(8) To obtain a strategic dominant position from nearness to farness
3.3 The expectations and cautiousness of the Southeast Asian countries in GMS
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investment gifts to gradually ease the political conflict between the two countries.22
(8) To obtain a strategic dominant position from nearness to farness
The GMS discussed in our study is located in one major route of the OBOR. China could reach Singapore and the Malacca Strait and connect to
“One road” by the Trans-Asian Railway in the Indochina Peninsula. As a result, the GMS can be viewed to be a junction of sea and land and the boundary of Pacific and Indian Ocean. Facing South China Sea in the east and the Indian Ocean in the west, GMS has potential for development. China would get strategic advantage and dominance on the peninsula affairs through solid cooperation with countries in the Indochina Peninsula.
The Indochina Peninsula is not only adjacent to China in location, but close to China in the historical and cultural background. On the basis of the past decades of economic cooperation, the GMS will be important arena for practicing China’s geopolitics and geo-economics. China’s OBOR strategy can not be ignored. China will declare a new stage of open market. In the future, China will make market expansion and integration “from nearness to farness”
and “from East Asia to Europe”.
3.3 The expectations and cautiousness of the Southeast Asian countries in GMS
This section will be focused on the attitude and stance of the GMS Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar. And with the alternation of ruling powers, the change of government
22 CNN (2016, Oct. 20). In China, Duterte announces split with US: 'America has lost'. Retrieved from:
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/20/asia/china-philippines-duterte-visit/
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position is also worth noting.
(1) Vietnam
Vietnam has a long history, but in the course of thousands of years of development, Vietnam cannot get rid of this factor of being close to China. In ancient times, China has sent troops to attack Vietnam. But the Vietnamese have also continued to overthrow China’s rule in order to maintain their independence as a vassal state. Frequent contact made Vietnam deeply affected by the Chinese culture. In modern times, the CCP and Vietnam also fell into war. Amid the Southeast Asian countries, there is not a country closer to China than Vietnam is, and there is not a country like Vietnam which needs to fight against China’s rule for many years. The whole process is full of sacrifice of life, economic development, and political compromise.23
However, the sovereignty dispute in the South China Sea occasionally led to dissatisfaction among the Vietnamese people, and even resulted in some anti-China demonstrations. The anti-China movement is of course the risk to China in the field of investment, but for Vietnam, China is its most important trading partners. Theunstable social situation may allow investors to wait and see or even leave. The Vietnamese authorities must know that to maintain a good relationship with Beijing is essential.24
Vietnam is also actively involved in China’s OBOR, and major construction has been gradually started. To maintain stability is the key to ensure that the construction will not be interrupted, and economic development would persist. Vietnam is not only the part of “one belt”, but also a segment of
“one road”. Haiphong, located in the northern part of Vietnam is the focus of development with the ongoing large improvement of port facilities. Haiphong is an important connection point for “Two economic corridors”: the first route connects Nanning, Lang Son, Hanoi and Haiphong, and the other connects
23 Forbes Andrew (2007, Apr 26). Why Vietnam loves and hates China. Asia Times. Retrieved from:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/ID26Ae01.html
24 範娥(2009 年 9 月)，中越關係分析：越南人眼裏的中國。BBC 中文網，參照：
http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/indepth/2009/09/090928_chinavietnam_relationship.shtml
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Kunming, Hekou, Lao Cai, Hanoi and Haiphong. At present, the “Two economic corridors” connect to OBOR. Vietnam and China continue to strengthen the infrastructure interconnection, production, investment and trade cooperation. Vietnam played a greater role in exports of China’s foreign trade products. Local Vietnamese consumer market was further opened up to foreign suppliers and Vietnam industrial base was thus developed.
Vietnam moved toward the open economy under the leadership of former prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who was regarded as “pro-American” and considered to be very likely to serve as general secretary. However, in power reorganization of Vietnamese Communist Party in 2016, general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong was re-elected and his position was classified as
“pro-China”. It is expected that Vietnam may gradually tilt to China.25
(2) Laos
Laos, is the only landlocked country in the Indochina Peninsula. In history, it was invaded by Siam and Vietnam and became a French colony in 1893. It was temporarily independent at the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945, but soon fell into French rule. In 1953, Laos became an independent state again. It is a socialist country. The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party is the ruling party, and the only legitimate political party.
Laos has announced a national program, appealing for the transformation from a “landlocked country” to “land
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connection country”, which could make the unfavorable conditions favorable. OBOR initiative was therefore deeply valued by the Lao government. OBOR was viewed to strengthen the cooperation and bring funds for the infrastructure and economic vitality.Especially “Sino-Lao Railway” of the Trans-Asian railway project allows Laos to connect the majority of the market of China and Southeast Asia.
