论述改革与中华人民共和国：可行性及应用评估 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Discourse Reform and the People’s 政治 Republic of China: An 大 Evaluation of 立 Possibilities and Implications 论述改革与中华人民共和国：可行性及应用评估 n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. ULYSSES Z.Y.(張越) MCGUINNESS Advisor: DAVID J. LORENZO. July, 2020. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(2) ABSTRACT What are the prospects for changing the People’s Republic of China’s international behavior by facilitating changes to its internal discourse environment? This thesis evaluates the possibilities and implications of inducing changes to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping’s conception of Chinese National Rejuvenation, with a particular aim of discounting the importance of territorial integrity; thereby moderating PRC behavior to transition away from irredentism. The theoretical framework of this study combines Hayden White’s conceptualization of metahistorical narratives, with David E. Apter and Tony Saich’s model for discourse creation and change. Under this framework, I use Taiwan as a single case study to test against one conceptualization of strategic communications, utilized as a vehicle for discourse change. This study is organized into three broad parts with intervening segments. First, this study presents the introduction and theoretical background. Then, this study proceeds to reflect upon contemporary U.S. policy in order to clarify a working set of guidelines and assumptions. The final portion focuses on analyzing the potentials and efficacy of discourse change by using strategic communications directed towards Xi Jinping. The findings of this evaluation suggest that the implementation of strategic communication, as conceived of by this study, is not likely to result in changes to deeply embedded sentiments of territorial integrity. Nor, as a consequence, result in profound changes to “National Rejuvenation.” These are due to a combination of the limitations of Xi’s power as well as a lack of a cohesive national vision on the part of the United States. Be that as it may, these methods may continue to reinforce short-term deterrence against the PRC’s decision to change the regional status-quo. Put together, such methods may afford the United States some degree of flexibility by providing necessary time to coalesce around a national narrative to guide a new grand strategy.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. I DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(3) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I began this project envisioning a start to my government service by seeking to make an infinitesimal contribution to US-PRC policy. Over time, however, it grew into a piece reflecting on the nature of US-PRC relations, the interconnection between domestic and foreign politics back home—as within the PRC—but importantly my own slow realization of self-defined purpose. This thesis was born out of numerous discussions with far more capable acquaintances, friends, mentors, and family. For that, I have a deep debt of gratitude for all who have contributed to this process. I want to thank my advisor Professor David J. Lorenzo for humoring my thoughts and frequently lackluster ideas—many of which appeared decent prior to our conversations! Dr. Lorenzo made all of this possible by indulging in my often overly ambitious ideas on discerning the nature of the world and political philosophy. For that, I have a tremendous amount of thanks.. 政治大. I also want to extend thanks my committee chair, Professor Hans Tung (童涵浦) for patiently provided invaluable answers and expert opinion to many a naïve question I have directed his way. His patience, in-spite of our conversations usually lasting longer than the allotted time, has been greatly appreciated and has done much to temper my own ignorance on a variety of subjects. Dr. Charles Wu (吳崇涵) also provided much needed direction, in terms of challenging questions and assumptions, on top of directing me to certain sources. He also has my thanks.. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Fulbright Taiwan, and the Foundation for Scholarly exchange (FSE) staff all have my sincerest appreciation for making my experience in Taiwan possible. I wish to thank Dr. Randall Nadeau in particular for leading Fulbright Taiwan through the unprecedented challenge that is the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, I also want to thank Dr. William Vocke for his generosity and guidance at times when it was a much needed. v. ni. l. A heartfelt thank you also goes C outhto my fellow Fulbright i U Student Fellows and e h n c g classmates. Second Lieutenant Benjamin Denn and Captain Daniel Glockler have the exceptional ability to tease out often abstract, ethereal, and complex thoughts on domestic affairs, the role of the United States, and of Nationalism in shaping our daily perspectives. Their thoughts have undeniably contributed to reflecting upon my own and they have my deep gratitude. I also thank Colonel E. John Gregory and Lieutenant Colonel Jason Halub for their persistent mentorship, instruction, and support. They serve as exceptional role-models for any aspiring Army officer, or leader. I have been fortunate to have benefitted so greatly from their continued support and direction. Lastly, to my family, thank you for imbuing in me the passion to want to change the world.. II DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(4) TABLE OF CONTENTS Part I Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................................1 1.1: Justifying U.S.-China Competition? ................................................................................................ 1 1.2: Examining Aspects of Competition: Making a Case for the Information Domain ........................... 2 1.3: Clarifying Misconceptions Regarding the Chinese Information Environment .................................. 5 1.4: Taiwan: It’s Importance, the Stakes, and Information’s Role ........................................................... 6 1.5: Thesis Structure ............................................................................................................................... 12. Chapter 2: Literature Review and Methodological Approach .......................................................14 2.1: Discourse and Behavior in Rationalist and Constructivist Literature ............................................. 14 2.2: Applications of Discourse in the Policymaking Community ........................................................... 16 2.3: Methods of Discursive Change in the Rationalist Paradigms ......................................................... 20. 政治大 2.5: Historiography and Discourse Analysis 立 ........................................................................................... 26 2.4: Methods of Discursive Change in the Constructivist Paradigm ..................................................... 23. ‧ 國. Part II. 學. 2.6: Theoretical Approach and Methodology ......................................................................................... 30. ‧. Chapter 3: Appraising U.S. Interests and the End State of Competition with the PRC ................33 3.1: An Overview of Existing U.S. Policy in the Donald J. Trump Administration ............................... 33. y. Nat. sit. 3.2: The Domestic Factors Shaping the Foreign Policy Debate .............................................................. 38. er. io. 3.3: American Interests and the LIO........................................................................................................ 42. al. n. iv n C 3.3.2: Historical and Contemporary American LIO ...................................................... 45 h eInterests i U n g c inhthe 3.3.1: What is the LIO? ......................................................................................................................... 42. 3.3.3: Existing Problems of the LIO ...................................................................................................... 49 3.3.4: How Does the PRC Subvert the LIO and American Interests? ................................................... 52. Chapter 4: Xi Jinping’s Worldview and the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation ...............59 4.1: The Party Structure and the PRC’s Governance ............................................................................... 59 4.2: Xi’s “National Rejuvenation” and Factors Heightening the Risks of Miscalculation ...................... 66 4.3: Xi Jinping as the Reform Agent ....................................................................................................... 73. Part III Chapter 5: Narrative Categorization and Selection .......................................................................75 5.1: Categorizing National Rejuvenation................................................................................................. 75 5.2: Political Perspectives and Undercurrents in the PRC ....................................................................... 