Germany in EU-China Relations

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63 negotiations and benefit above all the negotiating partner – in this case China.

5. The Role of the “Big Three” in EU-China Relations

The three Germany, France and the United Kingdom are the strongest EU Member States and the have most crucial influence in China bilateral relations. Their role in EU-China relation will be further discussed in this chapter.

5.1 Germany in EU-China Relations

The German government traditionally emphasizes the importance on building strong economic and political relations with Beijing. This pragmatic approach goes back to 1955 when the Federal Republic of Germany opened a trade office in China. This is significant because it was against the Hallstein doctrine which ruled out any contact with governments who recognize East Germany.¹³⁰ This pragmatic ensured the improvement of economic relations between Germany and China and by 1966 Germany was China’s biggest European trade partner.¹³¹ In the 1980s almost 50 percent of technology exports

130 German History in Documents and Images, “The New Ostpolitik and German-German Relations,”

accessed July 1.2012, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=917.

131 Nicola Casarini, “Remaking Global Order: The Evolution of Europe-China Relations and its Implications for East Asia and the United States,” (Oxford University Press 2009), 36.

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64 to China were expected to come from West Germany.¹³² This trade orientated, pragmatic policy was continued by Helmut Kohl, the West-German Chancellor from 1982 until 1990. He implemented the policy of the “German model” which was outlined in the German Asia Concept of 1993 (“Asian-Konzept der Bundesregierung”). ¹³³ As Christopher Nesshöver outline, the “German Model” can be characterized by three principles: (1) silent diplomacy – that is avoiding open human rights accusations, (2) the doctrine of change through trade (“Wandel durch Handel”) – that is pushing for political liberalization in China through economic development and (3) strictly holding on a “One China policy”¹³⁴

Since 1972 Sino-German economic relations have improved very fast and can be described as a great success. In 1972, German companies exported to China goods worth just 270 million USD. According to Federal Statistical Office of Germany, in 2011 German exports to China were already worth EUR 64.8 billion, an increase of 20.4 per cent compared with the previous year. German imports from China were worth EUR 79.2 billion, an increase of 2.5 per cent compared with the previous year.¹³⁵

Since 2002, China has been Germany’s second biggest export market outside Europe, after the USA and ahead of Japan. Germany is by far China’s largest European trading partner, ranking fifth overall among China’s trading partners (and fourth excluding Hong Kong).

132 Ibid. .

133 Die Deutsche Bundesregierung, Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, Asienkonzept

Bundesregierung, (1993), accessed July 1.2012, http://www.asienhaus.de/public/archive/brdasia.htm.

134 Christopher Nesshöver, „Die Chinapolitik Deutschlands und Frankreichs zwischen

Aussenwirtschaftsförderung und Menschenrechtsorientierung (1989 bis 1997),“ Institut für Asienkunde (1999).

135 Auswärtiges Amt, „Beziehungen zwischen der Volksrepublik China und Deutschland,“ (April 2012), accessed July 1.2012,

http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/China/Bilateral_node.html#doc334538bodyText4.

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65 Gerhard Schröder, the German Chancellor from 1998 to 2005, realized the importance of the rising Asian giant and seek good relations with Beijing and implemented a China-friendly policy. Schröder promised to visit China at least once a year, not surprisingly he visited China more often than any other country.¹³⁶ Schröder advocated, against the protest of the opposition parties, for an end of the weapon embargo: In 2004 and 2005 he aggravated considerable opposition within his coalition partners and even within his own party. Angela Merkel, the new elected German Chancellor in 2005, implemented a new policy towards China. After her inauguration she made soon clear that she her government will put more emphasize on human rights.¹³⁷ Again, the Chinese reaction was severe; a Chinese diplomat expressed the government’s disappointment: "How could the chancellor have done something so despicable?”¹³⁸ The temperature in Berlin-Beijing relations has "dropped almost to the freezing point" as the Welt-Kenntnis wrote.¹³⁹ Merkel’s approach towards China was highly criticized in Germany as well in Europe. In Germany, business men were unsatisfied with her business-unfriendly approach, which unsettled the Chinese side. "The way we deal with

136 Guenter Bannas, „Deutschland und China Politischer Anker,“ FAZ, (February 05.2012), accessed July 1.2012, http://m.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/deutschland-und-china-politischer-anker-11638610.html.

