. Ibid., p. 221. Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait (New York: Rowman & Littlefields Publishers, Inc., 1999), p. 114.. 6.

(9) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. So far, the crises and subsequent developments across the Taiwan Strait have demonstrated how the United States could be drawn into a dilemma of deterrence and why that was inevitable. Today, the strategic ambiguity policy of dual deterrence is not only vulnerable, but also counterproductive in terms of maintaining cross-strait peace and stability, given that the two archenemies have already succeeded in improving their relationships. If American dual deterrence strategy is phased out, maintaining the military balance through constant arms sales to Taiwan is also becoming more questionable. Following the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, for instance, Taiwan and China increased their military budgets in a major way. The resulting arms race and weapons proliferation had something to do with American’s strategic ambiguity policy toward the cross-strait issue.. 政治大 which requires that Washington立 keeps pace with a new pressing goal: maintaining its political The U.S. is now facing a new reality with the current rapprochement between China and Taipei,. ‧ 國. 3.. 學. and economic influence in Asia in view of China’s accession to the superpower status.. The Assumptions, Primary Goals and Strategies. ‧ sit. y. Nat. The following discussion of the U.S. policy in the cross-strait issue is based on four assumptions.. al. er. io. To begin with, China’s military and economic power will continue to grow in the years ahead,. n. causing in the same way a growing concern about the emergence of China as a world power.. Ch. i n U. v. Within a decade, perhaps much sooner, experts believe that China will be America’s only global. engchi. competitors for military and strategic influence. Even if the country is committed to taking a path of peaceful development through the adoption of a defensive military posture, “Beijing is poised for true global status as a military superpower,” argues U.S. scholar John J. Tkacik.15 Meanwhile, the PRC will not abandon its determination to unify with Taiwan, though Beijing claims that a peaceful reunification is obviously a long-term goal. “The more pertinent task for the medium term — the timeframe that is relevant to policymaking in all three capitals — is how to avoid crises and promote positive relations,” stresses U.S. scholar Alan D. Romberg.16. 15. 16. John J. Tkacik, “Web Memo: A Chinese military superpower?” The Heritage Foundation, No. 1389 (Washington, 2007/3/8), p. 1. Alan D. Romberg, “Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942 China Perspectives,” China Perspectives (2005), p. 60. [Accessed Online] http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/506/. 7.

(10) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Still, the Taiwanese will keep trying to increase their freedom of action and status in the international community. Thanks to President Ma’s pledge for a diplomatic truce, Taiwan’s top health official and his counterpart from China successfully met on the sidelines of the opening of the World Health Assembly (WHA) in Geneva last May to discuss possibilities for future cooperation. There is no doubt that the complimentarily of the economies of China and Taiwan will continue to exist and the economic links will continue to grow. According to U.S. scholars Daniel H. Rosen and Zhi Wang of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, “the net effect of ECFA for Taiwan would be some 5.3 percent improvement in GDP by 2020.”17 Against this backdrop, the U.S. has a variety of goals with the respect of the PRC and Taiwan in. 政治大 preventing the development of 立 a crisis in the Taiwan Strait in which it would be involved has the pursuance of its interests in the Asia Pacific region, though, Washington’s previous goal of. ‧ 國. 學. been directly questioned by the recent signing of the ECFA.. Even if Beijing says its military buildup is no threat to regional peace and stability, Peter. ‧. Brookes, senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation’s National Security Affairs committee, cited the then-U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, as saying that Beijing’s interna-. y. Nat. sit. tional behavior is driven by, among other things, a “longstanding ambition to see China play a. er. io. role of a great power in East Asia and globally.”18 The current rapprochement between China. al. v i n C h in Asia in viewU of China’s accession to the supertaining its political and economic influence engchi n. and Taipei could therefore require that Washington keeps pace with a new pressing goal: main-. power status.. 4.. Conceptual Framework. In order to explain why a sequence of events actually occurred — such as U.S. policies in the cross-strait stalemate, a simple description of surrounding contexts may not be sufficient to foresee all the related issues.. 17. 18. Daniel H. Rosen and Zhi Wang, “Deepening China-Taiwan Relations through the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement,” Policy brief (Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2010), p. 2. [Accessed Online] http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb10-16.pdf Peter Brookes, “Why China Worries the Pentagon,” Commentary on the National Security and Defense (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2009/10/7). [Accessed Online] http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2009/10/Why-China-Worries-the-Pentagon. 8.