77. III DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(5) 5.2.1. The Liberal Constitutionalist Vision of China ............................................................................. 78 5.2.2. Party Affiliated Dissenters ........................................................................................................... 81 5.3: Alternative Generalized Narratives ................................................................................................. 86. Chapter 6: Delivering the Narrative, Potential Indicators, and Assessment ..................................90 6.1: Narrative Delivery ........................................................................................................................... 90 6.2: Potential Indicators ........................................................................................................................... 95 6.3: Assessment ....................................................................................................................................... 98. Chapter 7: Concluding Remarks ..................................................................................................102 7.1: Contribution to the literature .......................................................................................................... 103 7.2: Limitations and Further Research .................................................................................................. 104. 政治大. 7.3: Implications .................................................................................................................................... 105. References (English) ....................................................................................................................107. 立. 學 TABLES AND FIGURES. ‧. ‧ 國. References (Chinese) ...................................................................................................................118. sit. y. Nat. Table 2.5-1: White’s Levels of Conceptualization in “Historical Work” .................................27. er. io. Table 2.5-2: White’s Conception of “Historical Work”.............................................................28. n. Table 3.1-1: A summary of DoDaObjectives from the National vDefense Strategy....................34. i. l. n Policy in the Absence of C h and GuidelinesUfor Table 3.2-1: Assumptions of U.S. Interests i e h n gc National Vision ..........................................................................................................................42 Table 4.1-1: Xi Jinping’s Formal Institutionalized Power .........................................................63 Table 4.1-2: Summary of Xi Jinping and his ties with other members of the Standing Committee ..................................................................................................................................64 Table 4.1-3: Summary of Xi Jinping and his ties with the remaining members of the 19th Politburo .....................................................................................................................................65 Figure 4.2-1 Figure of the PRC with its Disputed Boundaries and the “Island Chains” ..........71 Table 5.1-1: Categorizing Xi’s Humiliation and National Rejuvenation Narrative...................77 Table 5.2.2-1: Select National Initiatives and Strategic Goals of the PRC ................................83 Table 5.3-1: Potential Alternative Narrative Structures and their Favorability to U.S. Interests ....................................................................................................................................................87. IV DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(6) NOTICE “The views expressed are those of the author’s and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.”. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. V DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(7) 1. Introduction What are the prospects for changing the PRC’s international behavior by facilitating changes to its internal discourse environment? 1.1. Justifying U.S.-China Competition? Great-Power Competition between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (US) will indelibly characterize much of U.S. policymaking in the domestic and foreign spheres. Some scholars, such as Graham Allison, attribute this competition to an oftrepeated historical phenomenon, where the ascendance of a rival power triggers a propensity for conflict with the established power.1 Others, like Samuel P. Huntington, point to a “clash of civilizations,” whereby competing modes of cultural and religious oriented identities give way to. 政治大 between the United States and PRC立 are yet to be coherently articulated and accepted, what is conflict owing to existential differences.2 While the reasons and rationale for competition. ‧ 國. 學. apparent are the stakes that are involved. The confluence of changing geopolitical realities, emergent technologies and normative ideas on how to use them, are likely to fundamentally alter. ‧. the very ways in which we define our own humanity. Yet, U.S. and PRC leadership each ascribe to different sets of values, worldviews, and norms. Consequently, a rivalry viewed by some in. Nat. sit. y. increasingly zero-sum terms demands the attention of all observers. It is within this context that I. er. io. bring focus to an especially minacious facet of the PRC leadership’s pursuit of “National. n. Rejuvenation.” Specifically, the issue a of “territorial integrity” and its uncomfortable potential to. l. C region. trigger conflict in the greater Indo-Pacific. hengchi. i n U. v. On January 2nd, 2019, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping (习近平), delivered a speech to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” (告台湾同胞书纪 40 周年).3 Under the luminescent shine of the Great Hall of the People, Xi began his speech by grimly recounting the historical legacy of tragedy that. Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?,” The Atlantic (Emerson Collective, September 24, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-chinawar-thucydides-trap/406756/. 2 Samuel P Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49. doi:10.2307/20045621. 3 The original “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” was delivered by Deng Xiaoping on Jan 1st, 1979. This speech ended the bombardment of Jinmen (Quemoy) island by the PLA and began a transition towards the PRC’s guidance of “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan. 1. 1 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(8) befell China, and that resulted in the separation of Taiwan from the “ancestral nation” (祖国).4 As he neared the end of his speech, Xi’s tone began to shift from a monotone stoicism to a forceful confidence. “History cannot be chosen,” he affirmed, “the road ahead will not be smooth, but as long as we work together…we will be able to create a great future for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and we will be able to complete the great cause of the reunification of the ancestral nation.”5 Importantly, this speech marked Taiwan’s centrality in realizing Xi’s conception of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Problematically, however, this speech is also part of a broader pattern of Xi’s decision to turn towards irredentism. Xi’s emphasis of the importance of territorial integrity, in the realization of his conception of the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (中华民族伟. 政治大 lost Chinese greatness. Indubitably, this type of worldview further elevates the risks and 立. 大复兴的中国梦), is a historically indignant ethno-nationalistic project of reviving a perceived. potentials for miscalculation by opposing sides. Consequently, as the United States and PRC. ‧ 國. 學. clash over issues ranging from Taiwan to the South China Sea, competing below the threshold of armed conflict would require a reimagining of possible capabilities.. ‧. sit. y. Nat. 1.2. Examining Aspects of Competition: Making a Case for the Information Domain. er. io. In the current political atmosphere of the U.S. policymaking world, many security studies. n. observers are fixated on the idea ofaa “physical” competition withvthe PRC to the detriment of. l. ni. C h Whilst manyUof these observers rightly call for an leveraging other options, such as information. i e ngch. increase in physical power capabilities, that underpin deterrence, they may fail to account for uncomfortable limitations. One issue with deterring actions, based primarily on physical power, is the unwittingly exacerbation of tension that then threatens the stability it seeks to achieve with. I choose “ancestral nation” rather than the more typical translation of “motherland” because there is an important distinction to point out in this context. When Chinese, or some Chinese diaspora, refer to 祖国, it is a much deeper connotation of ancestry than simply a sense of where they came from which the more typical translation of “motherland” connotes. The use of this word in this context signifies a Confucian idea of belonging and cultural ties linked by blood relations through ancestral lineage. For this reason, Xi’s use of this word implies that association between Taiwan and the mainland is not something that can simply be broken by newfound identity, or events that have transpired since Taiwan’s separation from mainland governance, [《告台湾同胞书》发表 40 周年] 中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平同志发表重要讲话：为实现民族伟大复兴推进祖国和平统一而共同奋斗 (China Central Television, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hHc8xstP0Hs. 5 Ibid. 4. 