137 Deutsche Welle, „Merkel will für Menschenrechte eintreten“ (February 02.2012), accessed 1 July 2012, http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15706429,00.html.

138 Spiegel Online International, “Pressure Growing on Merkel to Fix Squabble with China,” (November 27.2007), accessed 1 July.2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-chinese-relations-pressure-growing-on-merkel-to-fix-squabble-with-china-a-519976.html.

139 Spiegel Online International, “Pressure Growing on Merkel to Fix Squabble with China,” (November 27.2007), accessed July.1.2012,

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-chinese-relations-pressure-growing-on-merkel-to-fix-squabble-with-china-a-519976.html.

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66 China is absolutely unjustified."¹⁴⁰ Jürgen Hambrecht from BASF criticized. Eggert Voscherau, also BASF, added: "We have pushed open the door, but others are going through."¹⁴¹ Even though the German leader took a more critical standpoint than her predecessor and advocated for a continuation of the weapon embargo, however, she also didn’t stick to a stronger coherent EU approach.¹⁴² In de media, the cost which Merkel’s policy towards caused for Germany and the EU was even called “Merkel-cost”.¹⁴³

Germany’s traditional own strategy, to separate politics from trade, was very successful during the era Kohl and Schroeder. Under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, German-China relations were greatly driven by economic exchanges. Political issues such as human rights or environmental protection were mostly ignored in order to safeguard smooth (economic) relations with Beijing. Merkel, who lived in the former communist East Germany, made it clear that human rights issues and business disputes such as the quarrel about the protection of Intellectual Property Rights would be addressed more directly under her government.¹⁴⁴ However, under Merkel continued her national approach towards China and, being the biggest European economy, ignored a coherent EU-approach. Even though took a tougher stance towards China, prosper trade relations were still business as usual.

140 Ralf Beste, Ralf Neukirch and Matthias Schepp, “Merkel Foreign Policy Is Bad for Business,” Spiegel Online, (October 23.2007), accessed 1.July.2012. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-cost-of-being-honest-merkel-foreign-policy-is-bad-for-business-a-513067-2.html.

141 Ibid.

142 Terry Narramore, “China and Europe : Engagement , Multipolarity and Strategy” The Pacific Review, 21 1 102 (2008 ).

143 Ralf Beste, Ralf Neukirch and Matthias Schepp, “Merkel Foreign Policy Is Bad for Business,” Spiegel Online, (October 23.2007), accessed 1.July.2012. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-cost-of-being-honest-merkel-foreign-policy-is-bad-for-business-a-513067-2.html.

144 Focus online, „Menschenrechte werden Thema,“ (21.05.2006), accessed July 1.2012, http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/merkels-chinabesuch_aid_109294.html.

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67

5.2 France in EU-China Relations

Although France lacks Britain’s historical ties with China and its commercial relations with Beijing are not as strong as Germany has with China, but Paris’ political relationships with Beijing are in many ways stronger than of any other EU Member State.

The French government regards itself as an idol in respect of leading China into the international system.

¹⁴⁵

At the European level, France has been very active and instrumental in building closer relations with China. As mentioned before, Paris was the first European State to normalize relations with Beijing in 1964. In the 19070s France pushed for the opening of diplomatic relations between the European Economic Community (the former name of the EU) and China. The main driver of the France-China rapprochement was that both shared the idea, that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the hegemony of the United States, the world was unipolar and unbalanced.¹⁴⁶ The two countries began to cooperate closely in the United Nations Security Council, where they both inherit a seat as a permanent member.¹⁴⁷ The two countries arranged closer cooperation, deeper cultural exchanges and arranged annual meetings and summits.

France has been also a leading actor to change the EU’s policy on human rights.

Already in 1997 France was the first democratic country to lobby for a stop to criticize Beijing in the Office of the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Human Rights

145 Katinka Barysch and Charles Gran, et al., “Embracing the dragon The EU’s partnership with China,”

Center for European Reform, (May 2005), 19.

