CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH FINDINGS
4.3 Case 2: “University Autonomous Governance Project” from National Cheng Kung
4.4.0 Discussion of result
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As figure 11 illustrates, policy entrepreneurs from NCKU have adopted diverse strategies in respective stream. And they took the declaration of university autonomy as a window of policy.
Figure 11 Strategies of policy entrepreneurs from NCKU
Source: Adapted from Craig, R., Felix, H., Walker, J., & Phillips, M. (2010)
4.4.0 Discussion of result
In this section, the research findings aforementioned are further analyzed base on those research questions listed below.
1. How policy entrepreneurs from universities and governments go through a politics stream? Do they adopt different strategies?
2. How policy entrepreneurs from universities and governments go through a problem stream? Do they adopt different strategies?
3. How policy entrepreneurs from universities and governments go through a policy stream? Do they adopt different strategies?
In this section, the discussion of result is presented in a comparative format. By comparing research findings from both policy entrepreneurs from universities and governments, the author expected to generate succinct propositions for each research questions in chapter five.
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I. How policy entrepreneurs from universities and governments go through a politics stream? Do they adopt different strategies?
In this section, the contextualized structure of multiple-principals competition is
presented at first. Then, the author explains diverse patterns of sharing power embedded in both policy entrepreneurs’ strategies. Last, the nuanced outcome of each policy entrepreneur attained is analyzed.
A. Contextualized prerequisite: A multiple-principals competition
To the MOE in the first case, university councils, relevant ministries and teachers’
associations are principals to compete with each other. And all faculties in national universities represented targeted stakeholders in terms of “University Corporations Project”. In the case, policy entrepreneurs neglected the multiple-principals condition. So they demonstrated the strength of project to university presidents and relevant ministries only. Thus, though these two groups supported “University Corporations Project”, but faculties, unions, and universities all opposed this project and demonstrated competing agenda to targeted stakeholders. University councils proposed the commercialization of higher education as alternative interpretation, while teachers’ associations emphasized the importance of maintaining faculties’ governance.
To NCKU in the second case, faculties’ unions, small-scaled colleges, students’ unions, relevant ministries, and university councils all represented competitive principals who also delegated universities with specific tasks or authorities. NCKU learned from the case of the MOE and took care of all principals. Policy entrepreneurs from NCKU competed with each principal and tried to reconcile conflicts between their proposal and those principals’ pursuits. In consequence, though the university council of NCKU, teachers’ unions and students’ associations didn’t fully support this project, but at least they reached a consensus that project could be done with agreement from most faculties in NCKU. Relevant ministries also promised to delegate specific authorities to NCKU once they chose to be a pilot university.
In brief, the multi-principals competition is an inevitable trend for policy entrepreneurs in higher education. Comparing the first case to the second, the number of competing principals grows, and so do their strength to propose competing agenda. That indicates policy entrepreneurs shouldn’t only be sensitive to these diverse principals, but should
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also be capable of reconciling conflicts or benefit among them. The approach of sharing power dominates when policy entrepreneurs are contextualized in a multiple-principals competition.
B. Strategy: Diverse power sharing approaches
Thus, both policy entrepreneurs were contextualized in a similar conditions but they adopted diverse approaches to implement their strategies. Obtaining information from critical stakeholders, persuading targeted stakeholders and devising essence of delegated power are major steps of their strategies but they exercise different approaches in those steps. Table 15 illustrates the comparison of strategies between these two cases.
In the first case, policy entrepreneurs from the MOE were used to formal communication for obtaining critical information. They hosted three public hearings for all faculties in Taiwan and arranged official meetings for university presidents. These formal
communication patterns simplified the diversity of stakeholders and diminished critical information. After that, policy entrepreneurs from the MOE contended the value of institutional autonomy and accountability are essential value of higher education. They anticipated that institutional autonomy could facilitate universities to accept this project.
Finally, the pattern of sharing power was designed as transforming all national universities into university corporations by the information collected from formal
communication. Without sensing complexity of demands and perception of stakeholders, the MOE delegated all institutional autonomies to universities and expected that model could gain stakeholders’ support. However, the delegated power resulted in stakeholders’
resistance. Those delegated autonomies from the MOE are taken as burdens to higher education institutions.
In the second case, policy entrepreneurs from NCKU chose both formal and informal occasions of communication for their stakeholders; they diversified the audience and those accesses to approach these stakeholders. By public focus groups and consultancy meetings, policy entrepreneurs detected the perception from diverse communities, and they contended this project only deal with limited scope of problems without harming stakeholders’ benefit. Finally, they coined a pilot project and adopted gradual approaches to soothe stakeholders’ resistance.
