CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
2.3.1 Pattern of interaction between governments and universities
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(2007) categorized the role from the authorities into three kinds of actors, policy
entrepreneurs, policy advocates and pro forma adopters. Policy advocate are the politician or bureaucrat who promoted successful ideas from other region while pro forma adopters implement these ideas by the top-down order. In conclusion, policy entrepreneurs who own the largest political benefit and take the most enormous risk will contribute the most among these three roles. Thus, when more and more policy entrepreneurs join policy formation in higher education, identifying the suitable background of policy entrepreneurs becomes an urgent research issue. However, from 1995 to 2015, there is limited literature on this part.
In this study, those cases from policy entrepreneurs inside and outside governments facilitate the author to explore diverse backgrounds of policy entrepreneurs.
Moreover, policy entrepreneurs are depicted as critical roles coupling streams of politics, policy and problem together for opportunity of policy window. That is still vague description to practitioners. Several researchers care about practical functions of policy entrepreneurs.
Are they decisive to policy change? Or policy entrepreneurs are just brokers? In the research finding from the drought policy in the United States. and Australia, Botterill (2013) concluded that policy entrepreneurs’ action still requires decisive political action at high level. However, from 1995 to 2015, relevant literature is still limited. Through practical cases in this study, policy entrepreneurs’ roles and functions will be specified, and that the other academic contribution of this dissertation.
2.3.0 Policy context for policy entrepreneurs
As Mintrom (2013) indicated policy entrepreneurs master negotiating at specific operating context. In other word, the operating context determines policy entrepreneurs’
success. In terms of higher education policy, policy entrepreneurs face implicit and explicit contexts influential to higher education policy formation.
2.3.1 Pattern of interaction between governments and universities
In terms of policy formation, the interaction between governments and universities is dominantly interpreted by principal-agency theory (Kivisto, 2007). According to this theory, due to complexity of academia, limited capacity and insufficient information, governments tend to delegate specific tasks to universities by implicit or explicit contracts (Lambert, 2001;
Leifner, 2003). Those tasks consist of fostering talents, conducting research, and contributing to social service. Higher education policies, such as competitive grant based on academic
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performance, funding in accordance with students’ enrollment and university evaluation, are formulated by the contractual rationale aforementioned.
However, even these policy makers set up their tasks as detailed contracts, they still face following risks, such as information asymmetries, goal conflicts, adverse selection and moral hazard (Holtta, 2008; Jongbloed & Vossensteyn, 2001; Kivisto, 2007; Smart, 2001). In order to prevent public interest from being diminished by those risks aforementioned, governments devise various monitoring mechanisms and incentives to secure expected performance from universities (Kivisto, 2007; Saam, 2007). In additional to the contractual interaction,
monitoring mechanisms and incentives constitutes specific devices in higher education policies, such as education quality assurance.
Nevertheless, the conventional assumption of higher education policy formation has been undermined. Single-principal-single-agent pattern has been taken as conventional pattern of interaction among universities and governments in Asia. Extant literature indicated that multiple-principal-single-agent pattern explains the government-university relation more completely than single-principal-single-agent one does (Kivisto, 2007). With increasing complexity of higher education, legislators, faculties’ unions, university associations and industries collaborating with universities all become significant principals to higher education institutions nowadays. These principals set up implicit or explicit contracts with higher education institutions by a variety of ways as well. Legislators passed regulations on
universities’ operation to assure public interests. Faculties’ unions negotiate with universities on the welfare of staff; corporations donating to universities expect to assure universities’
proper conduct. Even in the governmental system, various actors often share the power as a principal from a government.
In brief, the policy environment for policy entrepreneurs no longer suits
single-principal-single-agent pattern, they are situated in a multiple-principal-single-agent situation nowadays. When it comes to multiple-principals-single-agent pattern, the policy agenda become an arena in which diverse principals compete with each other. Therefore, the assumption from principal-agency theory should be redefined. In other words, the
conventional policy formation of higher education has transformed. In terms of policy formation, the interaction between governments and universities nowadays represents following traits.
