CHAPTER 2 TAIWAN’S CASE
2.1 C ROSS -‐ STRAIT RELATIONS PREAMBLE
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Chapter 2 Taiwan’s Case
In this section of the study it will be provided the supporting ground to understand where has the political opportunity structures in Taiwan emerged. For this reason the present chapter will be divided as follows. First, it will be provided a cross-strait relations preamble to understand the political nature and further political developments in Taiwan stemmed from the relations between the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China.
Second, the analysis will address the political tendencies found during the mandate of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and how these have created a conflict with the rising Taiwanese identity. Third, the Anti-Media Monopoly example will serve to illustrate the idea that a mixture between political opportunity structures in addition to the tilting policies toward the PRC created the opportunity for activist to accumulate a series of aggravations.
Forth, the study will provide an overview of the negotiations of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), an explanation of its content, its ratification process, and the legal loopholes that led activists and other members of the society to protest over its remaining sections. Fifth, the study will provide an overview of the reasons and events that led students and activists to create an alliance, regardless of their particular claims, to reject the ratification of the CSSTA through the Sunflower movement. Sixth, and final, the study will dedicate a section to understand the importance of the Sunflower movement, the strategy and logistics employed, which translated into its success.
2.1 Cross-strait relations preamble
The relation between the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been changing since 1979. These changes have generated a direct effect on the way people living in the ROC perceive the actions of the PRC. During Mao Zedong leadership, the PRC always defended the idea of “One China” and Taiwan was part of it.
This ideal was not possible because United States backed the government in Taiwan, allowing it to subsist. Nevertheless, in 1979 the United States changed its policy towards
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the PRC that led to the normalization of the U.S.-China relations. This approach between the U.S. and the PRC made ROC to start losing ground against PRC’s definition of “One China policy”. Immediately Taiwan suffered an abrupt change of its international status, from once having the support of the super power to be in complete isolation. (Huang & Li, 2010)
In the light of these events and in the same year, 1979, the PRC’s Standing committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) gathered to send a message to the “Compatriots of Taiwan”. The message stated a change in the PRC’s policy from a military liberation of Taiwan to a “peaceful reunification with the motherland”. This idea will later will be designated the “three links” (because it suggested direct postal, trade and transportation links) and “four exchanges” (free flow of exchange of relatives, tourists, academic and cultural groups, and sport representatives). Following this guideline, on September 1981 Ye Jianying (葉劍英) Chairman of the NPC’s Standing Committee delivered a public statement through Xinhua News Agency under the title of “Policy on Return of Taiwan to the Motherland and Peaceful Reunification”. This message contained nine points20 (which later would be named the “nine proposals”). The following year on January 11, 1982 Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) indicated that this nine proposals could be interpreted as “one country, two systems”. To complement these ideas, Deng would set forward six more points21 that would create a clear panorama of the peaceful reunification. (Cai, et al., 2011)
20 The nine proposals are:
1) The CCP and KMT conduct negotiations on an equal basis for two-party cooperation of a third time.
2) Both sides reach agreement on the establishment of postal, trade and transportation links as well as family and relative visit, tourism and academic, cultural and sports exchanges.
3) After reunification, Taiwan could enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and maintain its armed forces.
4) Taiwan’s existing socio-economic system would remain unchanged, as would its way of life and tis economic and cultural relations with foreign countries.
5) Taiwan’s politicians and other representative individuals of Taiwanese society would assume senior positions in national political bodies and participate in running the state.
6) When Taiwan experiences financial difficulty, the central government could offer financial support as appropriate.
7) Anyone in Taiwan who wishes to settle down in the mainland, regardless of his/her ethnic and social background, will be guaranteed for proper arrangement without discrimination as well as freedom of entry and exit.
8) Taiwanese businesses are welcome to invest and establish various kinds of business undertakings in the mainland, and their legal rights and profits would be protected.