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Table 15 Comparison of policy entrepreneurs’ strategies in a politics stream Step of
strategies
Policy entrepreneurs from the MOE
Hosting formal meetings for university presidents and faculties
Choosing formal and informal accesses of communication for faculties, students, administrators and ministries
Persuading targeted stakeholders
Propelling value of institution autonomy and accountability
Submitting limited scope of problems without harming corporation universities with the privatization of faculties’
positions
Offering a pilot project and gradual approaches
Source: Author
II. How policy entrepreneurs from universities and governments go through a problem stream? Do they adopt different strategies?
In this section, the contextualized prerequisite is presented at first. Then, the author explains critical elements embedded in both policy entrepreneurs’ strategies. Last, the nuanced outcomes each policy entrepreneur attained are analyzed.
A. Contextualized prerequisite: Legitimacy of identity
In the first case, policy entrepreneurs from the MOE were born with legitimacy of identity for they represented formal authorities in higher education policies. In Taiwan’s centralized system, policy entrepreneurs from the MOE had strong legitimacy of identity as conventional policy makers. Since policy entrepreneurs from governments had plenty of resources in fostering their problem preference via formal campaigns or media
diffusion, which was taken as an ideal platform for free riders or agenda competitors to join without cost. That legitimacy of identity appealed ubiquitous agenda competitors waiting for leaping on governments’ bandwagon at all time. Thus, the MOE faced with several agenda competitors, and those competitors brought diverse problem preferences to the public hearings.
In the second case, without official authorities, policy entrepreneurs from NCKU recruited experts as task force to strengthen the legitimacy of identity. Since university
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councils criticized that policy entrepreneurs from NCKU weren’t equipped with legitimacy of policy proposing, policy entrepreneurs from NCKU organized a series of research teams to evaluate and to draft policy solutions. By that pursuit of expertise, they built up legitimacy of identity in an alternative way. Moreover, policy entrepreneurs from NCKU also strategically cooperated with the MOE, and demonstrated their collaboration with governments to the public. Then, linking with conventional policy makers also strengthened their legitimacy of identity.
B. Strategy: Legitimacy of content
Thus, both policy entrepreneurs were contextualized in an identical condition but they adopted different approaches to put their strategies into practice. Flexibility of problem framing and acuity of stakeholders are critical elements of their strategies but they adopted diverse approaches to demonstrate these elements. Table 16 illustrates the comparison of strategies between these two cases.
In the first case, when it comes to flexibility of framing problems, policy entrepreneurs from the MOE encountered more restrictions in devising their problem preference than their peers from NCKU did. While abiding by the hierarchical bureaucracy, the MOE had limited choices and selected Japan’s reform on university corporations as a focus event. Thus, the status of university corporations had been defined as administrative corporations identical to Japan’s model. Once the options of potential solutions were fixed, policy entrepreneurs faced constraints in devising their focusing event. To policy entrepreneurs from the MOE, a centralized bureaucracy caused inflexibility. Thus, policy entrepreneurs’ agenda was determined by the upper level of the bureaucracy, rather than by themselves.
As to the acuity of stakeholders, policy entrepreneurs from the MOE took the university corporations in the United States and Europe as positive feedbacks for their audience; the MOE asserted that the academic achievement from those higher education institutions was attributed to their operation model, university corporations. When the MOE chose the focusing event, the tool of policy marketing, they avoided negative issues for these choices may have risk in harming the regime itself. However, that analogy led to lukewarm responses in campus for faculties’ major concern didn’t lie in efficiency of
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administration and university operation. In brief, this statement about spillover didn’t persuade faculties in campus and even stimulated the rival arguments from stakeholders.
In the second case, about flexibility of framing problems, without constraints from a bureaucratic system, policy entrepreneurs from NCKU had more options in their problem framing. Policy entrepreneurs from universities chose the domestic crisis, faculties’ corruption on research grant as their focusing event instead. The domestic event involved the substantial benefit or loss to faculties, so that focusing event resulted in recognition among faculties. To policy entrepreneurs from NCKU, they tended to select negative feedbacks to strengthen their legitimacy in policy formation. That can justify why they replace governments to improve the policies. In this case, policy
entrepreneurs from NCKU not only elaborated how their proposal can solve the problem of research grants, their consultancy team also drafted detailed solutions to improve extant accounting and audit system.