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1. Difficulties of specifying details of contracts
The tasks from diverse principals complicate the process of settling the contract between universities and governments. Due to the complexity of higher education, various tasks from legislators, faculties’ unions and industries collaborating with universities make it tough for governments to specify their requirements of higher education policies. During these years, several grant policies from East Asian government encountered the situation aforementioned. Since 2004, the government in Japan and that in Korea only set up guidelines of higher education development and universities can develop their own mid-term plan based on these general directions. Governments in Taiwan also allow universities to provide their own indexes of accountability rather than abiding by those set by the MOE. So the effect of contractual pattern between universities and governments has diminished.
2. Suspect on conflict of interest, adverse selection, and moral hazard When universities work for diverse principals who also represent various
stakeholders of higher education at the same time, the theoretical assumption about shrinking and conflict of interest may not be severe or even happen. Meanwhile, asymmetry of information between governments and universities are diminished.
When the global competition of higher education gets intensive, short-term, transparent information of accountability and operation are easily accessed via public media or universities themselves in time. Potential negative behaviors from asymmetry of information will be easily detected.
As Kivisto (2007) questioned, “Should a university accept all the goals of the government without questioning their effects on freedom? Or, what happen if universities understand better than the government which higher education goals the government should be
promoting?” When governments face the multiple-principals-single-agent situation nowadays, policy entrepreneurship may be a potential solution for them to replace conventional
contractual relationship with universities.
Policy entrepreneurs may solve the dilemma which governments and universities are
challenged by the multiple-principals-single-agent situation. First, as an agency delegated by various principals, policy entrepreneurs from universities have the capability of integrating diverse principals’ needs; those principals to universities highly overlap with stakeholders of
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higher education policy nowadays, such as students, parents, and industries requiring
academic service, governments, and so on. Thus, universities have the strength to understand diverse principals’ needs on the basis of their unique profession and intermediary roles. To governments, policy entrepreneurs from universities facilitate them to meet the stakeholders’
demand and conduct the complexity of academic easily.
Secondly, when universities face multiple principals, they should pursue their interest of efficiency and effect of limited resource to conduct tasks satisfying most of the principals in parallel. That condition shapes a more advantageous condition to governments. If
governments let universities lead the policy agenda in the multiple-principal-single-agent situation, they may have better defined tasks of contract, more support from the stakeholders and more efficiency of resources. Thus, the updated agent-principal theory support this study’s assumptions. And this theory is adopted as analysis tool for cases.
2.4.0 Policy entrepreneurs in cultural dynamics
Cultural impact is significant to education policy formation, and therefore shapes the pattern of policy entrepreneurs in that region (Marginson, 2011; Wu, 2006; Wursten & Jacobs, 2014). Culture has played a significant role in the contextual elements for policy
entrepreneurs; as Hofstede (1980) defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others.” To East Asia and Taiwan, impact from culture derives from the mixture of regional traits, global trends and local society. Thus, in this study, those dynamics are taken as indexes for control variables.
Detailed description will be elaborated in chapter 3.
1. Regional dynamics of culture
Education systems of China, Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore and Taiwan are deeply influenced by Confucian education and culture. Marginson (2011) identified four interrelated features of Confucian system; those features are listed as below and illustrated in figure 2.
(1) Strong nation-state hierarchy
The authorities in Confucian Zone tend to device their authorities as centralized power. Thus, governments’ intervention is ubiquitous in most policies of higher education, such as governance structure, funding policy and resource allocation.
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(2) The rapid growth of tertiary participation
The emphasis of education from Confucian culture leads to the high tertiary participation rate in those countries. Education is interpreted as family
responsibility and honor for the family. Thus, in those countries, the public is enthusiastic with studying and with pursuing degrees.
(3) One chance national examinations
That trait mediates social competition and university hierarchy and focus family commitments to education. Through one chance national examinations, social harmony and hierarchy are core value of Confucian philosophy. Thus, the one chance national examinations facilitate the government control on social sorting.
(4) Accelerated public investment
More and more countries in this region invest in research universities. In the era of knowledge economy, they expect that investment can stimulate the ranking of universities and improve the quality of higher education.
As Margison(2011) contends though those countries aforementioned have diverse political systems, national traditions, and languages, but they share those traits in their education system in common. Moreover, Wursten & Jacobs (2014) elaborated these cultural dynamics play roles as a “black box” in the policy process and those implicit cultural values are critical in social and education policies.