(11) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Political scientists usually develop theories in order to understand the causes of events that occur under a specific international environment. A theory, that is “a set of propositions and concepts that seek to explain a phenomenon by specifying the relationships among concepts,” is therefore the ultimate goal to predict states behavior under a given international system.19. 4.1. Theoretical constraints of the international system. To American scholar John Mearsheimer, there are five main assumptions about the international system. None of these assumptions alone says that states should attempt to gain power at each other expenses. Nonetheless, Mearsheimer claims that when these assumptions are combined together, they depict a world of ceaseless security competition.20. 政治大 the opposite of saying that the system is characterized by chaos. Anarchy is the ordering princi立 ple, which basically means that there is no central authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above First, great powers are the main actors in the anarchic system represented by world politics. At. ‧ 國. 學. the States. Second, all states possess some offensive military capability, even though that capacity varies among them. Third, states can never be certain about the intentions of other states.. ‧. While some states are determined to use force to alter the balance of power, other states are sat-. y. Nat. isfied enough with it and therefore do not have any interest in using force. Fourth, the main goal. sit. of all states is survival. States seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the authority of their. n. al. er. io. domestic political leaders. Fifth, states are rational actors. In other words, they are capable of. i n U. v. coming up with sound strategies that maximize the prospects for survival.. Ch. engchi. In short, Mearsheimer claims that great powers are trapped into an iron cage because of the anarchic structure of the international system, which pushes each state to increase its power in order to protect itself in the event of an attack.. 4.2. Taiwan’s position in the international immunity. Following Mearsheimer classification, it is clear that the United States and China are considered as the main “actors” in the cross-strait issue. Taipei has never been considered an equal player in the game, even if it has some defense and offense capabilities on its own.. 19 20. Karen Mingst, Essentials on International Relations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999), p. 63. John J. Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, Eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 71-88.. 9.

(12) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Moreover, it is worth noticing that after 1971, Taipei was not a member of the United Nations or any affiliated international organizations anymore. In other words, we argue that Taipei has been on its own in a complete anarchic system since the 1970s. Besides, it is obvious that whatever the state of Taipei’s relationship with Washington or Beijing, it has never been certain about their respective intentions or interests in using force. On the whole, the cross-Strait issue is therefore a question of security and territorial integrity between rational actors.21. 5.. Literature Review. 政治大. To Kenneth Waltz, the architecture of the international system forces states to pursue power. In this context, anarchy seems to play the most important role.. Structural Realism, Anarchy and the International System. ‧ 國. 學. 5.1. 立. According to Charles L. Glaser, structural realism is in fact based on three main assumptions:. ‧. first, states can be viewed as essentially rationale actors; second, states give priority to insuring their security; and, third, states confront an international environment that is characterized most. y. Nat. er. io. sit. importantly by anarchy.22. Why is anarchy so important? Hierarchy and anarchy are the two main political ordering princi-. n. al. i n U. v. ples of the international system. Anarchy suggests a lack of an international authority capable of. Ch. engchi. enforcing agreements, while hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among system’s parts.23 As Robert Jervis further puts it, there are no institutions or authorities that can make and enforce international laws, the policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if others cooperate may bring disaster if they do not. In other words: “ [..] States are aware [of this;] anarchy encourages behavior that leaves all concerned worse off than they could be, even in the extreme case in which all states would like to freeze the status quo.”24 21 22. 23 24. Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making peace in the Taiwan Strait (The Brookings Institution, 2005), p. 81. Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help” in International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Cambridge: Harvard University, December 1994), p. 50. Ibid. Robert Jervis, Op. Cit., p. 167.. 10.

(13) Chapter1: Introduction. 5.2. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Kenneth Walt and the Study of International Relations. Kenneth N. Waltz has made several important contributions to the study of anarchy in the international system. First, Waltz denies that human nature and the characteristic of domestic regimes best explain states’ foreign policy. Compare with Hans Morgenthau, Waltz argues that the structure of the international system actually forces states to pursue power. Second, in his best known work, “Theory of International Politics” (1979), Waltz also underlines that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones, because they were not highly economically dependent. His main contention is that economic stability increases as oligopolisitic sectors narrow. In this logic, a market dominated by a few large firms is to be preferred to. 政治大. one in which many small firms compete because stability is inversely related to efficiency. The reason why two great powers is the optimum number is strategic, not economic. 立. Third, Kenneth Waltz conducts his study according to respective level of analysis. In short,. ‧ 國. 學. Waltz stresses that political scientist should avoid assembling factors from all levels in an ad hoc and untestable manner. On the contrary, they should assume that the variables that are being. ‧. examined are the most important ones. He also criticizes parallel arguments on the importance. y. sit. io. er. often behave similarly.. Nat. of the nature of the states by showing that states with widely divergent domestic characteristics. Fourth, Waltz places greatest emphasis on the international system. In “Theory of International. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. Politics,” he carefully develops what he began in “Man, the State, and war” (1954): one should. engchi. start with the structure of the system, which has three elements: First, the ordering principle of the system: if there is a government or authority among “powers,” then the system is hierarchical. Otherwise, the system is anarchic. Second, the differentiation principle among the ‘units’ composing the system: states cannot afford extensive division of labor lest they become dangerously dependent on one another. Third, the power concentration principle: if the power is concentrated in only two states (bipolarity), the system is much more stable than if there are more than two dominant actors. But, what are the implications of Kenneth Waltz’s approach? To begin with, Waltz reconceptualizes the crucial notion of balance of power by clarifying and extending the concept. To the American scholar, it is a mistake to equate effects with intentions.. 11.

