2. EU-China Relations
2.3 EU’s Foreign Policy towards China
2.3.1 EU’s policy of Unconditional Engagement
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39 When analyzing the EU’s policy towards China, it must be kept in mind that the European Union consists of a large number of member states with different levels of economic development. Despite these differences, national strategy papers, key statements by officials, and bilateral agreements or specific development programmers on China, designed by individual EU Member States contain similar goals, such as increased economic openness or stronger environmental protection. These similarities are also the outcome of the EU-policymaking process. Member States can channel their national interests via committees working on EU Joint Statements or strategy papers on China.
These official policy documents, however, need the consensus of all Member States who have agreed to transfer their bargaining power to the EU Commission. The complex process of EU policymaking is time-consuming, because the largest common denominator between all involved decision-makers need to be found.
2.3.1 EU’s policy of Unconditional Engagement
In this chapter the term of “Unconditional Engagement” will be introduced.
Unconditional Engagement The term “unconditional engagement” was introduced by the former advisor to US-president Ronald Reagan, Constantine C. Menges, when he described US foreign policy towards China. He wrote unconditional engagement
“… is not isolation, but rather a policy of realistic engagement. This would use the enormous economic benefits accruing to China from trade with the US as an incentive for its acting peacefully and cooperatively internationally and it’s
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40 complying domestically with the human rights commitments China has freely assumed.”73
Applying the term of unconditional engagement Fox and Godement criticize EU politicians that the theory that economic development and economic exchanges between the West and China will establish Western values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights in China. One of the main pillars of this approach was China’s entrance to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.
The statement by Romano Prodi reflects the EU’s motivation in its political relations with China:
“Europe needs to project its model of society into the wider world. We are not simply here to defend our own interests: we have a unique historic experience to offer…. We have forged a model of development and continental integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and solidarity—and it is a model that works.”74
Believing in this approach Brussels has been trying to persuade Beijing that the EU’s demands, such as rule of law or climate change, are also in the interests of China.
However, as Fox and Godement criticize,
“[that there] has been a steady increase in the number of objectives the EU formulates for its China policy; these are often changed as new topics acquire urgency. These objectives are seldom followed through. The EU has never carried
73 Constantine C. Menges, “China: a Policy of Realistic Not Unconditional Engagement,” Hudson Institute,
http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=3175&pubType=RusChin.
74 Romano Prodi, ‘2000-2005: Shaping the New Europe’, speech to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, Speech 00/41, (15 February 2000), 3, accessed 1.July
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/00/41&format=HTML&aged=1&langu age=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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out a proper evaluation of the success of its individual policies.”75Furthermore, Brussels is eager to integrate China into the international community so that not only cooperation between the two sides will be improved, but also the EU’s role in the world will be strengthened. To accomplish that goal, the EU invested for its first China National Indicative Programme (2002-2006) 250 million Euro76 and spent in the following one (2007- 2010) 225 million Euro.77 However, China’s progress seems to be unsatisfactory.
However, as many observers argue, the hopes of the EU have been disappointed.
Although China has signed both of the UN Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Political and Civil Rights, the Chinese National People’s Congress has not ratified the second covenant eleven years after its signature. Furthermore, since China has become a WTO member the reform has been slowed down or even stopped. 78 The case of WTO also shows that the hopes of the EU have been disappointed:
“Examples of Europe’s failure to mould China in its own image are legion.
Political liberalization seems to have stalled, or even reversed: China has tightened restrictions against NGOs, stepped up pressure on dissidents, and
75 John Fox and François Godement, “A Power Audit of EU-China Relations”, European Council on Foreign Relations, (1), accessed July 1. 2012,
http://ecfr.3cdn.net/532cd91d0b5c9699ad_ozm6b9bz4.pdf.
76 European Commission, “European Council, National Indicative Programme 2005-2006 – China ” (2005), accessed July 1.2012,http://eeas.europa.eu/china/csp/05_06_nip_en.pdf.
77 European Commission, “China Strategy Paper, 2007-2013,” (2006), accessed July 1 2012, http://eeas.europa.eu/china/csp/07_13_en.pdf.
