4. Xi Jinping’s Worldview and the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation
4.2. Xi’s “National Rejuvenation” and the Heightening the Risks of Miscalculation Xi Jinping’s decision to forcefully pursue his conception of “National Rejuvenation”
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4.2. Xi’s “National Rejuvenation” and the Heightening the Risks of Miscalculation Xi Jinping’s decision to forcefully pursue his conception of “National Rejuvenation”
brings with it a dangerous series of implications. Under his directive, the current Party leadership chooses to wield notions of infallibility and inevitability in an effort to force conformity and discipline within the party, but also to enforce stricter controls over the Chinese populace. In doing so, these actions only serve to clamp down on necessary challenges to biased information sharing in critical areas. This mechanism, in conjunction with the enduring legacy of historical grievance, results in the creation of enemies. Enemies who, in turn, are perceived to provide counternarratives or opposing perspectives challenging the Party leadership’s discourse, and by extension, the Party leadership’s legitimacy. Furthermore, due to escalating internal pressures being driven by a recentralization of power, mistakes by Xi Jinping, of any sort, are magnified.
As a consequence, the primary mode of response under the current leadership has been to act with more forceful measures. This has proven to be the case in issues associated with territorial integrity. These measures, in many cases, are intended to deter would-be events that can
potentially challenge the CCP leadership’s legitimacy. The choice to escalate, made with inaccurate or biased information, however, provides a catalyst for miscalculations to occur.165
In a speech titled, “The Chinese Dream is the People’s Dream”, given in September, 2015, Xi Jinping detailed his vision for what the “Chinese Dream” ought to be. The “top priority” of the party, Xi said, is for China’s leadership “to focus on improving people’s living standards and achieving common prosperity.”166 To that end, Xi demarcated two “centenary goals” for the Party to focus on:
1. To double GDP and the per capita incomes of urban and rural residents compared to 2010 levels, and to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2020, as the centenary of the CPC approaches
2. Build China into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious, and achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by the middle of the century, which will see the centenary of the PRC.167
165 To be clear, this author isn’t arguing that a conflict under the current PRC leadership is a matter of inevitability. Rather, it is these factors that greatly heighten the propensity for mistakes to be made.
166 Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, 1st ed., vol. 2, 30.
167 These two goals were actually referenced in a speech made in November 2012; the first centenary goal was initially quoted as being achieved by 2021. Xi Jinping, Governance of China, 1st ed., vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign
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The above two centenary goals are what Xi, and his supporters, use to justify the continued pursuit of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (中国特色社会主义), and it is also at the core of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism for a New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思 想).168 For them, this notion explicates the Party’s rationale for abiding by Marxism, as well as for greater confidence in the Party’s own system. These two goals provide what Xi, and some among the Party, argue to be the original intention and mission of the Party.169 Xi reemphasized this assertion at the 19th Party Congress by stressing to the Party not to forget that the original intention (不忘初心) of Chinese Marxism has always been to “seek the well-being of the people and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”170 These statements are important because they cut to the heart of Xi’s vision for the Party, and in relation to its legitimacy in the governance of China.
Afterall, the Party intimates with the narrative of “National Rejuvenation”, that it is the Party’s role to defend the 5,000-year legacy of the Chinese nation. The deviation from this belief by Party members, and others, jeopardizes the legitimacy of the Party itself.
The “National Rejuvenation” narrative, under Xi, belies a predisposition in assuming that China had been forced off of its status as a once-great power.171 Indeed, Xi attributed this to
“backwardness” on the part of the Manchu rulers of Qing China. Backwardness, which enabled states like Great Britain to take advantage of Qing China. To that end, Xi articulates a vision of
Languages Press, 2014), 40. Yet, because the above quote is an updated reference, this author chose to use the speech made in 2015, Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, 1st ed., vol. 2, 30.
168 The Party’s most recent revision to the Party Constitution denotes this idea“中国共产党党章程,” 共产党员 网 (共产党员网, October 24, 2017), http://www.12371.cn/special/zggcdzc/zggcdzcqw/, Xi Jinping thought has largely been characterized by 14 policy points Xi presented during the 19th Party Congress, “His Own Words: The 14 Principles of 'Xi Jinping Thought',” BBC News (BBC, October 24, 2017),
https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c1dmwn4r.