Figure 2 Regional dynamics of culture Source: Marginson (2011)
Regional dynamics Strong
nation-state hierarchy
The rapid growth of
tertiary participation One chance national examinations
Accelerated public investment
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2. Global dynamics of culture
The most significant impact of globalization toward countries in Confucian Zone is the new public management reform (Mok, 2006; Marginson, 2011). Critical
elements of new public management reform include efficiency drive, downsizing and decentralization, search of excellence and public service orientation (Sporn, 2002). Under the wave of new public management reform, those countries in Confucius Zone chose a quasi-market model with governments’ supervision to transform their higher education system. As Raza (2009) indicates Japan, Korea, Singapore, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Lao and Vietnam either transformed universities as independent entities or infused more autonomy into the higher education institutions through policy legalization or
administrative arrangements. With delegating autonomy to university via this model, governments in Confucius Zone also strengthen their evaluation on accountability on the other hand. There are increasing policy tools for assessing performance of higher education institutions, such as quality assurance, audit and accountability mechanism.
Figure 3 Global dynamics of culture Source: Sporn, 2002
Global dynamics of culture Efficiency drive
Downsizing and
decentralization Search of excellence
Public service orientation
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3. Domestic dynamics of culture
In additional to regional and global culture, the domestic mindset and shared value also influence formation of policy. Scholars who research influence of domestic culture have intensively adopted cultural dimensions from Hofstede’s theory.
Hofstede (1980) identified cross-country cultural indexes via analyzing the data from a multinational company, IBM. The data is obtained from the branches of IBM in fourteen countries, and those cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede not only can do cross-country comparison, but also can be quantified. These dimensions consist of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and collectivism. In term of relevant research, Wursten & Jacobs (2014) adopted Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to explore how an education system exercise based on those domestic value; Wu (2006) compared the difference of domestic cultural dynamics between Taiwan and the United State. Dynamics of culture in Taiwan are evaluated as below (Wu, 2006; Wursten & Jacobs, 2014).
(1) Power distance
Power distance infers the degree of hierarchy in an institution. If a country gets high scores in this dimension, that represents the recognition of hierarchy is highly valued. Through a series of societal changes and transformation of democracy, Taiwan demonstrates decreasing power distance value (Wu, Taylor,
& Chen, 2001; Wu, 2006). That decreasing momentum reflects decentralization in the governance structure. Moreover, the relationship between universities and a government becomes more contract-based rather than hierarchical.
(2) Uncertainty avoidance
The score of uncertainty avoidance demonstrates the degree people are afraid of ambiguity and uncontrolled risk. Countries with high degree of uncertainty avoidance set up more rules or structure within an institution. Taiwan scored high in the dimension; and that infers faculties in universities are opted for clear definition of job and detailed procedures (Wu, 2014).
(3) Masculinity
Masculinity evaluates what kind of success a society pursues. The high scores of masculinity demonstrate this community enshrines success and advancement while low score, femininity, represents consensus seeking, friendly atmosphere, and position security are valued. Therefore, the academic achievement is highly promoted and most of public investment is devised as competitive grant.
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(4) Collectivism
People in countries with high degree of collectivism will cherish the benefit of the groups they belong to more than themselves while those in countries with individualism look after themselves. Taiwan has medium high scores in this index. Thus, universities in Taiwan emphasize equity more than excellence or other values.
Figure 4 Domestic dynamics of culture
Source: Adapted from (Hofstede, 1980; Wu, 2006; Wursten & Jacobs, 2014)
2.5.0 University autonomy in OECD, WB and EUA Elaborating on previous discussion on extant literature, fostering policy entrepreneurs outside governments to participate in policies may be regarded as alternative autonomy for universities. Though delegating empowering autonomy to universities has prevailed among global governments, most of these autonomies for higher education institutions are framed by the authorities, rather than by universities themselves. In this section, the practice of
university autonomy in OECD, WB and EHEA is introduced first; then the relevant analysis follows.
From OECD’s perspective, university autonomy is essential for higher education institutions to face global challenges. Policy makers should bear in mind that how the governance of universities assures their independence and dynamism to strengthen
universities’ impact on society and economy (OECD, 2003). In terms of university autonomy, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) announced their
Dynamics of culture Power distance
Uncertainty
avoidance Masculinity
Collectivism
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evaluation on university autonomy equipped by their member countries. According to the survey of OECD, university autonomies are categorized into following dimensions.