2 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(9) absolute power disparity—in what is known as a security dilemma. This is particularly true if the targeted state perceives the physical manifestation of deterrent actions as a confirmation of its worst suspicions. The security dilemma certainly rings true for the United States and the PRC. Afterall, the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is intended to seek parity with the U.S. military by mid-century, supposedly, in order to defend territorial integrity.6 While conversely, U.S. planners would never accept a PLA anywhere near military parity. Concurrently, the prospects for the United States to achieve absolute physical power disparity are dwindling. Global U.S. military commitments have not drawn down significantly—despite an earnest effort by recent administrations. Similarly, the PRC—along with other actors—are rapidly closing the gap in technology and exploiting unconventional capabilities.7 Beyond these material limitations, domestic concerns also weigh heavily as an underappreciated cost in. 政治大. shaping the limits of foreign policy; concerns which can also be exacerbated by foreign actors.. 立. For these reasons, a supplemental method to advance U.S. interests in great power competition. ‧ 國. 學. could be to apply a lower cost, underappreciated, and underutilized instrument of national power: information. Indeed, the U.S. Military Joint Staff’s recent publication, “Joint Concept for. ‧. Operating in the Information Environment” outlined a need for the greater use of “information.” In the publication, the authors stressed, “the increasing importance of information requires that. y. Nat. sit. the Joint Force move beyond the current paradigm focused primarily on physical power.”8 In. er. io. recent years, the PRC has been shown to be adept at wielding such unconventional tools—even. al. n. iv n C U and effort towards globally American policymakers have devoted h esignificant n g c h itime. on American soil.. combatting dangerous acts, influence operations, and provocative narratives stemming from the PRC. Contrary to popular understandings, these actions by the PRC have resulted in concrete, and tangible damages to U.S. national security on American soil. For instance, FBI director Christopher Wray cited the 2017 Equifax hack and stated, “if you are an American adult , it is. 6. To be clear, I believe these moves are irredentist in nature, but many Chinese do in fact believe that they are “defending” what is “historically” theirs, “China's National Defense in the New Era,” China's National Defense in the New Era § (2019). 7 “Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 ,” Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 § (2019). 8 “Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE),” Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE) § (2018).. 3 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(10) more likely than not that China has stolen your personal data.”9 Elements of the PLA, or state directed individuals, and even private American citizens, have also engaged in intellectual Property (IP) theft or misuse. All together, these unfair practices may exceed an estimated $225 billion of damages annually.10 Another source of concern, beyond the immediate cost of damages, is that some of these technologies and IP have a dual-use function. Meaning they can be fielded to advance the PLA efforts of modernization. Additionally, agents of the PRC’s intelligence services have long been known to accost Chinese diaspora and green card holders, among others, in extrajudicial intimidation campaigns on U.S. soil.11 Most recently, several prominent U.S. businesses, to include the National Basketball Association, Activision-Blizzard and others, were pressured to stifle individual expressions of support for Hong Kong protestors by citing China’s immense market and the hurt feelings of the Chinese people.12 Importantly, all. 政治大. of these acts are facets of how the PRC leadership behaves in pursuit of its own national interest,. 立. whilst simultaneously endangering Americans’ safety and infringing upon constitutional rights. ‧ 國. 學. on American soil. These acts lead to questions of how to respond using information. In one example, U.S. lawmakers have been leveraging the support of U.S. government. ‧. funded media, such as Radio Free Asia’s Uighur Service.13 This reporting not only brought attention to the human rights abuses in Xinjiang, but also aided in preventing the normalization. y. Nat. sit. of the PRC’s actions. While these efforts have certainly raised international awareness, they have. er. io. had little impact in discouraging the CCP from continuing with its policy. One rationale for this. n. a that discourse guides policy limited success can be tied to the idea i v and action. In the PRC’s. l C n from broader international U context, their discursive environment is not insulated honly i e n largely h gc “Director Wray Discusses Threat Posed By China to U.S. Economic and National Security,” FBI (FBI, July 7, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-and-the-chinesecommunist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-unitedstates/layout_view?fbclid=IwAR3rTVwHdt8d-W_6_yGPcbX4CSEUfcFEOQoNYxAcukNyiL7hvIOLz3nLvFY. 10 “The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy” (The National Bureau of Asian Research, February 27, 2017), http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf. 11 Karen DeYoung, “Obama Warns China About Using Secret Agents to Track Down Fugitives in U.S.,” The Washington Post, August 16, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-warns-chinaabout-using-secret-agents-to-track-down-fugitives-in-us/2015/08/16/603934a0-4475-11e5-846d02792f854297_story.html. 12 Zheping Huang and Gregory Stuart Hunter, “Gamers Boycott Blizzard After Protest Sympathizer Is Banned,” Bloomberg , October 2, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-09/gamers-call-for-boycott-ofblizzard-after-hong-kong-protest-ban. 13 Andrew McCormick, “What It’s Like to Report on Rights Abuses Against Your Own Family,” The Atlantic, March 1, 2019. 9. 4 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(11) pressures, it is frustratingly difficult to shape from the bottom-up; especially as an external actor with access to limited information. Where outside pressure may have failed, could other forms of information use, such as strategic communication and public diplomacy, succeed? Despite the obvious challenges, it is worth exploring this topic by posing the question: what are the prospects for changing the PRC’s international behavior by facilitating changes to its internal discourse environment? 1.3. Clarifying Misconceptions Regarding the Chinese Information Environment Although many questions persist regarding the effectiveness of attempting to shape internal opinion within the PRC, a lot of misconceptions cloud a proper understanding of. 治政大 of information within the PRC, that does not entail that all Chinese—or even Party leadership— 立 think the same way, or believe the official narratives as presented. Certainly, the CCP has done. Chinese discursive spaces. While the CCP has a formal, monopolistic, hold over the presentation 14. ‧ 國. 學. its best to perpetuate this notion.. In February 2016, Xi Jinping, stated, “party-owned media must embody the family name. ‧. of the party.”15 Due his efforts on strengthening enforcement of his ideology, along with his. sit. y. Nat. crackdown on political rivals via his anti-corruption campaign, virtually all public media in the PRC reproduces similar information. This, along with an extreme censorship apparatus on all. io. a. er. Chinese social media, controls much of what the average Chinese can see or read without a. n. v l virtual private network in the PRC. Admittedly, even outside of n ithe PRC, the Party takes a Ch. U. e n g con h iethnic Chinese organizations and proactive role in trying to monopolize their influence. enclaves, which further insulates this discourse space from outsiders. For example, Chinese students studying abroad in countries, such as the United States and Australia, sometimes come across liaisons from the Chinese Student and Scholars Association, who work closely with PRC consulates and embassy staff.16 On the surface, these and other similar reasons present a strong. 14. While this point may appear as a bit of a strawman, worryingly, there are indeed many people—even within the policymaking community—who believe that Chinese act as if they were automatons, consistently obeying the official party line. 15 周成洋, “党和政府的喉舌就是人民的喉舌,” Xinhuanet, February 22, 2016. