In other words, a market dominated by a few large firms is to be preferred to one in which many small firms compete. What benefit firms does not necessarily benefit consumers. Stability is often inversely related to efficiency, product quality and low prices, but it all benefit for the firms: “International-political systems are judged more by the fate of the units than by the quan-tity and quality of their products.”64 Second, Walt tries to be more precise in specifying the op-timum number of dominant states in the system. The reason why two great powers is the opti-mum number is strategic, not economic. Stability is defined as peace, or the absence of war among great powers. In complete contrast to Morgenthau, who believes that contemporary bipo-larity is the most unstable balance of power, Waltz claims the opposite. What does it mean?
Waltz’s claim rests upon his argument that the balance of power operates differently in multipo-lar than bipomultipo-lar systems. In a multipomultipo-lar system, states rely on alliances to maintain their securi-ty. However, such a system is inherently unstable.
“ In multipolar systems there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries and too few to keep the effects of de-fection low. With three or more powers flexibility of alliances keeps relations of friendship and enmity fluid and makes everyone’s estimate of the present and future relation of forces uncertain. So long as the system is one of fairly small numbers, the actions of any of them may threaten the security of others.”65
Consequently, there is always a danger of miscalculation and defection between alliance part-ners but during the cold war for example, the United States and the Soviet Union did not depend on anyone else to protect themselves.
“ Internal balancing is more reliable and precise than external balancing. States are less likely to misjudge their relative strengths than they are to misjudge the strength and reliability of opposing coalitions. Rather than making states properly cautious and forwarding the chances of peace uncertainty and miscalculations cause war. In a bipo-lar world uncertainty lessens and calculations are easier to make.”66
4. Stephen Walt: Alliance Politics and the Balance-of-Threat
Regarding the formation of alliances in a balance-of-power configuration, Hans Morgenthau claims that given the power maximization assumption, whether or not a nation shall pursue a policy of alliances is a matter of expediency, not principle.67
64 Ibid., p. 137.
65 Ibid., p. 168.
66 Ibid.
67 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Op. Cit., p. 201.
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Morgenthau thus believes that if a state is strong enough to hold on its own unaided or that the burden of the commitments resulting from the alliance is likely to outweigh the advantages ex-pected, it will shun alliances.
Conversely, Kenneth Waltz argues that a balance-of-power theory should be exclusively based on a distribution of capabilities principle. In Waltz’s words, “Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer, provided, of course, that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking.”68
Yet, Stephen Walt underlines that states form alliances to balance against threats and not power only.69 Although power is an important part of the equation, it is not the only one. Walt there-fore asserts that states tend to ally with or against the there-foreign power that poses the greatest threat.
Stephen Waltz calls it the ‘balance-of-threat’ theory.
4.1 States’ Behavior in a Balance-of-Threats Theory
Stephen Walt suggests that states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone.
Although the distribution of power is an important factor, Walt argues that the level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive and aggregate capabilities, and perceived in-tentions.
When confronted by a significant external threat, Stephen Walt therefore stresses that states may either balance or bandwagon. Walt describes balancing as allying with others against the pre-vailing threat, while bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger. In other words, balancing or bandwagoning are accurately viewed as a response to threats.
When do states choose to balance or bandwagon?
According to the balance-of-threat theory, states form alliances in order to prevent stronger states powers from dominating them. In other words, states join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat.
68 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Op. Cit., p. 127.
69 Stephen M. Walt, The origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1987), p. 17.
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Obviously, states would place their survival at risk if they failed to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong. Consequently, to ally with the dominant power or bandwagon means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence.
To the contrary, states would increase their influence within a new alliance if they chose to join the weaker side or balance. In this respect, balancing increases one’s influence because of the other party need for assistance.
4.2 Factors Influencing the Level of Threat
Stephen Walt identifies four factors affecting the level of threat: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions.
First, aggregate power refers to a state’s resources. The greater these resources, a potential threat it can pose to others. The total power states can wield is thus an important component of the threat they pose to others.70
Although power can pose a threat, it can also be prized. States with great power have the capaci-ty to either punish enemies or reward friends. By itself, a state’s aggregate power may provide a motive for balancing or bandwagoning.
Second, offensive power describes the ability to threaten other states. Although it is closely re-lated to aggregate power, it is not identical. Stephen Walt argues that states with large offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke an alliance than those that are incapable of attacking be-cause of geography, or military posture.71
Specifically, offensive power is the ability to threaten to sovereign or territorial integrity of an-other state at an acceptable cost. Yet, the effects of offensive power may vary. The immediate threat that offensive capabilities pose may create a strong incentive for others to balance.
Third, geographic proximity concerns the ability of a state to project its military. States that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away.
70 Ibid., p. 22.
71 Ibid., p. 24.
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Other things being equal, states are more likely to make their alliance choices in response to nearby powers than in response to those that are distant.72 As the aggregate power, proximate threats can lead to balancing or bandwagoning. When proximate threats trigger a balancing re-sponse, alliances are likely to occur. Conversely, when a threat from a proximate power leads to bandwagoning, the sphere of influence of this state is likely to increase.
Fourth, aggressive intentions refers to the perceive intentions of an aggressive state. According to Walt, states that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them.
In this respect, intention not power is crucial.
Indeed, even states with rather modest capabilities may prompt others to balance if they are per-ceived as especially aggressive. Perceptions of intent are likely to play a crucial role in alliance politics. Thud, the more aggressive or expansionist a state appears to be, the more likely it is to trigger an opposing coalition.