CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
5.3.0 Academic contribution and future research
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slums or rare clean water in developing nations. In domestic environment, though policy formation has been regarded as power centralized in governments, but these platforms will facilitate policy makers to brew a democratic environment for better communication and collation for public issues.
5.3.0 Academic contribution and future research
1. Implications on a politics stream
In comparison to Kingdon’s assumptions on a politics stream, our propositions provide more detailed descriptions on a politics stream than that original model does. According to the multiple-streams framework, policy entrepreneurs who utilize national mood, pursuits of interest groups and party ideologies can go through a politics stream.
However, this study specifies the essence of this stream. First, a multiple-principals competition is identified as a unique contextualized prerequisite in higher education policies. That competition attributes to the complexity of modern higher education, and that complexity leads to entwined relationships among universities, faculties, legislators, students, governments and policy entrepreneurs. Secondly, policy entrepreneurs’
behaviors were identified by the concept of power sharing in democratic countries.
Through these longitudinal cases, even stages of policy entrepreneurs’ strategies were identified, which increases more in-depth observation for multiple streams framework.
As to the final goal of both policy entrepreneurs in a politics stream, this study validated Kingdon’s assumptions; effective political coalition determinates the success of policy entrepreneurs in this stream.
As to future research, multiple-principals competition is a topic worthy of exploration. In terms of higher education policies, that condition indicates a changing structure of power and a new pattern of decision-making stream. To practitioners and researchers, clarifying a multiple-principals condition can facilitate them to find potential interest groups and understand the exact pattern of interaction among stakeholders.
2. Implications on a problem stream
When Kingdon’s assumptions on a problem stream are revisited, this study explains additionally the nuanced capability of policy entrepreneurs inside and outside a government. In multiple streams framework, policy entrepreneurs magnify focusing
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event and feedbacks to market their problem preference. However, this study unfolds stakeholders’ perception operating in a sequential order to both policy entrepreneurs.
First, policy entrepreneurs should prove their legitimacy of identity, then they are allowed to state their perspective on problem preference. Not only identifying the sequence of perception, this study pointed out legitimacy of content and clarified Kingdon’s concept about problem framing; in our study, problem framing actually contains two critical measurements, flexibility of framing and acuity of stakeholders.
There’s a counter-intuitive interesting research topic about a problem stream for future researchers. In this case study, we found the more legitimacy of identity a policy
entrepreneur owns, the less the legitimacy of content they can demonstrate. For example, policy entrepreneurs from government are equipped with conventional authorities, but their legitimacy of content is also constrained by their position. That intriguing
phenomenon can be further detected by quantitative research. To policy entrepreneurs from governments, that research can dig out specific hidden obstacles they face.
3. Implications on a policy stream
In Kingdon’s theory, policy entrepreneurs need to demonstrate technological feasibility and value acceptability in a policy stream. Though this study conquers with Kindon’s concept, but the author specified their essential sequence in advance. Once policy entrepreneurs reach political acceptability, they have chance to present technological feasibility. Moreover, technological feasibility has been criticized as a vague concept by extant researchers. In this dissertation, this concept is clearly defined by a collection of scope of reform, available workforce and option of alternatives.
As to future research, sequence between political acceptability and feasibility is an intriguing issue. Though a policy solution is a product of profession and rationality, but political acceptability still dominates the perception of stakeholders. Thus, research on stakeholders’ choices aforementioned can provide observation in terms of social psychology. And research on contextualized elements, such as culture and norms of society is still limited. Thus, identifying significant contextualized determinants is another issue for future researchers to detect.
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APPENDIX'II'
Interview Questions-Higher Education in Eastern Asia
1. There’re 8 autonomies in Taiwan’s universities, which one (ones) of them are familiar to you? Please identify the one (ones) benefiting to your university.
2. Please identify the one benefiting to your university. And please elaborate the reason why those university autonomies can’t work?
3. Following section represents these 8 autonomies we mentioned in the previous questions and their respective definition.
a. Setting up accountability standards
According to Regulation Regarding Evaluation of Universities , universities can set up their own criteria of accountability rather than abide by unified standards from the government to evaluate operational and academic performance. That autonomy facilitates universities to prevent unfair or unsuitable evaluation indexes and to develop their capability of self-evaluation.
b. Establishing financial self-management mechanism
Based on Act for the Establishment of University Fund, universities can exercise financial autonomy to plan, to execute their self-provided income and to construct their own financial management system. Universities can be benefited by financial flexibility and effectiveness of budget. Those autonomies will facilitate universities to create accountability.
c. Implementing performance-based pay mechanism
According to University Performance-based Project, higher education institutions are allowed to construct their performance-based payment mechanism to replace previous seniority-based one. Through this autonomy, universities will strengthen their
competitiveness of global talents recruitment.
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d. Leading industry-academia collaboration
According to the Regulation on Industry-academia Collaboration, universities can lead and manage industry-academia collaboration actively for the MOE deregulated several restrictions, such as co-investment project, faculties’ participation in the board of companies and recruitment professions in industries.
e.Recruiting international talents and non-academic professionals.
