CHAPTER 3 HONG KONG’S CASE
3.2 B UILDING A PRO -‐ DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN H ONG K ONG
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3.2 Building a pro-democratic movement in Hong Kong
On July 1st 2003, a big protest would create an important social change in the Hong Kong society, creating the opportunity to search for coherent democracy. The study conducted by Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph M. Chan in their book “Media, Social Mobilization and Mass Protests in Post-Colonial Hong Kong” (2011), provide us with the evidence of how since the 2003 a chain of collective actions took place due to accumulated grievances. These movements would provide the “know-how” in the development of a pro-democracy movement.
In 2003 there was a mass gathering of 500,000 people that would become the second largest in the history of Hong Kong66. This was the result of a coalition called Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) that was formed by 42 diverse groups in the end of 2002. The reason why groups like the Catholic Church gathered partner up with people supporting Gay rights, for instance, was because all were all concerned with the national security legislation at the moment. The main concern lay on the article 23 of the Basic Law that states:
“The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.” (Basic Law Promotion Steering Committee, 2015)
These organizations feared that the article would be used to prohibit their gatherings or that it would provide the legal action for Beijing to start a “witch hunt” the organizations. This was the political opportunity that provided the space for the formation of the group.
66 The first largest protest took place during the colony in 1979. For more information please refer to: Yik-Yi Chu, C. (2010). Chinese Communists and Hong Kong Capitalists: 1937-1997. New York, New York, USA: Palgrave
Macmillan .
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Nevertheless, there were challenges in the unity of the CHRF group posed by the diversity of believe, but most of all due to the lack of a serious leadership structure. There was not a clear leader and preferred decision-making. The mobilization that this collective action achieved was limited to one day of protest67 and eventually would have to stop the civil disobedience as different objectives rose dividing the CHRF. The group would have to retreat from further activities as media managed to show to the public the serious lack of coherence of the group.
CHRF mobilization in 2003 lacked real objectives or mechanisms to obtain them. Still, the government did not adopt a harsh perspective of the article 23. It was clear for the government in Hong Kong that the society was increasingly concern about the political process and conservative approaches would generate a reaction. But no one really knew if this was “one occasion event” or it would be echoed in the future.
The lessons drawn from the 2003 movement would serve to guide further protests the following years as they emerged in July 1st 2004, December 4th 2005, July 1st 2006 and 2007. The most immediate lesson from 2003 was that clear objectives were needed. In the following occasions the collective actions gathered to request direct elections of the CE by 2007 and LegCo in 2008 but again did not possessed any clear objectives or methods of negotiation. In July 1st 2004, 200,000 people gathered to request direct elections of the CE by 2007 and LegCo 2008. The National People’s Congress rejected this proposition the same year, triggering further protests. On the following year 2005, after the protests of July 1st when 30,000 people requested the direct elections of CE, on December 4th 2005 100,000 people went to the streets to pressure the government on a clear time table for the instauration of direct elections of the CE and LegCo. The following two years July 1st 2006 and 2007, an approximate of 50,000 people rallied both years to sustain claim of the direct elections. At this moment it was clear that protesting for increasing population participation in the political process had become a continuous process that has been building in the society. Even though that at that moment a unity with pro-democracy political parties
67 The authors presume that the fact that was a holyday commemorating the Tiananmen events was the key factor to actually achieve the numbers of people that was not properly organized. (Lee & Chan, 2011)
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seemed the logical step for these collective actions to “institutionalize” their claims, people in the protests rejected the idea of “politicizing”68 their claims.
In light of this evolving events, Beijing reacted cautiously by not provoking any strong response but rather dismissing it in due time. It was clear that the PRC government was interested to not destabilize the system of “one country two systems”69 and putting in question the “high degree of autonomy” by instating a strong reaction to the protests.
Instead Beijing remained confident of the “patriots” controlling the political process in Hong Kong. Beijing would play a double game by encouraging the idea of a real “two system” in which Hong Kong actually enjoyed a democratic tendency. Therefore, since October 2003 Premier Wei Jiabao had expressed that Hong Kong needed further democratization. The situation led to a strong debate in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, in 2004 when an interpretation of the law of the direct elections of CE by 2007 and LegCo in 2008 Beijing stepped in. In this way confirming that the game was just an illusion to appease the democratic movement. The PRC government recurred to its “megaphone politics” by republishing in the media Deng Xiaoping’s speech stating that Hong Kong had to be ruled by “patriots”. This provided the ground for National People’s Congress interpretation of the law and rule out the elections on the proposed years 2007 and 2008, triggering other demonstrations.
Thence, the pro-democratic movement in Hong Kong has been evolving from the claims first made in 2003 to specific and constant objectives in the succeeding events. Although the political opportunities (direct vote for CE and LegCo) were closing with the interpretation of the National People’s Congress that rule out the possibility, the people continue the pressure. This came although, as Lee and Chan tell us, without clear propositions of how to achieve their goals, but rather they were more reliant on the succession of the events and the numbers they gathered. As it was seen in this section,
68 During the conduction of different surveys Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph M. Chan found that people perceived negatively the involvement of political parties in protests. As they recount, people perceived that politicians would only twist a noble cause to obtain support and push other agendas. (Media, Social Mobilization, and Mass Protests in Post-Colonial Hong Kong, 2011)
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protest continue their periodicity on a year basis with a group that maintain large numbers of members, showing the that the core group identifying with the claims is important. This
“identification” of this challenge would converge with the rise of an identity in Hong Kong (Lee & Chan, 2011).