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-02/22/c_128741125.htm. 16 Larry Diamond, and Orville Schell, eds, “Chinese Influence and American Interests Promoting Constructive Vigilance,” Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2018.. 5 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(12) case that any and all discourse and accompanying narratives relating to the Chinese information environment are strictly controlled by the PRC. For policymakers, however, concluding that the whole of China is forced via censorship tools to believe and think in a similar manner, or that outside actors have few—if any—means of impacting their discursive environments and accompanying behaviors, would be a mistake. Much news coverage is given to the virulent, and often dangerous, outbursts of apparent uniform and directed nationalist vitriol by the Chinese people. For some, however, it may come as a surprise that thoughts within this discourse space are still malleable, and evidently myriad in variety. Topics which are often thought of as taboo in China quite frequently slip past censors in creative or ingenious ways such as puns or clever wordplay. Chinese netizens calling for the death of Xi Jinping in the ensuing fallout of COVID-19, for instance, began using the character. 政治大. 翠 (cui, green jade), which combines the character 习 (Xi, Xi’s family name) and 卒 (zu, a dated. 立. way of expressing “to die”).17 Likewise, when the Chinese public discovered that COVID-19. ‧ 國. 學. whistleblower, Dr. Li Wenliang (李文亮), had passed, hashtags calling for freedom of speech possessed millions of views.18 These cases show that while censorship may blot out certain. ‧. sentiments from being seen publicly, it does not necessarily mean that the Chinese populace. sit. y. Nat. completely believes what it is being shown. Thus, it offers up a potential rationale in wondering about the possibility of what—if any—influence external actors can have in shaping behavior;. io. a. er. particularly over certain Party leadership who would be more likely to be in contact with external. n. v l there even be possibilities actors than many ordinary Chinese. Might n i of persuading key Chinese Ch. U. i to shape their international e n g cinhorder leadership to change elements of national narratives behavior? It is worthwhile to use Taiwan as a backdrop to explore the above questions,. especially as Taiwan increasingly becomes a focal point of competing U.S. and PRC interests. 1.4. Taiwan: It’s Importance, the Stakes, and Information’s Role. Josh Rudolph, “Sensitive Words: ‘Where Is That Person?", ‘Everyday I Pray for Green Jade,’” China Digital Times (CDT), February 11, 2020, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/02/sensitive-words-where-is-that-personeveryday-i-pray-for-green-jade/. 18 Dr. Li had been reprimanded by local authorities for raising public awareness of the virus and later succumbed to the virus, Josephine Ma and Jun Mai, “Death of Coronavirus Doctor Li Wenliang Becomes Catalyst for ‘Freedom of Speech’ Demands in China,” South China Morning Post, February 7, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3049606/coronavirus-doctors-death-becomes-catalyst-freedomspeech. 17. 6 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(13) Taiwan provides a good setting to explore potential applications of information related capabilities. Not only is Taiwan critical to understanding the PRC’s view of territorial integrity in “National Rejuvenation,” but Taiwan is also important in understanding and appraising the reality of exigent American interests. Simultaneously, Taiwan still remains a dangerous flash point for conventional war between the United States, U.S. allies and Partners, and the PRC. For these reasons, Taiwan serves as a unique case for examining information as a method of competing below the threshold of armed conflict. The contemporary Party leadership’s push for territorial integrity over Taiwan is guided by its twin desires to: 1) demonstrate the legitimacy of its right to rule and 2) legitimate its ideology to continue being wielded as a vanguard of the Chinese people. For the CCP, exalting. 政治大 democratic government” is a matter of life and death for the Party. A successful reunification of 立 the central importance of the PRC’s Marxist-Leninist governing model over that of a “liberal. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan, whether through force or peaceful measures, is thus a necessity in articulating why the Party should continue to stay in power via a demonstration of its own “end of history” moment.. ‧. Consequently, territorial integrity in this context isn’t simply righting the wrongs of historical humiliation, but about linkages in other areas of the Party’s understanding of national security.. sit. y. Nat. The leadership of the CCP, and many of the PRC’s governed people, view Taiwanese. er. io. reunification as a deeply symbolic affirmation of the PRC’s system and prevailing discourse.. n. Taiwan is significant because of thea historicity of its place in the Century of Humiliation. l. iv. narrative. By virtue of being the last significant part of “China” C U n that is still “separated,” uniting. hen. hi. g cleadership and ordinary Chinese alike. A Taiwan fulfills an ethno-nationalistic drive for PRC recent survey across ten major cities in the PRC suggests that the majority of respondents possessed affirmative views towards such sentiments of reunification.19 Not only does this. perception hold true for many denizens of China, it directly legitimizes the Party and Xi Jinping in their pursuit to rationalize their hold on power. Xi is reported to have stated, “the Communist. Hsin-Hsin Pan, Wen-Chin Wu, and Yu-Tzung Chang, “How Chinese Citizens Perceive Cross-Strait Relations: Survey Results from Ten Major Cities in China,” Journal of Contemporary China 26, no. 106 (September 2017): pp. 616-631, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2017.1274835. 19. 7 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(14) Party would be overthrown by the [Chinese] people if the pro-independence issue [is] not dealt with” during a meeting with a former Chairwoman of the Kuomintang.20 From the PLA’s geostrategic perspective, Taiwan is also important because of its location. Not only is it situated along the “first island chain,” it is a critical portion of territory in securing the PRC’s other contested areas from the South China Sea to the East China Sea. Being part of the first island chain, Taiwan is located between shallow and deep waters and offers a pivotal ground for expansion into the greater Eastern Pacific region for the PLA Navy. For CCP leadership, seizing Taiwan breaks the uncomfortable perception of a stranglehold via containment by the United States. At the same time, control over Taiwan offers PLA planners a greater array of options for pressuring neighboring would-be adversaries in addition to U.S. allies and partners in the region.21. 政治大. Moreover, Taiwan’s existence as a separate and de-facto independent nation provides an. 立. uncomfortable alternative to the CCP’s leadership. This is not simply because Taiwan provides. ‧ 國. 學. an alternative “beacon of freedom” for ethnic Chinese (as is a point many American/Western commentators like to focus on).22 Rather, it is because it provides a literal counter example to the. ‧. Party’s narrative that China must be territorially and socially united in order to be safe, and to prevent the “backwardness” which lead to weakness and ensuing exploitation.23 This dynamic. y. Nat. sit. puts pressure on the Party in its response to traditionally non-ethnic Han provinces, or regions. er. io. that have enjoyed significant cultural and normative autonomy. These areas include places such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and even Hong a Kong.. n. iv l C n U fulfillment of national Technologically speaking, Taiwanhise crucial to the n g c h i PRC’s. initiatives such as the Made in China 2025 strategic vision and even military modernization. Crucially, Taiwanese talent and technology can be utilized to aid the PRC in its economic competition with the United States. Semiconductors are an integral component of modern advanced electronics manufacturing. Over 70% of the world’s semiconductors are either. 20 Zhang Pinghui, “Xi Jinping Warns Communist Party Would Be ‘Overthrown’ If Taiwan’s Independence Push Left Unchecked,” South China Morning Post, November 4, 2016, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/2042784/xi-jinping-warns-communist-party-would-be-overthrown-if. 21 Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia (Manchester: Eastbridge Books, 2017), chap 1. 22 Ibid., chap. 7. 23 Song expounds upon this perception of weakness being linked to backwardness in this journal from the Central Party School, 宋福范, “论习近平治国理政的宏观理路,” 中共中央党校（国家行政学院）学报 21 (February 2017): pp. 5-13, 9.. 