146 Alex Hughes, “France/China: Intercultural Imaginings” Legenda (London: MHRA and Maney Publishing, 2007 – Legenda Series Research Monographs in French Studies, 22 2007), 45.

147 Ibid.

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68 (OHCHR).¹⁴⁸ Furthermore the French government tried to avoid any problems with Beijing concerning human rights, Paris argued in an agreement with China, that human rights should be rather discussed on EU level.¹⁴⁹

France’s China-friendly policies were obvious once again during the EU-China negations about China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). With the help of the French EU’s main negotiator, Pascal Lamy, an agreement was signed in May 2000.¹⁵⁰ After France’s supportive role the WTO-negotiations the partnership between France and China was lifted up to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” and both countries shared a large number of identical views. France shows a successful record in implementing a mercantilist strategy of pushing national initiatives and sign large-scale grand contracts with China.¹⁵¹ In other words, the French government is assuming that good political relations will lead to major business deals. While France has been very successful in establishing stronger ties between the European Union, Paris also caused troubles inside the EU while dealing with China. As Fox and Godement describe it:

“… the country’s propensity for sudden swings between political support for China and criticism of China over human rights, Taiwan or Tibet make it an unpredictable partner, both for China as well as for other Member States.”¹⁵²

Under Jacques Chirac France-China relations were stronger than ever before. In 1975

148 Giuseppe Balducci, “Inside Normative Power Europe: Actors and Processes in the European Promotion of Human Rights in China”, EU Diplomacy Papers, (August 2008), 22.

149Ibid.

150 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, “EU and China Reach WTO Accession Agreement,” (May 23 2000), accessed July 1.2012, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/88831/.

151 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “France and China, Country Files” (2007), accessed July 1.2012, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/china-506/france-and-china_5691/index.html.

152 John Fox and François Godement, “A Power Audit of EU-China Relations”, European Council on Foreign Relations, (April 1.2009), 6, accessed July 1. 2012,

http://ecfr.3cdn.net/532cd91d0b5c9699ad_ozm6b9bz4.pdf.

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69 Chirac, as France’s then prime minister met Deng Xiaoping the first time and praised the Chinese leader highly.¹⁵³ In 1997, two years after his inauguration, during Chirac’s visit to China, the French president and its Chinese counterpart, the Chinese president Jiang Zemin agreed upon the establishment of the Sino-French “Global Partnership”. Most interestingly,

France was the first Western country to establish such strategic partnership with China. ¹⁵⁴ Only China’s direct neighbor and long-time ally Russia had already agreed on a “strategic partnership” with China in 1996.¹⁵⁵ France willingness to foster strong ties with Beijing went even to that point that Paris stopped its support for a resolution for the condemnation of China human rights violation in the United Nations Human Rights Commission.¹⁵⁶ In 20002, when Chirac was reelected he continued his approach of pro-China policy pushed for even further improvements of bilateral relations with Beijing:

Under his presidency, France pushed several times for an end of the weapon embargo against Beijing, most significantly in 2003 just before his visit to Beijing. ¹⁵⁷ France was one of the very first EU Member states who openly questioned the usage of the European Weapon Embargo.

At beginning of his presidency in 2007, France’s new leader Nicolas Sarkozy followed continued his predecessor’s China-friendly approach. At the same time German-France relations suffered from Merkel’s harsh stance on China. At the peak of PRC

154 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Relations between France and China; Towards a Paris-Beijing Axis,” China: An International Journal, 4(2), (2006), 3270-40.

155 Andrew Kuchins, “The Emerging Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership and Eurasian Security,” PONARS Policy Memo, Stanford University (1997), 1.

156 Paul Lewis, “China Warns Denmark On Resolution,” New York Times, (April 08.1997), accessed July 1.2012, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/08/world/china-warns-denmark-on-resolution.html.

157 Caroline Wyatt, “Chirac bid to lift China arms ban,” BBC, (8 October. 2004), accessed, July 1.2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3725942.stm.

