Source: edited by this study
4.4 The intervention by Russia .1 Background
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43.5 billion US dollars.21 Japan continued to enhance the military and arms to eye the security and interests in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
The Japanese government is learning how to get along with Trump’s government and continuously showing good will. It can be seen from the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Trump. Trump was also happy to respond, the United States “100%” supports Japan, this important ally.22
It is conceivable that the United States and Japan will continue to cooperate, especially in the regional security level, because the US is worried about the North Korean issue and Chinese growing military. When it comes to the economic level, the large regional economic and trade integration mechanism may not appear in a short term. After all, Trump seemed to tend to trade protection and he was dissatisfied with the works being robbed by other countries. If there is no powerful economic and trade integration mechanism, it is more difficult to compete with China’s OBOR or RCEP. Under the unpredictable behavior of Trump, where the United States will go in the Asia Pacific and how the United States and Japan will interact are worth an observation.
4.4 The intervention by Russia 4.4.1 Background
When it comes to the relationship between modern Russia and the Indochina Peninsula, it can be described from the Soviet Union after the World War II. The two blocs of the United States and the Soviet Union dominated
21 Frances Martel (2016, Dec 23). Japan Prepares to Rival China with Record-Breaking Defense Budget. Breitbart. Retrieved from:
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/12/23/japan-record-defense-funding/
22 Michelle Mark (2017, Feb 11). Trump addresses North Korea missile test: 'America stands behind Japan, its great ally, 100%'. Business Insider. Retrieved from:
http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-south-korea-says-north-korea-test-fires-missile-into-sea-2017-2-2
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nearly 40 years in the opponent situation in the cold war. The United States was eager to win over Southeast Asia and actively supported Japan, in order to prevent the spread of communism. The United States and some pro-US countries established a variety of military and economic organizations, to carry out containment policy to the Soviet Union and the CCP. The Soviet Union also actively expanded its communist forces. After the World War II, the colonies in the Indochina Peninsula began to seek independence. Vietnam experienced years of war after independence. When the US military sank into the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union gave large-scale aid to Vietnam, regarding it a good opportunity to weaken the strength of the United States. Until the withdrawal of the US military in 1975, the Soviet Union has been fully supporting Vietnam.
At the same time, Vietnam believed that the US can be defeated so Vietnam was getting ambitious to seek to establish the Indochina Union.23
In addition to taking the opportunity to expand the scope of communist forces, the Soviet Union’s support for Vietnam in the Indochina Peninsula can be viewed as the attempt to divert the attention of the United States. Basically, the center of the US-Soviet confrontation was the European region. The trouble created by the Soviet Union in Asia could not only make the United States sink in the mud but make the Soviet Union itself get more benefits in Europe.24 But with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited the Soviet Union’s original international obligations and rights. Russia’s strength can not be compared with the past and it was difficult to maintain a confrontation with the US.
4.4.2 Russia stepping towards ASEAN
In the Cold War, the United States won over the majority of the ASEAN
23 壹讀(2016 年 1 月 15 日)，上世紀越南不可能實現的—中南半島聯邦「夢」。參照：
https://read01.com/kgzazM.html
24 每日頭條(2016 年 9 月 23 日)，使越南成為東南亞的小霸王，蘇聯究竟為何要這麼做？參照：
https://kknews.cc/zh-tw/history/y52a6k.html
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countries, while the Soviet Union roped in those countries with its powerful forces. In Gorbachev era, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the ASEAN has begun to improve. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia had no reason to take the road of confrontation. After the Cold War, the ASEAN was actively interested in establishing a close relationship with Russia, but it was not in big progress due to Russia’s political and economic chaos and its foreign policy.
However, since the mid-1990s, Russia has adjusted the pro-Western foreign policy, and implemented the “double-headed eagle” policy instead, which emphasized both the West and the East. Under the guidance of the policy, Russia has adjusted its policy towards Southeast Asia and gradually participated in the affairs of this region. Especially in the 21st century when Putin came to power, he positively developed the economy, enhanced national strength, created a favorable environment to diplomacy, and developed relations with Europe and Asia, in order to obtain the necessary funds for economic development and technology.25
Russia began relations with ASEAN very early. In the 29th ASEAN ministerial conference held in Jakarta in 1996, the relationship between Russia and the ASEAN was enhanced to the formal dialogue partnership. The important milestone of bilateral relations was Russia’s joining of the “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia”, in November 2004. The
“Russia-ASEAN Summit”, held in Kuala Lumpur in late 2005, was a new era in the development of bilateral political relations. After the summit, the “Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership” was published, which symbolized bilateral relations were upgraded from the dialogue level to a fully cooperative partnership.
