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93 can be concluded that there was certainly a smuggling issue that involved both businessmen and government officials in the 1920s332. Considering the government sanctioned export of crude morphine, the legality of cocaine exports, and the possibly illicit transhipment of raw opium and export of morphine manufactured on the island, it is thought that narcotics constituted a significant part of the economy.
4.5. Conclusion for the Late Japanese Period
The aim of this chapter is to provide information for comparative analysis for the conclusion of the thesis. Thus far a multiplicity of data has been presented regarding the administration, culture and economy of opium and narcotics in accompaniment with other relevant and necessary historical information during the late period of Japanese rule. Here the aforementioned knowledge shall be further analysed to produce new points and summarised for convenience in reference.
To begin with, this period of rule was marked by significant historical changes in comparison with the earlier era. By the 1920s Japan had at last achieved parity with the Powers that had formerly subjected it to the unequal treaties. The country possessed an empire, had defeated not only China but also Russia which was a Power in war, and was admitted to become a member of the Council in the League of Nations which was an exclusive club of nations. Nevertheless, the rejection of its call for universal racial equality signalled that Japan had not achieved complete parity with the Powers in terms of race from the Japanese perspective. Discrimination against Japanese nationals by foreign governments continued at least in America. The country thereafter became disillusioned with the Powers and international system. As for Taiwan, colonial rule was prosperous from the early 1900s and politically and socially stable from 1915.
The late Japanese period of rule brought new challenges that confronted Japan and the Taiwan Government-General.
The terrific horror wrought by scientific advances in technique and technology in warfare inspired the creation of the League of Nations. It was a revolutionary institution that redefined political conduct amongst countries. Previously international
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94 relations tended to be closed, bilateral and directed by self-interest. However, the League provided a platform that added a new dimension to such relations. On that world stage international relations were open, multilateral and considerate to the interests‟ of other nations. The result was that the national policy of a single country was obliged to be both restricted and directed by the international interest of a group of countries. The crucial word there is “obliged”: it was not illegal for a nation to conduct action irrespective of the League‟s consensus. Albeit offending national leaders could be tried as war criminals if their country lost a war. In this society Japan was therefore thrust into a position where it had to consider to what extent it should act according to its will or the will of others.
As illustrated above and as will be discussed in detail in the following chapter Japan accepted obligations to the League by participating in conferences and ratifying the 1925 Geneva Convention on Opium. In others it conceded to international interest.
However it ultimately rejected the encroachment on its freedom to act by withdrawing from the League in 1933.
The principle of self-determination which was espoused by Woodrow Wilson threatened the rule of Taiwan. It declared that the nation rather than the state was sovereign, and identifiable peoples particularly colonised ethnic groups should be at liberty to determine their own destinies. This notion applied to the Chinese who were ruled by Japanese on the island. It immediately resulted in the radical call for the establishment of a Taiwanese assembly within the Japanese empire. However the administration attempted to nullify that threat by presenting a rival idea: extending the home territory. Its goal was to gradually assimilate Chinese and aborigines into Japanese. Its mechanisms were reducing discrimination against the colonised to a limited extent and promoting Japanese language. Although it was an excellent response to self-determination, its success was undermined by two factors; namely: a) Chinese nationalism which presented another concept to rival gradual assimilation;
and b) the 1930 opium dispute wherein the thought that the administration was not treating its subjects correctly in accordance with international justice appeared.
The Government-General increasingly confronted challenges to its policies by the manifestation of political associations. That evinces its aim to consolidate rule through promoting loyalty through assimilation was nevertheless undermined by
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95 determination, Chinese nationalism and the opium dispute. However the administration was by no means defeated. It retained power in the same way it seized it. That is it had a police system and military force that was highly effective in its suppression of native unrest. In other words the Government-General was ultimately triumphant.