As to the acuity of stakeholders, policy entrepreneurs from universities made efforts to distinguish “University Autonomous Governance Project” from “University
Corporations Project”. Not only making a distinction, policy entrepreneurs from universities also emphasized their proposal didn’t contain controversial measurements adopted by “University Corporations Project”. That negative feedback successfully defended certain actions and statements from potential opponents against “University Autonomous Governance Project”.
Table 16 Comparison of policy entrepreneurs’ strategies in a problem stream Policy entrepreneurs from the
MOE
Selecting the reform in Japan on university corporations by abiding by policy design from Executive Yuan
Choosing domestic crisis, faculties’ corruption on research grant instead
Acuity of stakeholders
Taking University corporations in U.S. and Europe as positive feedbacks
Selecting negative feedbacks to distinguish “University
Autonomous Governance Project”
from “University Corporations Project”
Source: Author
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III. How policy entrepreneurs from universities and governments go through a policy stream? Do they adopt with different strategies?
In this section, the contextualized structure of political acceptability is presented at first.
Then, the author explains diverse approaches of feasibility embedded in both policy entrepreneurs’ strategies. Last, the nuanced outcome of each policy entrepreneur attained is analyzed.
A. Contextualized prerequisite: Political acceptability
Via “University Corporations Project ”, the MOE constructed the political acceptability by building organization autonomy through corporatizing all national universities. To policy entrepreneurs from the MOE, they assumed the political acceptability of institution level out weights that from individual one. Corporatization brought
organizational autonomy to universities at the cost of faculties. These faculties will be dismissed their identities as public officers when institutions they affiliated become university corporations. Moreover, new faculties won’t have privileged pension anymore.
As a result, the MOE didn’t win political acceptability from faculties for their individual benefit out weighted that of their institutions.
Policy entrepreneurs from NCKU also pursued value of university autonomy by
“University Autonomous Governance Project”; however, an alternative way was chosen.
Policy entrepreneurs from NCKU surpassed the conflict of interests from faculties, students, and administrators. To them, the acceptable premise should not harm the
benefit and status quo of stakeholders. Most of faculties in NCKU actually supported this gradual approach.
B. Strategy: Technological feasibility
Thus, both policy entrepreneurs were contextualized in a similar conditions but they adopted diverse approaches to realize their strategies. Scope of reform, available taskforce and number of alternative are determinants of their strategies but PE adopted diverse approaches to demonstrate them. Table 17 illustrates the comparison of strategies between these two cases.
In the first case, “University Corporations Project” involves in a large scope of policy change. Policy entrepreneurs from the MOE integrated dramatic innovations into
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“University Corporations Project”, such as transferring national properties to universities, shifting governance power to board of regents and privatizing all national universities.
The MOE delegated almost all kinds of organization autonomies for universities, inclusive finance management, personnel recruitment and decision-making. In consequence, policy entrepreneurs failed to explain the details of policy design; that large scope of reform was also interpreted as a burden from the perspective of faculties.
As to available taskforce, the team members of the MOE consist of public officers and part-time scholars. Not only lacking diverse experts, policy entrepreneurs from
governments were restricted to time constraints in a policy stream. Due to intensive election in Taiwan, public officers needed to propose accountability in a short term, and didn’t have currency to design strategies delicately. Last, about the number of alternative, though policy entrepreneurs from the MOE expected that experience from Japan can bring more feasible design for “University Corporations Project”, but that represented the only option stakeholders can choose. Also, a series of negative information from Japan’s policy led distrust from stakeholders.
In the second case, “University Autonomous Governance Project” is equipped with controllable scope in comparison to “University Corporations Project” does. Since the scope of change is limited, policy entrepreneurs from NCKU can offer their targeted audience with detailed policy design, actual mechanisms and task force from diverse experts. Policy entrepreneurs from NCKU gained stakeholders’ supports and
governmental agencies’ recognition. On the contrary, policy entrepreneurs from universities won’t face the pressure of the elections, and the professional networks facilitated them to propose solid solutions and more options of alternatives.
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Table 17 Comparison of policy entrepreneurs’ strategies in a policy stream Policy entrepreneurs from
the MOE
Policy entrepreneurs from NCKU
Scope of reform
Integrating dramatic innovations into “University Corporations Project”
Narrowing down “University Autonomous Governance Project”
into a controllable scope Available
task force
Public officers and part-time scholars
Taskforce from diverse experts and relevant ministries
Number of alternative
The only option stakeholders can choose is university corporation from Japan
Professional networks facilitating them to propose flexible solutions Source: Author
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