3. Appraising U.S. Interests and the End State of Competition with the PRC
3.3. American Interests and the LIO
3.3.3. Existing Problems of the LIO
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order, the U.S. has long been able to define values, interests, and norms that have shaped
international laws and conduct between international actors. Quite literally, by being the leading power, the U.S. has had the ability to define elements of how the world ought to look like—
though not always successfully. These are some of the key reasons why the LIO is crucial to American interests.
3.3.3. Existing Problems of the LIO
Despite the benefits and idealistic visions brought on by the LIO, with U.S. stewardship, there exist several major flaws—among others—that have exacerbated distrust in the current Order. Flagrant abuse of norms and internationally recognized laws by powers, particularly among members of the UN Permanent Security Council (UNPSC) members, damage the order’s credibility. Additionally, there exists the issue of the Liberal Order’s inability to perfectly
address the issue of equity among states. Most importantly, however, one of the major
drawbacks of the Liberal Order is its inability to effectively manage competition among great power competitors that are integral to the Order’s functioning. These are but some of the main reasons for distrust with the Liberal Order. The purpose of this section is to point out that limitations to how effective the Order functions is a result of certain factors. Factors that can be addressed in the long term, and issues that can be improved upon by states willing to engage in good faith. Yet, this process may well be interrupted by revisionist powers, like the PRC, or Russia.
Another grouping of literature analyzes problems with the existing International Order and the ways to addressing these issues. One perspective argues that the Order is ill equipped to deal with structural factors like the rise of China, which endanger it, and that it is almost certain to undergo fragmentation into multiple smaller orders. Scholar Randall Schweller, for instance, argued that the diffusion of power and authority causes unpredictability, which is likely to result in fragmentation.127 In a similar vein, former Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker contended that the order is weakened owing to “an unregulated diffusion of authority, agency and responsibility.”128 On the other hand, journalist Fareed Zakaria argued that the problems facing the International Order are the results of self-inflicted wounds of unilateral
127 Xiaoyu Pu & Schweller, Randall. (2014). Status Signaling, Multiple Audiences, and China’s Blue-Water Naval Ambition. Status in World Politics. 141-162. 10.1017/CBO9781107444409.009.
128 Chester A Crocker, “The Strategic Dilemma of a World Adrift,” Survival, Vol. 57, No. 1, February–March 2015, pp. 7–30.
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mismanagement by the United States. He contends that the U.S. squandered its unipolar moment by violating key international laws and norms on top of pursuing unilateral interests.129
Statesman Zbigniew Brzezinski combines the two earlier issues, but also stresses the dangers of a non-strategically attentive U.S. and the implications for global issues ranging from nuclear proliferation to climate change.130 Another problem for the International Order, as author Stewart Patrick surmises, concerns the unwillingness of current principal actors to adjust the Order to provide more representation for emerging powers. Yet, this issue, Patrick argues, could be resolved by constructive efforts made to integrate emergent powers.131 A further critique of the International Order, largely from a Chinese perspective, argues that the Order serves to function as a mechanism for U.S. hegemony meant to constrain states like the PRC.132
One of the more controversial problems with the Liberal Order is that important norms and internationally recognized laws have been and continue to be broken, even by states central to the Liberal Order. One of the primary sources of this issue is the fact that individual state interests may not necessarily align with what is beneficial overall for the LIO. In cases where states grotesquely violate the established rules of the International Order, punitive actions, like sanctions, are meant to be applied against offenders. Some of those offenders, however, are also key members of the LIO or significant enough in global influence and political capital to make sanctions unpalatable or downright impossible. An uncomfortable example for many Americans to admit would be the George W. Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq and end Iraq’s capacity to engineer Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2003. In this particular case, the U.S. did not receive UN endorsement to invade Iraq. Then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had also openly declared the war “illegal.”133 In a more recent example, the PRC’s island reclamation campaigns in the South China Sea violates the UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), despite the PRC being a signatory. To be clear, this author does not believe that there is a moral equivalence between these two states. Yet, the apparent hypocrisy is highlighted by illiberal powers to degrade the legitimacy of the U.S. led Order. These two examples illustrate
129 Fareed Zakaria, “The Self-Destruction of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, 2019.
130 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, New York: Basic Books, 2013.
131 Stewart Patrick, “The Unruled World,” Foreign Affairs, 2014.
132 Fu Ying, Global Changes and China's Role, Beijing, 2018.
133 MacAskill, Ewen, and Julian Borger. “Iraq War Was Illegal and Breached UN Charter, Says Annan.” The Guardian. September 16, 2004. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq.
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that at the heart of the LIO, there exists a tension between notions of Westphalian sovereignty and global interconnectedness. In a globalized world where concepts like the “responsibility to protect” (which seeks the approval of intervention in cases of genocide and mass killings) were gaining traction, the tension between sovereignty and the laws and norms of the LIO are made more palpable. Especially at a time of rising populism and nationalist sentiments. A factor exacerbated by inequities caused by globalized economies. Consequently, this contradiction between sovereignty and interconnectedness partially drives states to take action unilaterally.
Another issue with the Liberal Order is its inability to perfectly address the issue of equitable redistribution. Although one of the defining features of the Liberal Order has been the promotion of free trade and market economies, in recent years this has led to a reexamination of liberal economic benefits by some. In one interpretation of these events, the rise of populism globally, has been linked to rising inequality and disparities in quality of life metrics.134 Recent protests by disaffected members of the populace across Latin American countries have, in part, been levied against decades of Neoliberal policies either overseen by international organizations such as the IMF or by domestic leaders.135 Likewise, the Donald J. Trump administration’s criticism of American allies and competitor states unfair trade policies serves as another
prescient example. Certainly, some of the stated problems of inequitable redistribution relates to the aforementioned issue of tension between sovereignty and the rules and norms of the LIO.
Despite the global issues of inequity, provided willingness and good faith of actors to cooperate internationally, they can still be resolved via changes to the rules-based system under the Liberal Order. Illiberal, revisionist powers like the PRC have made it clear they do not seek to do that.
A further issue with the existing Liberal Order is its inability to effectively manage competition between great powers that have become integral to its functioning and continued success. Once states are “brought” into the Liberal Order, they become members that have the potential to affect certain aspects of the Order. However, as mentioned above, the Liberal Order may not always have the capacity to decisively and retroactively affect said state. Consequently, not all members of the Liberal Order necessarily believe in liberal-democratic principles, though they may certainly be bound to the principles tacitly. This is certainly not the case with more
134 Ronald Inglehart, and Pippa Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash," HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP16-026, August 2016.
135 Ishaan Tharoor, “The Anti-Neoliberal Wave Rocking Latin America,” The Washington Post, October 29, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/10/29/anti-neoliberal-wave-rocking-latin-america/.
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powerful participants of the International Order. It is also for this reason that many influential members of the Order have placed sovereign interest over upholding liberal-democratic norms and international law. Then, when this issue circles back to the problematic conundrum of great power competition between states within the order, there is little the Liberal Order can
collectively do in order to constrain or manage states participating in this competition.