What is the LIO?

change the PRC’s policy. I will use Taiwan as a single case study due to its importance in the PRC’s narrative on territorial integrity’s necessity in the National Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.

Table 3.2-1 Assumptions of U.S. Interests and Guidelines for Policy in the Absence of National Vision

Assumptions Guidelines

1) The U.S. should continue to support the LIO because it affords strategic security and flexibility in determining future actions or attempts at implementing a National Vision

1) Applying short-term policy to prevent dramatic changes to the status-quo of key regions—which could disrupt the LIO—

should be considered essential 2) War with the PRC would be fundamentally

detrimental to the U.S.

2) Given the growing demands of U.S.

commitments worldwide, more effort should be invested in ideas that reduce the burden of necessitating employment of American physical power; information can be used to fulfill part of this gap

3) A complete collapse of the PRC would be devastating to the U.S. economy.

4) Deterrence should be applied to buy time

3.3. American Interests and the LIO

The PRC’s attempts to change the LIO threatens American interests. First, one has to understand the function of the LIO in securing American interests, and how the PRC is seeking to impose its vision of the world. I will define what this idea of the LIO is, and explain how it is a centerpiece in upholding American security; both from a historical and contemporary

perspective. Then, I will expound upon the contemporary problems facing the LIO. Importantly, though, I will explain why the PRC presents a unique danger to the established Liberal Order.

3.3.1. What is the LIO?

Conceptions of an International Order vary and are frequently conflated and interpreted along varying lines of thought. Most scholars generally refer to the LIO interchangeably with the Rules-Based International Order. Some throw out all of these conceptions of an “Order” as idealistic notions, and instead argue that there exists hegemony instead of an Order.

Fundamentally, each of these understandings begin with a conception of what an “Order” is and how it is arranged. From there, based upon the fixed assumptions of scholars, these inputs are relayed to their conception of the international order. In other words, based upon the scholar’s

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understanding of the degree in which individual states, institutions, or norms have played a role, this affects their common understanding of an “order” and its arrangement.

Statesman Henry Kissinger supplied a distinction in the context of separating the concept of a world order from an international order. Kissinger defined world order as a description of,

“the concept held by a region or civilization of just arrangements and the distribution of power thought to be applicable to the entire world.”¹¹⁰ He separately categorized an international order as something akin to the above definition, only applied to a “substantial part of the globe,” rather than universally acknowledged. He further explicated that an “order” bases itself on a set of two components. First, a consensus on rules that define the limits of permissible action. Second, a balance of power that enforces restraint where rules break down. Based on Kissinger’s

understanding, the world has never seen a “world order.” Indeed, the closest “order” nearing his understanding a “world order” was that of the U.S. post-war international order. Even in that case, Kissinger argued, the U.S. has thus far failed to universally enforce its interpretation.

A select group of literature examines the International Order as it relates to institutions and international organizations. An earlier body of work, done by authors such as Krasner, argued a role for international regimes in shaping international outcomes.¹¹¹ Later authors built upon this idea when conceiving of how the international order is arranged. G. John Ikenberry refers to his conception of an order as, “governing arrangements between states, including its fundamental rules, principles, and institutions.”¹¹² Yet, even here there exists debate among which institutions matter more or take precedence in the conception of an order. Some point to the importance of formal political institutions, while others point to the importance of economic institutions and conceive of a “monetary order” that undergirds the international system.¹¹³ Ikenberry, for his part, separates his understanding of the Liberal Order based on crucial

temporal and historical events and the subsequent changes that impacted the Order. Thus, though the structure remained relatively consistent, the purpose and context has gradually changed.

110 Henry Kissinger, World Order, New York: Penguin Books, 2015, 9.

111 Stephen D Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,”

International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 185. doi:10.1017/S0020818300018920.

112 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 23.

113J. D. Ciorciari, China’s Structural Power Deficit and Influence Gap in the Monetary Policy Arena. Asian Survey 54, no. 5 (2014): 869-893.

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Researcher Michael J. Mazarr and his coauthors’ understanding of an order relates to the complexity of a multitude of concentric orders and suborders. They define an order as, “a stable, structured pattern of relationships among states that involves some combination of parts, ranging from emergent norms to rule-making institutions to international political organizations or regimes.”¹¹⁴ Mazarr argued that parallel to the “international order,” it is these norms and rules which give rise to what they term the “institutional order.” A form of “suborder” that, alongside other “suborders” such as the financial, security, and a multitude of other domains, comprise of the “liberal world order.”

Beyond the definitional contention over what an “order” is and the arrangement of an order, yet more debate centers around differing conceptions of existing and emergent

international orders. Broadly speaking, this series of literature can be grouped into Western conceptions and Chinese conceptions given the context of this thesis. Though there exists some degree of overlap, the distinction between these two sets of literature lies in normative and cultural undertones for examining how the world ought to function.

The Western conception of an International Order can be further subdivided into a few distinct categories. A subsect of this literature typically defines the concept of the international order as a U.S. led order. Most individuals who fall into this category conceive of the

International Order as a U.S. construct by making links between the broader institutions and the U.S. web of alliances, and by extension U.S. benevolent hegemony. Robert Kagan, for instance, links his thesis of refuting America’s decline with the relevance of U.S. alliances and the

International Order in his work The World America Made.¹¹⁵ As noted above, both Mazarr and Ikenberry also make similar allusions to the relevance of U.S. security relations, the U.S.

leadership role, and the arrangement of the International Order. Another Western conception of the International Order roughly aligns with some variation of a Rules-Based Order. In this

understanding, more emphasis is given to the normative values and laws, as well as, international organizations and institutions that shape the Order. Whereas, less importance is conferred on the U.S. web of alliances.¹¹⁶ Other views also suggests that there does not exist an International

114 Michael J. Mazarr, Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Understanding the Current International Order, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR1598-OSD, 2016.

115 Robert Kagan, The World America Made. New York: Vintage Books, 2013.

116 Malcolm Jorgensen, “Equilibrium & Fragmentation in the International Rule of Law: The Rising Chinese Geolegal Order,” Social Science Research Network, Berlin Potsdam Research Group, December 6, 2018.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3283626.

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Order based firmly upon liberal rules and values. Chomsky argues that common understandings of the Order are in fact a pretense for U.S. imperialist foreign policy ambitions.¹¹⁷

Mazarr and his co-authors provide a sufficient definition for what an “Order” is by stating, “the body of rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations among the key players in the international environment.”¹¹⁸ This definition works well because it articulates the

understanding that the present Order is one among many possible, and that an “Order” is not a unique product of a Post-Second World War world. In practice, an Order reflects how states behave with one another and is separate from conceptions of the International System, which in some definitions determines how states behave with each other. An Order can be contextualized by observing historically contingent, normative behavior among states. Behaviors which are subject to willful, normative transformations as well. The present LIO is thus a contingent product of the Post-Second World War world and has continually been shaped by its principal actor, the United States of America. Yet, to truly define what it is in totality, is a nigh impossible task. The best one can put forth to grasp the “essence” of the Order is to surmise that the LIO is in reality an abstraction used to describe the set of institutions, structures, and organizations which are imbued with ever-changing conceptions of universal values and ideas.