Lattanamany, the deputy minister The Ministry of Public Works and Transport
25 李建歡(2016 年 4 月)，越南新總理阮春福上任 中越關係、經濟改革成挑戰。The News Lens 關 鍵評論，參照：https://www.thenewslens.com/article/27288
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and also head of the Sino-Lao railway project, said the railway project was an important milestone in the cooperation of the two countries and in accord with Lao policy of changing the landlocked country into a land
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connection country. 26 Lao officials have further added that OBOR is good for Laos. Laos is bordering China. China could be connected to ASEAN countries by Laos, which is conducive to the exchange among China and ASEAN countries and Laos can also attract more investment and tourists.27(3) Cambodia
Cambodia is adjacent to Thailand in the west and northwest, Laos in the northeast, Vietnam in the eastern and southeast and faces the Thailand Gulf in the south. In the central part of territory is the vast and rich plain. There is Southeast Asian largest freshwater lake-Tonle Sap Lake, providing a wealth of fisheries and irrigation functions.
Cambodia has a good relationship with China and is quite dependent on China for economic development. Since 2010, China has been the largest capital lender. Under poor economic development in Cambodia, it is easy to imagine Cambodian government supported China’s economic initiatives.
Cambodian officials have expressed full support for the OBOR, noting that the initiative can promote links to the region and improve the poverty of Cambodia. 28 Currently Cambodia is running the substantive stage of cooperation of OBOR, including economic special zones, ports, hydroelectric power plants, highways, and so on.
But there are different voices beyond the government’s stand. For example, the scholars have suggested that Cambodia, one of the ASEAN members,
26 Zhang Jianfeng (2016, Sep 8). Belt and Road initiative broadens prospect for China-Laos cooperation. CCTV English. Retrieved from:
http://english.cctv.com/2016/09/08/ARTIhSdgfLCm2pweCNjG7uCh160908.shtml
27 國際日報(2015 年 6 月 4 日)。寮國官員：”一帶一路”助寮國轉為”陸聯國”。參照：
http://www.chinesetoday.com/big/article/1006632
28 Mom Chan Dara Soleil (2015, Dec 22). Cambodia Reconfirms Support for the One Belt, One Road Initiative. Agence Kampuchea Presse. Retrieved from:http://www.akp.gov.kh/?p=73898
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which is too close to China, will be pulled into Chinese economic sphere of influence. Over-reliance will result in the reluctance to criticize China in various issues. Indeed, Cambodia was considered to echo China’s position too much. For example, Cambodia was blamed for abandoning the ASEAN common statement to China’s artificial reefs in the South China Sea. Another example is Cambodian government before captured the Taiwan telecom fraud suspects and repatriated them to China according to China’s request rather than sending them to Taiwan.29
However, the Cambodian government still showed a high willingness of cooperation. In October 2016 when Xi Jinping visited Cambodia, the two countries agreed to speed up the development of strategic connection. Both leaders also witnessed the signing of a number of cooperative documents, including the fields of diplomacy, promotion of OBOR, production cooperation, investment, hydraulic engineering, news, sea, and so on.30
(4) Thailand
Thailand, formerly known as Siam, is adjacent to Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Malaysia and faces the Siam Bay and Andaman Sea in the south.
The location is proper and the climate is warm. Thailand is a country of constitutional monarchy, showing the moderate image. The state took neutral attitude in politics, so in the colonial era by European powers, Thailand can still pose itself suitably amid powers and was the only unincorporated country in Southeast Asia when the surrounding areas have become British and French colonies.
Among the Indochina Peninsula countries, Thailand is relatively good in economic development. Its capital city, Bangkok, is a metropolitan area with
29 Janelle Retka (2016, Jun 27). Cambodia Positions Itself Along New Silk Road. The Cambodia Daily.
Retrieved from:
https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/cambodia-positions-itself-along-new-silk-road-114629/
30 鉅亨網(2016 年 10 月 14 日)。習近平亞洲行 首站柬埔寨 加快戰略對接推一帶一路。參照：
http://news.cnyes.com/news/id/3575927
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high degree of internationalization. Although Thailand has a lot of positive images, its frequent military coups have brought the impression of “political instability” to the world. The most recent coup occurred in May 2014. The then elected government was overthrown by the military led by incumbent Prime Minister Prayuth.31
With regard to the construction of OBOR, Thailand was supposed to support OBOR as Chinese investment in Thailand continues to increase and more and more large enterprises invested in Thailand. Indeed, Thailand expressed its active position to support and participate in the OBOR in the official meetings, and signed agreements about cooperation. However, Thailand has a moderate character and welcomes investment from other countries, such as Japan and Singapore. Thailand might not over tilt to China in order to maintain flexibility.