Based on University Act, universities can recruit foreigners to take administrative or academic posts. By that, universities can have broader choices of human resources to develop their international competiveness.
a. Academic Qualification Review
According to University Act, universities are delegated to set up their own mechanism for faculties’ promotion and recruitment. That delegation facilitates universities to
develop their promotion accesses, requirements of promotion and develop strategies of academic development.
b. President Election
On the basis of University Act, universities can set up their own committee to decide the mechanism of president election autonomously, such as the criteria, bylaws of
committee, and procedures of election. That autonomy allows universities to choose the most appropriate person in terms of diverse campus culture and development strategy.
c. Autonomy of setting up internal organization
According to University Act, universities are delegated to set up their own administrative unit or committees. That empowerment benefits universities to operationalize their strategies or cater to international trends promptly.
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APPENDIX III
Primary Draft on Pilot Interview (1) Setting up evaluation indexes
Interviewee Comments
(A) Number1, the self-evaluation criteria are usually set lower by department or colleges. There lacks an objective or
professional party to monitor the appropriateness of these indexes. The reason why the MOE rarely adopts the criteria set by the universities, for they know there’s an ethic hazard but they can’t judge if their criteria meets the standards or not.
Ironically, MOE still announces they are delegated.
(B) The autonomy of setting up accountability criteria is not useful to us. There are two kinds of important evaluation: university evaluation and top university project. About the former one, for the self-planned criteria will not necessarily influence the outcome of assessment. So the autonomy won’t be really exercised. The latter one, appealing for most of faculties’
attention, prefers natural science criteria which is not really fair to a university based on social science. Of course, MOE delegates us to set up criteria for social science. But those criteria are not easy to be established for the achievement from experts in social science can’t be quantified easily, such as contribution to public policy.
And the knowledge center’s combination has much more weights in representatives from natural science. That forms another barrier for us to pass or gain more budgets from this.
(C) Take university evaluation held in 2011 as example, the issues raised by committee belongs to details or very macro
questions. They didn’t indicate the directions of university development nor understand the characteristics of the
institutions they visited. I can’t see any substantial effect from that kind of evaluation. Most of the committee members are
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assigned temporary and lack of experience of involving operation of universities.
In the American universities, we can see the board of trustee or regents is equipped with certain flavor of evaluation; the accreditation association plays another qualified external role.
The members of creditors should keep posted on the
information and development of specific universities, and if necessary, there will be a formative evaluation before 4years interval. By that, universities can really be evaluated
completely.
(D) I think university evaluation has too many rigid and strict indexes of evaluation, and the required documents are serious burden to the administrators. And universities are reluctant to set up their own indexes for they are afraid that will make them fail to pass the evaluation. Not only that, existing indexes form a fixed frame for university development, that will further make institutional development restricted for they need to create the exact accountability meeting the requirements of evaluation indexes. In my observation, especially some tech colleges in Taiwan are losing their uniqueness for their indexes are too unified and similar to general universities.
Moreover, the profession evaluation also has its constraints.
For example, in order to fit the ratio of faculties, some
universities will sign a short-term contract with faculties, after they pass the evaluation, and those faculties will be fired.
(2) Autonomy of financial management Interviewee Comments
(E) Number2 doesn’t work as well. First, the financial authorities are restricted by several public agencies’ perception or
regulations. Most of them work in top-down fashion. Thus, not only the amount of money is limited but their interventions will diminish the flexibility of this fund. Further, the people in
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accounting system are tightly linked to those public agencies and the staff just comes from there.
(A) Intervention within and outside the university will hamper this autonomy to president. Internally, when I was assigned as a president, in the first year there’s no budget for me. The colleges have allocated the self-provided fund according to their existing rules. There’s no plan but follow the original allocation of money. Thus, when I proposed to get 25% out of self-provided fund for university development, certain colleges were severely against that. Meanwhile, the committee
responsible for the management and audit, which are
composed by amateur faculties, usually abuse their authorities to boycott polices harming their benefit or misuses them.
Externally, this autonomy keeps scrutinizing by several kinds of political representatives or is intervened by governmental agencies. For example, we organized an investment group to manage some self-provided fund. However, that becomes the issue challenged by legislators even we just execute our legal autonomy by professional judgment. Moreover, the president mentioned, not until the second year did he know there’s no budget for planning. Somehow there shows some dysfunction within the administrative team.
(B) The autonomous financial rules and systems, still have restrictions in themselves. First, we can’t earn sufficient income to exercise this autonomous financial mechanism. In Taiwan, donators prefer NTU, such as the top university with high reputation, and people and industries didn’t have the culture to donate their money to universities. So that restricts
(B) The autonomous financial rules and systems, still have restrictions in themselves. First, we can’t earn sufficient income to exercise this autonomous financial mechanism. In Taiwan, donators prefer NTU, such as the top university with high reputation, and people and industries didn’t have the culture to donate their money to universities. So that restricts