5.1. League of Nations
5.2.0. International Conferences
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106 women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs”346. Unlike other articles that were concerned with the operation of the League to avert war, this one was not concerned with that whatsoever. Rather it expressed an interest for enhancing the conditions of mankind: improving labour conditions, securing just treatment of the colonised and communications, and engagement in arms and disease control are also stated in it. Albeit the fact it is article 23 out of 26 signifies its relatively low status in terms of necessity. Nevertheless it is of great significance because it renders salient the matter of opium and narcotics before the eyes of the world. The association of opium with other the aforementioned noble matters further entrenches its equal importance. In effect opium and narcotics control became a marked issue of international concern.
The League occupied a supervisory role over agreements and therefore could exert pressure on any government that did not comply with the will of the Assembly.
However such pressure would not necessarily result in compliance. As previously mentioned, members of the League were merely obliged to uphold the Covenant: it was not enforced in law. On the one hand members of “the society of nations” were idealistically obliged to peacefully cooperate on the basis of “fraternity and friendship”
for the sake of mankind, while on the other hand states realistically retained the freedom to act according to their interests. The key issue here is what defined those interests: the private interests of the civil service and military versus the public interest of ordinary citizens. It is thought that in a representative democracy which is dominated by private interests it is more likely that the state should act freely regardless of its obligations to the League for the sake of those interests. With this in mind, it can be held that the League would only be a most effective instrument for preventing war if its members were democracies that represented their peoples. By extension, in a world where the zeitgeist was increasingly opposed to illicit narcotics trafficking, truly representative governments are deemed to be the most likely to cooperate in ending the traffic.
5.2.0. International Conferences
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107 In total there were four significant international discussions on narcotics control that correlate with the thesis research; namely: a) 1909 Shanghai International Opium Commission; b) 1912 Hague Conference; c) 1924-1925 Geneva Opium Conference;
and d) the 1931 Bangkok Narcotics Conference. The emphasis began on opium but expanded to cover narcotics in accordance with the development and spread of narcotic drugs. Only the latter two conferences were held under the League. All four of the discussions are thought to represent the zeitgeist of each time regarding the control of opium and narcotics. A survey of them will therefore illustrate changes and reveal a trend in development as per narcotics control. Hereafter the author shall separately review and analyse each conference in terms of its origin, participants, aims and results including special reference to Japan.
Some points must be qualified. Actually the 1909 Shanghai Commission was not a conference: its aim was to investigate the matter of opium and recommend action to rectify it. A conference is very similar but its aim is to explore specific issues highlighted for discussion and oblige governments to conduct agreed action to handle it. Moreover, altogether there were six international conferences excluding the 1909 Shanghai Commission. The additional ones were the 1913 and 1914 Hague Conferences, and the 1930 Geneva Conference. Predicated on their resolutions in comparison with the others they are deemed insignificant: they merely polish existential protocol and agreements. The significant ones are therefore more representative of the zeitgeist and influential, and it is thus thought prudent to examine them in detail. Naturally the additional conferences will be mentioned as considered necessary. Lastly the soon to be introduced Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB) and Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) can be included under the thought of international discussions on opium because they were essentially such discussions on opium. Nevertheless their impact in assessment is more instrumental in triggering the aforementioned conferences rather than reforming narcotics control through protocol, agreements etc. as concluded at the Hague in 1912 for instance.
Relevant points pertaining to them will be produced as necessary later.
5.2.1. 1909 Shanghai International Opium Commission
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108 The Shanghai International Opium Commission was held in 1909. Delegates representing a total of 13 countries attended the discussions. They were: America, Austria-Hungary, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia and Siam. It was the first international commission into opium in the world347. As already mentioned the commission was indeed a commission and not a conference. It is understood that in this case a commission is a preliminary event preceding a conference. That is inferred from two facts; namely: a) related conferences proceeded this commission; and b) in the text reporting the proceedings of the commission it was stated that a conference was not held because the participating governments were insufficiently informed and unanimous for immediate results348. However delegates attending the commission regard it as a conference349. It is thought that calling the commission a commission outside discussions was a matter of diplomatic protocol, and regarding it as a conference during discussions was a matter of convenience.
The aim of the conference is inferable from the speaker that opened it. Yet it must be mentioned that such an aim merely indicates the topic of discussion. Naturally each government has its own policy towards the matter. The 1909 Shanghai Commission was opened by Tuan Fang. He was the Viceroy of Liangjiang in China. In short the goal of the commission was to: a) consider the matter of opium with the view to suppress it; and b) discuss the conflict between regulations that suppress it and certain clauses in unequal treaties applied to China. Tuan states: “On the whole, since the main object of this Conference will be to consider the question of putting a stop to the consumption of opium, fortunate indeed will it be for the whole world if by the labours of the Conference a way be found to shorten the limit and bring about the abolition of opium at an early date”350. What is more, he adds: “…the main idea will be to prohibit the cultivation of the poppy, the sale of the drug and the consumption thereof. It is only to be apprehended that in putting into effect the law for this prohibition it may conflict with certain clauses of the treaties. It is my hope that this Conference will carefully investigate the matter beforehand, so that there may be no misunderstandings in the future”351. With this in mind it is evident that the Chinese hosts were desirous of prohibiting the cultivation, sale and consumption of opium through law without entailing diplomatic difficulties. This will be analysed later.