The program catching eyes the most in OBOR is “Sino-Thai Railway”, which started in October 2013 when Chinese premier Li Keqiang visited the then prime minister, Yingluck in Thailand. The two countries reached an agreement that China will participate in the construction of high-speed rail projects in Thailand with the cost being paid by Thai agricultural products, which was called “The exchange between high-speed rail and rice”. The cooperation was shelved owing to the military coup in May 2014. However, negotiations were restarted again after singing of the Sino-Thai railway cooperation memorandum by Li Keqiang and Thai Prime Minister Prayuth in December 2014. But the two sides have had disagreement on the cost so that the progress of the program went slowly. By September 2016, both sides agreed to continue the project and reduce the price.32
31 鉅亨網(2016 年 10 月 24 日)。泰國，處在十字路口的東盟大國。參照：
http://news.cnyes.com/news/id/3586061
32 Prashanth Parameswaran (2016, Sep 21). China-Thailand Rail Project Back on Track With Cost Agreement. The Diplomat. Retrieved from:
http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/china-thailand-rail-project-back-on-track-with-cost-agreement/
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(5) Myanmar
Myanmar is located in the west of the peninsula, adjacent to India and Bangladesh in the northwest, Thailand and Laos in the southeast, and faces the ocean in the south. In ancient times, Myanmar has paid tribute to China. Later when the British-Burmese war occurred, the British occupied Myanmar and launched a colonial rule. After the World War II, Myanmar struggled for independence and formally announced the establishment of the Republic of Myanmar in 1948. But the one-party dictatorship system conducted by military forces which clamped down on speech and personal freedom has affected Myanmar for more than 50 years, during which the anti-military demonstrations took place, but were suppressed by the government. In the election of November 2015, National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi won the power. The National League for Democracy and the military formed the government in 2016 according to the constitution, ending the long time rule by military government.
Myanmar, which is the channel of Pacific and Indian Ocean and the corridor for neighboring countries, has a very good strategic position. Myanmar has long coastline, faces the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean and possesses potential for marine development. The favorable position made Myanmar easy to draw the attention from the surrounding powers. For example,
“Bangladesh-China- India-Myanmar economic corridor” of OBOR goes westward through Myanmar. India’s “Eastward policy” also needs Myanmar to smoothly connect Southeast Asia and China.33
Energy projects are an important part of Burmese economic development and geographical strategy. As neighboring countries, such as India, China and Thailand, are facing the increase of energy demand due to economic development, Myanmar is getting more influential owing to its abundant export of both oil and gas.
33 Daw Chaw Chaw Sein. Myanmar’s Perspective of “One Belt, One Road”. Internal Document for Silk Road Forum 2015. Retrieved from: http://en.drc.gov.cn/DawChawChawSein.pdf
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Beijing authorities have been keeping close relations with the Burmese military government. Myanmar which needs the development is certainly to welcome China’s OBOR, whether in the regime of president Thein Sein or the current National League for Democracy government led by Aung San Suu Kyi, basically regarding OBOR as an opportunity for Burmese economic development.34 However, Myanmar didn’t blindly rely on China. There have been some conflicts, like races, environmental protection and sporadic warfare within Myanmar, making some Chinese-invested projects retarded.
Although the occasional conflict, China and Myanmar still need cooperation for the sake of their interests. As mentioned earlier, China needs to import oil and natural gas from Myanmar. For the sake of convenience of transport, China has built a pipeline connecting Kyaukpyu of Myanmar to Yunnan, which has been operated in early 2015. In order to further ensure the control on the port operations, Chinese enterprises in the beginning of 2016 was warranted the development rights of economic special zones in the tender of the port and the industrial park. The development of Kyaukpyu Port is an alternative path for China. For Myanmar, the construction, employment opportunities and economic development can be carried out. This cooperation can be treated as a demonstration of gaining its own benefit.
In Myanmar, the local and the academia are still worried that Burmese economy may be dragged by China. Therefore, it will be an important issue for Burmese authorities to balance among China’s ambition, local development opportunities and different domestic voices.35
34 李晨陽&宋少軍(2016)，緬甸對”一帶一路”的認知和反應。南洋問題研究，No.4，pp 20-30.
35 Nicholas Farrelly (2015, July 13). Can Myanmar benefit from China plan? Myanmar Times.
Retrieved from:
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/opinion/15460-can-myanmar-benefit-from-china-plan.html
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Figure 3.6 Kyaukpyu Port and transport route of oil
Source：蘋果日報
3636 蘋果日報(2016 年 8 月 18 日)。開發皎漂特區 納一帶一路。參照：
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/international/art/20160818/19741111
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