(14) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. A “balance of power” in the sense of a system, which is not yet dominated by any state, results in other states or ‘units’ to band together against the state that is making progress towards domination. The implications of this behavior on the conditions under which it occurs have been explored by two of his students, Stephen Walt and Barry Posen. Stephen Walt stresses that states balance against threats, not against power alone. Although the distribution of power is an extremely important factor, the level of threats is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions, and aggressiveness. Barry Posen analyzes the conditions leading states to engage in ‘buck passing,’ that is pushing onto other states the costs of containing the state that threatens their security. Moreover, Waltz proceeds to a reconceptualization of the notions bipolarity and multipolarity.. 政治大 actors were divided into two antagonistic 立 camps. As a result, bipolar systems were quite unsta-. According to classical theory of international politics, bipolar systems represent those in which. ‧ 國. 學. ble because of the danger that the two camps could be pulled into a car by aggressive or foolish behavior of any of their members.. ‧. Waltz structural approach rather defines systems as bipolar when power is concentrated in only two actors. As a result, in a world that is structurally bipolar, the defection of an ally matters. y. Nat. sit. less as each superpower knows that the other is its main adversary. This line of argument im-. al. er. io. plies not only that a bipolar world is stable but that collective goods are more likely to be pro-. n. cured when power is concentrated.. 6.. Ch. i. e. gch Methodology: Sources andnProcess. i n U. v. A historical approach is used to conduct this case study on how the American factor is going to be affected in the post-ECFA cross-strait relations. This also study applies an empirical inquiry on contemporary issues with its real-life context, in which multiple sources of evidence are used.. 6.1. Sources classification. Basically, three kinds of sources have been used during the elaboration of this research. First, theoretical works from major authors on ‘realism’ and ‘structural realism’ constitute the author’s primary sources of reference.. 12.

(15) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. The main contributors to the theoretical analysis are Kenneth Waltz, Hans Morgenthau, Glenn Snyder, Jack Snyder, Scott Sagan, Robert Jervis, Thomas Christensen, Aaron Friedberg, David Lampton, Harry Harding, Allen Whiting, Charles Glaser, John Mearsheimer, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Richard C. Bush and Stephen Walt. Both periodicals and non-periodicals were used during the analysis. For reference, the author used periodicals such like International Security, Foreign Affairs, Asian survey, Orbis etc. during the conduct of this research. English was the medium used in all those documents. Second, the author also used secondary sources in order to support the case study analysis. On the one hand, the author gathered Congressional Reports and record transcripts of House Committee Hearings from the United States, and conference reports and case study analyses availa-. 治政 English and Chinese Languages to complete this study. The大 main contributors are James Mann, Patrick Tyler, David Lampton, 立 Richard C. Bush, Steve Chan, and Allen Whiting. Through the ble on the internet. On the other hand, the author used other non-periodicals sources in both the. ‧ 國. 學. use of the internet, the author accessed documents from the Brooking Institution, the Heritage Foundation, the Rand Corporation, the National Policy foundation and the Democracy Founda-. ‧. tion.. y. Nat. Third, the author’s tertiary sources are composed of interviews and newswire reports. Washing-. io. sit. ton Post, New York Times, China Times (中國時報), Taipei Times, United Daily News (聯合報),. n. al. er. Liberty Times (自由時報), Yazhou Zhoukan (亞洲週刊), New Taiwan (新台灣) and China Post. Ch. i n U. v. news reports were accessed directly through the internet. Interviews were also conduct directly. engchi. in Taipei between December 2005 and June 2007 by the author with former Minister of Foreign Affairs John Jiang (章孝嚴), former Chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Shih Min-teh (施明德), Legislator Ding Shou-zhong (丁守中), and, former Ambassador to United States and the European Union, Chen Chien-jen (陳建仁), among others. These interviews were conducted in English or Chinese.. 6.2. Methodological Barriers. Despite these strengths, we have encountered a number of potential methodological problems during the writing of this research. Although several can only partially alleviated, none presents an insurmountable barrier.. 13.

(16) Chapter1: Introduction. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. A first potential difficulty is that U.S. policy toward Taiwan has been a controversial issue for American policy for the last 60 years. The Taipei-Washington relationship is however difficult to define and measure with precision without engaging in lengthy historical descriptions. Besides, as Joseph Nye argues, theorists of international relations usually suffer from being in the middle of events, rather than seeing them from the distance. Consequently, it is not surprising in international relations that theories have always been strongly affected by political concerns. 25 A second potential difficulty arises from our focus on the cross-Strait issue. It might be argued that adequate understanding of Taipei and Beijing relations requires specialized training and knowledge of unique cultural factors that foreigners usually cannot claim. Although these considerations are not without merit, they do not present an overwhelming bar-. 政治大 extensively as possible, relying立 on the multiple sources mentioned above, which constitute the rier. To compensate for these problems, We have tried to document events and arguments as. ‧ 國. 學. most widely accepted historical accounts in both English and Chinese languages. For reference, we will proceed as follow in our demonstration of the development of the Ameri-. ‧. can factor in post-ECFA cross-strait relations. In Chapter two, we will develop the notions of anarchy, alliances and balance-of-power according to realist and structural realist theories. In. y. Nat. sit. Chapter three, we will begin the task of comparing assumptions and evidence, while in Chapter. al. er. io. four; we will proceed to a contradictory analysis of the research results presented in the previous. n. chapter. Finally, our conclusion will be presented in the last chapter of this research. . 25. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Review: Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 2 (January 1988), p. 235.. 14.