9) Reunification of the motherland is the responsibility of all Chinese, and therefore suggestions on state affairs from people of all ethnic groups and all social groups in Taiwan are sincerely welcomed. (Anlin, 2011)
21 The six points proposed by Deng Xiaoping are the following ones:
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proposing measures. In 1987 president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) would take the decision to permit mainlander veterans to visit their families and relatives through a “third port” and in this way opening the contact in the Strait. The increasing contact led to the creation of the National Unification Council (NUC) that issued the Guidelines for National Unification (GNU). As these organisms and guidelines came in place, it would also come the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). In correspondence Beijing also introduced the proper institutional platform called: Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) (Cai, et al., 2011). The first meeting of the SEF and ARATS delegations on March 23, 1992, will serve to discuss how to apply the one-China principle in the cross-strait relations. The debate generated different resolutions from both sides all through 1992 and then after. Despite several meetings no clear outcome came from them but one statement that would found in all the declarations: “there is one China but both sides have different interpretations of what does this means”. Later on these talks would be incorrectly refer to as the “1992 Consensus”22 (Huang & Li, 2010).The talks would continue through these mechanisms reaching levels never seen since 1949.
In on April 27-29, 1993 the “Singapore Koo-Wang Joint Agreement” would take place.
1) The core of the Taiwan issue is reunification of the motherland, and “peaceful reunification has become the common aspiration of both the CCP and the KMT"
2) Taiwan’s “absolute autonomy” could not be endorsed, as the “absolute autonomy” of the island is equivalent to
“two Chinas”.
3) “Different systems could remain across the Straits, but the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should be the sole representative of China in the international community”.
4) “After reunification, as a special administrative region, Taiwan could maintain its autonomy and adopt a different system from that in the mainland with its own independent judiciary with the final adjudication kept in Taiwan, with its own army as long as it poses no threat to the mainland, while the central government would not send administrative personnel to be stationed in Taiwan”. Instead, “the central government would reserve some positions for Taiwan”.
5) “Peaceful reunification by no means implies the mainland’s absorption of Taiwan. Needless to say, it doesn’t imply Taiwan’s absorption of the mainland either”.
6) A proper way for peaceful reunification is “to hold talks between the two parties on an equal footing to achieve a third round of KMT-CPP cooperation, rather than talks between the central and local governments. Once the two sides have reached an agreement, it can formally proclaim. But under no circumstances will we allow any foreign country to interfere. Foreign interference would simply mean China is still not independent, and that would lead to endless future troubles.” (Anlin, 2011)
22 As Jung Huang and Xiaoting Li, argue in their book “Inseparable Separation The making of China’s Taiwan policy”(2010), Koo Chen-fu would explain, Taiwanese business man and diplomat involve in the 1992 talks, that the use of the word “consensus” it is a mistake as there was no agreement on this. Therefore the correct way to call these converging ideas was rather an “understanding”. (Huang & Li, 2010)
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The talks between the negotiators Wang Daohan (汪道涵) [PRC] and Koo Chen-fu (辜振 甫) [ROC] would set forward the Agreement on the Use and Verification of Notary Certificates Across the Straits, the Agreement on Inquiry of and Compensation for [Lost]
Registered Mail Across the Straits, and the Agreement on the Mechanism of ARATS-SEF Contact and Talks. These negotiations opened two different paths for political and economic interactions (Huang & Li, 2010).
The political path would follow a road with constant setbacks, twist and turns as it was and it is the most delicate one. Since the rapprochement between PRC and the ROC, the latter would continue to strive for international independence, avoidance of ultimate obliteration and absorption, as it would be natural. Being established this; therefore, it was not strange that just after 1993 “Singapore Koo-Wang Joint Agreement”, Taiwan authorities put forward a plan to join the UN. On the following year, 1994, President Lee Teng-hui (李登 輝) strived for reasons to deteriorate the relations with the PRC (Anlin, 2011). This led to the proper reaction from Beijing. The PRC released in 1993 through the Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State Council joint the “white paper” on “The Taiwan Issue and Reunification of China”. This was on the purpose to confirm Beijing’s stand, which considers that Taiwan belongs to the Mainland. Subsequently, in 1995 Jiang Zemin would deliver his speech of “Continue to Strive for Accomplishment of the Great Cause of National Reunification” with his eight-point proposal23. In June 7th 1995 President Lee
23 The eight points presented by Jiang Zemin are:
1) “Adhering to the ‘one China’ principal is the basis of and prerequisite for peaceful reunification,” opposing any words and activities in support of “Taiwan Independence,” “split a separation of the country,” and “staged two Chinas’”.
