5. The Role of the “Big Three” in EU-China Relations
5.3 Great Britain in EU-China Relations
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
70 criticism of Angela Merkel the French leader went to China on a state visit. The Chinese press hailed French-Chinese relations as ‘stable, long-term, and strategic’.158 However, France's ties with China strained in 2008 for a number of reasons. In March of that year, relations soured after Sarkozy expressed his criticism at Beijing's crackdown in Tibet after protests there led to violence.159 One month later, during the Olympic torch relay in Paris and several attempts by protesters to disrupt the ceremony the celebrations were relayed.160 At the end of the same year a meeting between Sarkozy and the Dalai Lama further alienated Beijing.161
5.3 Great Britain in EU-China Relations
Even though Britain was one of the first Western countries to recognize the PRC in 1950, ambassadors were not exchanged between Beijing and London until March 1972. In the 15 years before 1997, political relations between the UK and China were largely influenced by the debate about Hong Kong and the return of sovereignty to China. In December 1984, both sides signed a joint declaration to mark the hand-over of Hong
158 China.Org.cn, “Sarkozy visit marks new phase in relations,” (November 26, 2007), accessed July 1.20212, http://www.china.org.cn/international/opinion/2007-11/26/content_1233093.htm.
159 The Times of India, “French President Nicolas Sarkozy 'shocked' by Tibet unrest,” (Apr 25, 2008), accessed July 1.2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-04-25/europe/27741804_1_french-president-nicolas-sarkozy-beijing-olympics-dalai-lama.
160 Alasdair Sandford, “How French protests rained on China's Olympic parade,” The Guadian, (April 7.2008), accessed July 1.20212, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/07/olympicgames2008.france
161 ChinaPost, “The China Post Sarkozy meets Dalai Lama as China fumes,” (December 7, 2008), accessed July 1.2012, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/china/local-news/tibet/2008/12/07/186515/Sarkozy-meets.htm.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
71 Kong on 1 July 1997.162
The newly British Prime Minister, Tony Blair of the Labour party handled the hand-over in 1997. The processes went rather smoothly without any major disturbances.
In these new circumstances, relationships between the PRC and the UK seem to have become easier and more relaxed. After 1997 a series of state-visits marked an improvement of bilateral relations. In April 1998, China’s Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited Britain, and President Jiang Zemin followed in October 1999.163 Tony Blair paid a visit to Beijing in October 1998 just after Britain’s Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott was in China in July 1998.164 This new diplomatic climate was formed and is influenced by the conclusion that both countries, as permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, have similar international interests and responsibilities and should therefore step up bilateral and multilateral co-operation. As a result, China and the UK agreed in 1998 to intensify their political and military dialogues and work together towards a more peaceful and secure world.165 Both countries also share common global interests in issues such as environmental protection, fighting crime and corruption, drugs and AIDS. Furthermore, the two sides enjoy close bilateral ties in areas like education, science, finance, academic ex- changes, health and culture.
Tony Blair became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in 1997. In the same year he had to handle the handover of Hong Kong to China.166 HK was the biggest issue
162 Eberhard Sandschneider, “China’s Diplomatic Relations with the States of Europe,” The China Quarterly, vol. 169, (April 2002).
163 Xinhuanet, “Backgrounder: China and the United Kingdom,” (July 16.2003), accessed July 1.2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-07/16/content_977034.htm.
164 Ibid.
165 Xinhuanet, “Backgrounder: China and the United Kingdom,” (July 16.2003), accessed July 1.2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-07/16/content_977034.htm.
166 BBC, Hong Kong handed over to China, (December 31.1997), accessed July 1.2012,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/for_christmas/_new_year/events_of_the_year/41020.stm.
‧
that had influenced UK-China relations since the end of World War. The end of this problem in UK-China relations made way for a new China-policy by London. Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary, broke with tradition by announcing “a global foreign policy”, a“third way” and a “business-like approach“ for Britain’s foreign policy. 167 Furthermore Cook announced that “our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. The Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy.”168 However, despite the smooth hand-over and several state-visits, relations between London and Beijing were shaky during Blair’s administration. Reason for that was Blair’s rather China-critical foreign policy.169 In 1997, during the first meeting since 1991 between British and Chinese representatives, he stressed the importance of freedom
of the press and human rights.
170 Two years later, the Dalai Lama visited the British Prime Minister.171 During his term, Blair was eager to boost trade relations with China and stabilize political relations in general. However, his emphasize on human rights and UK’s close ties to Washington created problems in London-Beijing relations.During his comparatively short term as the British Prime Minister (2007-2010) Gordon Brown followed the steps of his predecessor, but put more weight on strong
167 The Guardian, “Robin Cook’s speech on the government’s ethical foreign policy, The speech by Robin Cook that started it all”, (December 05.1997), accessed July 1.2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicy.
168 Ibid.
169 The UK Defence Forum, “New Directions in UK Foreign Policy Presentation to the Australian Institute of International Affairs,” (August 5.1997), accessed July 1.2012,
http://www.ukdf.org.uk/assets/downloads/assets/writings/articles/older/artukfp.html
170 Teresa Poole, “Hong Kong handover: Blair accepts invitation to visit China,” The Independent, (July 1.1997), accessed 1.July.2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/hong-kong-handover-blair-accepts-invitation-to-visit-china-1248371.html.
171 BBC, “Dalai Lama meets Blair,” (May 11.1999), accessed July 1.2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/340564.stm,
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
73 business relations with China.172 In 2009 an execution of a British citizen convicted of
drug running prompted a fierce diplomatic row between the UK and China. The British Prime’s efforts to save the British man’s life were fruitless, said he was appalled and disappointed". Besides that, under Gordon Brown’s administration, no big disturbances or great foreign policy changes occurred.
Table 4: The divions of the Big Three
Table 4: Fox and Godement
173, Erik Class
172 BBC, “Brown calls for China trade boost,” (2 February 2009), accessed July 1.2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7864245.stm.
173 Fox, John and François Godement, “A Power Audit of EU-China Relations”, European Council on Foreign Relations, accessed, April 1.2009, July 1. 2012,
http://ecfr.3cdn.net/532cd91d0b5c9699ad_ozm6b9bz4.pdf.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
74
Table 4 shows the difference of the leaders of the Big Three and their respective China policy. Except the Blair and Brown it is remarkably how a change of power also changes their countries foreign policy. This not also means that the bilateral relations to China are unstable and unpredictable but also has a huge impact on the EU policy making process.
As discussed before, the Big Three have significant means to influence the outcome of the EU internal process and a change of power of one EU Member State also means that the whole EU internal system has to react to this change.
The biggest responsibility for the failure to develop a coherent and effective EU approach lies with France, Germany and the UK. They are competing to become China’s closest ally and openly criticize EU’s trade policy to China. This “me-first strategy”
ignores the cost of this selfish, short-term oriented approach. Furthermore, their policy undermine each other and a coherent EU policy more generally. The dispute between these three states over whether the EU should lift its arms embargo on China was described by a senior European official in Beijing as “the classic counter-example of what you should not do – it should be taught in diplomatic schools”174.