CHAPTER 3 HONG KONG’S CASE
3.7 D IFFUSION AND SUPPORT OF THE OCLP MOVEMENT IN T AIWAN
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outcomes: a) a political alliance with pro-democratic parties or, b) the creation of a new political party to “institutionalize” the claims.
As seen in the past June 18, 2015 Beijing followed through with the only option it could consider: give Hong Kong residents the right to vote but only for those pro-Beijing candidates. Therefore, legislators and citizens rejected the “reform” provided by the PRC on that same day. Moreover, the increasing attempts of the Chief Executive to sell the idea that pro-democracy legislators and activist are provoking that the majority of people would not have right to vote has further infuriated the society. Although the large protest that paralyzed Hong Kong took place more than 9 months ago, the society keeps demanding democracy, defending their identity and requesting self-determination. (The Guardian, 2015)
3.7 Diffusion and support of the OCLP movement in Taiwan
In January 13, 2014 pro-democracy groups of students and politicians from Hong Kong and Taiwan gathered in Taipei to held talks during the weekend. This marked the first real approach between both communities. Advocates from both sides pursue similar interests and share the same enemy: PRC. The increasing force of the PRC in terms of economy, military and world prominence, made possible the approach of both sides. From the encounter both sides understood that they have things in common in their fight against the PRC’s oppression. Unfortunately the discussion of the meeting was hardly mentioned by the media. (Sui, 2014)
The implications of this meeting are very significant in the relations between these two societies. For those theorizing about the “Hongkongisation of Taiwan”, like Professor Malte Philipp Keading, this reunion could be regarded as a cornerstone in their mutual recognition of claims. In his paper “Challenging Hongkongisation: the role of Taiwan's social movements and perceptions of post-handover Hong Kong”, Keading provide us with the elements to define the “Hongkongisaiton of Taiwan”, that can be defined as “[t]he
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strategic co-option [of the Beijing leadership of] …[c]apitalists who rely on the Mainland market or production, and who favor intimate relations with the Chinese regime [under a united front scheme]” (Kaeding, 2014). This “united front scheme” Keading’s work mentions is linked to the description presented by Professor Yik-yi Chu in the case of Hong Kong (here found in the beginning of this chapter, in the section of “Political structure in Hong Kong”). The approach entails that the PRC targeted the elites (business community, industrialists, etc.) to create a Beijing social and economic elites. In addition, pro-Beijing unions and a wide array of social groups were created to support the new elites.
Therefore, following this line of thought Keading argues that there are four points81 that summarizes the PRC increasing influence in Taiwan: economic, political discourse, media and united front’s targeting students. (Kaeding, 2014)
The first three points can be corroborated. As it was appreciated previously in the chapters of the present study, the economy and political discourse in Taiwan has been indeed strongly tilting towards the PRC. Therefore, it can be traced that the PRC has directly (economic dependene of Taiwan on the PRC) or through Taiwanese capitalists (read: media case) and pro-union Taiwanese politicians (KMT), permeated different levels of the Taiwanese society.
Finally, the fourth point Keading mentions is the united fronts seeking influence students.
Keading proposes that Beijing has tarjeted politically active students and union members by united front agents to be invited to organised trips to Mainland China, in the promise of prestige and using their curiosity. Kaeding defents that Chinese agents has gain access and prestige in Taiwanese political institutions to slowly influence the student population.
Nonetheless, the author of the present study does not agree with the effectivity of this perspective. The reason behind this disagreement lies on what Professor McAdam calls:
“we-ness”. Identity in the Taiwanese society, and also Hong Konger society, has become
81 In his study, Kaeding support himself on professor’s Wu Jieh-min (a political economy researcher at Academia Sinica) three main areas of influence and adds the additional element of “united front”, to argue that the PRC’s influence in Taiwan is taking place in this manner.
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the main pillar behind the rejection of the return of Taiwan to the rest of China. Therefore, this tool of influence has proven rather inefective and actually sparked further repudiation82.
Thence, the similarities provoked by the “China factor”, has driven both societies to seek mutual aid. After the reunion between Hong Kong and Taiwan activist of January 13th, the Sunflower movement would take the streets and the Legislative Yuan on March 2014 and then achieving its victory. During the time of the occupation, as Lin Fei-fan would confirm to the Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong students attended the demonstrations. Through this involvement, Hong Kong students and activists witnessed the process and logistics of the Sunflower movement.
The pressure felt by the students make a movement that provided hope in the search of democracy, defend their identity and proclaim their self-determination, created a movement that impacted also people in Hong Kong. The victory open the possibility to continue building the relationship between activists in Hong Kong and Taiwan that started with the meeting in January. After the Sunflower movement, other activists from Hong Kong would continue the learning process by contacting Lin Fei-Fan and other participants of the movement to acquire more training to organize, mobilize, and improve their advocate’s moral.
The transmission of these ideas and lessons acquired during the Sunflower movement between parties continued on the eve of the scheduled resolution of the PRC in regards of the election of the Chief Executive. When the PRC’s rejection on allowing the society to choose and directly elect the Chief Executive was made public, the students groups along with the OCLP agreed to take action through a civil disobedience. Therefore, it was planned that in October 1st 2014 the OCLP would organize massive sit-ins in Hong Kong.
