Chapter 3: Techno-nationalism in China
3.1 Understanding China’s Techno-nationalism
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Chapter 3: Techno-nationalism in China
3.1 Understanding China’s Techno-nationalism
As documented in the preceding section, over the course of the 20th century through to the present day, East Asian states have, in various ways, embraced a techno-nationalist worldview prioritizing the development of indigenous capabilities while protecting strategic sectors of the economy from foreign ownership, influence, and control. This worldview, rooted in a desire for achieving technological independence as a means of ensuring the development, sovereignty and security of the collective “nation,” appears throughout the analysis of East Asian development. While the specific policy contours evolved considerably over time, place, and sector, such core ideas remain deeply entrenched through to the present day.
In defining techno-nationalism for the duration of this thesis, we can see it as being composed of several related components:
The idea there is a “national interest’ - synonymous with the nation-state - transcending the specified interests of the individual or the firm.
The idea that nation-states compete with one another (both commercially and geo-strategically) in a conflict prone international system and that only through power maximization can an individual state best safeguard its national/regime security.
The idea that technology is a crucial driver of national power and, by extension, national security and sovereignty. As such, not all economic activities are equal: some are more “strategic” than others. For the nation-state, some sectors must be prioritized for reasons of national security and/or the benefits they confer to the broader “national” economy.
The idea that state action facilitates technological/economic development; state interventionism can “construct” comparative advantage in strategically important industries. As such, the
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development of high tech industry shouldn’t be left strictly to market forces.
Accordingly, states should strive for technological autonomy and indigenous aptitude in
“strategic” industries as such objectives comport with the overall “national” interest as it pertains to both development and security.
There is evidence suggesting these techno-nationalist attitudes continually exert significant influence over the maintenance, construction, and execution of public policy in China today. An array of existing academic literature utilizes techno-nationalism as an analytical categorization for making sense of China’s approach to technological development. For example, Segal and Naughton argue, “notions of technonationalism are still relevant in China, even as it moves toward reduced government steerage of the economy.”76 Cheung, writing in the context of China’s defense industry, argues that “a techno-nationalist perspective that views technological development as central to the country’s national security and economic prosperity shapes the Chinese approach to technological catching up in the defense and strategic sectors of its economy.”77
However, what also comes across in holistically assessing the relationship between the Chinese state and technological development is a system with no regional or international analog; China retains an extensive yet ever-evolving techno-industrial policy infrastructure while simultaneously differentiating itself from its East Asian peers in distinctive ways.78 While China is undoubtedly becoming a global epicenter of
technological innovation, the academic literature regarding the role of the state in promoting high-tech development remains contested. Despite ongoing debate over the efficacy of China’s overall
techno-industrial policy approach, this structure – embodied most closely in programs like the 2006 MLP, Made in China 2025 and conceptions of “cyber sovereignty” – enjoys high level political buy-in, most notably from President Xi Jinping.79
76 Barry Naughton and Adam Segal. “China in Search of a Workable Model: Technology Development in the New Milennium.”Crisis and Innovation in Asian Technology. 2003. 53.
77 Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy, 2009.
78 Andrea Boltho and Maria Weber. “Did China Follow the Developmental State?.” The European Journal of Comparative Economics. 2009.
79 See Xi Jinping, Governance of China, 2014
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This thesis posits a principal reason for this is ideational; China promotes indigenous strategic technology because, like its East Asian peers, the uppermost echelons of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) subscribe to techno-nationalist ideas regarding the interplay between “national” technology and national (regime) security. This worldview sees external dependency as a point of strategic vulnerability to be transcended. Put another way, technology is instrumental; tools to be put in service of the party-state’s principal focus on survival – in the face of both internal and external threats.
Further in keeping with traditional techno-nationalist thinking, China’s political elites largely eschew aspects of market liberalism, preferring to see a pro-active state as enabling technological development rather than inhibiting it. State institutions determine the national system of science and technology, which, in turn, determines the country’s innovation potential. Targeted interventions – protecting and promoting domestic technology providers – are widely believed to result in better national outcomes than through a laissez faire approach.
Finally, as this thesis explores in greater detail, indigenous technology also fits into a politically constructed ideological narrative; one linking regime legitimacy to ideas regarding national “rejuvenation,” “harmonious development,” and the achievement of the “China Dream.” According to this dominant narrative,
technological parity (if not supremacy) is synonymous with the restoration of national pride and Chinese greatness. In this sense, there is an explicit link between technology (the “techno”) and national
identity/pride (“-nationalism”).
As Steve Chan points out in the general context of East Asia, while all states desire a combination of security, development, and social stability, there is no universal framework for optimizing the attainment of all three.80 States necessarily pursue certain strategies while eschewing others. Furthermore, the three overarching objectives will, at times, require tradeoffs between one another: growth may undermine social stability; the pursuit of external security may come at a cost to material welfare; shoring up internal stability
80 Steven Chan, East Asian Dynamism: Growth, Order, and Security in the Pacific Region, 1993.
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may undermine relations with foreign actors etc. etc. This is relevant to contemporary China, where successive generations of leadership attempted an oft-uneasy calibration between these three imperatives.
The nature of China’s history and culture, its political system, and position in the global security order, frame the manner in which policy making elites make trade-offs and decide on priority and strategy.
In this context, we can see technology - Herrera’s “master key that unlocks everything” - as essential to understanding the trade-offs and strategies underpinning China’s approach. Economic development, military security, and social stability - the core facets of state survival - all hinge, to a considerable extent, on the manner in which various forms of technology are developed, regulated, and utilized. Unsurprisingly then, questions of technology are also questions of politics and vice versa; technological change affects internal politics and international relations and internal politics and external security are imperative to understanding the nature of technological development within the PRC.
What follows is an attempt to unpack the underlying dynamics behind techno-nationalism in the PRC. While clearly distinctive in myriad ways, China shares certain core characteristics with other East Asian techno-nationalist states. As this framework makes clear, the impetus for techno-nationalism in contemporary China stems from a combination of historical/systemic and contemporary factors and includes three components central to state survival: sovereignty and regime security, development and mobilization, and
nationalism/national identity. By better understanding the manner in which China’s political elites
conceptualize these issues and challenges, we can better understand the allure of techno-nationalist thinking within the contemporary PRC.