8 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(15) manufactured or undergo production of some capacity in Taiwan.24 For this reason, the PRC has made a concerted effort to poach Taiwanese talent by giving greater incentives to those working in the semiconductor and advanced electronics industries.25 The PRC relies heavily on Taiwanese semiconductor exports to drive their indigenous capacity. Taiwan’s importance to the United States is harder to define in concrete terms because various stakeholders ascribe to differing conceptions of what’s important. In some broadly similar ways to the PRC, Taiwan’s importance to the United States can be denoted by its geostrategic, ideological, and economic aspects. Yet, various parties from average voters, policymakers, and elected representatives, all possess differing conceptions of what proves most salient to their interests and what they are willing to give-up in exchange. Certainly, there exist lawful considerations on top of other factors such as strategic, economic, and moral. 政治大. considerations among others. For many Americans, however, these considerations may still not. 立. be strong enough of a justification to warrant valuing Taiwan’s importance, because these issues. ‧ 國. 學. either appear distant or are presented in terms harder to gauge. For these reasons, to truly articulate why Taiwan is important to the “average American,” policymakers need to explain. Taiwan, and then make the link to broader national security threats.. Nat. y. ‧. why the average American’s daily routine would be disrupted by the PRC’s reunification of. sit. Taiwan’s importance to the United States is easy to justify on a variety of fronts, but it is. er. io. frustratingly difficult to reconcile with the potential costs. The prevailing sentiment of explaining. n. a Taiwan’s importance is usually as follows. First, is the citation of i vcodified laws such as the. l C n U Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which introduced “strategic ambiguity” and the potential of U.S. heng i h c 26 intervention on Taiwan’s behalf. Similarly, strategic and diplomatic considerations are. carefully weighed as well. This line of thought usually espouses the idea that failure to aid Taiwan would destroy U.S. credibility in the eyes of other allies and partners; ergo triggering grave ramifications for our network of alliances and partnerships. Next, interested parties generally point to a moral obligation to protect a fellow democracy from a would-be Brad Slingerlend, “A Semiconductor 'Cold War' Is Heating Up Between the U.S. and China,” MarketWatch (MarketWatch, June 2, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/a-semiconductor-cold-war-is-heating-upbetween-the-us-and-china-2020-06-01. 25 Yimou Lee, “China Lures Chip Talent From Taiwan with Fat Salaries, Perks,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, September 4, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-semiconductors-taiwan-insight-idUSKCN1LK0H1. 26 “Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8, 22 U.S.C. 3301 Et Seq.),” American Institute in Taiwan (American Institute in Taiwan, July 10, 2018), https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policydocuments-region/taiwan-relations-act/. 24. 9 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(16) authoritarian aggressor. Some policymakers also highlight the trade and importance of Taiwan in relation to the United States own economy. Yet, despite all of these being exceptional reasons for why Taiwan matters, to many observers there is perhaps still something lacking. Congress may vote against military support because of the sheer costs of a war with the PRC. Compounding this issue, for some U.S. policymakers, continued and sustained aid to Taiwan should be predicated on the Taiwanese willingness to fight against an adversarial PRC. A separate, but related consideration for American policymakers weighing Taiwan’s importance, deals with the issue of Taiwanese willingness and capability to defend itself. These considerations also inform policymakers and the American public’s contemplation of Taiwan’s importance. Despite author Ian Easton’s excellent points on how difficult of an invasion scenario Taiwan would present to the PRC, detractors point to rightful concerns with the present state of. 政治大. Taiwanese defense and domestic Taiwanese perceptions of them. For one, there is justifiable. 立. concern with questioning the readiness of the Taiwanese armed forces. From the quality of. ‧ 國. 學. conscript training, quality and capability of dated equipment, to overly scripted and unrealistic military exercises, there are a multitude of issues readily apparent with Taiwanese force. ‧. readiness.27 Compounding this issue, many Taiwanese are well aware of the limits in Taiwan’s military capabilities compared to the PRC, and by extension are unwilling to die for what they. y. Nat. sit. assume would be a forlorn conclusion. Recent surveys by the Taiwan National Security Survey. er. io. show that in the event of a PRC invasion close to 45% of respondents plan to “leave the. n. a country,” “unhappily accept the situation,” “hide,” or will choosei vto surrender.28 Thus for all. l C n of why the United States ought U relevant observers, these disconcerting truths the iquestion h edonbeg h gc to risk blood and treasure in support of a people who appear unwilling to defend themselves.. Perhaps the clearest way to justify the potential costs of supporting Taiwan could be to illustrate the potential impact on the day-to-day lives of Americans—if Taiwan were to be reunified by the PRC. One potential explanation could be elucidating that the material impact on every-day Americans would be concrete and readily apparent. As mentioned above, Taiwan’s dominance in the semiconductor industry would make any disruption hard-felt on average. 27 Kevin McCauley, “Han Kuang 33: New Strategy, Old Problems,” accessed August 16, 2020, http://globaltaiwan.org/2017/06/07-gtb-2-23/#KevinMcCauley060717. 28 Dennis V. Hickey, “What the Latest Opinion Polls Say About Taiwan,” The National Interest (Center for the National Interest, March 5, 2019), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-latest-opinion-polls-say-about-taiwan46187.. 10 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(17) consumers within the United States. It is not difficult to picture the costs of electronic devices rising well beyond what is considered affordable and making certain electronic goods and services prohibitively expensive for many. A more abstract concern, but one that should be treated with equal consideration, is that of its psychological impact. While for many Americans a loss of Taiwan may appear inconsequential on their day-to-day lives, the second and third order effects will most definitely be felt. The resultant tectonic shifts in foreign affairs will recursively impact perceptions domestically, which will in turn have their own ramifications. A parallel can be drawn to the rise of fascism in the early Twentieth century. The unwillingness of liberal democracies to intervene, when necessary, led to the erasure of liberal democratic norms and processes in pursuit of apparent authoritarian systemic-efficiency across many European countries. Not only might this erasure of norms and systemic self-confidence cause greater. 政治大. domestic divisions, longer term the United States may yet again find itself in a global. 立. conflagration when its populace is ill-prepared and already unconfident in the nation as a whole.. ‧ 國. 學. Thus, while it is hard to treat such descriptions of a “zeitgeist” with anything but incredulity at first, it bears some necessary consideration of its long run effects on democratic processes just as. ‧. much as material considerations do. As to the issue of risking blood and treasure for an apparently dispassionate Taiwanese populace, policymakers should also understand that these. y. Nat. sit. facts do not presuppose that the denizens of Taiwan will not resist would-be CCP rule by other. er. io. means. Nor does it mean that this intention to resist will be overlooked by the CCP leadership.29. n. a authoritarianism through largely Taiwan’s own history of combatting i v peaceful means and with l C n U spirit is proof enough. The central importance continued survival as a liberal h e ofn Taiwan’s i h gc. democracy, relative to American interests, is thus the underappreciated—and disproportionate— influence on the day-to-day lives of many Americans. Regardless, policymakers should be focused on clearly communicating these differing strands of real day-to-day impacts, and tailoring the messaging for different interest groups. From this perspective, the PRC’s resistance to deviation from the path of Taiwan reunification pits the Party’s core interests against the status-quo American way of life. Though, clearly, war is not a viable alternative. Consequently, leveraging information through the use of. Ian Easton’s book details a variety of primary sources that detail PLA perceptions of fierce Taiwanese resistance. Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat, chap 1. 29. 11 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(18) strategic communications may prove instructive, especially if it is successful as a means of attaining changes in the Party leadership’s actions. 