Chapter 3: Techno-nationalism in China
3.5 Technology and Nationalism/National Identity
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instances, resulted in a renewed emphasis on state interventionism in accordance with the broader economic ideology of state capitalism. Writing in 2010, Thomas Hout & Pankaj Ghemwat concluded that within China today, “its leaders see state capitalism and the containment of foreign companies as China’s best chance of regaining technological superiority.”120
As Morris Bian points out, China has undergone massive systemic change at both the ideological and
institutional level in defining the relationship between state and market forces. In spite of this, China remains constrained in executing certain reforms by its path dependency. While institutions of economic governance have been overhauled and reformulated to address new challenges and meet new objectives, Bian argues that
“China’s government has displayed an enduring faith in the necessity and efficacy of government-led
change. Discussions of economic development have often assumed that the government must take the lead in shaping the process, and this was as true today as it was in the 1920s.”121 Evidence of this imperative on proactive government management of the economy can be seen in both the 2008 response to the global financial crisis and in weathering turbulence in the Chinese stock market in 2015.
3.5 Technology and Nationalism/National Identity
Another prism through which to evaluate the relationship between technology and the Chinese state concerns the re-emergence of nationalism as a major force in Chinese political and cultural life. While defining the nature of Chinese nationalism is an inherently fraught, there is a widespread belief that
nationalism is a crucial tool of regime legitimation; particularly given the gradual displacement of socialist ideology over the past four decades.122
In that light, CCP elites across successive generations of leadership deploy a specific nationalist discourse as
120 Thomas Hout and Pankaj Ghemawat. “China vs the World: Whose Technology Is It?” Harvard Business Review. 2010.
121 Morris Bian. “Explaining the Dynamics of Change: Transformation and Evolution of China’s Public Economy through War, Revolution and Peace, 1928-2008.” State Capitalism, Institutional Adaptation, and the Chinese Miracle. Barry Naughton and Kellee Tsai. 2015.
122 Christopher Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, 2006.
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a means of building support for the party-state structure in the face of internal reforms and international opening. Put another way, nationalist discourse is a way of holding the nation-state together in the face of the centrifugal challenges of globalization. In this sense, nationalism is synonymous with patriotism and a love of the party-state.123 Suisheng Zhao provides a working definition of this Chinese nationalism, writing that:
Nationalism is an effective instrument for the Communist regime…Chinese patriotism can be understood as a state-centric or state-led nationalism. The Communist state is portrayed as the embodiment of the nation’s will and seeks the loyalty and support of the people that are granted the nation itself. The Communist state tries to create a sense of nationhood among all its citizens by speaking in the nation’s name and demanding that citizens subordinate their interests to those of the state. Freedom is not for the individuals but for the nation-state. This means all power is given to the rulers of the Communist state…By identifying the party with the nation, the regime makes criticism of the regime an unpatriotic act.124
This regime-legitimating nationalism – rooted in the core idea of the party bestowing security, stability and development upon the Chinese citizenry – logically interacts with the technology in key ways. Since the era of Mao, progress in the fields of indigenous science and technology have been depicted as critical to the CCP mission of national strengthening, development, and preservation of sovereignty. Various leaders opportunistically deployed techno-nationalist ideals as a way of building public (and elite level) support for key initiatives.
This tendency appears over the course of the Deng period, where, according to Christopher Hughes,” Deng Xiaoping himself stressed the linkage between science and technology and national power.”125 Deng built support for his “reform and opening” by positioning reforms efforts as a way of harnessing the worldwide revolution in science and technology as an opportunity for national strengthening. Hughes sees evidence that
123 Ibid
124 Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy, 76
125 Christopher Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, 2006. 32.
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subsequent generations of CCP leaders proceeding Deng drew heavily on techno-nationalism as a broad ideological concept due to the fact that, “for the CCP political elite, however, managing the political impact of deepening integration with the international technological revolution was a major challenge under ‘reform and opening.’”126 This reliance on techno-nationalist discourse stemmed in no small part, from a fear that the importation of foreign capital and technology would simultaneously bring about “ideological pollution.”