1. Owning buildings and equipment 2. Borrowing funds
3. Spending budgets to achieve their objects 4. Setting academic structure or course content 5. Employing and dismissing academic staff 6. Setting salaries
7. Deciding the size of student enrolment 8. Deciding level of tuition fee
World Bank (WB) propels an integrative catalogue on university autonomy as well. WB divides universities’ autonomies into substantive autonomy and procedural ones (Berdahl, 1990; Raza, 2009). Based on the argument of WB, the substantive autonomy covers the sphere of academic affairs, while procedural one contains non-academic areas overlapping with many financial matters.
In order to strengthen the competitiveness of the European Research Area (ERA), the European Commission (EC) and most European Governments have recognized the need of university autonomy. Not only the European Commission sets creation of a new framework as priority to improve autonomy, the Council of the European Union also makes a clear link between autonomy and the abilities universities to meet social expectations (European Union, 2007; European University Association EUA , 2009).
The representative dimensions of European university autonomy come from the exploratory study from EUA. For the EUA has been devoted its attention to the development of autonomy, they expect to facilitate debates about the correlation of autonomy with institutional
performance, excellence, quality and efficiency by the report mentioned above. This report was drafted in 2007 to evaluate their members’ autonomy by balance scorecards (EUA, 2009).
In this report, EUA defines university autonomy based on their Lisbon Declaration in 2007.
These four dimensions of university autonomy are represented below (EUA, 2009).
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1. Organizational autonomy
This autonomy is designed for institutional structure and governance. With this autonomy, universities are delegated to construct their structure of governance and to design governing bodies, to make contracts, and to elect decision units.
2. Financial autonomy
Universities are allowed to acquire and allocate fund, to charge tuition fees or to borrow and to raise money by being equipped with this autonomy. Also, in terms of property, this autonomy also contains the ownership of land and buildings as well as the flexibility to set up their own financial accountability tools.
3. Staffing autonomy
This autonomy facilitates higher education institutions to recruit staff, to set up their own standard of salary and to decide relevant issues on employment, such as civil servant status and contracts.
4. Academic autonomy
Universities can define their academic profiles, control on student admission, decide on degree supply, and set up their own quality assurance mechanism by obtaining this autonomy.
As table 8 illustrates, about university autonomy aforementioned, they are framed by the authorities and at operational level. First, even though these autonomies delegated have been involved in micro aspect of higher education, governments still play the major role in
devising the delegation. In consequence, the state role has been strengthened rather than weakened (Mok & Lee, 2001). Secondly, when that delegated autonomy is designed by governments, it falls in operational level, such as financial management, staff recruitment, and program establishment. Thus, even eleven countries in East Asia involved in this wave of reform by transforming universities as independent entities or infused more autonomy into the higher education institutions (Raza, 2009). East Asian universities only obtain operational autonomies designed by their governments, and these autonomies only brought limited effect on universities (Estermann, 2009; Mok, 2006; Varghese, 2009).
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Therefore, policy entrepreneur may be a potential solution for alternative autonomy for universities since autonomy on operational affairs can’t facilitate universities to deal with the stagnation of higher education in East Asia. As World Bank (2013) points out five
disconnects of higher education system in East Asia nowadays, those disconnects are tough issues which universities should have innovative policy rather than adjusted operational autonomy to reconcile those disconnects, inclusive of (1) disconnect between higher education and employers (2) disconnect between higher education and companies (3) disconnect between higher education and research institutions (4) disconnect among higher education institutions themselves and the gap between higher education institutions and training providers (5) disconnect between higher education institutions and secondary
education. Thus, policy entrepreneurs who can introduce, interpret, and implement innovative ideas into public sector practice may be equipped with capability to propose innovative solutions for this dilemma.
Table 8 University autonomy in OECD, WB, EUA
OECD WB EUA
Owning buildings and equipment Borrowing funds
Spending budgets to achieve their objects
Deciding level of tuition fee Procedural autonomy
Organizational autonomy
Organizational autonomy