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109 The origins of the commission are multiple. Ultimately it was the American government that triggered it by calling for it352. The background factors that contributed to the rationale for that call are many. To begin with America was in possession of the Philippines where opium addiction was ubiquitous from 1898. Its government had appointed a committee to investigate the use of opium and recommend provisions for its suppression. The American delegation at the 1909 Shanghai Committee included Bishop Brent and Hamilton Wright who were fiercely anti-opium353. In 1906 the Guangxu emperor issued an edict prohibiting opium.
McAllister reports in 1907 Britain and China concluded the Ten Year Agreement wherein Indian opium imports were to be reduced by ten percent points from that year over the following decade354. It is unknown whether he means ten percentage points but it is presumed so lest suppression of the traffic be unattainable within ten years.
China was moreover well known to be flooded with opium at the time. It is in such a background that President Theodore Roosevelt considered the 1906 proposal for the establishment of an international forum on opium by Charles Brent who was an American missionary355. With respect to this, it was from Brent and Roosevelt that the commission originated.
The result of the commission can be understood in two ways. First of all in nine resolutions that were reached by participating governments. Secondly in highlighting the division between American on one side contra Japan and Britain on another side regarding the extent to which opium ought to be eliminated. Both are useful for this thesis.
As for the former, the resolutions can be surmised as participating governments: a) recognise China in terms of its government and public opinion is sincerely exerting effort in the eradication of opium production and consumption; b) recommends that non-medical opium use and opium divans be prohibited; c) suggests smuggling of opium and its derivatives be prevented; d) urges cooperation with China to suppress trade and manufacture of narcotics and apply national laws to consular districts in possessions in China; and e) calls each government to undertake scientific research into opium and its derivatives as well as develop a cure for opium addiction356. In observation it is evident that there was a consensus that regulations for the suppression of opium would be passed. Additionally the issue of the legal conflict
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110 between Qing law and the laws of the Powers applied to territories in China would be resolved through the application of the Power‟s laws that have been evaluated in accordance with recommendations to suppress opium. In conclusion initial steps were taken to accomplish the aim Tuan indicated in his opening speech. That is an undeniable success. Another observation is that cocaine was not referred to in the resolutions.
In connection with that it is worth remembering the obvious that resolutions are not legally binding. The language expressed in the resolutions is not forceful. The international commission “strongly urges” and “recommends” certain measures are taken. The language is moreover unspecific. It was recommended “reasonable measures” were undertaken and suggests drugs policy is “evaluated accordingly”. The point is the resolutions mark a direction and are formed to be most accommodating.
That means governments do not necessarily have to promulgate stringent measures.
They retain their freedom to act. The implication is the resolutions are meaningless.
However that is thought to be untrue. After all they serve as a stepping stone for future multilateral cooperation on the matter in that opium and its derivatives were raised as an issue to be discussed. Such multinational discussions could prove fruitful in the future. Restated it usefully initiates a series of processes aiming for suppression.
As for the latter, on the one hand American delegates were exceedingly enthusiastic in suppressing opium completely, but on the other hand British and Japanese delegates were more guarded in doing so. Brent and Wright wanted to accelerate the 1907 Ten Year Agreement but Britain and Japan refused to discuss it. They further posited that opium should be restricted for medical and scientific purposes only but all of the colonial powers objected to any contention that use of opium in traditional applications was deleterious. Lastly, they called for a plenipotentiary conference following the commission but that too was rejected357. These conflicts express differences in attitudes: progressive America versus static Powers. It is thought the underlying cause for the reluctant posture would be that the colonial powers had economic interests as per opium in colonies that they were unwilling to forfeit. Yet the fact they attended the conferences to discuss suppression indicates they were willing to address the issue of suppression. It is paradoxical. It is deemed that other reasons involved the colonial powers in the discussions such as it was prestigious, participating in it could protect interests by directing the argument, moral concern
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111 regarding the “opium plague”, and ensuring votes would not be lost to an opposing party in elections by failing to satisfy public opinion by expressing moral concern.
The fact resolutions aiming towards suppression was concluded suggests moral concern was an issue. The fact the resolutions were neither forceful nor specific suggests that defending economic interests was also an issue in the sense that such intentionally designed resolutions should not undermine them. With this in mind, the author thinks moral concern would guide and advance suppression but economic interest would check its progress. Electoral necessity and pride from participation are also deemed important notions, but it is held that moral concern and economic interest were the most fundamental to discussions on opium control in the 1909 Shanghai Conference. After all, they defined narcotics control. Albeit evidence suggesting electoral necessity and pride were factors for attending are unavailable to the author so it cannot be said whether they were or were not major factors.