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70 criticism of Angela Merkel the French leader went to China on a state visit. The Chinese press hailed French-Chinese relations as ‘stable, long-term, and strategic’.¹⁵⁸ However, France's ties with China strained in 2008 for a number of reasons. In March of that year, relations soured after Sarkozy expressed his criticism at Beijing's crackdown in Tibet after protests there led to violence.¹⁵⁹ One month later, during the Olympic torch relay in Paris and several attempts by protesters to disrupt the ceremony the celebrations were relayed.¹⁶⁰ At the end of the same year a meeting between Sarkozy and the Dalai Lama further alienated Beijing.¹⁶¹

5.3 Great Britain in EU-China Relations

Even though Britain was one of the first Western countries to recognize the PRC in 1950, ambassadors were not exchanged between Beijing and London until March 1972. In the 15 years before 1997, political relations between the UK and China were largely influenced by the debate about Hong Kong and the return of sovereignty to China. In December 1984, both sides signed a joint declaration to mark the hand-over of Hong

158 China.Org.cn, “Sarkozy visit marks new phase in relations,” (November 26, 2007), accessed July 1.20212, http://www.china.org.cn/international/opinion/2007-11/26/content_1233093.htm.

159 The Times of India, “French President Nicolas Sarkozy 'shocked' by Tibet unrest,” (Apr 25, 2008), accessed July 1.2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-04-25/europe/27741804_1_french-president-nicolas-sarkozy-beijing-olympics-dalai-lama.

160 Alasdair Sandford, “How French protests rained on China's Olympic parade,” The Guadian, (April 7.2008), accessed July 1.20212, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/07/olympicgames2008.france

161 ChinaPost, “The China Post Sarkozy meets Dalai Lama as China fumes,” (December 7, 2008), accessed July 1.2012, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/china/local-news/tibet/2008/12/07/186515/Sarkozy-meets.htm.

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71 Kong on 1 July 1997.¹⁶²

The newly British Prime Minister, Tony Blair of the Labour party handled the hand-over in 1997. The processes went rather smoothly without any major disturbances.

In these new circumstances, relationships between the PRC and the UK seem to have become easier and more relaxed. After 1997 a series of state-visits marked an improvement of bilateral relations. In April 1998, China’s Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited Britain, and President Jiang Zemin followed in October 1999.¹⁶³ Tony Blair paid a visit to Beijing in October 1998 just after Britain’s Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott was in China in July 1998.¹⁶⁴ This new diplomatic climate was formed and is influenced by the conclusion that both countries, as permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, have similar international interests and responsibilities and should therefore step up bilateral and multilateral co-operation. As a result, China and the UK agreed in 1998 to intensify their political and military dialogues and work together towards a more peaceful and secure world.¹⁶⁵ Both countries also share common global interests in issues such as environmental protection, fighting crime and corruption, drugs and AIDS. Furthermore, the two sides enjoy close bilateral ties in areas like education, science, finance, academic ex- changes, health and culture.

Tony Blair became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in 1997. In the same year he had to handle the handover of Hong Kong to China.¹⁶⁶ HK was the biggest issue

162 Eberhard Sandschneider, “China’s Diplomatic Relations with the States of Europe,” The China Quarterly, vol. 169, (April 2002).

163 Xinhuanet, “Backgrounder: China and the United Kingdom,” (July 16.2003), accessed July 1.2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-07/16/content_977034.htm.

164 Ibid.

165 Xinhuanet, “Backgrounder: China and the United Kingdom,” (July 16.2003), accessed July 1.2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-07/16/content_977034.htm.

166 BBC, Hong Kong handed over to China, (December 31.1997), accessed July 1.2012,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/for_christmas/_new_year/events_of_the_year/41020.stm.

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that had influenced UK-China relations since the end of World War. The end of this problem in UK-China relations made way for a new China-policy by London. Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary, broke with tradition by announcing “a global foreign policy”, a

“third way” and a “business-like approach“ for Britain’s foreign policy. ¹⁶⁷ Furthermore Cook announced that “our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. The Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy.”¹⁶⁸ However, despite the smooth hand-over and several state-visits, relations between London and Beijing were shaky during Blair’s administration. Reason for that was Blair’s rather China-critical foreign policy.¹⁶⁹ In 1997, during the first meeting since 1991 between British and Chinese representatives, he stressed the importance of freedom

of the press and human rights.