The way the administration managed opium also changed. In December 1928 the Taiwan Opium Ordinance was decreed. It was primarily an updated version of the 1897 ordinance but there were also significant additions and a revision. Opium dross was made illegal. Opium divans were ordered to be closed. The Government-General expressed it could treat addicts. In addition illicit smokers became only punishable by imprisonment with hard labour not exceeding three years. These impacted on society in that it affected what you could smoke, where you could smoke, implied opium addicts may receive treatment for the first time, and meant secret smokers had to be imprisoned if caught. The treatment for smokers was realised in the December 1929 addict registration campaign that regulated that light smokers would be denied licences and moderate smokers would be hospitalised for rectification. Altogether 17,468 addicts were rehabilitated in opium wards and the Kōsei hospital, and 7,454 addicts were made to abstain. Although rehabilitation was only approximately fifty percent efficacious the first time, it was an important mechanism in reducing the addict population. It was a mechanism that was difficult to surmount with illicit smoking considering in the 1930s police had technology to detect opium in urine and they most likely knew who the illicit smokers were after they applied for licences in the registration campaign. With the new ordinance and rehabilitation centres, the administration accelerated the diminution in the number of addicts as an effect.
The Government-General implemented reforms regarding opium dross and divans in accordance with the 1925 Geneva Opium Convention. But it did not adopt recommendations to transform the commission based wholesale and retail system into a salaried one or require records of retail sales to be taken. It is thought that on the one hand the administration was satisfied with the progress of the opium monopoly system and prohibiting dross and divans was simple, but on the other hand installing a recording and salary system would diminish opium revenue and threaten social stability. Closing divans would also upset locals but their owners are assumed to be relatively unimportant compared to the local notables who typically held the
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96 wholesaler and retailer positions. As a colonial regime, social stability for the sake of economic exploitation was of paramount concern.
The way in which the Government-General regarded opium changed as well. It previously regarded opium as an “evil”, addicts as “wretched” and was terrified it should spread to Japan. The architect of the opium monopoly system was Gotō Shinpei who thought in terms of biological principles and worked in Department of Hygiene before assuming the position of Civil Administrator in Taiwan. It is thought opium was perceived as an issue of sanitation and the Chinese race. However this view changed gradually at first and then markedly in the late 1920s. The success of the gradual opium prohibition policy illustrated that opium addiction was manageable.
It was no longer terrifying. What is more, the 1928 ordinance that included a reference to opium as medicinal and the provision of medical treatment to addicts suggests opium was deemed a medical issue. By 1930 smokers were categorised as light, moderate or heavy which implies an emergence of a new perception of smokers and suggests treatment was administered accordingly. It is thought opium was viewed as an issue of medicine and the Chinese race. The effect was that opium was no longer considered an uncontrollable poison but rather a curable disease. In other words, it was not such a serious issue anymore.
As for the culture of opium there were both changes as per its usage and how it was regarded by the Taiwanese. In a preceding paragraph on the aforementioned 1928 Taiwan Opium Ordinance, 1929 addict registration campaign, and 1930 opening of a rehabilitative centres it has already been stated that opium smoking became a more restricted activity. You could typically only indulge in the habit at a home. It was unlikely dross should be smoked. Moreover, with knowledge identifying prior licence holders, technology to detect opium in urine, and a fiercer punitive law, the police force could greatly reduce the number of illicit smokers.
There were three attitudes towards opium smoking that were expressed by the literati.
The first was a conflicting attitude. On the one hand opium should be quit because it was unhealthy but on the other hand it could be continued because it was liked. Poorer addicts regretted abstaining from the habit owing to rises in the price of opium. This view was held in the 1920s. Next the second attitude was extremely opposed to opium.
Smokers were deemed shameless, worthless and unenlightened. They were further
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97 thought to constitute servants who supported the colonial regime. This perception appeared in 1929 in response to the administration implementing another addict registration drive. Unlike the first view that was generally expressed by the literati, this attitude was held specifically by members of Chinese political associations and the medical and legal communities. Their view was legitimate because both Japan and the international community were against opium smoking and authoritative because of their social standing. It was significant in that it represented the first instance Chinese were opposed to opium smoking in public. It was influential because after the opium dispute it became publically unacceptable to condone opium smoking. Lastly the third attitude offered countenance to the gradual opium prohibition, light addict abstinence, and moderate addict rectification policies effected by the Government-General. This emerged in 1930 as a reaction to the second attitude. In consideration of the above, it is thought that the 1930 opium dispute was pivotal and it represented a shift from when opium smoking was regarded as unhealthy yet acceptable amongst Chinese in the 1920s to immoral, backward and servile and thus illegitimate and unacceptable in the 1930s.