(17) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Chapter 2: Conceptual framework Anarchy, Alliances and the Balance of Power in Neorealism. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. “It is hard to say that there is any longer a particular core to the field [of international relations]… Our field should be basically concerned with the relations between states, and relations between societies and non-state actors to the extent that those relations impinge upon and affect the relations between states. When we go far beyond these domains, we get into areas of sociology, anthropology, and social psychology that are best dealt with by 1 people in those disciplines.”. y. Nat. sit. Why political scientists develop theories of international relations? According to Karen Mingst,. er. io. political scientists develop theories in order to understand the causes of events that occur every. al. n. v i n actually occurred. A theory, that is C “a h set of propositionsU e n g c h i or concepts that seeks to explain an event, by specifying the relationships among the concepts,” should be the ultimate tool to de-. day. A simple description of surrounding contexts may not explain why a sequence of events 2. scribe and predict a phenomenon. For reference, international relations theories come in a variety of forms but good theories generate groups of testable hypotheses, which are specific statements positioning a particular relationship between two or more variables. In the context of cross-strait relations, we believe that the role of the American factor is best explained once the structure of the system is taken into account. The theory of choice is in this respect is structural realism.. 1. 2. A. Jones, “Interview with Kal Holsti” in Review of International Studies, 28/3 (London: British International Studies Association) p. 621. Karen Mingst, Op. Cit., p. 63.. 15.

(18) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. But, what is structural realism? Where does is come from? Structural realism indicates a partial continuation with the so-called “classical realism,” which has its intellectual roots in the oldest political philosophy of the West: the Greek antiquity. In short, they both recognize the central role of power in politics of all kinds, but also the limitations of power and the ways in which it can readily made self-defeating. In this chapter, we introduce the theoretical perspectives of realism and structural realism, since we argue that the latter is a continuation on the former. To begin with, we will describe the essential assumptions of realism, which are found in classical realist thinkers such as Thucydides, St. Augustine, Niccolo Machiavelli or Thomas Hobbes. Then, we will introduce Morgenthau’s contribution to the study of realism in his major work of. 政治大 realism and neorealism through立 Waltz’s work, “Theory of international Politics,” another major international politics, “Politics among Nations.” We will also clarify the distinction between. ‧ 國. 學. work of the twenty century.. Finally, we will assess the work of two former students of Kenneth Waltz. Stephen Walt’s study. ‧. entitled “The Origins of Alliances” explains how states engage in balancing or bandwagoning. Nat. er. io. 1.. sit. trine,” describes how states react when faced by an external threat.. y. behaviors as a result of a threat, while Barry Posen, in his book “The Sources of Military Doc-. Classical Realist Thinkers a. n. iv l C n hengchi U In this first section we are going to underline the basic tenets of realism, which didn’t come out at once. They are the product of a long historical and philosophical tradition that started in the fifth century B.C. when the Athenians began to expand their empire.. 1.1. Thucydides’ Account of the Peloponnesian War. Greek tragedians like Thucydides, Aristotle or Plato tend to regard history as cyclical, in the sense that “efforts to build order and escape from fear-ridden worlds, while they may succeed for a considerable period of time, ultimately succumb to the destabilizing effects of actors who believe they are too powerful to be constrained by law and custom.”3. 3. Tim Dunne et al., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 53.. 16.

(19) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Even though Thucydides (460-390 B.C.) constructed no theories in the modern sense of the term, he is considered as the first theorists of international relations.4 On the whole, four essential assumptions of realism are found in Thucydides’ work. First, for Thucydides, the state is the principal actor in war and politics in general. While other actors may participate, they are not important. “ I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go yonder and bring more back with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the treaty which you have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet- for nominal it has become, owing to the practices of certain men here and at Sparta- but which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would not delay our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention was forced upon them by disaster and was less honorable to them than to us; and secondly, because in this very convention there are many points that are still disputed. Again, some of the most powerful states have never yet accepted the arrangement at all.” 5. 立. 政治大. Second, the state is assumed to be a unitary actor. To Thucydides, once a decision is made to go. ‧ 國. 學. to war or capitulate, the state speaks and acts with one voice.. ‧. “ In the face of this great danger, the command of the confederate Hellenes was assumed by the Lacedaemonians in virtue of their superior power; and the Athenians, having made up their minds to abandon their city, broke up their homes, threw themselves into their ships, and became a naval people.”6. y. Nat. sit. Third, the decision makers, acting in the name of the state, are assumed to be rational actors.. n. al. er. io. Thucydides stresses that actors make decisions by weighing the strength and weaknesses of var-. i n U. v. ious options against the goal to be achieved. Nonetheless, the decision making process leads. Ch. engchi. always to the pursuit of the national interest.. “ Make your decision therefore at once, either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to war, as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making concessions or consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions.”7. Fourth, Thucydides is also concerned with security issues such like protecting the state from enemies both foreign and domestic. A state improves its security by increasing its domestic capacities, building up its economic, and forming alliances with other states.. 4 5. 6 7. Karen Mingst, Op. Cit., p. 70. Thucydides (translated by Richard Crawley), The History of the Peloponnesian War, p. 213. [Access Online] http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext04/plpwr10.txt . Ibid., p. 7. Ibid,, p. 34.. 17.