¹⁷⁰ Two years later, the Dalai Lama visited the British Prime Minister.¹⁷¹ During his term, Blair was eager to boost trade relations with China and stabilize political relations in general. However, his emphasize on human rights and UK’s close ties to Washington created problems in London-Beijing relations.

During his comparatively short term as the British Prime Minister (2007-2010) Gordon Brown followed the steps of his predecessor, but put more weight on strong

167 The Guardian, “Robin Cook’s speech on the government’s ethical foreign policy, The speech by Robin Cook that started it all”, (December 05.1997), accessed July 1.2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicy.

168 Ibid.

169 The UK Defence Forum, “New Directions in UK Foreign Policy Presentation to the Australian Institute of International Affairs,” (August 5.1997), accessed July 1.2012,

http://www.ukdf.org.uk/assets/downloads/assets/writings/articles/older/artukfp.html

170 Teresa Poole, “Hong Kong handover: Blair accepts invitation to visit China,” The Independent, (July 1.1997), accessed 1.July.2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/hong-kong-handover-blair-accepts-invitation-to-visit-china-1248371.html.

171 BBC, “Dalai Lama meets Blair,” (May 11.1999), accessed July 1.2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/340564.stm,

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73 business relations with China.¹⁷² In 2009 an execution of a British citizen convicted of

drug running prompted a fierce diplomatic row between the UK and China. The British Prime’s efforts to save the British man’s life were fruitless, said he was appalled and disappointed". Besides that, under Gordon Brown’s administration, no big disturbances or great foreign policy changes occurred.

Table 4: The divions of the Big Three

Table 4: Fox and Godement

¹⁷³

, Erik Class

172 BBC, “Brown calls for China trade boost,” (2 February 2009), accessed July 1.2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7864245.stm.

173 Fox, John and François Godement, “A Power Audit of EU-China Relations”, European Council on Foreign Relations, accessed, April 1.2009, July 1. 2012,

http://ecfr.3cdn.net/532cd91d0b5c9699ad_ozm6b9bz4.pdf.

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74

Table 4 shows the difference of the leaders of the Big Three and their respective China policy. Except the Blair and Brown it is remarkably how a change of power also changes their countries foreign policy. This not also means that the bilateral relations to China are unstable and unpredictable but also has a huge impact on the EU policy making process.

As discussed before, the Big Three have significant means to influence the outcome of the EU internal process and a change of power of one EU Member State also means that the whole EU internal system has to react to this change.

The biggest responsibility for the failure to develop a coherent and effective EU approach lies with France, Germany and the UK. They are competing to become China’s closest ally and openly criticize EU’s trade policy to China. This “me-first strategy”

ignores the cost of this selfish, short-term oriented approach. Furthermore, their policy undermine each other and a coherent EU policy more generally. The dispute between these three states over whether the EU should lift its arms embargo on China was described by a senior European official in Beijing as “the classic counter-example of what you should not do – it should be taught in diplomatic schools”¹⁷⁴.

6. Conclusion and Policy Implications

The study concludes that the EU’s foreign policy is weak and need to be changed.

174 John Fox and François Godement, “A Power Audit of EU-China Relations”, European Council on Foreign Relations, (April 1.2009): 28, accessed July 1. 2012,

http://ecfr.3cdn.net/532cd91d0b5c9699ad_ozm6b9bz4.pdf.

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75 Furthermore the consequential sub-propositions, which were given at the beginning of this paper, can be all described to be true.

Chapter 1 explained that the EU has implemented a weak China-policy of unconditional engagement which hindered the EU to implement an efficient foreign policy. The results of chapter 2 show that the US had a strong influence on EU’s decision

Chapter 1 explained that the EU has implemented a weak China-policy of unconditional engagement which hindered the EU to implement an efficient foreign policy. The results of chapter 2 show that the US had a strong influence on EU’s decision

在文檔中 A Study of EU-China relations EU-China Relations after China’s WTO Entrance in 2001 Does the EU need a new China-Policy? (頁 63-0)