CHAPTER 3 HONG KONG’S CASE
3.3 I DENTITY IN H ONG K ONG
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protest continue their periodicity on a year basis with a group that maintain large numbers of members, showing the that the core group identifying with the claims is important. This
“identification” of this challenge would converge with the rise of an identity in Hong Kong (Lee & Chan, 2011).
3.3 Identity in Hong Kong
Identity in Hong Kong is a topic that troubles citizens in the HKSAR as well as the citizens of the rest of Mainland China. Hong Kong’s history has asserted a problematic in the context of building an image of a single country united by the same ideas and cultural believes. In the past Hong Kong was a colony of the United Kingdom for 156 years, and much of the western culture had been mixed and assimilated by the people living there.
With the return of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China in 1997 the problem became clear. Many Chinese started to arrive to Hong Kong first as tourists, later to buy real estate. In the later stages pregnant women went to the hospitals to have their children there and achieve the residence. Finally, more and more people were arriving in search for jobs in Hong Kong.
The shock of the massive movement marked even further the cultural differences. People in Hong Kong started to reject the “Mainlanders”, who they perceive as rude and with cultural traditions that are distasteful to the Hong Kongers. The mixture of inequality70, rapid increase of real-estate prices71, cooption of the media-outlet72 and the loss of the dominance
70 Nowadays Hong Kongers are confronted with harsh economic realities. The Gini coefficient has increased by the years locating it at 0.539 by 2011. Hence, the top 1 percent of the population in Hong Kong has increased their wealth separating them more and more from the rest of the population. Around 19 percent of the population (1.3 million of people) lives under the poverty line. Life quality has lowered to a historical minimum (taking as base year 2002) to 25.76 points in 2013. Finally, Hong Kong’s economy has become more dependent of Chinese imports but its exports to the rest of China have been reducing. (Chen L. , 2014)
71 Like Taiwan Hong Kong also suffers from staggering real-estate prices due to the land scarcity and the increasing population of Chinese moving from other cities within the PRC. Nevertheless, the problem in Hong Kong is greater as only 50 percent of the population owns the home they are living in, in comparison with Taiwan where 85 percent does. This was result from the decision taken by the government in 1997 to stop the home ownership scheme (HOS) policy to provide an aid for people in Hong Kong to own their houses (Ang, 2015).
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frictions. As shown in a poll made to 6,100 people in 2013 by the South China Morning Post, the PRC’s government reached such level of unpopularity in Hong Kong to the extent that 90 percent of the people voting would rather return to be a colony of the United Kingdom than continue being part of the Mainland China (South China Morning Post, 2013). Beijing couldn’t just wait until this sentiment grew into a bigger problem.The PRC’s had already detected this rising problematic at the beginning of 2012, when officials began to put in practice a plan to reverse the tendency. The strategy was to implement the “moral and national education” intended for all schools in Hong Kong. As it was expected, the people in Hong Kong immediately rejected this measure. They criticize the curriculum, which was loaded with nationalism and provides a favorable perspective of the role of Communist Party. An estimate of eight thousand protesters rejecting this measure went to the streets marching from Victoria Park to the government’s headquarters in a series of protests that would take place from July 29th 2012 till September 8, 2012. On September 8th 2012 the group of protestors reached a hundred thousand and managed to pressure the Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying, to postpone the application of this measure until 201573 (Bradsher, 2012; Fang, 2012)
Now the friction between the state and the people had reached the level where subtleties had vanished and the counterparts had clear stands of their intended plans. As it is shown in Figure 1, 2 and 3, which contains the latest results of the poll gathered from December
72 Media-outlets and information sources in Hong Kong has been losing objectivity and become more pro-PRC.
Now the only media resource in Hong Kong completely independent from China is the Apple Daily. According to a report presented in “The Guardian”, the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region controls: two newspapers (Ta Kung Pao and Wen Hui Pao), three magazines, and three main local bookshop chains (Joint Publishing, Commercial Publishing and Chung Haw Books) with 51 outlets around Hong Kong.
This has created warmer news to Beijing and those books that the authority does not agree on are put on the corners of the stores or simply not available. As Professor Michael of the University in Hong Kong says: “At the university, in schools, and in the press, often you do not know whom you are dealing with. Are Chinese state-owned enterprises part of the government? Are they pure business interests? This may never be tested, even in Hong Kong. The real problem, though, is that our local government does not defend our autonomy. Rather, they lecture Hong Kong on how to behave to please the central authorities.” (Sala, 2015)
73 The new curriculum had the clear objective of “brainwashing” people in Hong Kong. Among the changes in the educational system devised by the PRC was the inclusion of the book called “The China Model”, which describes the Communist party as “progressive, selfless, and united”. Furthermore, the book criticizes the multiparty system of Hong Kong and diminishes the events of the Tiananmen Square and Cultural Revolution. (Fang, 2012)
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2012 to June 2014 by the Hong Kong University, the PRC citizen identity has been continuously losing ground74.
Figure 1. Identity in Hong Kong: More Hong Kongers or PRC’s citizens?
Source: (University of Hong Kong, 2014)
74 The responses were retrieve from the polls that were made to 1,017 Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong citizens aged 18 or above, selected randomly from residential telephone directories
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Figure 2. Hong Konger per age.
