Implication

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seizing window of policy. During the stream, political acceptability operates as a control variable to intermediate the outcome of policy entrepreneurs’ strategies. Creating or seizing window of policy is taken as a dependent variable; that variable shows the outcome of the interaction between their strategies with technological feasibility and stakeholders’ policy acceptability.

Figure 14 Variables in a policy stream Source: Author

5.2.0 Implication

As extant research reveals, to global policy makers, networking governance, civil participation and policy innovation requires policy entrepreneurs’ involvement. Thus, policy entrepreneurs can be complementary alliances to policy makers. Based on our research findings, following implication suggest how policy makers can collaborate with policy entrepreneurs in each policy stream.

I. Implication for policy makers:

A. Effective political coalition: Shaping a cluster of policy formation

The multiple-principals competition has explained that policy makers can’t achieve any education policies alone nowadays. In a politics stream, multiple principals in specific issues of higher education constitute the infrastructure of the network; specific interest groups or stakeholders also participate in the network. Policy makers should make the most effective connection with those roles by smart strategies of power sharing. For example, in terms of revising University Act to transform national universities into university corporations, policy makers were located in the network, consisting of competitive principals, stakeholders, and interest groups. How to allocate their power

Creating window of policy Technological

feasibility

Goal (DV) Strategy

(IV)

Contextualized prerequisite (CV)

Political acceptability

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and how to make most actors in the network agree to join their alliances become the essential issue every policy makers should face nowadays, especially in democratic regimes.

Extant research indicated policy entrepreneur have more incentives to lead policy innovation than policy pro forma or advocators. This study has validated that policy entrepreneurs from universities can adopt their strategies of sharing power better in a politics stream than those from governments. Thus, policy makers can effectively conduct those strategies of power sharing by delegating power to policy entrepreneurs outside governments.

Shaping a cluster of policy formation is an option. By infusing budget or sharing governance power, governments can foster certain influential organizations policy entrepreneurs operate. In the U.S., various think tanks and nonprofit foundations on education policies have formed diverse clusters of policy formation. Each think tank or foundation works on specific issue they care with respective alliances and intensively promote their belief for political coalition. In the era of multiple-principals competition, what policy makers need to do is to identify influential one and connect with these cluster. To Asian governments, those think tanks and nonprofit foundations run by policy entrepreneurs are still limited; thus, they should foster certain amount of those

organizations first.

B. Identification of emergent problems: Building a market of problem competition As our research findings demonstrate, while policy makers search for emergent public issues, they may be misled for legitimacy of identity may block policy entrepreneurs with great legitimacy of content. That means only public officers can have smooth access to propose urgent issue. However, based on our research finding, policy entrepreneurs from governments have more constraint on framing problems for the hierarchical system they are located. From the perspective of policy makers, that condition may result in stagnation of policy formation; even worse, government may invest limited resources into less urgent issues.

Governments can create a market of problem for policy entrepreneurs to compete their problem preference. So, before the competition initiates, policy makers should broaden

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the requirements on legitimacy of identity. Potential policy proposers don’t have to be public officers but can prove their expertise or representativeness as legitimacy of identity instead. What governments need to do is just only delegating those promoters with legitimacy of content and let stakeholders to filter meaningful information for them.

For this study points out that once a problem preference is supported by most

stakeholders, that means this issues at least contains flexibility of framing and acuity of stakeholders.

In brief, governments can build an open platform of problems for audience who care public issues and who have proposals. The semi-market of public issues from University of Chicago and National Cheng Chi University may be a demonstration for policy makers who expect to create a market of problem preference. Both universities aforementioned provide an exchange market of future events. The platform was simulated as a stock market to test significance of each issue by stakeholders’ opinion and their investment. Instead of conventional public hearings, it is faster, more accurate and cost saving. Especially, it can facilitate policy markers to foster a market to filter meaningful and significant public issues in a problem stream.

C. Selection of mature policies: Platform for wisdom of the crowds

Once political alliance is organized and public issues are identified, searching for policy solution with technological feasibility and political acceptability usually trap policy makers. On the basis of our research finding, the policy proposal from policy entrepreneurs outside governments is equipped with technological feasibility and political acceptability. Thus, policy makers can establish a platform to call for policy solutions from policy entrepreneurs.

That approach is not uncommon in some countries. Asian Development Bank, which conducts educational and social needs of developing countries in ASEAN has built a similar platform. They provide grant or loan for developing countries to call for feasible proposals and resources from experts around globe, rather than do by themselves.

Usually, they diversify those projects to various policy promoters rather than relying on limited agencies. In U.S., most of these platforms come from private sector. Clinton foundation provide one million USD every year to call for sustainable solutions for severe social problems, such as solution for crowded urban residence, child education in

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slums or rare clean water in developing nations. In domestic environment, though policy formation has been regarded as power centralized in governments, but these platforms will facilitate policy makers to brew a democratic environment for better communication and collation for public issues.