Nevertheless, as the events unveiled the protest had to be launch prior to that date, as the
82 Further supporting data of this stand will be provided in chapter 4 when the study addresses the results found in the questionnaire applied to the Taiwanese students.
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police detained the student leader Joshua Wong Chi-fung along with others when trying to enter an administrative building.
At the same time the Hong Kong and Macau student organization in Taiwan, which was planning to show its support by organizing sit-ins in Taipei’s Liberty Square, had to quickly adjust to new events. In response Taiwanese activists, organizations and students helped the Hong Kong and Macau student organization to quickly gather a group of people, which surprisingly reached 4,000 protesters, on Sunday’s night September 28, 2014 (Hsu J. W., 2014). That night Taipei’s Liberty Square saw a mixture of supporters conformed by Hong Kong and Macau students from abroad, Taiwanese students and Taiwanese from other social strata.
On that day reporter Cindy Sui from BBC news conducted interviews to the people gathered there, revealing that it was clear to all the idea that they needed to support the fight for democracy in Hong Kong. Among the Taiwanese people interviewed and others showing their support, many had placards with the slogan that read: “Today Hong Kong tomorrow Taiwan” (Sui, 2014). That day was revealed to the world that the cross-national diffusion of the claims between Hong Kong and Taiwan was really strong. Interestingly, when analyzed, the diffusion followed the three key points argued by David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford: 1) the transmission of both claims were and are of interest for both sides; 2) both share structural characteristics (being the most important democracy, particular identity, self-determination and the rejection of the PRC) that constitute the basis of mutual identification; and 3) both were and are linked together “relationally” through social networks (made between activists and other sectors of the society), and “non-relationally” through social media. Therefore, the demonstration of support would not be limited to a single demonstration.
Activists distributed the message to keep supporting Hong Kongers’ struggle. Through Facebook people changed their profile picture to a yellow ribbon that now had become another symbol of the Hong Kong movement. The support would also expand into other areas. Such was the case when in November 14th 2014 Taiwanese soccer fans followed the call to show their support for Hong Kongers in the qualifier round between Taiwan and
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Hong Kong of the East Asia Cup in Taipei. Several hundred Taiwanese fans pull out yellow umbrellas. Fans in one row of the stands held up 14 yellow umbrellas displaying lyrics from Hong Kong band Beyond’s hit song “Glorious Years” from the 1990s: “Hold on tight to freedom in the wind and rain. We have the confidence to change the future” (風 雨中抱緊自由、自信可改變未來). (Pan, 2014)
Thus, that day the mutual recognition of both sides transcended Doug McAdam’s dynamic interactive model to reach new paradigm that followed Robert D. Putman’s ideas of rejecting a foreign opportunity political structure. (Alternative Types of Cross-national Diffusion in the Social Movement Arena, 2009; Hsu J. W., 2014; Kasoff I. E., 2014; Wen, 2014)
Conclusion
Through the present chapter it was exposed the socio-economic and political context that led to the creation of the social movement in Hong Kong. Like in the case of Taiwan, in Hong Kong the singularities found in the political structure is largely responsible for creating the opportunities for activists to oppose. Hong Kong complexities have confused several specialists. An example of this is the misinterpretation that people in Hong Kong was or is interested in politics. The assumption comes from a lack of understanding of the realities found in the society’s consciousness (identity and self-determination).
As seen the process of building a democratic movement was slow. The large mobilizations seen in 2003 and the ones that followed were unable to be maintained because lacked objectives, but most importantly, sense unity. As the objectives defended by activists became clear and aligned with the developing awareness of the Hong Konger identity, (this unit of people different from the citizens of the PRC), the success of a collective action became more real. Additionally, with the learning process and support achieved from
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Taiwanese activists, all the elements started to converge. This led to the mobilization of September 28th 2014.
Finally, the support seen in Taiwan as the mobilization in Hong Kong took place, confirmed that the approach between these two societies had reached a new level. Both sides understand the magnitude of the threat they are facing and the difficulties that entails as the PRC‘s power rises. Thus, both sides acknowledge that remaining alone against this challenge means defeat. Therefore, as it was seen in the meeting on January 13th 2013, a new era in the relations between these two societies emerged. Their search to defend their respective identities, democracies and self-determination, made both sides to seek the creation of a stable relationship.
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Chapter 4 Comparison of the Movements and Questionnaire analysis
The present chapter will be dedicated to the comparison of both social movements to clarify their differences and similarities. First, it will be presented the differences between the groups. Second, the similarities will be provided so the reader can understand what the common ground between the social movements is. Third, the study will present the results of the questionnaire and the information will be analyzed to draw conclusions on the findings. Through this method the study will state clearly to the reader what were the key points making feasible the collaboration between sides. Without further due let us proceed to the analysis.
4.1 Differences and Similarities
As seen so far in the current study, there are different political opportunities structures that led to the creation of the social movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan. When analyzing each movement in their respective contexts it may seem that both are different from each other, without having a vast array of elements connecting them. Nevertheless, despite their particularities, collaboration has taken place. To be able to understand this cooperation more clearly firstly the present section will expose the contrasting areas marked between groups and secondly the common grounds.
4.1.1 Differences
The areas of discrepancy found between each social movement ranges from the political to the social realms. As the context plays a crucial role in the creation of the political opportunities structure, it is important to consider it. In Figure 1 it can be observed the differences lived in the context of each case.
Figure 1. Context differences between Hong Kong and Taiwan