The Japanese view towards the opium commission was marked by no strong convictions and loyalty to Britain. Jennings‟ work supports this observation. He writes that overtures from Washington indicated Tokyo to be “without any strong convictions regarding international opium and narcotics control”358. It is explained that although Japan had an economic stake in opium from its colonial possessions, at home there was no opium addiction problem and public opinion was disinterested in the matter. It is thought Tokyo had thus no reason to formulate an international opium and narcotics control policy. He furthermore adds that because the Anglo-Japanese alliance was the “cornerstone” of Japanese foreign policy Komura Jūtarō, who was Japanese minister resident in London, was dispatched to Whitehall to ensure a
“convergence of views”359. This evidently reflects Japanese interest in preserving the strategic alliance. Ideally the author should wish to peruse official documents from the Japanese foreign ministry on its views toward the opium commission but regrettably there are no records on the 1909 Shanghai International Opium Commission available in the foreign ministry‟s digital archive or the Japan Centre for Asian Historical Records. That in itself suggests the perceived importance of control of opium and its derivatives in China from the perspective of Tokyo. With this in mind, it is maintained Tokyo sent delegates to attend in order to preserve the strategic alliance with Britain.
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112
5.2.2. 1912 Hague Conference on Opium
The Hague Conference on Opium was the first international conference on opium. It originated from American calls for it to be held and was inspired from the progress made at the 1909 Shanghai Commission360. Interestingly Wright proposed a meeting under the auspices of the American government but the European powers deferred to settle for the Hague which was far from the moralistic tone of public opinion in the United States361. Altogether the delegates of 12 governments participated in the conference; namely: Germany, America, China, France, Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia and Siam362. The delegations represented the same countries as in the 1909 commission excepting Austria-Hungary which did not attend the conference. The Hague Conference produced the Hague Convention on Opium which was contemporaneously known as the International Opium Convention.
That was the first international agreement on opium and narcotics control. The first protocol on it was concluded then too. Actually in total there were three conferences held at the Hague in succession from 1912 until 1914. The latter two conferences were supplementary and resulted in new protocol as deemed necessary.
The aim of the conference can be inferred from the opening speech. There it was stated that the conference was convened in order to “bring about the gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine and cocaine, as also of the drugs prepared or derived from these substances…”363. The rationale for that undertaking is moral concern. It is evinced that such a goal was a “humanitarian endeavour” in the speech364. An international agreement on narcotics control was moreover considered necessary and mutually advantageous. This then can be maintained to be the topic and rationale behind the topic of discussion. Naturally the aforementioned aim by no means correlated with the policies of all participating governments. As previously suggested not only moral concern as expressed here as humanitarianism but also economic and strategic interest played roles in directing the outcome of the meeting.
The result of the conference was a convention and a protocol. The convention had six chapters which covered; viz: a) raw opium; b) prepared opium; c) medicinal opium, morphine, cocaine and derivatives; d) China; e) communication and possession; and f) final provisions365. Altogether there were 25 articles. Broadly speaking regarding
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113 narcotics control they aimed for greater control, and gradual and effective suppression of opium and other drugs. It would be achieved through various schemes of licensing, limitation, prohibition and reduction regulated by the laws of contracting parties.
In analysis it is evident that the above presented generalisation does not reveal the true complexity of the agreement.
Firstly, regarding the control of raw opium it was agreed that exports and imports of it would be limited in terms of quantity and ports and towns etc., consignments would be marked, exports to countries that prohibit its imports would be prohibited, and only authorised persons could import and export it. However such limitations would be undertaken with “due regard to commercial conditions”; meaning economic interest was stipulated to be a decisive factor366. What is more, McAllister notes that there was no timetable for limitation367. That is thought to protract suppression.
Next, as per prepared opium which additionally refers to opium dross there was consensus that measures would be taken for the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture, internal trade in and consumption of prepared opium in accompaniment with a ban on exports and imports “as soon as possible”368. This should be sound policy. However, like raw opium there is no timetable but unlike raw opium a system of recording and licensing is not proposed. Moreover delivery and possession of it was not called to be an infraction. The consequence of such a laissez-faire approach was that the authorities could not: a) measure the actual quantity of drugs in a locality by statistic reference; and b) arrest smugglers for possessing and delivering opium. There was therefore an opportunity to bypass any regulations predicated upon the consensus. It is thought a licensing and recording system would stymie smugglers from doing so.
Third, regarding narcotics such as morphine and cocaine and medicinal opium (raw opium with a morphine content manipulated to be ten percent) they were to be controlled through limitations on manufacture, sale, consumption, and imports, as well as by licensing, recording. Exports had to be licensed. It was an extremely
Third, regarding narcotics such as morphine and cocaine and medicinal opium (raw opium with a morphine content manipulated to be ten percent) they were to be controlled through limitations on manufacture, sale, consumption, and imports, as well as by licensing, recording. Exports had to be licensed. It was an extremely