(20) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. “ We must believe that the tyrant city that has been established in Hellas has been established against all alike, with a program of universal empire, part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us then attack and reduce it, and win future security for ourselves and freedom for the Hellenes who are now enslaved.”8. 1.2. St. Augustine and Human’s Nature. As mentioned earlier, Thucydides only identified the first four tenets of classical realism. For future reference, six centuries after the end of the Peloponnesian War, a Christian bishop and philosopher, St. Augustine (345-430 A.D.) added another fundamental assumption, claiming that “man is flawed, egoistic, and selfish, although not predetermined to be so.”9 “ [217] I acknowledged a perfect man to be in Christ – not the body of a man only, nor, in the body, an animal soul without a rational one as well, but a true man. And this man I held to be superior to all others, not only because he was a form of the Truth, but also because of the great excellence and perfection of his human nature, due to his participation in wisdom.”10. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. ‧. Niccolo Machiavelli and the Role of the Leadership. sit. y. Nat. 1.3. 學. “ [581] the first man did not fall by his lawless presumption and just sentence; but human nature was in his person vitiated and altered to such an extent, that he suffered in his members the warring of disobedient lust, and became subject to the necessity of dying. And what he himself had become by sin and punishment, such he generated those whom he begot; that is to say, subject to sin and death.”11. io. er. Drawing from the same implications of man’s flawed nature; Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) argues in The Prince that a leader needs to be mindful of threats to his personal security and the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. security of the state. He further contents that “[because] men, when they receive good from him. engchi. of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favors; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.”12. 8 9 10. 11. 12. Ibid., p. 29. Karen Mingst, Op. Cit., p. 75. St. Augustine (translated and edited by Albert C. Outler), Confessions, p. 76. [Access Online] http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/confessions-bod.html St. Augustine (Translated by Philip Schaff), City of God and Christian Doctrine, p. 214. [Access Online] http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.txt Niccolo Machiavelli (Translated by W. K. Marriott), The Prince, p. 11. [Access Online] http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince.txt. 18.

(21) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Moreover, Machiavelli promotes the use of alliances and various offensive and defensive strategies to protect the state.13 “ I say that the duke, finding himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against them […].”14. 1.4. Thomas Hobbes and Anarchy. Finally, the central tenet of realism, introduced by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1677) and accepted. 政治大 argues that just as individuals in the state of nature have the responsibility and the right to pre立 serve themselves, so too does each state in the international system.. by almost all realist theorists, is that states exist in an anarchic international system. Hobbes. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. “ And because the condition of man is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies; it followed that in such a condition every man has a right to every thing, even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endured, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise so ever he be, of living out the time which nature ordinarily allowed men to live.”15. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Hans Morgenthaua and the Balance of Power v. n. 2.. i l C n hengchi U Comparatively Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980) does limit his analysis of international affairs to the search of single paradigms. To him, the task of a theory of international politics is to determine and classify the historical patterns of human activity resulting from the struggle for power between states. Morgenthau argues that the fact such patterns exists, and can be discovered beneath the contingent elements of historical practice, makes a theory, as opposed to a narrative history, possible. In other words, Morgenthau claims that the difference between theory and history is simply one of form rather than substance. The possibility of empirical theory thus presupposes the existence of some historical continuity in international politics.. 13 14 15. Karen Mingst, Op. Cit., p.75. Niccolo Machiavelli, Op. Cit., p. 11. Tomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 49. [Access Online] http://www.infidels.org/library/historical/thomas_hobbes/leviathan.html. 19.

(22) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. “ International politics embraces more than recent history and current events. The observer is surrounded by the contemporary scene with its ever shifting emphasis and changing perspectives. He cannot find solid ground on which to stand, or objective standards of evaluation, without getting down to fundamentals that are revealed only by the correlation of recent events with the more distant past and the perennial qualities of human nature under lying both.”16. 2.1. Relations Between Individuals and Relations Among Nations. In Morgenthau’s view, relations between nations are not, essentially different from the relations between individuals. They are only relations between individuals on a wider scale.17 Consequently, to understand the behavior of states, it is necessary to begin with individual behaviors as an explanation.. 政治大. “ […] Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure.”18. 立. ‧ 國. 學. But, if domestic and international contexts of social and institutional “relations” are subordinate. ‧. determinants of state behavior, on what basis can one justify a particular characterization of “human nature” as good or evil?. y. Nat. sit. To Hans Morgenthau, the importance to understand human nature is a precondition to analyze. er. io. relations among and within states. First, Morgenthau believes that all politics is a struggle for. al. n. v i n C hman is utterly evil. Like St. Augustine previously asserted, e n g c h i U Second, Morgenthau justifies the previous assumption, both in revealing the intellectual poverty of the nineteenth-century liberal power because the political man is by nature a selfish creature with an insatiable urge for power.. belief in progress, based on an optimistic view of man, and in providing the basis for a fullblown grand theory of international politics. “ The nineteenth century was led to the depreciation of power politics by its domestic experience. The distinctive characteristic of this experience was the domination of the middle classes by the aristocracy. By identifying this domination with political domination of any kind, the political philosophy of the nineteenth century came to identify the opposition to aristocratic politics with hostility to any kind of politics.”19. 16. 17 18 19. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985 [6th Edition]), p. 19. Martin Griffiths, Realism, Idealism and International Politics: A Reinterpretation (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 37. Hans J. Morgenthau, Op. Cit., p. 4. Ibid., 41.. 20.