In this sense, techno-nationalism is a critical component of a broader nationalist discourse been used by Jiang, Hu and Xi as a means of validating the role of the party-state in the era of globalization and economic opening. This discourse transcends questions of optimal development and national security strategy. All three leaders relied on techno-nationalism – in both language and policy – as a way of building support for international integration; relying on core ideas about national strength and sovereignty as a means of embracing interdependence.
This is apparent under Jiang, where his core ideological contribution, the “Three Represents,” broke with longtime orthodoxy by elevating private business and science and technology personnel into the party vanguard – seeking them as catalysts strengthening the nation-state. According to Hughes, “by the end of the 1990s, the particular form of Chinese techno-nationalism had become quite explicit in Jiang Zemin’s
elevation of scientific and technological personnel it the status of the revolutionary vanguard leading the nation to wealth and power under his ideology of the “Three Represents.’”127
Evidence of this can also be seen over the Hu-Wen era, where the state more heavily embraced the use of techno-industrial policy geared toward popular techno-nationalist end-goals. According to Ling and Naughton, “political entrepreneurship” in the early stages of the Hu-Wen administration resulted in an embrace of both “indigenous innovation” and the “scientific view of development.” In embracing these core concepts, Hu and Wen combined the power of nationalism with the promise of technological progress as a
126 Ibid, 34.
127 Ibid, 34.
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way of legitimating their hold on power. This “search for policy orientations that appealed to a wide spectrum of political groupings”128 resulted in the promotion of indigenous technology in part because it proved deeply appealing for a number of important political constituencies: the military and security hawks, nationalists, officials uneasy with the extent of liberalization in the late 1990s, as well as reformers keen to see China gravitate toward a more innovation-based economic model.
The linkage between national rejuvenation through the creation of a prosperous society/powerful state and the imperative of developing cutting edge indigenous technology remains an essential component of how Chinese officials discuss and conceptualize national development. This tendency continues well into the Xi period, where conceptions of national rejuvenation and the achievement of the “Chinese Dream” stress the development of independent technical prowess.129
In this regard, techno-nationalism fits into a broader pattern of nationalistic discourse used by the party in legitimating itself in the post-Deng era. Regardless of the efficacy of actually techno-industrial policy in bringing about the desired ends of development, sovereignty and security, the ideas animating techno-nationalism resonate deeply at both the elite and public level within China. The dominant, state-centric conception of nationalism used by the party today in building support is deeply tied up in techno-nationalist ideals. In this regard, techno-nationalist discourse and aggressive state techno-industrial policies represent a coping mechanism for the modern CCP; a way of maintaining a hold on the public imagination in an era of rapid change and international integration.
Put differently, the legitimacy of the CCP rests on the provision of generally desired public goods: stability, prosperity, external security, national pride/status. Since the foundation of the PRC, the attainment of such
“goods” is closely tied up to progress in scientific and technological development. A core CCP narrative holds such public goods are “provided,” first and foremost, by the party-state. In this sense, if the CCP is the
128 Barry Naughton and Ling Chen. “The Emergence of Chinese Techno-Industrial Policy: From Megaprojects to Strategic Emerging Industries.”2013.
129 Xi, Governance of China
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enabler of public well-being, security, and material progress, then it must also position itself as the enabler of the scientific and technological forces driving national strengthening, rejuvenation, and overall development.
In this sense, there is a tendency – in both ideas and policy – for leaders to play up techno-nationalism as an important means of legitimizing the entire structure of one-party governance. As Segal and Naughton put it,
“the Chinese government is constantly casting about for factors to justify its continuing hold on power and its extensive involvement in the economy…This is especially true when the Chinese government actively promotes a view of itself as the strong defender of China’s national interests and pride.”130