About the economy and trade, the growing trend actually revealed. In 2006, the total trade volume between Russia and ASEAN was only about 4.4 billion US dollars. By 2014, the volume has reached 22.5 billion and is still
25 沈彩雲(2007)，普丁時期俄羅斯與東南亞關係之研究。國立政治大學俄羅斯研究所碩士論文。
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increasing. But even so, compared to China, Japan or the US, Russia only played a less important role in ASEAN’s foreign trade. Basically, the ASEAN countries expected Russia to demonstrate impact in the field of regional security. However, in economic affairs, Russia was valued much less than China, Japan and the US. Basically, it can be viewed as the phenomenon of
“hotter politics but cooler economy”.26
4.4.3 To strengthen cooperation through the EEU
The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is an international organization established by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, the five former Soviet countries, to deepen economic and political cooperation.
Member States signed the agreement in 2014, which officially entered into force in 2015. The administrative center is located in Moscow, which is the largest city in the league. Russia is one of the largest and most influential countries with no doubt.
Russia strengthens external cooperation through the EEU and ASEAN is an important partner. The trade cooperation between EEU and ASEAN can be viewed as a breakthrough, which could contribute to the introduction of foreign investment. EEU and ASEAN are complementary to each other. Vietnam also made an agreement with EEU, which has created the access to ASEAN’s market for Russian manufacturing industry.27
Vietnam and EEU signed the FTA in 2015, which was the first free trade agreement signed between EEU and ASEAN countries. Russia in May 2016 held the summit in Sochi, focusing on the economic field. Putin aimed to promote the free trade agreement between the ASEAN and the EEU. The performance of Vietnamese and EEU’s free trade agreement will affect the
26 魏百谷，俄羅斯與東南亞國協的關係：政治熱，經濟冷。東協瞭望，2017 年 3 月 3 日參照：
http://www.aseancenter.org.tw/upload/files/outlook006-03.pdf
27 Nicholas Trickett (2016, Dec 11). Can Russia ride China’s trade lead in Southeast Asia? Global Risk Insights. Retrieved from:
http://globalriskinsights.com/2016/12/can-russia-ride-chinas-coattails-southeast-asia/
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following cooperative negotiations of the two unions.
The EEU also began to promote cooperation with China. In 2016, EEU and China launched an FTA negotiation, and prepared for the establishment of large Eurasian economic partnership agreement. The members which may join the partnership include EEU, India, China, Pakistan and other interested countries. Although the initiative was very preliminary, it can be seen as Russia’s ambition to integrate surrounding markets by EEU.
4.4.4 Moving forward by the ride of OBOR
Facing the vigorous OBOR, it is hard to say that Russia’s trade and political activities in Southeast Asia or the Indochina Peninsula were intended to stand against China. After all, Russia’s trade in Southeast Asia is far from China’s. Besides, China can invest heavily in the construction of the Indochina Peninsula, while Russia is in need of ASEAN’s investment.
Moscow was clearly aware of the current situation. As what mentioned by President Putin was that further cooperation and more attempts to doing connection with ASEAN was based on the achievements of what has been done between EEU and China’s OBOR.28 Indeed, Russia itself is the beneficiary of OBOR. Russia is the member in both China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor and New Asia-Europe Continental Bridge, enjoying the strategic benefits. How could Russia want to conflict with China?
The ongoing OBOR provided Russia a direct opportunity to develop southward. Through the construction of OBOR, Russia can connect to Southeast Asia by Central Asia and China, which significantly reduces transport costs, improves competitiveness and expands the geopolitical scope.
Of course, Russia would emphasize that the connection with Southeast Asia was based on OBOR construction in Russia and Central Asia. Only by
28 霍娜(2016 年 5 月)，挺進東南亞 俄羅斯欲借中國東風？多維新聞，參照：
http://global.dwnews.com/big5/news/2016-05-19/59740228.html
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supporting the OBOR can Russia further strengthen economic and trade cooperation with Southeast Asia or other subregions, improve the domestic economy and enhance its international influence.
Although Russia needs China’s OBOR, this economic initiative stepped into Central Asia and even Eastern Europe, most of which were in Russian and the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence in the 19th century. China’s deep entering in Russian “backyard” led to the potential geopolitical contradictions.
Russia has been wary of China’s expansion of influence in the above-mentioned areas and has also raised its own EEU. Basically Russia supported the connection with OBOR, but under the fear that its influence might be gradually diluted, Russia would not entirely trust China, and would manage the relation with China step by step.
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Chapter 5 Conclusions
OBOR initiative has been under way for several years and is constantly coming to the countries along the route, with irresistible momentum. The initiative revealed the lofty idea of shared economic prosperity, which seems to create welfare to the developing countries. In fact, the intentions that China wants to maintain economic strength, ensure the safety of energy supply and solidify the status of regional power are very obvious. From the perspectives of
“geopolitics” and “geo-economics”, OBOR shows China’s ambitions of the great powers with the thinking of “from nearness to farness” and gradually looking at Asia and Europe. The GMS is close to China and has strategical value. It is a region where China attaches great regard. OBOR has brought benefits and opportunities for the region. At the same time, it has also brought a little threat and challenge. Not only the five countries of Indochina Peninsula but also China need to face the changing era. In this chapter, we will organize the content of the previous chapters and put forward the opportunities and challenges of the development in the GMS.