(23) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Given these constraints, Morgenthau asserts that at the domestic level, his ideal state enjoys a legitimate monopoly of violence. The latent but ever-present threat of punishment backed up by law and a network of societal norms, provides a basis for domestic order and stability. At the international level, however, similar constraints on the use of force are much weaker. In this context, Morgenthau points out that morality and reason must be differentiated.. 2.2. Autonomy of the Politics, Morality and Power. It is worth noting that Morgenthau considers “politics” as an autonomous sphere of social life in which success is ultimately dependent on the use of power to dominate others. Accordingly, morality and reason should be subordinate instruments in the international arenas.. 政治大. “ Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal of acquiring, maintaining and demonstrating it.”20. 立. ‧ 國. 學. “ Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs.”21. Political autonomy thus arises from man’s inevitable failure to reconcile ‘the rules of the politi-. ‧. cal art’ with ethics and morality. In other words, political autonomy denies men’s human will because although men can recognize their own sinfulness, they can never, as political actors,. Nat. sit. y. avoid it.22 Yet, if politics is an autonomous sphere of social life, does it mean that reason and. al. er. io. morality are merely instruments for attaining power? Clearly, Morgenthau distinguishes be-. n. tween a transcendent morality and a culturally specific set of ethical rules. Because international. Ch. i n U. v. politics is a realm of perpetual conflict, in which my gain is your loss, there is an absolute con-. engchi. tradiction between the ‘laws’ of politics and ethical norms.. “ Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The individual may say for himself: “Fiat justitia, pereat mundus’ (Let justice be done even if the world perish), but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care.”23. On the other hand, the concept of power, which establishes the autonomy of all politics, is accentuated by the structural context of action between states.. 20 21 22 23. Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1946), p. 196. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Op. Cit., p. 13. Martin Griffiths, Op. Cit., p. 41. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Op. Cit., p. 12.. 21.

(24) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Power provides the springboard of action, whilst reason determines both the proximate goals for which states compete, as well as the means to achieve these goals. The function of reason is thus to guide the use and purpose of power in a prudent selection and pursuit of interests define in terms of power. In short, Morgenthau asserts that power is an end in itself, since it is the sole determinant of state behavior: “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.” 24. 2.3. International Politics and the Balance of Power. Finally, although a theory of international politics is equally applicable to all states, it is only directly concerned with the behavior of the most powerful ones in generating propositions about. 政治大. the international system. This is simply because not all states have enough power to affect the functioning of the system, but because only the most powerful states determine the character of. 立. international politics at any time.. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. “ […] it is no exaggeration to say that the very structure of international relations […] has tended to become a variance with, and in large measure irrelevant to, the reality of international politics. While the former assumes the ‘sovereign equality’ of all nations, the latter is dominated by an extreme inequality of nations, two of which are called superpowers because they hold in their hands the unprecedented power of total destruction, and many of which are called ministates because their power is minuscule even compared with that of the traditional nation states.”25. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. Therefore, power is not merely a key to distinguish between politics and other modes of human. v. interaction, but also to distinguish between various kinds of states and the activity they engage. Ch. in internationally. Power is a policy tool.. engchi. i n U. In this respect, Morgenthau argues that all states seek to maximize their power. He further claims: “We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out.”26 As a result, all foreign policies tend to conform to and reflect one of these three main patterns of activity: First, defending the status quo and maintaining an overall distribution of power; second, trying to change the status quo through imperialist strategies; or third, trying to impress other nations with the extent of one’s power and achieve some prestige. 27. 24 25 26 27. Ibid., p. 31. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Op. Cit., p. 8. Ibid. Martin Griffiths, Op. Cit., p. 47.. 22.

(25) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. The outcome of this perpetual struggle for power, among states at the international level is thus called a ‘balance of power’ In other words; it is “an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality.”28 Such outcome is nonetheless inevitable when each state strives to maximize its power in a context of structural anarchy. “ Two assumptions are at the foundation of all such equilibriums: First, that the elements to be balanced are necessary for society or are entitled to exist and, second, that without a state of equilibrium among them one element will gain ascendancy over the others, encroach upon their interests and rights. […] Since the goal is stability plus the preservation of all the elements of the system, the equilibrium must aim at preventing any element from gaining ascendancy over the others.”29. Ergo, Morgenthau argues that the balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only inevitable but are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations and. 政治大 ple but to the particular conditions under which the principle must operate in a society of sover立 eign nations. that the instability of the international balance of power is due not to the faultiness of the princi-. ‧ 國. 學. However, even though it is inevitable, Morgenthau still stresses that the stability of the system. ‧. in a balance of power situation depends on the ability and willingness of statesmen to recognize and work with constraints that it imposes on their freedom of action. For instance Hans Morgen-. Nat. sit. y. thau claims that containment was a good example of balancing behavior. During the cold war,. io. er. containment was achieved by balancing American power against the Soviet Union. During the 1970s, Henry Kissinger encouraged the classic realist balance of power by supporting weaker. n. al. Ch. powers like China to exert leverage over the Soviets.. 3.. engchi. i n U. v. Kenneth Waltz: Structural Aspects of the Balance of Power. In 1979, Kenneth N. Waltz (1924- ) published his “Theory of International Politics,” which shows a partial continuation with the so-called “classical realism” of Hans Morgenthau. Like his predecessor, Waltz presents international politics as a realm of necessity and power politics. “ The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared 30 to do so — or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors.”. 28 29 30. Ibid., p. 49. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Op. Cit., p. 189. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Berkley: University of California, 1979), p. 102.. 23.