1.5. Thesis Structure This study is organized into three broad parts with intervening segments. First, this study presents the introduction and theoretical background. In chapter one, I began with an introduction on exploring the importance of the information element of national power in relation to Great-Power Competition between the United States and PRC, presented my research question, and linked Taiwan’s importance in this issue. In chapter two, I present a literature review to clarify discourse’s definition, its relation to behavior, and methods of inducing discursive change. In this section, I also explain my theoretical approach and my methodology.. 政治大. The theoretical framework of this study combines Hayden White’s conceptualization of. 立. metahistorical narratives, with David E. Apter and Tony Saich’s model for discourse creation. ‧ 國. 學. and change. Under this framework, I justify the use of Taiwan as a single case study to test against one conceptualization of strategic communications, which is utilized as a vehicle for. ‧. discourse change. In Part two, this study proceeds to reflect upon contemporary U.S. policy in. y. Nat. order to clarify a working set of guidelines and assumptions. Under this heading, I dedicate. sit. chapter three to interpreting what American interests are, and to appraise how China fits within. er. io. these competing conceptions, and to provide a set of assumptions and guidelines for policy. The. n. final part focuses on analyzing the a potentials and efficacy of discourse i v change by using strategic l. n. C. U I provide an examination of the h eInnchapter communications directed towards Xi Jinping. g c h ifour,. contemporary PRC leadership and its worldview. I dedicate chapter five to the task of analyzing narrative categorization and selection. In chapter six, I will briefly discuss ways of message delivery, on top of stipulating possible indicators. I will conclude this chapter by assessing whether the selected narrative, and indeed, method of strategic communication can be successful in pushing for discourse change and thereby changes to policy. Finally, in my conclusion, I will provide remarks on limitations, implications, and possibilities for future research. The findings of this evaluation suggest that the implementation of strategic communication, as conceived of by this study, is not likely to result in changes to the PRC’s deeply embedded sentiments of territorial integrity. Nor, as a consequence, result in profound changes to “National Rejuvenation.” These are due to a combination of the limitations of Xi’s. 12 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(19) power as well as a lack of a cohesive national vision on the part of the United States. Be that as it may, these methods may continue to reinforce short-term deterrence against the PRC’s decision to change the regional status-quo. Put together, such methods may afford the United States some degree of flexibility by providing necessary time to coalesce around a national narrative to guide a new grand strategy.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 13 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(20) 2. Literature Review and Methodological Approach The relationship between discourse and behavior is an important assumption held in this paper; there is a need to clarify these definitions in this section. This paper’s definition of discourse is not simply a synonym for rhetoric. Rather, this paper defines discourse as a concept drawn from sociological and social science literature. Discourse is, “any practice by which individuals imbue reality with meaning.”30 From this understanding, discourse describes the way to contextualize the expressive and descriptive modes of human experience that are communicated through texts, be they verbal, written, or otherwise expressed. These texts comprise of stories, or narratives, that, among other things, explain understandings of relations among people or groups; classifications of people and actions; definitions of people, concepts. 治政 politics, and ideology. Dutch scholar, Teun A. van Dijk, for 大 instance, argued, “politics is usually 立 discursive as well as ideological, and ideologies are largely reproduced by text and talk.” In and things and so forth. Some scholars articulate the close relationship between discourse,. 31. ‧ 國. 學. short, discourse aids in defining one’s interest. Moreover, an extrapolation of this understanding can be found in other areas of established rationalist and constructivist theories, as well as the. ‧. policymaking world.. y. Nat. er. io. sit. 2.1. Discourse and Behavior in Rationalist and Constructivist Literature Among rationalist theories in international relations, discourse can be applied to examine. n. al. iv. the relationship between a state’s actors, behavior. For example, n Cand its impact on international. i U. he. nisgcentral c h to Democratic Peace Theory. the Kantian conception of a “Republican Peace”. Wherein, the populace’s participation in governance directly impacts the decision of a state to wage war.32 Selectorate theory also provides an additional example, especially given that a certain segment of a population’s opinion does matter in determining leadership selection; ergo influencing foreign policy.33 Though, of course, there are scholars who attribute greater Jorge Ruiz Ruiz, “Sociological Discourse Analysis: Methods and Logic,” Forum: Qualitative Social Research 10, no. 2 (May 2009), http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1298/2882#gcit. 31 Teun A. van Dijk, “Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics,” in Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics, ed. Keith Brown, 2006, pp. 728-740, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0080448542007227?via%3Dihub. 32 Bruce M. Russett, and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001. 33 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival, Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 2006. 30. 14 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(21) prominence to structure rather than individuals’ agency in shaping outcomes. Gartzke, for instance, argues that the liberal peace may actually be a function of capitalism rather than the choice of the individual.34 Yet, it can be argued that in each of these cases, discourse does have an effect in shaping states’ behaviors; regardless of whether individual agency or structural constraints apply. Some constructivist arguments relate the social construction of norms to foreign policy outcomes, which is an inherently discursive phenomenon. Constructivists broadly conceive of international interactions as consisting of a recursive interaction between social construction and behavior.35 In specific contexts some scholars attempt to clarify these relations. Adel Altoraifi, for instance, used the Saudi-Iranian context to illustrate how interaction and changes in state identities had dramatic impacts on foreign policy choices between the two states.36 M. Hakan. 政治大. Yavuz also argued that the rise in Neo-Ottomanism drove an active interventionist policy in. 立. Turkey.37 Javier Morales Hernández combined a constructivist approaches with Foreign Policy. ‧ 國. 學. Analysis in examining the role of “identities” in Russian foreign policy.38 More prominently, scholars such as Keck and Finnemore, in their description of concepts such as the “boomerang. ‧. pattern,” discuss the ways in which states may apply transnational networks to discursively influence a state’s behavior.39. y. Nat. sit. With the above literature in mind, discourse may be appropriately perceived as having a. er. io. recursive relationship; wherein it is both influenced by and influences ideology. In a practical. n. a operations” are a literal ipracticed sense, certain conceptions of “influence form of influencing v. l C Un discourse to elicit behavioral change. Be they battlefield psychological h epropaganda n g c h i campaigns, operations, or other forms of influence operations. These efforts aim to create or redress. narratives, or otherwise instill new understandings of a present situation to elicit changes to. 34. Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2007): 166-91. www.jstor.org/stable/4122913. 35 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1. 36 Adel Al Toraifi, "Understanding the role of state identity in foreign policy decision-making: the rise of SaudiIranian rapprochement (1997-2009)." PhD diss., The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2012. 37 M. Hakan Yavuz (1998) Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo‐Ottomanism, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 7:12, 19-41, DOI: 10.1080/10669929808720119 38 Morales Hernández, Javier. (2006). The Influence of Identities on National Interests: The Case of Russia's Security Policy. 39 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics,” International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 (1999): pp. 93, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2451.00179.. 