169 Xi commits to the importance of Marxism by stating, “Marxism is the fundamental guiding thought for the establishment of our Party and our country. Departing from or abandoning Marxism, the Party would lose its soul and direction. On the issue of Marxism as a fundamental guiding thought, we shall not waver under any
circumstances” during a speech commemorating the 95th anniversary of the CCP’s founding, Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, 1st ed., vol. 2, 33.
170 “习近平十九大报告全文,” Deutsche Welle (Deutsche Welle, October 18, 2017),
https://www.dwnews.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/60018047/%E4%B9%A0%E8%BF%91%E5%B9%B3%
E5%8D%81%E4%B9%9D%E5%A4%A7%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A%E5%85%A8%E6%96%87.
171 Many scholars and observers refer to the “Century of Humiliation” as the narrative which conveys this idea.
For the purposes of understanding Xi’s works, I refrain from explicitly denoting this term because it comprises several differing interpretations among Chinese Nationalism studies. Moreover, several leaders of “modern” China have evoked the term “Century of Humiliation” each with a slightly different meaning, given the context of their time, Suisheng Zhao, “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,”
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (January 1998): pp. 287-302, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0967-067x(98)00009-9.
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the CCP that has assumed the mantle of a (conceived) 5,000 year old continuous Chinese
civilization.172 In this capacity, the Party—and importantly Xi—regards Marxism’s scientific and teleological view of history as providing a framework for the “development” of the putative Chinese nation into something of a “modern” state. Xi elucidated this point during his first group study session with the 18th CCP Central Commission Political Bureau. He stated, “it was
emphasized at the 18th National Congress that the basic foundation for building socialism with Chinese characteristics is that China is in the primary stage of socialism, that its overall plan is to seek economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress, and that its main objective is to achieve socialist modernization and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”173 The implication of
“developing” into a modern state is thus correlated with the notion of preventing another
humiliation. As a consequence, Marxism, under Xi, is strictly enforced as a core concept guiding the Party—but also the Chinese nation—forward. Where obvious contradictions appear between
“traditional” Marxist-Leninist theory and the realities facing China, such as Chinese ethnocentrism and nationalism, “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” is utilized as a
theoretical tether. A tether through which to examine and understand the existing world within a Marxian paradigm of concepts such dialectical materialism and so forth. Yet, Xi had to
forcefully reinvigorate the ideological tenets of the CCP to a cadre whom Xi perceived as having gone astray.
Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the CCP at a time when he, and other Party elders, perceived the Party to be embroiled in a crisis of legitimacy with the Chinese people. In Xi’s understanding, rampant corruption and the appearance of self-serving cadre fueled a growing agnosticism by Party cadre in the ideological tenets of the Party.174 He described this perspective during his first group study session of the Politburo. Xi said, “a large number of facts have proved that corruption is now raging; if it is not curbed our Party and country will surely be doomed. We must keep on high alert.” In turn, the Party elders believed, these perceptions of corruption also inspired a sense of detachment between the Party and the governed people of
172 Among historians and scholars, there is a lot of contention regarding the supposed “5,000” years of Chinese history. Beyond this particular issue, even the word “Chinese” proves to be problematic as constructions of race and ethnicity in the modern Chinese context clash with historical conceptions of Sinic civilizations or empires self-described as non-Chinese.
173 Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, 1st ed., vol. 1, 22.
174 Ibid., 22.
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China.175 This resulted in an early centralization of power around Xi in an effort to push through with urgent reforms. As a result, Party organs such as the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) were utilized by Xi on numerous occasions in helping to drive forward his agenda such as with the implementation of the four-pronged strategy and military reforms, among others.176 Over time, however, the CCDI has also been used to target opposition and those critical of Xi; likely generating tremendous amounts of enmity within the Party.177 One element of Xi’s vision, that many Party elders did not account for, had been his efforts to instill a Mao like cult of personality. This has taken various forms to include elevating Xi to the “core of the Party” (党的核心). Whereas former leaders such as Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao were considered first among equals, Xi has been de-facto considered peerless. Another one of the more
controversial methods has been Xi and his allies attempts to instill a near religious faith (xin yang信仰) in the ideological framework of Marxism, but also of Xi Jinping’s vision of
“Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”178 At the end of the 19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping Thought was officially elevated to the same level of previous leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping through a revision to the Party Constitution. A direct result of these successive processes has been an artificially imposed “infallibility” attributed to Xi and his leadership.
