2.5. Conclusion for the Late Qing Dynasty
3.2.4. The Opium Monopoly System
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46 regarded opium that the Government-General pharmaceutical plant produced as a medicine. Kodama is remembered to have said “that drug opium is manufactured into a medicine without poison… at the pharmaceutical plant the drug opium is made into a good medicine”144. That plant is the same one that should have produced opium paste for addicts during early rule. Considering opium smoking was disdained by the Japanese, it is peculiar that it referred to as a medicine. Perhaps calling it so was a strategy to induce Formosans to accept the product and support the administration‟s activity. Perhaps the morphine content of the opium paste was lower and thereby less addictive. Unfortunately an explanation as to why opium paste was a “medicine” is yet to be discovered by the author.
With regard to the above it can be concluded the gradual prohibition policy reflects Gotō‟s philosophical outlook and the contemporaneous circumstances of the Government-General. It reflects the “biological principles” in the sense it: a) considered the fate of Chinese opium addicts were they denied opium; b) cherished the opium smoking custom by allowing it to continue; c) sought to transform local culture gradually over thirty to fifty years as per being unable to make a Flounder into a Sea Bream abruptly. This is ideological. It is associated with the state of colonial rule with respect to the fact it generated revenue and should not precipitate unrest unlike immediate prohibition. This is pragmatic. It was thus both an ideological and practical policy. It should be argued that in the early period of Japanese rule it was necessarily pragmatic. Yet once the island had been pacified and was no longer in deficit it is thought to have lost its practical value. In that respect it should have been a purely ideological policy toward middle and late periods of rule.
3.2.4. The Opium Monopoly System
On 21st January 1897 the Government-General promulgated the “Taiwan Opium Law”
(Taiwan ahen rei). It had 14 articles. Broadly speaking its aim was to restrict opium related activities. It was to accomplish this goal by creating an opium monopoly system operated by the Government-General. After numerous revisions it was implemented on 1st April that year145. Later in accompaniment with the monopolies on salt, camphor and tobacco it was subsumed under the Monopoly Bureau (senbaikyoku) which was established in 1901.
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47 Establishing a monopoly meant only the Government-General was able to import, buy, sell and produce opium for consumption. Anyone else was prohibited from entering into the business146.
Profit earned from sales funded administrative operations.
The monopoly system is so called with respect to the fact regulations were devised to create a system in which the Government-General‟s monopoly would operate smoothly. There were three key aspects of the system; namely: a) issuing licences to addicts; b) prohibiting any unpermitted opium related activities; and c) penalising those who violated the law.
As for the former, only confirmed opium addicts were issued licences. Only licensees could consume and possess opium. Next you could say apart from holding or taking opium with a licence every other activity was illegal. Importation, manufacture, sale, assignment and exchange of opium and its instruments was forbidden. Government produced opium could not be mixed with other opium for consumption.
Establishments for taking opium were illegal to set up. As for the latter violators were punished either by imprisonment or a fine. The duration of imprisonment and cost of the fine could be severe. Selling opium was for instance penalised by a maximum five year prison term or fine under 5000 yen. Lastly smoking without obtaining a licence was punishable by a prison term under three years and fine under three thousand yen147.
As for other points on the monopoly system, Jennings states that there would be one licensed wholesaler in every police district and one licensed retailer for every forty five licensed opium smoker148. In addition, licence holding addicts were issued a ration book149. Wholesalers and retailers earned respective commissions of 1.5 percent (lowered to 1.3 in 1915) and 10 percent on each sale150. According to Ts‟ai they earned 1.3 percent and 8.5 percent respectively in 1926151. Takekoshi writes that Japanese were prohibited from dealing with opium: only Chinese could handle it152. Ts‟ai writes that the hosei (Japanese) or baozheng (Chinese) “… stood a fairly good chance of becoming authorized opium agents”153. They were in charge of opium-smoking surveys and many of them served as opium-distribution agents. Like the Chinese gentry of the Qing dynasty, they were the crucial mediating link between the state and common people154. Hosei and the hōkō system will be discussed later. Lastly,
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48 unlike the opium monopoly system that eliminated opium in Japan by the very late nineteenth century, there is no evidence available that suggests retailers had “to file a report with the local authorities every time they dispensed the drug”155. Though from 1904 it was stipulated the retailer had to record the type of opium sold, its quantity, its value, the date of transaction and require the retailer to sign the document156. What is more no more than three days provision of opium could be sold to license and ration book holders after 1909157.