2) “We do not have objection to the development of non-governmental economic and cultural ties between Taiwan and other countries,” but oppose Taiwan’s activities of “expanding international living space” aimed at creating
“two Chinas” or “one China one Taiwan”.
3) “It has been our consistent stand to hold negotiations on peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Straits”, and
“on the premise that there is only one China, we are prepared to talk with the Taiwan authorities on any matters,” including all matters that concern the Taiwan authorities. As a first step, negotiations could be conducted to reach an agreement on “the formal ending of the state of cross-Straits hostility under the ‘one China’ principle.” “On the basis thereof, both sides could jointly assume responsibilities to maintain China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and plan for the future development of cross-Straits relations”.
4) “We should try our best to achieve the peaceful reunification of China and the Chinese should not fight against the Chinese.”
5) “We should spare no effort to develop Strait economic exchanges and cooperation” and “prevent cross-Strait economic cooperation from being impeded by political disagreement.”
6) “The 5000-year splendid Chinese culture created by the sons and daughters of all ethnic groups of China has consistently remained a spiritual tie that holds all the Chinese people together and constitutes an important basis for the peaceful reunification of the motherland.”
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while in the United States would respond to these eight points with another speech showing increasing search of independence. The situation would lead the third cross-strait crisis24 in which the United States had to show military support for Taiwan to avoid any military retaliation from the PRC. This event would bring together a strong interaction of the three key players in the process achieving peace talks: PRC, ROC and the U.S (Huang & Li, 2010).
The PRC suspected of the U.S. as the pillar backing Taiwan’s independence. Nevertheless, the U.S., would assert in repeated occasions, as it was clear the first time with Clinton’s 1998 “three noes”25, which it would not support Taiwanese leaders if the endeavors they pursued deviated the country from the one China policy and peaceful talks.
From this moment onward a new wave of tension would come in 2000. There were two factors that constrained the situation: 1) during Lee Teng-hui’s last year in power, 1999, Tsai Ying-wen (secretary general of the ROC’s national security council) encouraged scholars to produce a legal disassociation of the PRC, this would be called the “two states theory”26; and 2) the change of power in Taiwan when the Democratic Progressive Party’s
7) “We will fully respect our Taiwan compatriots’ lifestyle and desire to be their own master and protect all their legitimate rights and interests.”
8) “We welcome the leaders of Taiwan to visit the mainland in an appropriate capacity.” In the meantime, “we are also ready to accept invitations to visit Taiwan” to “discuss state affairs.” (Huang & Li, 2010) 24 The first and second Taiwan crisis took place in 1955 and 1958 respectively. In each occasion the PRC tried to seize control of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu from the ROC. Both occasions ended when the United States interceded on behalf of ROC government. (Bureau of Public Affairs United States Department of State, 2015) 25 For further information please refer to:
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1111&context=polisci-faculty-publications
26 The “two states” theory was created to break the one China paradox that would eventually ROC’s position vis-à-vis PRC. The recounts of this theory that would never see the light, is still classified, comes from to principal strong sources: Ex-president Lee Teng-hui and former chairman of the Mainland Affairs Committee (MAC) Su Chi. It was based on the proposition of the scholars that studied the case and concluded the following:
-‐ All historical links between Taiwan and Mainland China had to be downplayed. Specifically, Taiwan had to forsake the KMT’s long-standing claim that “the ROC has been in existence since 1912” because the “ROC” was merely a national title that had to be retained for the present. Moreover, that claim instilled a historical meaning in the “ROC”
and made it more difficult for Taiwan to abandon that title in the future. Additionally, Taiwan had to relinquish some other claims of the KMT’s, including that “China is under divided rule” and that “the ROC has been divided by the Taiwan Strait since 1949.” This was because it only put emphasis on historical links. Taiwan had to avoid mentioning this in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation in the future.