15 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(22) behavior. Influence operations are a literal practice where individuals are engaged in imbuing reality with their conception of meaning. 2.2. Applications of Discourse in the Policymaking Community This section will examine a selection of U.S. and Chinese policymakers’ perspectives on a generalized conception of discourse to induce behavioral change. The purpose of this segment would be two-fold. First, to illustrate that policymakers do engage in a practical application of discursively motivated methods to shape behavior. Second, to clarify relevant concepts and separate perspectives. The selection of literature here is not meant to be all-encompassing, but rather a quick presentation of broad ideas already being discussed. Since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, more attention has been dedicated to the field. 政治大. of so-called influence operations, and yet there remains a general quandary about what influence. 立. operations are. In one understanding, influence operations are “the conveyance of selected. ‧ 國. 學. information to adversary audiences” for the purposes of shaping behavior.40 In another, the term “political warfare” is used by a RAND report to describe similar efforts between the Soviet. ‧. Union and contemporary actors such as Russia, Iran, and others to interfere in political processes.41 Concurrently, ideas such as “information warfare” have also been studied in earlier. y. Nat. sit. U.S. government publications such as, Information Warfare Legal, Regulatory, Policy and. er. io. Organizational Considerations for Assurance.42 Consequently, whilst there may appear to be a. n. a l there is a need to clarify these commonality in many of these fields, i v concepts before discussing their qualities.. Ch. n engchi U. The central theme shared by most of the above concepts—at least among American policymaking literature—relates to the importance of information as a tool to shape behavior, and by their relevant interest in U.S. national security. For these reasons, the U.S. military provides a helpful starting point in understanding these perspectives. The U.S. Joint Staff refers to “Information Operations” (IO) as “the integrated employment, during military operations, of Herbert Lin and Jackie Kerr, “On Cyber-Enabled Information/Influence Warfare and Manipulation,” in Oxford Handbook of Cybersecurity, August 14, 2017, pp. 5–7. https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/cyber-enabled_influence_warfare-ssrn-v1.pdf 41 Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, and Katya Migacheva, “The Growing Need to Focus on Modern Political Warfare,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10071.html. 42 “Information Warfare Legal, Regulatory, Policy and Organizational Considerations for Assurance,” Information Warfare Legal, Regulatory, Policy and Organizational Considerations for Assurance § (1996). 40. 16 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(23) IRCs (information-related capabilities) in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.”43 Importantly, the same document defines a concept of the information environment: “the information environment comprises and aggregates numerous social, cultural, cognitive, technical, and physical attributes that act upon and impact knowledge, understanding, beliefs, world views, and, ultimately, actions of an individual, group, system, community, or organization. The information environment also includes technical systems and their use of data. The information environment directly affects all [Operating Environments].”44 These definitions draw a link between IOs and warfighting. As a result, this perspective is complicated by its clear delineation from operations conducted exclusively outside of traditional. 政治大 In other instances, similar concepts expand the scope of an adversary’s influence over the 立 “information environment” to include operations beneath the threshold of war. One concept conceptions of war.. ‧ 國. 學. pertains to “Gray Zone Operations” as a nebulous space between war and peace. Another RAND report amends several definitions to produce the following concept of Gray Zone Operations:. ‧. er. io. sit. y. Nat. The gray zone is an operational space between peace and war, involving coercive actions to change the status quo below a threshold that, in most cases, would prompt a conventional military response, often by blurring the line between military and nonmilitary actions and the attribution for events.45 Still, the predominant fixture of this type of concept is its relation to military operations,. n. a. l C typically carried out by U.S. adversaries.. i n U. h. v. e nthatgexpands c h i the scope of operations beyond Information warfare is another concept. traditional conceptions of war, or indeed the military. Longtime member of the Intelligence Community, Dennis F. Poindexter, argues that a general concept of “Information Warfare” happens outside the boundaries of conventional war. Poindexter cites relevant reports from 1999 in addition to Department of Defense (DoD) policy to break down information warfare as comprising of six distinct categories: Economic Warfare, Cyber Warfare, Psychological Warfare, “Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations 27 November 2012 Incorporating Change 1 20 November 2014,” Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations 27 November 2012 Incorporating Change 1 20 November 2014 § (2014), ix. 44 “Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations 17 January 2017 Incorporating Change 1 22 October 2018,” Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations 17 January 2017 Incorporating Change 1 22 October 2018 § (2018), 105. 45 Lyle J. Morris et al., “How the United States Can Compete in the Gray Zone,” RAND Corporation, June 27, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2942.html, 8. 43. 17 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(24) Intelligence-Based Warfare, Command and Control Warfare, and Electronic Warfare.46 In this fashion, references to “information warfare” entail a broadened understanding of similar concepts. This type of perspective correlates with the view that the PRC is engaged in a near total war. Indeed, recent policymakers have alluded to such concepts by referencing the “all-ofsociety” or “whole of society” approach employed by the PRC (though these terms are being reworded to “whole-of-state” due to criticism of its problematic connotation).47 In the PRC, an intensive conceptualization of similar concepts began in response to early U.S. flirtations of these ideas, but they deviate from being constrained purely in the military domain. One of the most famous works in this field has been then-PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Senior Colonels Qiao Liang (乔良) and Wang Xiangsui’s (王湘穗) seminal work, “Unrestricted Warfare” (超限战). Both authors cite the 1991 Gulf War as the war that “changed the world.”48. 治政大of military force being able to They identify this conflict as the turning point against the idea 立 decisively enforce the notion of “‘using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one's ‧ 國. 學. will.’”49 They conceived that the nature of war would evolve into “using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to. ‧. compel the enemy to accept one's interests.” These kinds of perspectives also took hold in the. y. Nat. CCP’s conceptualization of “political warfare,” and the “Three Warfares” understanding.. io. sit. Researchers Mark Stokes and Russel Hsiao presented the PRC security apparatus’. a. er. structure and employment of their conception of political warfare. They defined the PRC’s. n. v reasoning, and behavior l emotions, motives, objective political warfare as seeking to, “influence ni Ch. U. e nandg individuals of foreign governments, organizations, groups, in a manner favorable to one’s chi. own political-military objectives.”50 In this capacity, the end goal of the PLA, and the PRC for that matter, would be to, “shape and define the discourse of international relations.”51 This 46 Dennis F. Poindexter, The Chinese Information War Espionage, Cyberwar, Communications Control and Related Threats to United States Interests (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2018), 9. 47 “U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence § (2018), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-worldwide-threats-0#, 50. 48 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House Arts, 1999), http://www.cryptome.org/cuw.htm. 49 The two officers cite the ensuing conflicts the U.S. became involved in (to include the Yugoslav wars, in addition to Somalia) as conflicts without a clear role among military forces for a victory in war, Ibid. 50 Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics,” Project 2049 Insititute (Project 2049 Institute, October 14, 2013), https://project2049.net/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/P2049_Stokes_Hsiao_PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_101413.pdf, 3. 