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3.5. Conclusion for the Early Japanese Period

4.2.1. Addict Registration

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77 items indicates the administration recognises and wants to combat the illicit trade that had emerged during the early period of rule.

It is interesting that policy towards opium dross and divans were reformed in accordance with the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Convention on Opium, but the commission based retail system was not reformed into a salary based one and the recording of retail sales was not implemented in accord with it. An explanation for it could be that the administration was on the whole satisfied with the opium monopoly system. It was efficacious after all. What is more, prohibiting opium dross and divans was relatively simple. However, employing wholesalers and retailers on a salary rather than a commission could possibly incite unrest amongst the notables who were accustomed to the system.

This is particularly so if they lost income as a result of the reform. It would be against the interest of the Government-General to guarantee a fixed salary for the wholesalers and retailers in case it lost income through declining addict numbers. Deciding upon a salary would necessarily be conducted annually in accordance with statistics on addict numbers. It would become an issue of dispute. This could further promote unrest. In addition, the administration would further lose revenue if the wholesalers and retailers were paid on a fixed salary because without a commission system they would not possess an incentive to sell greater quantities of opium. That means the Government-General would earn less. A sound recording system adopted by retailers would also reduce income by impeding illicit sales. Seen in this light, it was in the interest of the administration to not implement a salary and recording system for the sake of social stability and profit.

4.2.1. Addict Registration

Approximately one year after the revised Taiwan Opium Ordinance was implemented, on 18th December 1929 the Government-General ordered another addict registration drive. According to Hsu 48,991 smokers applied, among whom there were 25,527 illicit smokers254.

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78 Unlike the previous campaigns when strict medical examinations were cancelled for expediency, the administration was pressured to “carry out strict physical examinations of smoking license applicants in order to limit the licenses to incurable addicts”255. That undertaking is expressed by the fact that amongst the applicants some were granted licences, some were ordered to receive rehabilitative treatment, and some were commanded to abstain from opium. Additionally, Liu holds licence applicants were “left for ten hours… to confirm the degree of addiction from withdrawal symptoms in an accurate examination” under police supervision256. Interestingly, the campaign was allegedly “facilitated by the fact that most unlicensed opium smokers were already known to the police…” according to Sha Shunmoku‟s 1931 account of the development of the Taiwan People‟s Party257.

It is thought that the trigger for the registration campaign was a proposal for the establishment of clinics for the purpose of rectifying opium addicts. Its author was Du Congming, who was an eminent doctor of medicine and researcher employed by the Government-General at the time258. Having recently travelled to Korea, Manchuria and Shanghai to research opium addiction, he submitted a report titled “Proposal for the Establishment of a Hospital for Rectifying Opium Addicts Medicinally” (ahen insha kyōsei chiryō iin secchi kengisho) in August 1929259. That represented the first proposal to treat opium addicts the administration had received. Four months later the administration announced the registration campaign that for the first time aimed to order some addicts to receive such treatment.

There is disagreement on statistics regarding that matter. Liu writes that amongst the new applicants 7,170 were bestowed licences, 12,156 were dispatched to hospital for recovery, and 6,201 were denied licences260. Yet Jennings, who interestingly quotes the Japanese edition of Liu‟s book (the author could only obtain the Chinese edition), states 5,518 were awarded licences, 13,584 underwent treatment, and 6,209 quit under police supervision261. As for the totality of the 48,991 applicants Hsu records 23,845 were classified as addicts, 17,468 were sent to rehabilitation centres, and 7,454 had to abstain from opium262. Incidentally, Jennings and Hsu maintain 216 and 224 died during the campaign respectively.

There were two consequences of the campaign. The first is that it signalled the administration was serious regarding the rectification of addicts: light smokers were

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79 forced to quit smoking and moderate smokers were hospitalised for recovery. This should impact on how it was seen at home and abroad. Secondly, having a great number of addicts whose licences had been revoked meant they should be discontent or purchasing opium illegally on the black market. Nevertheless they were under police observation. Additionally the fact that the average consumption of opium per person rocketed from a trend of approximately 1.30 kilograms to 1.56 kilograms suggests that illicit opium had once more become scarce. It is thought that the 25,527 new applicants who unveiled their secret lifestyle to the authorities should have been interrogated by the police regarding where they purchased opium. Such interrogation would indubitably offer information on the identities of the smugglers. In other words, the new applicants‟ presumed desire to avoid three years imprisonment with hard labour for the sake of their secret lifestyle provided the means for the police to severely close the black market. There was therefore an increase in discontent amongst remaining illicit smokers who found it relatively difficult to acquire their drug.

Lastly, it is considered incredible that the number of illicit smokers matched the number of registered smokers. The author‟s original calculations, which were predicated on an assumed scarcity of supply of black market opium as suggested in an increase in the consumption of officially retailed opium per person, indicated that merely fifteen percent of the totality of smokers were secret consumers during the First World War. Actually here that figure has risen to as high as fifty percent. This suggests the author‟s method is erroneous. That suggestion can be confirmed by the fact from 1927 to 1929 exceptionally large quantities of smuggled opium were seized.

They were respectively 548, 696 and 1,479 kilograms263. During that period the average amount of opium consumed per person remained static at approximately 1.30 kilograms per person. That thus indicates there is no relationship between opium seizures and an increase in the quantity of opium consumed per person per year.

However, it is worth remembering that 1,479 kilograms may only represent a drop in the ocean regarding the quantity of opium smuggled onto the island. The fact is 1,479 kilograms is supply for a mere 1138 addicts per year. That number of addicts only represents 4.5 percent of the secret smokers who applied for licences in 1929. If 1,479 represents 4.5 percent of smuggled opium and we utilise 1.3 kilograms per year as the divider then in that year 32,833 kilograms of opium were clandestinely imported for

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80 the secret smokers altogether. Incidentally 31,967 kilograms of official opium paste were retailed in the same year. Considering the quantity of opium seized was miniscule compared to total smuggled opium it is likely it is too small a figure to impact on the average amount of opium smoked per year per person. In other words, the author‟s method is still valid.