-‐ There could not be further mention of reunification; instead Taiwan should adopt the vague term of “integration”.
This term of reuniting should be avoided in the National Unification Council and National Unification Guidelines.
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candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidency. Although Chen tried to assure Beijing on his speech of the “Five Noes” (where he promised Taiwan will follow a peaceful path and no independence would requested if Beijing did not use its military force), Beijing did not seem convinced. A letter was sent to senior officials of the Communist Party warning about Chen’s dubious intentions, would set the guideline of the perception of Taiwan under Chen’s leadership.
Therefore, soon after the theory of “two states” was created, it emerged in Chen Shui-bian’s speeches in different occasions. This would serve to justify Beijing’s attitude to increase the number of ballistic missiles pointing at Taiwan (Huang & Li, 2010). The situation would maintain a high level of tension between the three actors, but a new cycle in the relation would be achieved by the George W. Bush administration calming Beijing’s fears.
After the third cross-strait crisis, President George W. Bush would announce a huge arms sale to Taiwan and, at the same time, would send the former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft to assure Beijing. This was to assure that if Taiwan took a unilateral action affecting the current status of the negotiations the U.S. would not defend the island and it would only defend the island if Beijing attacked. This would set a new trend that would continue regardless of Chen’s continues acts to push “the envelope”.27
-‐ There should not be more mention of one China. That meant rejecting all KMT’s formulas like: “one country, two governments”, “one country, two equal political entities”. The same would have to be done with the 1992 Consensus, as the new interpretation had to be that only has the “spirit” of what is search for.
-‐ Taiwan should establish a strict national security network to oversee and monitor the cross-strait exchanges.
-‐ The existing ROC constitution had to be amended to change article 4 referring to the territory of the ROC. It would no longer be all China but now it would only refer to Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu. Furthermore, it should provide plebiscites to underline the concept of popular sovereignty and delete the term “prior to national reunification”. Finally, the term “mainland area” or “the Chinese Communist authorities” had to be change for “the People’s Republic of China” or simply “China” and the also change the terms “two areas” or “equal political entitles [of one China]” to “two states”.
-‐ In terms of foreign policy Taiwan should strive to distinguish itself more clearly from China using for membership in the UN or other international organisms. The name to use would no longer be “Chinese Taipei”, instead it would be “Taiwan” or “the ROC of Taiwan”. (Huang & Li, 2010)
27 President Chen Shui-bian never lost his impulse to search for a more independent Taiwan and always seek for further recognition. The reaction of Beijing would not follow the solution seen during 1995-96 crises. Instead, PRC leaders had learned to integrate to their rhetoric a friendly version. In this new position PRC leaders denounced to be open to talk to all the Taiwanese and even those separatist forces (DPP members and President Chen Shui-bian). This friendly position would neutralize any further friction between the U.S. and Beijing, regardless of Taiwan’s actions(Huang & Li, 2010).
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The rise to power of Hu Jintao would adjust the rhetoric of Beijing to be harmonious with the “peaceful rise”. Hu was interested in not creating unnecessary friction between the PRC and the U.S. during the process of the rise of China, in which Taiwan was key. Therefore, Hu would maintain a guideline in his speeches of “peace, stability, and development”. This of course did not affect any “soft push” to an “early reunification of the Motherland” that followed the same rhetoric. Hu would generate a four-point initiative for an Anti-Secession Law (ASL), to make clear to the “separatist forces” the following: 1) Never wave adhering to the one-China principle; 2) Never give up efforts to seek peaceful reunification; 3) Never stop placing hope in the Taiwan people; 4) Never make compromises in opposing the separatist activities aimed at Taiwan independence.
The creation of the law in 2005 left enough margins in the definition of the one-China principle to avoid any fears within separatists in Taiwan that the island would be
The creation of the law in 2005 left enough margins in the definition of the one-China principle to avoid any fears within separatists in Taiwan that the island would be