78 Hanns Günther Hilpert, „Chinas globale wirtschaftliche Herausforderung Für eine kohärente Außenwirtschaftspolitik Europas,“ (2010): accessed 1 July
2012,http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2010_S29_hlp_ks.pdf, Margott Schüller, „The EU’s Policy on China on Economic Issues: Between Disillusion and Dialogue,” in American and European Relations with China, Advancing Common Agendas. German Institute for International and Security Affairs, David Shambaugh and Gudrun Wacker, ed., 65-78, (2008), accessed 1 July 2012,
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2008_RP03_shambaugh_wkr_ks.pdf.
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42 stopped or rolled back local electoral reforms. At the UN, Beijing has built an increasingly solid coalition of general assembly votes, often mobilized in opposition to EU values such as the defence of human rights.”79
Observers criticize that the policy of unconditional engagement is too convenient for EU policy-makers, as there is too less political will for EU leaders to push Beijing hard enough on political values.80
One can take the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue as an example. The dialogue was introduced in 1995 and is considered a soft, low-profile approach of influencing China. It tries to take China’s dignity and values and the countries sensitivity after a century of national humiliation by Western powers into consideration. However, after only ten years the EU already expressed for the first time its dissatisfaction with the results of that softer approach, and openly questioned the usefulness and effectiveness of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue. EU documents from 2006 indicate that the EU’s expectations are not being fulfilled.
The organization “Human Rights Watch” criticizes that the EU-China Human Rights dialogue has "consistently failed" to produce substantive results because it is not linked to other issues such as trade, investment and the environment.81
The advocacy
director of Human Rights Watch, Sophie Richardson, said that"for too long, the EU-China human rights dialogue has been a toothless talk shop which has failed to meaningfully address the Chinese government's poor record on human
79 John Fox and François Godement, “A Power Audit of EU-China Relations”, European Council on Foreign Relations, (20), accessed, (April 1.2009), July 1. 2012,
http://ecfr.3cdn.net/532cd91d0b5c9699ad_ozm6b9bz4.pdf. Mikael.Mattlin, “A Normative EU Policy Towards China: Mission Impossible?” (Finland: Finnish Institute for International Affairs), September 2010.
80 Ibid.
81 Human Rights Watch, “EU: China Summit Needs Rights Focus,” (May 19, 2009), accessed 1 July 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/19/eu-china-summit-needs-rights-focus.
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In the last 25 years, the European Parliament has adopted more than 25 resolutions pointing at the deficit of democracy, rule of law and human rights in China. The resolutions were not combing with further sanctions and ineffective to push Beijing for the desired actions.
Maybe the most significant showcase of EU’s weak approach of “unconditional engagement towards China is the example EU’s behavior to Taiwan. In 2004 France conducted a joint naval exercise with China close to Qingdao. 82 The date and place of the military exercise was significant, because it was just days before Taiwan held its presidential election and first referendum. China, who claims that “there is only one China in the world" and "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China” and is willing to “use force to if necessary”.83 The Council of the European Union and especially Javier Solana84, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, openly criticized Taiwan’s political direction and Taiwan’s referendum in particular.
Between 2004 to 2007 the EU consistently pushed Taiwan not to take any political actions of provoking China.85 While this may well have been the case, EU leaders have
82 China Daily, “China, France hold joint naval drill,” (April 162004), accessed July 1 2012,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/16/content_315366.htm, BBC, “China drill before Taiwan poll,” March 16.2003, accessed July 1.2012. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3512088.stm.
83 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, “White Paper - The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” (August 6.1993), accessed 1 July 2012, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/White%20Papers/t36705.htm
84 Xinhua, “Solana concerned over Taiwan leaders' comment” (October 26.2007), accessed 1 July 2012,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/26/content_6209103.htm.
85 Council of The European Union, “Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the decision of the Taiwanese leader regarding the NUC,” (March 6.2006), accessed 1 July 2012,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/88561.pdf.
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44 been reluctant in denouncing Beijing for similar actions that could also be deemed provocative, a steady build-up of missiles targeting Taiwan, or rhetorical war threats.
In summary, EU’s weak approach is visible on many fronts of EU-China relations.
The term unconditional engagement reflects in a perfect manner, how EU Member States are unable to coordinate their national policies towards a stronger EU-approach. Some states confront China political, other EU Member States criticize Chinese trade policies, and others ignore both. EU’s weak policy of unconditional engagement and its lake of leverage over China, hinders the EU to pursue its own goals towards China and