The Government-General hired two companies to purchase opium on the international market: Mitsui Bussan and Samuel and Samuel. They commenced purchasing Persian and Indian opium in Hong Kong from 1896. Here it should be noted prior to the implementation of the Taiwan Opium Law raw opium was processed into smoking paste at the Medicine Manufacturing Bureau (Seiyakujo) from the same year. In 1910 Samuel and Samuel were additionally commissioned to purchase Turkish opium. In 1912 the same company was exclusively contracted to purchase all opium. Yet Mitsui Bussan held the sole contract to do so from 1917158. Opium was not cultivated on the island. It “was found to be unsuitable for large-scale cultivation”159. Indeed in 1898 and 1901 test planting poppies proved unsuccessful owing to damage from wind, rain and insects160.
A campaign to have addicts register was held in 1897. Then the island was not wholly subjugated. Only 95,449 addicts were registered from an estimated total of 170,000.
Jennings writes that: “In their zeal to collect as many opium smokers as possible, the authorities either disregarded or loosened the registration guidelines”161. Waving strict physical standards, physicians also registered occasional smokers162. Further drives to register addicts were held until 1900. Nevertheless unlicensed smoking continued.
That provoked the authorities to undertake two additional campaigns. By the end of the fourth drive in 1905, 220,657 addicts were registered altogether and there were 130,476 addicts in that year according to Jennings.
According to Jennings the reduction in the number of licensed addicts continued from a peak of 169,064 in 1900 to a low of 7,560 in 1941. The only year the number of such addicts increased was in 1908. Then it rose by 6,826 from 113,165 to 119,991163. However, according to Takekoshi the number diminished from of maximum of 165,752 in 1900 to 132,903 in 1903. Within that period it increased by 7,576 to
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49 163,842 in 1902164. Based on Liu‟s research Takekoshi‟s figure for 1900 can be accounted for by the month in which the statistics are counted: there were 169,064 and 165,752 addicts registered by September 1900 and in 1900 respectively165. Neither Liu nor Jennings‟ studies explain why Takekoshi‟s 1903 figure is different.
Apart from that 1903 data all statistics correlate. Takekoshi and Liu do not indicate the sources. Jennnings relies on Kaku Sagatarō‟s research included in Kikuchi Toraji‟s “Ahen mondai no kenkyū” (Research on the Opium Problem) published in 1928, and Ryū Meishu‟s “”Nihon no ahen seisaku to Taiwan zaisei” (Japan‟s opium policy and Taiwan‟s finances) published in 1979166. Regrettably both sources are unavailable to the author for examination.
Considering the above it is evident that the opium monopoly system was extremely thorough in controlling opium. However it was by no means ensured absolute control.
By examining the system without regard to other influential factors three problems are identifiable. The first is that opium distributors had an economic incentive to sell more opium: wholesalers and retailers earned commission on sales. This commission system could be exploited by corruption. The second is, unlike in the Japan‟s opium monopoly system until 1904, opium distributors were not required to maintain records of sales to addicts. The effect was a retailer could in theory sell opium to addicts who did not possess licenses without raising suspicion from authorities. The authorities had no record for checking who the opium was sold to. This would make exploitation of the system easier. Lastly the hōsei were ubiquitously responsible for opium surveys and distribution. In practical terms these are the two most important parts of the monopoly system because they could control who did and did not smoke opium within their communities from day to day. With respect to that, it is thought peculiar that the most important tasks in regulating opium consumption were assigned to Chinese who were not staunchly opposed to opium smoking unlike Japanese and had an economic incentive and ability to sell more opium. Albeit, it was practical that the hōsei were endowed with such responsibilities. It is understood that fearing the spread of addiction to Japan the Government-General would not want Japanese nationals involved in retailing opium. It is further thought the Japanese should not favour retailing “evil” opium to “wretched” addicts who were Chinese. Lastly offering trust, responsibility and a secure opportunity to profit from the business of opium to respected and influential community leaders should satisfy them and discourage them
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50 from becoming recalcitrant. In other words that would assist in maintaining social stability.