51 Ibid.. 18 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(25) perspective of “political warfare” is thought to be subordinated as a component operation conducted by the PLA and parts of the Party’s security agencies, but also with engagement from non-security domains. For this reason, these sorts of conceptions tie the Party and state together in a manner that would appear foreign to most Americans. Likewise, the “Three Warfares” is another American understanding attributed to Chinese policymakers in this domain. This concept falls under the purview of political warfare, and is separated into: “public opinion warfare…influencing foreign decision-makers and how they approach China policy…[and] shap[ing] the legal context for Chinese actions including building the legal justification for Beijing’s actions and using domestic laws to signal Chinese intentions.”52 The PRC’s use of influence networks, such as the United Front Work Department, is another more commonly known example of its blurring of lines between civil and military. 政治大. applications of influence operations. On the 18th of May, 2015, Xi Jinping, delivered an oft-. 立. overlooked speech stressing the importance of the United Front. Crucially, Xi emphasized that. ‧ 國. 學. the focus of the United Front was to, “unite all these people, [so] we will have a stronger force to fight for the realization of the two centenary goals and the Chinese Dream of National. ‧. Rejuvenation.”53 This speech had coincided with a meeting between Xi himself and then Kuomingtang (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu two weeks earlier on the fourth of May.54 In this. y. Nat. sit. speech Xi’s reference to “these people” include “members of other political parties, prominent. er. io. individuals without any party affiliation, people from ethnic minority groups, and religious. n. a and people from Hong iKong, circles, people from New Social Groups, v Macao, Taiwan and. l C n refers to, “people working in U overseas…” An added footnote clarifies that Group” h e“New i h n g Social c emerging industries, including management personnel and professionals in private and foreignfunded enterprises.” Xi’s speech highlighted the extreme importance that the PRC placed in forcefully guiding public perception and opinion both at home and abroad. Another area, where similar sentiments of blurring civil and military applications of influence have galvanized greater focus, includes such concepts of “discourse power (话语权).” For example, researcher Zhang Zhizhou (张志洲) articulated the necessity of the PRC’s pursuit. 52 Peter Mattis, “China's Three Warfares in Perspective,” War on the Rocks (War on the Rocks, January 30, 2018), https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/chinas-three-warfares-perspective/. 53 Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, 1st ed., vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2017), 332. 54 Zhang Hua, “Xi-Chu Meeting Strengthens the 1992 Consensus,” China.org.cn (China.org.cn, May 6, 2015), http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2015-05/06/content_35503417.htm.. 19 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(26) of discourse power to shape international rules and standards in an opinion piece published in the People’s Daily in February, 2017.55 Ten days later, in a memo, Zhang clarified that “a country’s discourse power, that is, to obtain power through discourse, is the same as military, economic, and other material powers,” thereby highlighting the importance of information and the shaping of opinion.56 Since then, a slew of reports have documented the expansive efforts by the CCP to shape narratives among academic circles, the policy world, and even local government within the U.S.57 2.3. Methods of Discursive Change in the Rationalist Paradigms The rationalist paradigm of discursive change draws its basic assumptions from the. 政治大 certain assumptions related to how the international system can be structured, there are 立. broader international relations theories of Realism and Liberalism. Whilst both theories differ in. commonly held beliefs. The first commonality relates to the broader understanding that states,. ‧ 國. 學. much like individuals, are rationally ordered and unitary actors motivated by essential forces of human nature. In addition, these states exist beholden to a set of material and structural. ‧. constraints. Consequently, states will always seek to optimize their outcomes.58 The next. sit. y. Nat. common assumption presumes that the world is structured by an anarchic system due to the lack. io. er. of a supranational government to enforce universal rules. From these commonly held assumptions, the two theories then diverge. While realists generally assume that power is the. n. al. iv. means by which states guarantee security, n importance of institutions that C liberals emphasize the. i U. he. n tog cooperation. 59 ch can bridge gaps in communication that may lead Another related point of. 张志洲, “增强中国在国际规则制定中的话语权,” The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, February 17, 2017), http://www.scio.gov.cn/zhzc/10/Document/1542461/1542461.htm. 56 Zhang argues that, “international rules not only influence the distribution of interests among countries, but also determine the role a country can play in the international community and judge the legitimacy of its international behavior. Therefore, the competition for the discourse power of international rules has become an important form of competition among countries,” 张志洲, “国际话语权建设中几大基础性理论问题,” The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China., February 27, 2017), http://www.scio.gov.cn/zhzc/10/Document/1543300/1543300.htm. 57 Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., “China's Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance,” The Hoover Institution (Stanford University, November 29, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-promoting-constructive-vigilance. 58 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 1979). 59 Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph S Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 2nd ed. (New York, New York: HarperCollins, 1989). 55. 20 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.

(27) divergence involves the redistribution of material gains (wealth or power in certain definitions). Many realists lean towards the idea of gains being relative among states, whereas liberals tend to emphasize the importance of absolute gains. Consequently, these dynamics lead realists to view state to state interaction with pessimistic outcomes over time as interests diverge. Liberals, on the other hand, believe in the long-term possibility of cooperation between states, despite putative disparity in derived benefits and security. Of course, these theories include subcategories that separately define and emphasize the importance of power, distribution of gains, and the various roles of institutions. Yet, the central focus is principally bound to the notion of a materially driven economic rationalism; wherein, individual actors will always seek to optimize their present situation. One grouping of rationalist literature focuses on conceptions of soft power and sharp. 政治大. power. Scholar Joseph Nye argues that Soft Power is a country’s ability to influence predicated. 立. on its positive qualities such as culture, policies, and political ideas.60 He contrasts this with. ‧ 國. 學. notions of “hard power,” a state’s ability to coerce using metrics such as its military or economy. A foundational principle of soft power is the idea that certain milieus of a state present attractive. ‧. qualities to a broad audience through texts—verbalized or otherwise. These qualities, whether through passive or direct effort, generate a desire in an actor to affiliate oneself with these. y. Nat. sit. attractive aspects. In so doing, soft power, can shape the discourse present in another state with. er. io. this attraction. Over time, implementation of soft power has taken on a variety of forms, but in. n. a essence it still constitutes varying degrees of textual based transmission. Soft Power’s iv. l C n fundamental principle of attractive qualities—as byU Nye—has not changed drastically. h e ndefined i h gc Yet, some nation-state actors find that using soft power to promote good will is not always conducive to their aims. Recently, more effort has been made to distinguish other forms of influence separate from soft power. For example, researchers Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig coined the term “sharp power.”61 They argued that the main distinction to soft power results from the motivations of authoritarian states like Russia and China. Importantly, both researchers point to attempts by these states to manipulate and spread disinformation in order to further their own. 60 61. Joseph S Nye, "Soft Power," Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 153-71. doi:10.2307/1148580. Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, “The Meaning of Sharp Power,” Foreign Affairs, November 16,. 2017. 21 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420.