There are myriad secondary and third order effects of Xi’s enforcement of his tenuous cult of personality. But one important concern is its effect on policy. In most recent examples, officials appeared to be increasingly afraid of providing information contrary to the official narratives
175 A speech by Xi at a Politburo meeting in January, 2015, highlights these points by arguing the need to target the four malfeasance: Going through the motions, excessive bureaucracy, self-indulgence, extravagance, Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, 1st ed., vol. 2, 22.
176 The four-pronged strategy consists of: comprehensive moves to complete a moderately prosperous society in all respects, further reform, advance the rule of law, and strengthen Party discipline, Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, 1st ed., vol. 2, 22. Getting rid of Generals opposed to Xi’s reforms or perception of how the military ought to be run.
177“Translation: Former Party Professor Calls CCP A ‘Political Zombie,’” China Digital Times (China Digital Times, January 12, 2020), https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/06/translation-former-party-professor-calls-ccp-a-political-zombie/; Chun Han Wong, “Chinese Mogul Faces Probe for Essay Critical of President Xi’s Coronavirus Handling,” Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-mogul-faces-probe-for-essay-critical-of-president-xis-coronavirus-handling-11586283853.
178周 守红, “共产党员的信仰,” 共产党新闻网 (人 民 网, December 12, 2012),
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/1219/c40537-19949896.html, “习近平谈如何成为一名合格党员,” 求是网 (求 是网, January 24, 2019), http://www.qstheory.cn/2019-07/24/c_1124790973.htm.
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sought by Beijing. While this speaks to the greater principal-agent problem that already existed, Xi’s actions have undoubtedly exacerbated them.179 This is particularly worrisome.
Territorial integrity is central to the CCP’s legitimacy in Xi’s conception of “National Rejuvenation.” The CCP links its self-imposed status as a defender of the Chinese nation with its rationale for existing and guiding the Chinese nation (民族) forward.180 This is a deeply ethno-nationalist appeal to the Chinese people. The narrative of humiliation figures strongly into the national consciousness, and it is one of the primary concerns that many Chinese expect the government to be accountable for.181 As a direct result, a crucial component of Xi’s attempts to bolster the alignment of the Party’s to its “original intent” has been to push for greater reform of the military in order to bring credibility to this important dimension of securing territorial integrity. The most recent PLA White Paper, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” stated that the fundamental goal of China’s national defense in the new era” is “to safeguard national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security” among other listed goals. In that capacity, the PLA seeks to “basically complete the modernization of national defense and the military by 2035; and to fully transform the People’s armed forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century.”182 Xi made a point to forcefully express the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity during the 19th Party Congress. He stated, “we (implying the Chinese people) resolutely safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity and will never tolerate the recurrence of the historical tragedy of national division” and concluded by insisting, “we (implying the
179 This issue with information flow is not exactly a new problem, since its based on a principal-agent issue, but it certainly has become more pronounced under Xi. This can be seen in the Hong Kong local elections in August.
Nectar Gan and Chow Chung-yan, “Blindsided: Why Does Beijing Keep Getting Hong Kong Wrong?,” South China Morning Post (South China Morning Post, August 21, 2019),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3022970/blindsided-why-does-beijing-keep-getting-hong-kong-wrong; Likewise, the unwillingness of officials to address outbreak of virus in the early days, William Zheng,
“Beijing's Purge Over Virus Response Removes Top Hubei Communist Party Officials,” South China Morning Post (South China Morning Post, February 13, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3050372/coronavirus-beijings-purge-over-virus-takes-down-top-communist; This study explicates the more general concealment of corruption, Jennifer Pan and Kaiping Chen,
“Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances,” American Political Science Review 112, no. 3 (June 2018): pp. 602-620, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000205.
