Source: edited by this study
4.3 The intervention by Japan .1 Background
4.3.2 Sino - Japanese competition under China’s threat
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
4-12
the 1970s, mainly because Japan solved the problem of war compensation. In the 1960s to 1970s, Southeast Asia became Japan’s largest raw material origin and important overseas market only second to the United States. The ASEAN countries and Japan have become important trading partners. In the background of the United States failure in the Vietnam War, Japan increased aid and deepen its regional strength.13
In 1988, the Takeshita Naikaku put forward “East Asian Economic Circle”, which viewed East Asia as an important foothold and starting point for the implementation of global strategy. By its strong economic and technological strength, Japan tried to consolidate the Japan-led East Asian economic cooperation system and built East Asian economic circle based on the geese-model.14
4.3.2 Sino - Japanese competition under China’s threat
When China moved toward economic reform and opening up, and gradually showed power in the world stage, the “China’s threat” issue was widely concerning in the late 90s. At the same time, Japan experienced the financial turmoil and its position in Asia began to be shaken. The role of regional economic leader was not easy to maintain. Although China did not replace Japanese economic status in Asia, it really weakened Japan’s influence.
Japan originally with the sense of “Japan first” began to lose self-confidence and was aware that the dominant status was difficult to maintain. Murai Tomohide published the article about the “China’s threat” in 1990, which shocked the Japanese society. Japanese people were worried that China’s threat would come true.15
13 宋成有(2015)，戰後日本區域經濟合作構想的再審視。四川大學學報，5，pp26-36。
14 段進軍、陸大道(1999)，論大國東亞地緣經濟戰略與東亞地區經濟合作。經濟地理，19(2)，
pp22-26。
15 李靜旻、徐斯勤(2008)，一個中國、兩種威脅：美國與日本知識界的文化策略。東亞研究，39(2)，
pp73-103。
‧
Perceiving this threat, China and Japan, the two major Asian powers even more beware of each other, and the competitive situation was obvious. Japan paid attention to the Indochina Peninsula very much. Since the 1960s, Japan used Thailand and Vietnam as the bridgehead to operate the Indochina Peninsula. In the 1980s, Japan was actively assisting Vietnam. In 1990, Japan gave a strong assistance to Cambodia. So Japan has maintained a certain degree of influence in the ASEAN countries.16 In the face of China’s rise and frequent action in the South China Sea, Japan worried that once the Indochina Peninsula falls into the sphere of influence of the China, the circumstances in neighboring South China Sea will be affected and Japanese interests will be threatened. In recent years, Japan has repeatedly referred to the South China Sea as its sea lifeline, suggesting that the scope of “US-Japan Security Treaty” could be applied to the South China Sea region. After all, for Japan, a country in the lack of energy, the South China Sea is not only a sea route, but also an important energy route from the Middle East to Japan. Japan needs to ensure the freedom of the South China Sea based on its interests.17
Japan has provided substantial financial assistance by signing declarations or action plans with the countries in the Indochina Peninsula. This pattern of providing funds, techniques and loans directly by official agencies is called
“Official Development Assistance (ODA)”. The other pattern is to make contribution in the GMS mechanism, which was founded by the ADB. The ADB is the coordinator and major sponsor in some conferences and the presidency of ADB has been taken by the representatives of Japan. Japan could join and impact the GMS operation by using its power in the ADB.18
After China’s OBOR initiative, the Indochina Peninsula was regarded as an important area for expanding the economy and consolidating its strategic interests. China has continued to increase its investment, especially in some
16 藍科銘(2011)，大湄公河次區域經濟合作研究。新興市場，100-34，p.11。
17 Steve Mollman (2016, Sep 22). Japan and China’s maritime tensions in the South China Sea are resurfacing World War II-era wounds. Quartz. Retrieved from:
https://qz.com/932236/refugees-made-some-of-the-nicest-things-we-have/
18 藍科銘(2011)，大湄公河次區域經濟合作研究。新興市場，100-34，pp12-13。
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
4-14
construction with strategic considerations, such as Sino-Thai Railway, Sino-Lao Railway and Kyaukpyu Port. China actively consulted with the relevant countries, released friendly messages, and strove to promote the plan.
It can be said that OBOR emphasized interconnection, and implied the layout of China’s energy interests. Some GMS plans could thus speed up in implementation. GMS, after all, was interfered by the Japanese forces. In order to fully control, China self-convened first meeting of leaders of Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation was held in Hainan Province in March 2016.
Despite the face of sweeping OBOR, Japan has never forsaken to manage relations in Southeast Asia. For example, Japan, Thailand and Myanmar have cooperated in the development of the Dawei Special Economic Zone, which is located in the south of Myanmar, facing the Andaman Sea, and the largest one of the three special economic zones pushed by Burmese government. This plan also contains an important deep water harbor. In addition, the competition of construction of high-speed rail in Southeast Asia was known as the Sino-Japanese “high-speed rail war”. China got Indonesian Yavan high-speed rail and Sino-Thai high speed rail while Japan got Bangkok-Chiangmai high speed rail.19 When two countries won by turns, it can be expected the following Malaysian-Singaporean high speed rail competition will happen between the two countries.
Japan also helped its companies finance and establish the entire supply chain to Southeast Asia. Japanese government worked hard to operate new partnerships with Southeast Asian countries to help boost its economy.20
19 張銀銀(2016 年 8 月)，中日分別拿下一條泰國高鐵項目，博弈再升級。壹讀，參照：
https://read01.com/zxdRzL.html
20 The Economist (2013, Jun 1). Japan and South-East Asia Hand in hand. Retrieved from:
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21578714-shinzo-abe-has-compelling-diplomatic-well-economic -reasons-push-south-east-asia-hand
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
4-15