During the late Japanese rule a new culture of narcotics manifested on the island.
Illicit morphine use increased during the 1930s. Coca was also cultivated under licence on the island for export like crude morphine. It is unknown whether cocaine was also consumed on the island.
Akin to the early period of Japanese rule the number of opium related businesses decreased gradually. The number of wholesalers also diminished although it was at a rate so slow it impresses the number actually remained constant on the whole.
However, unlike the early period the opium monopoly system became decreasingly profitable. It was nonetheless profitable however marginal. The Government-General had an economic incentive to operate it because it was both profitable and necessary in that the administration overspent annually.
Smuggling opium into the island continued to play a large role in the economy. This is illustrated by the 25,527 illicit smokers who applied for licences in 1929. This figure approximately corresponds to the number of licensed smokers in 1928, which totalled 26,942. The only way of supplying so many secret smokers was through smuggling opium from China, where opium was abundant to Taiwan. It is possible
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98 narcotics such as morphine and cocaine were also smuggled to the island from China.
It is thought that the number of illicit smokers increased after the last opium addict registration campaign in 1908 because smokers who acquired the habit through friends, family, business associates and prostitutes could only smoke illegally.
Exporting narcotics such as crude morphine (that can be refined into morphine) and cocaine from the island was an aspect of the economy from 1914. It is unknown for certain that an alleged smuggling operation primarily involving Japanese businessmen and administration officials occurred on Taiwan. However, there is circumstantial evidence that suggests it did in fact take place at least after the First World War. For instance, Japanese companies could possess opium after the 1917 Opium Law and knowledge on how to produce opium paste, morphine and cocaine was available.
Japanese citizens did smuggle narcotics into China, and in Korea, Taiwan and Japan scandals implicating bureaucrats in the narcotics traffic erupted in the 1920s. The imperial army was influential and wanted Japan to rule China. In Taiwan opium was allegedly made available to rebellious Hakka by the authorities. Another rumour was that Chinese prisoners were encouraged to work for the administration in China where they enjoyed extraterritoriality. China was fragmented amongst various warlords and later between nationalists and communists. Opium financed war there. It was also ubiquitous to consume opium and later morphine. The Japanese regarded the Chinese as racially inferior and opium as a manageable substance at the time. As evidenced by the notion of economic warfare, it was reasonable to profit from a rival race‟s loss for the sake of national survival. Additionally, as a rule bureaucrats tend to be satisfied with the respect derived from their occupation but are aware they should not be as affluent as certain businessmen: they may engage in corruption to become fully satisfied. With this in mind, it is not unreasonable to think Japanese officials and businessmen in Taiwan did smuggle narcotics to China. In connection with this, it would moreover be reasonable to operate the opium monopoly system as a cover for purchasing excessive quantities of opium on the international market for processing into opium derivatives for export. However, it is worth remembering that the above is merely speculation predicated on circumstantial evidence. What is more, the fact that the author is mostly reliant on literature written after World War Two, when it was revealed there were Japanese convicted of war crimes regarding narcotics traffic, might precipitate one to expect such smuggling to have occurred throughout colonial
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99 rule. But the problem with that is fascist wartime Japan, and liberal yet increasingly conservative Japan in the 1920s were markedly different. Restated, just because the state smuggled narcotics during the second Sino-Japanese war does not necessarily mean it did so in the 1920s: it could have just been private firms. Another issue is that although hearsay from Kerr provides the author with something to write, it cannot be trusted without supporting evidence. In addition the origin of such rumours which were likely to be Taiwanese as expressed in the literature that the author utilises might be biased considering the growth of Chinese nationalism wherein Japan was demonised on the island after 1945. Considering this as a restraint on conclusions reached based on circumstantial evidence, it is thought that further research is necessitated before a concrete statement on the matter can be produced.