Source: (University of Hong Kong, 2014)
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Figure 3. Hong Konger, Asian, Global Citizen, Chinese or PRC Citizen?
Source: (University of Hong Kong, 2014)
The evolution of these events clearly shows a civil group that is becoming organized and posing a strong opposition to the PRC’s government. As professor Malte Kaeding argues, during the first decades of the colony there were no signs a local distinction between Chinese people in Hong Kong and the Mainland. After the Second World War briefly a
“sojourner mentality” (refugees or economic migrants that had made sufficient money that wanted to return to the Mainland) emerged but was ended when the border was closed in 1950. From that moment onward the new generations lacked the first hand experiences of the PRC that allowed Hong Kong to develop its own sense of identity and political culture (Kaeding, 2011).
Nowadays, it can be identified that the group rejecting the status of being a citizen of the PRC could foster a communality of interests, responding to the “voluntary participation”.
As Kaeding argues identity in Hong Kong follows an ethno-cultural approach that is integrated by: economic development, popular culture and education, the influence of western values and the market, cultural memory, civic identity, political identity and civic
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terms of pluralism, looking at the identity reflected in polls, it is clear the people supporting this group come from different economic strata and ages, but those who are more numerous are the young generations.Lastly, we find a negative character towards the PRC. Being “Hong Kongers” means to be strongly united by the idea of the territoriality and language, which clearly describes the motivation to differentiate themselves from the rest of the PRC citizens. The idea behind of
“Hong Konger” is to create a clear identification system, to differentiate people and allow the rejection of what is called the “mainlandisation” of Hong Kong.
Thus, it can be found that there is a strong correlation between the theory and the facts.
Identity or “we-ness”, as McAdam points out, has been crucial to contribute not only for the unity of the group but also for the search of a different political configuration of the territory (Political process and the development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970 , 1999).
From all of this, the question that rises is: could a sector of the society serve as platform to propel collective actions looking to achieve particular objectives like the OCLP?
75 Kaeding argues in that thanks to economic development a transformation in identity of a “Hong Kong Man”
(Chinese but with western values) with a sense of sophistication and superiority was possible. In terms of pop culture and education, it was characterized by a non-interventionist attitude during the colony. Therefore, it focused on the “Hong Kong” way of life (by creating the concept “Hong Kong Person”) and “othering” Mainlanders as different. In this way the Hong Kong identity was built upon the idea of a Chinese identity detached from its context as Hong Kong history was completely absent of school curriculum. In regards of “western values and the market” Kaeding explains, that the mixture of western (most prominent basic individual rights) and global values, along with the rapid economic growth help shape this “market mentality” that does not subscribes to the idea of “belonging to a nation”. Hence, “patriotism” is based on the “individual” loyalty to the state. Moreover, in terms of “cultural memory” the 2003 the mobilization of opposing the national security law marked the appearance of a civic awareness. In this moment, as Kaeding explains, the people in Hong Kong start to understand their unity and building upon the idea that there is a Hong Kong community and it became apparent when it became threaten in 1997 by the unification with the PRC. This showed Hong Kongers “civic identity”.
As Kaeding explains, the myth that people in Hong Kong were apathetic for political process was proved wrong. Kaeding argues that what created the confusion was the “utilitarianistic familism” that consisted on individuals putting first their families’ interests and materialistic concerns before the society. But all this changed since 2003. Therefore, Kaeding explains that in regards of “political identity” Hong Kongers interest can be trade to 1960s, when the protests of 1966 marked a new trend of serious talks regarding local issues. This led to the colonial government to change its stance by 1970s ceding to the social pressure. By 1980s the colony had instated relative openness, freedom and the concept of rule of law, the protection of human rights and stability.
Thence, Kaeding explains that their “civic values” when reunification with the PRC took place Hong Kongers self-confidence felt shattered and at the same time a senses of superiority emerged in regards of the Mainland. This unleashed a stronger sense of connection with the city and their duties. Finally, this would reflect on the “political ritual and protests”, as it was seen that stronger social and political participation as a unified actions could build on the identity. It was in this way, as Kaeding argues, that identity in Hong Kong evolved composed by these different elements. (Kaeding, 2011)
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The author of the present study argues that this is affirmative. The concept of identity has such level of interrelation with self-determination76 for the society that it can accommodate collective actions that appeal to these precepts. In this particular case, the democratic vote plays that key role. Figure 4 retrieves the responses of a recent survey conducted to 1,017 Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong citizens, showing the desired level of democratic participation of the sample.
Figure 4. Desired level of the Universal suffrage in Hong Kong
Source: (University of Hong Kong, 2014)
Although the question is contradictory to certain level, as it leaves outside of the equation a pan-democratic alliance to participate in the election, nonetheless, the results shows that the society wants further participation in their political system. Therefore, this section of the population will support a collective action that is seeking this objective and has not political ties. To be able to understand this, let us proceed to address the first the context that brought about the OCLP movement and its developments.
76 The present author argues that identity and self-determination are interrelated due to particular manner in which the Hong Kong identity has emerged. In all instances serve to become part from a group that has different characteristics than the rest. It is, as it is also in the case of Taiwan, a method to mark the differentiation from the rest of China.
Therefore, it seeks to be maintained and the element threatening its existence is the reunification with the rest of the PRC.
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