(26) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Yet, Kenneth Waltz claims to deduce the nature of international politics exclusively from certain structural properties of the anarchical environment within which states coexists, rather than from any assumptions about man, or power-maximization premises about states. In short, Waltz claims that insufficient attention was and is paid to the external context of state action as an autonomous determinant of state behavior, since “the prominent characteristic of international politics, however, seems to be the lack of order and of organization.”31. 3.1. A scientific theory of international relations. Compare with Morgenthau, Waltz claims that theory is purely an instrumental tool. In this respect, he carefully distinguishes between laws and theories as qualitatively distinct kinds of. 政治大. knowledge. On the one hand, laws are observable propositions which establish relations between variables. Waltz thus points out that a law is “based not simply on a relation that has been. 立. found, but one that has been found repeatedly.”32. ‧ 國. 學. Conversely, if laws describe relations between phenomena, theories explain those relations. Laws and correlations do not describe anything, and their inductive accumulation cannot, by. ‧. themselves, result in theory.. Nat. er. io. sit. y. “ […] facts do not speak for themselves, because associations never contain or conclusively suggest their own explanation, the question must be faced.”33. A theory therefore explains laws and provides an indispensable link between facts and proposi-. n. al. i n U. v. tions expressing probabilistic relations between these facts. Waltz further argues that “a theory. Ch. engchi. is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connections among its parts.”34 On the other hand, unlike Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz maintains that theories do not describe reality or make truth-claims. Instead, they simplify reality by artificially isolating certain factors and forces from a multitude of innumerable possible factors that may be relevant to account for a specific range of behavior, and by aggregating disparate elements, according to specified theoretical criteria.35. 31 32 33 34 35. Ibid., p. 89. Ibid., p. 1. Ibid., p. 4. Ibid., p. 8. Martin Griffiths, Op. Cit., p. 43.. 24.

(27) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. The ultimate aim is therefore “to find the central tendency among a confusion of tendencies, to seek the propelling principle [and] to seek the essential factors.”36 Nevertheless, what are the criteria for evaluating competing theories? According to Kenneth Waltz, the criteria for evaluating competing theories are not in terms of truth or falsity, but according to their explanatory utility. For reference, since theories are different from the reality they seek to explain, one cannot distinguish between true and false theories. “ If truth is the question, then we are in the realm of law, not of theory.”37. Obviously, theories should specify the empirical referents for the concepts contained in their deductive hypotheses, and they should also specify how variables are associated within these. 政治大. hypotheses. Theories themselves cannot be tested directly, but only indirectly through the hypotheses they generate.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. “ Rigorous testing of vague theory is an exercise in the use of methods rather than a useful effort to test theory.”38. In this context, what is the validity of a theory? What are the theoretical limits? According to. ‧. Kenneth Waltz, the validity of a theory depends on its ability to explain and predict a broad range of behavioral patterns but not policy-making processes.. sit. y. Nat. io. er. First, regarding the validity of theories, the assumptions made by Waltz about the interests, survival motives and unitary nature of states do not themselves have to be accurate. Waltz recog-. n. al. i n U. v. nizes on the contrary that states are not unitary actors at all. However, he argues that these as-. Ch. engchi. sumptions are the only necessary ones in a systemic theory that tries to explain behaviors as a result of structural conditions rather than state’s foreign policies.39 From a theoretical point of view, as long as most states, including the most powerful, conform to the dictates of anarchy and engage in power-balancing behavior, the assumptions are valid ones. Second, Waltz also points out that given his strict distinction between levels of analysis, his theory only explains the expected impact of structure on systemic behavior, not policy-making processes. 36 37 38 39. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Op. Cit., p. 10. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 16. Martin Griffiths, Op. Cit., p. 84.. 25.

(28) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. In other words, Waltz’s theory does not explain how specific states will respond to structural conditions in particular historical circumstances. Structure constraints and incentives may sometimes be outweighed by unit-level incentives and constraints because the theory explains similarity of behaviors, not differences. “ The theory leads to many expectations about behaviors and outcomes. From the theory, one predicts that states will engage in balancing behavior, whether or not balanced power is the end of their acts. From the theory, one predicts a strong tendency toward balance in the system. The expectation is not that a balance, once achieved, will be maintained, but that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or another.”40. Finally, how do we test a theory? Once again, Waltz denounces Morgenthau. He rejects the strategy of “successive confirmation of hypotheses” derived from theories. Waltz argues that. 政治大 may confound it. Waltz also rejects strict falsification criteria, since a theory only gives rise to 立 expectations, which are some what general and indeterminate. So, what does Kenneth Waltz these do not prove a theory’s validity, since there may be historical or future exceptions which. ‧ 國. 學. recommend to do?. ‧. First, Waltz stresses that tests may be carried on by examining structurally comparable, although not necessarily identical realms.. y. Nat. sit. er. io. “ Structural theories, moreover, gain plausibility if similarities of behavior are observed across realms that are different in substance but similar in structure, and if differences of behavior are observed where realms are similar in substance but different in structure.”41. al. n. v i n C is permissible where In other words, “reasoning by analogy h e n g c h i U different domains are structurally similar.”42. Second, Waltz also claims that “hard confirmatory tests” should be applied given the problematic nature of behavior which can be inferred from the theory, and therefore the inapplicability of strict falsification. Unlike Morgenthau, who illustrates his so-called universal laws of the balance of power, Waltz rejects the nineteenth-century period because of the absence of deep ideological cleavages.43. 40 41 42 43. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Op. Cit., p. 128. Ibid., p. 123. Ibid., p. 89. Martin Griffiths, Op. Cit., p. 85.. 26.