180 Xi reemphasized this earlier assertion at the 19th Party Congress by stressing to the Party not to forget that the original intention (不忘初心) of Chinese Marxism has always been to “seek the well-being of the people and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”
181 Among the survey questions asked by the researchers, “National Unity and territorial integrity are the highest of society,” received some of the highest favorability ratings among Chinese respondents, Jennifer Pan and Yiqing Xu, “China’s Ideological Spectrum,” The Journal of Politics 80, no. 1 (January 2018): pp. 254-273,
https://doi.org/10.1086/694255.
182 “China's National Defense in the New Era,” China's National Defense in the New Era § (2019).
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Chinese people) will never allow anyone, any organization, any political party, at any time, in
any form, to split any piece of Chinese territory from China!”183
The trouble with this approach, however, has been that Party leadership deliberately conflates historically unsettled territorial disputes with areas of geostrategic significance, in some cases. While this may provide the raison d'être for some of the PRC’s moves to unilaterally seize strategic locations and initiatives, this causes the exact instability which Chinese leadership professes to avoid. From this frame of thinking, areas of geostrategic value serve the need to fulfill the defense of the Chinese nation in the event of a war. However, these actions also only serve to exacerbate preexisting tensions. In places such as the South China Sea or the Doklam range, historical claims are made by the PRC to provide legitimacy to its actions.
Problematically, once the argument for historical claims has been applied, the emotive and legitimation issue of ethno-nationalist sentiment arises. An area once deemed valuable for its strategic position then becomes a matter of survival for current Party leadership. Leadership,
183 “习近平十九大报告全文,” Deutsche Welle.
Figure 4.2-1 Figure of the PRC with its Disputed Boundaries and the “Island Chains”
Source: DoD, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Washington, D.C., 2008.
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under Xi, who are already under internal pressures due to their prosecution of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign and centralization of power. The rationale for these sorts of
decision-making can be explained by the likelihood that the leadership already views foreign opponents to its stated aims as likely enemies. Afterall, this sentiment was summarized in an internal memo titled Document 9. This memo denounced Western ideas and influence as inimical to the Party’s interest. The memo also denounced any historical interpretations contrary to Party narratives as being “historically nihilistic” and aimed at challenging Party authority.184
The PRC leadership labels challengers—foreign and domestic—to its increasingly dogmatic views on governance as enemies threatening the legitimacy of Party leadership, and specifically Xi Jinping. The combination of a forced infallibility and the legacy of historical grievances likely creates tremendous domestic pressures on Xi Jinping. Especially given his moves to consolidate power and instill greater internal repression of both the Party and the Chinese people. A byproduct of this effort is the greater culpability for situations where
governance appears weak or ineffectual. For this reason, one recurrent mode of response by Xi, and his supporters, has been the need to not appear weak in front of adversaries within the Party, within China, but also in the face of external threats. This calculation is generally made in an effort to deter future, or emergent threats. Afterall, Xi’s 19th Party Congress speech intimated, with his allusions to the Opium War, that weakness invited further attacks. This perception has also been corroborated by Xi’s dealings with domestic opponents within China such as the Uighurs, Hong Kong, as well as important dissidents like Xu Zhiyong or Liu Xiaobo. In external relations, this has been the case with India, with preemptively motivated border clashes, in the South China Sea, and the greater display of military threats against Taiwan.
Yet, there are significant dangers with these types of responses. One major problem is that the flow of information is not always accurate.185 An issue made worse particularly because it is increasingly based on what the current Party leadership would like to hear. Another issue relates to the repeated failures—deliberate or otherwise—to account for the domestic situation in other countries. Arguably, many of these actions taken by the PRC are likely the result of the
Yet, there are significant dangers with these types of responses. One major problem is that the flow of information is not always accurate.185 An issue made worse particularly because it is increasingly based on what the current Party leadership would like to hear. Another issue relates to the repeated failures—deliberate or otherwise—to account for the domestic situation in other countries. Arguably, many of these actions taken by the PRC are likely the result of the