Chapter 4: Techno-nationalism and Techno-Industrial Policy
4.8 Military Modernization, National Security and Informatization
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“the plan emphasizes the need to protect China’s economic, cyber, and national security. It is likely that the collective consequence of these efforts to strengthen political control and national security are not supportive of the strengthening of unbiased market institutions.”189
Another prominent shift in emphasis in Chinese S&T strategy is the increasing usage of the “innovation-driven development” concept under Xi Jinping, manifested most prominently in the State Council’s
“Opinion on Accelerating Implementation of the Innovation-Driven Development Strategy through
Strengthening Institutional Reforms” released in 2015. The opinion focused on the removal of barriers and strengthening of incentive structures conducive to improving S&T innovation within China.
4.8 Military Modernization, National Security and Informatization
Perhaps the central arena in which China’s techno-nationalist predilections blend with integration into the international economy concerns defensive modernization. As Cheung points out, China’s national system of defensive innovation improved markedly from the 1990s onward.190 This was, broadly speaking, brought about by improved alignment between three powerful constituencies essential for effective modernization:
the military, the defense and scientific research community, and civilian regulators. In no small part, defensive modernization reflected a recognition that access to foreign knowledge and foreign technology was essential for jump starting domestic innovation in the defense sector.
Cheung notes that within the uppermost echelons of the PLA, techno-nationalist notions rooted in historical experiences tracing back to the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the successful “Two bombs, One Satellite”
drive under Mao continually shape and reinforce the imperative placed on technological autonomy.191 While defense related projects don’t figure prominently in the content of the MLP, Cheung argues that it “seeks to blur the classic distinction between civilian and military technologies and points out that S&T development
189 Ibid
190 Cheung, Fortifying China, 2009.
191 Ibid
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should benefit both civilian and defense needs at the same time.” As Cheung writes:
The potential benefits from the establishment of an effective and capable dual-use economy are numerous and wide-ranging. A dual-use economy will produce an environment that is more encouraging and supportive of the kinds of innovation and leapfrogging activities that the Chinese authorities are actively seeking to promote. This includes marrying commercial entrepreneurship and risk taking with the support of substantial state resources and R&D capabilities. The results should be the development of technology and equipment that is cheaper, better, and faster.192
Whereas earlier efforts at civil-military integration were ineffective and poorly coordinated, the current movement toward Yujun Yumin is both more nuanced and well-though out in its policy approach and enjoys a robust level of elite level political support. As Cheung notes: “Finding ways to catch up and leapfrog has become a central tenet in this search for a new development model. This is because a key assumption framing this debate is that the new information paradigm offers a unique chance to leap ahead and significantly narrow the military technology gap with the world’s advanced military powers.”193
The blurring of the security and civilian sectors – embodied by the movement toward a dual use economy – is most clearly reflected in the current emphasis placed on development through the informatization of the physical economy. According to a recent CCP journal article in Qiushi, prepared under the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the deepening of civilian and military capabilities is one of the central objectives of China’s current push toward a informatization-based economy.194
In July, 2016 the State Council issued guidance for the “National Informatization Development Strategy Outline” as a way of strutting development of the ICT sector in China going forward. National security and
192 Ibid
193 Ibid
194 Elsa Kania, Samm Sacks, Paul Triolo and Graham Webster. “China’s Strategic Thinking on Building Power in Cyberspace.”
New America. September, 2017. < https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinas-strategic-thinking-building-power-cyberspace/>
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indigenous innovation figure prominently into the plan with specific calls for reducing foreign reliance on
“core” technologies. References are repeatedly made to the priority of achieving a “secure and controllable”
network system, with language tying informational superiority to national competitiveness and military security.195
Unsurprisingly given the centrality of ICT as a major driver of both development and national security, Chinese leadership takes a keen interest in overseeing development and regulation. The clearest indication of this is the formation of the Central Leading Small Group for Network Security and Informatization set up in 2014 under the chairmanship of President Xi. According to Congressional testimony provided by Chinese cybersecurity expert Samm Sacks, the formation and composition of the group is reflective of two key developments in China’s ICT policy approach: the desire for centralization in the policymaking and oversight/implementation process and the rising influence of hardline thinking as it pertains to the cyberspace. Sacks states that, “within the Chinese bureaucracy, proponents of greater data localization, import substitution, sovereignty in cyberspace, and encryption access are exerting increasing influence over the policy agenda……direction is coming from the highest levels in the Chinese system under the direction of President Xi himself.”196
Evidence of this thinking further reveals itself in the words of President Xi himself, who has asserted that,
“national security no longer exists without information security”197 and that China should push for “internet sovereignty” as a means of safeguarding both economic development and national security prerogatives.
Such language, built upon in an assortment of recent policy documents, refutes the Western notion of a
“borderless internet” largely independent on extensive national regulation. The goal of ICT development through economy-wide informatization brings security concerns intimately into the realm of technological
195 “Preventing Deglobalization.” US Chamber of Commerce.
196 Testimony of Samm Sacks to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Hearing on Commercial Cyber Espionage and Barriers to Digital Trade in China. < https://www.uscc.gov/Hearings/hearing-commercial-cyber-espionage-and-barriers-digital-trade-china-webcast>
197 As quoted in the “Preventing Deglobalization” report.
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development. As the “Preparing for Innovation” report points out, the Snowden revelations exacerbated existing worries about dependence on foreign technology for the provision of core digital network infrastructure.198 In response, Chinese authorities are ratcheting up demands for access to proprietary information from foreign providers as a precondition for market access. In this light, national security legislation is widely seen as playing a dual role: preserving state security and promoting domestic
technology. According to the report, “authorities are drawing up sweeping national security, cybersecurity, and foreign investment laws and regulations that require national security reviews and only permit use of technology that is ‘secure and controllable.’”
Within this framework of national security and cyber sovereignty are myriad concerns that vague and broadly defined definitions of security are means of suppressing competition, extracting technical
concessions and promoting domestic alternatives. As the U.S. Chamber of Commerce points out, the “legal and regulatory framework that sets forth security-related requirements to support development of indigenous technologies and exclude foreign technologies poses an obstacle for foreign companies operating in these industries.”199 China’s policies for achieving developmental and security outcomes in the fast-evolving ICT sector are easing fears over “Chinese leadership’s ambition to use the country’s industrial policy apparatus to foster domestic ICT capabilities for security purposes, political control, and economic power’” wherein
“protectionist instincts underlie security-related policy and regulation.”200
198 Cheung. “Planning for Innovation.”
199 “Preventing Deglobalization”
200 Ibid
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