Moving on, the rationale behind Government-General opium policy was also modified during the late Japanese era of colonial rule. Unlike the preceding chapter such policy is exclusively discussed in this section owing to the fact that quotes of officials indicating it are unavailable to the author. It is therefore necessarily deduced from the implementation of related policies. The late period is divisible into two sections: early and late. The early part covers the early and middle 1920s. The other part refers to the late 1920s onwards.
The former is comprised of three to four aspects; namely: a) biological principles; b) economic warfare; c) accelerated assimilation; and d) possibly self-enrichment. Both economic warfare and biological principles defined the opium policy of the early Japanese era. The applicability of them to opium policy in the 1920s is demonstrated by the continuance of the existential and efficacious opium monopoly system which contributed to Japan‟s strength as per economic warfare and was gradualist as per biological principles. Accelerated assimilation as enunciated by Governor-General Den Kenjirō was a new factor. Calling for less discrimination and more equality between Japanese, and Chinese and aborigines meant that biological principles which fostered division was undermined. Its effect was to impinge on the applicability of the gradual opium prohibition policy from the perspective of both Japanese and Taiwanese. That should provide an incentive to expedite absolute prohibition. Lastly supposing bureaucrats such as Kaku, Uchida and Shimomura were complicit in the narcotics traffic to China, that should then suggest the administration was compelled
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100 to maintain the gradual opium prohibition policy at least for the crude morphine concession to Hoshi.
In analysis it is evident that success with the opium monopoly system, biological principles, economic warfare and possibly self-enrichment ensured the continuation of the status quo whilst assimilation provided a background factor for reform that was later realised in the second part. The latter is composed of five aspects. They are precisely the same as the above except for the last aspect, which is international influence. Such influence manifested both directly and indirectly. It was expressed directly through the 1925 Geneva Convention on Opium. The international convention on opium caused the administration to overhaul the 1897 Taiwan Opium Ordinance when it was ratified by Tokyo in 1928. International influence was furthermore exerted indirectly through international pressure and zeitgeist. This is more complex. In the 1920s Japan was frequently lambasted for not preventing its citizens from smuggling narcotics to China. It was a national embarrassment that was recognised by educated Formosans. What is more such international pressure fostered an atmosphere where opium was regarded as negative more zealously. In these circumstances certain Chinese literati such as Du Congming (who witnessed addiction in Korea, Manchuria and Shanghai) and those activists involved in the opium dispute were inspired to challenge the administration‟s opium policy. The Government-General accepted Du‟s proposal and conceded to the activists. As already mentioned it resulted in a fundamental change to policy in that medicinal treatment was expeditiously provided to addicts against their will for the first time. In light of this, it is maintainable that international influence influenced the rationale behind opium policy both directly and obliquely. In connection to self-enrichment, again, it is only a possibility that bureaucrats connived in the smuggling of narcotics. Though the
In analysis it is evident that success with the opium monopoly system, biological principles, economic warfare and possibly self-enrichment ensured the continuation of the status quo whilst assimilation provided a background factor for reform that was later realised in the second part. The latter is composed of five aspects. They are precisely the same as the above except for the last aspect, which is international influence. Such influence manifested both directly and indirectly. It was expressed directly through the 1925 Geneva Convention on Opium. The international convention on opium caused the administration to overhaul the 1897 Taiwan Opium Ordinance when it was ratified by Tokyo in 1928. International influence was furthermore exerted indirectly through international pressure and zeitgeist. This is more complex. In the 1920s Japan was frequently lambasted for not preventing its citizens from smuggling narcotics to China. It was a national embarrassment that was recognised by educated Formosans. What is more such international pressure fostered an atmosphere where opium was regarded as negative more zealously. In these circumstances certain Chinese literati such as Du Congming (who witnessed addiction in Korea, Manchuria and Shanghai) and those activists involved in the opium dispute were inspired to challenge the administration‟s opium policy. The Government-General accepted Du‟s proposal and conceded to the activists. As already mentioned it resulted in a fundamental change to policy in that medicinal treatment was expeditiously provided to addicts against their will for the first time. In light of this, it is maintainable that international influence influenced the rationale behind opium policy both directly and obliquely. In connection to self-enrichment, again, it is only a possibility that bureaucrats connived in the smuggling of narcotics. Though the