(29) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. 3.2. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Structure, Domestic and International Politics and Anarchy. According to Waltz, the international political system is composed of two related but distinct component parts: a political structure and a set of interacting units — or states. For reference, Waltz assumes that states generate the structure, which is formed through their mutual interaction. Once formed, the structure then influences the behavior of states and therefore outcomes, by constraining states from undertaking certain policies and disposing them towards others.44 But, why does the definition of the structure must omit the attributes and relations between units? Waltz argues that this is a precondition set in order to distinguish between changes of structure from changes that take place within it. What Waltz is trying to explain is the kind of behavior. 政治大. which in encouraged by the structure and how much of that behavior is accounted for the structure and how much is accounted for by unit-level phenomena.. 立. which specify how states are arranged within the system.. 學. ‧ 國. Waltz then defines the international political structure by three formal and positional criteria,. ‧. “ Everything else is omitted. Concern for tradition and culture, analysis of the character and personality of political actors, consideration of the conflictive and accommodative processes of politics, description of the making and execution of Policy all such matters are left aside. Their omission does not imply their unimportance. They are omitted because we want to figure out the expected effects Of structure on process and of process on structure. That can be done only if structure and process are distinctly defined.”45. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. n. v i n Next, Kenneth Waltz provides threeC criteria to distinguish between domestic and international hengchi U structures. The first criterion is the principle of “arrangement,” by which the system’s parts relate to one another. Domestic systems are hierarchical but the international system is anarchical. An anarchical system is described as a self-help world. “ None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. […] Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability.”46. The second criterion is the principle of “functional differentiation” between units of the system, which denotes how the subordinate parts within a structure relate to one another in terms of tasks they must perform.. 44 45 46. Ibid., p. 80. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Op. Cit., p. 82. Ibid., p. 88.. 27.

(30) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. Now, given the differences between domestic and international politics arising from the hierarchy of authority relations within states and its absence between them, therefore domestic politics is characterized by specialization, integration and, an extensive division of labor. International politics on the other hand is characterized by its obverse. The third criterion is the principle of ‘distribution of capabilities’ among its component parts. Waltz claims that “states are alike in the tasks they face, though not in their abilities to perform them.”47 Yet, Waltz argues that this threefold definition of political structure is reduced to two in international politics. In other words, the second component is constant over time and because its implications can be inferred from the first criterion (anarchy), it drops out as an independent variable at the international level.. 立. Structures as Independent Determinants of Behavior. 學. ‧ 國. 3.3. 政治大. To Kenneth Waltz, the above mentioned structures constrain and dispose behaviors of units for. ‧. two main reasons: First, the structure is not the agent. Only states are agents in the system. In this respect, structures are merely “a set of constraining conditions,” which select behaviors. Nat. sit. y. rather than participate as a concrete actor. After all, the structure cannot be seen, examined or. io. er. observed directly. Waltz therefore asserts that structures work through indirect effects.. al. n. v i n C which shapes the behavior of firms byhrewarding e n g ccertain h i Upatterns of behavior and punishing. For instance, the author uses the analogy of Adam Smith’s freely formed economic market, actors, “through socialization of the actors and through competition among them.”48 In other words, Waltz asserts that structures determine behaviors independently of “the characteristics of units, their behavior, and their interactions.”49 Second, Waltz also argues that each component part of the structure shapes state behavior and outcomes in international politics. Furthermore, anarchy explains the continuity of state behavior despite procedural unit-level changes.. 47 48 49. Ibid., p. 96. Ibid., p. 74. Ibid., p. 89.. 28.

(31) Chapter 2: Conceptual framework. The American Factor in Post-ECFA Cross-Strait Relations. “The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent.”50. Within a system whose distribution of capabilities is stable, anarchy is a constant condition that explains continuity, not change. Waltz merely means “to say why patterns of behavior recur, why events repeat themselves, including events that none or few of the actors may like.”51 The expected effects of anarchy are both economic and political.. 3.4. Economic and Political Effects of Anarchy. From an economic perspective, anarchy limits the division of labor between states, and explains. 政治大 “ What one might want to do in the absence of structural constraints is different from what one is encouraged 立 to do in their presence. States do not willingly place them-. the absence of international integration.. ‧ 國. 學. selves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.”52. As a result, mutual gains to states that would arise, if the law of cooperative advantage operated. ‧. across borders, are not achieved.. y. Nat. sit. Moreover, each state also worries about the distribution of possible gains arising out of greater. al. er. io. specialization. In short, dependence and vulnerability go hand in hand in a self-help system be-. n. cause “a state also worries lest it become dependent others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges.”53. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In practice however, some cooperation does take place between states, and there is of course something of an international division of labor among states but Waltz further claims this distinction is not meant to be descriptively accurate but theoretically useful. Even though Waltz admits that all societies are already mixed, the nature of these exchanges and the extent of cooperation within them are both limited by the condition of anarchy, and the concomitant need for each state to protect its security, autonomy and control.. 50 51 52 53. Ibid, p. 66. Ibid, p. 69. Ibid, p. 107. Ibid, p. 106.. 29.