Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Understanding Techno-nationalism
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Understanding Techno-nationalism
Techno-nationalism describes and conceptualizes the relationship between the nation-state and technology as it pertains to security, development, power, and sovereignty. In this sense, techno-nationalism refers to an ideational framework or guiding ideology rather than a specific set of policies. According to Richard
Samuels, author of “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” “Technonationalism is an ideology, and like all ideologies it is a force that precedes and informs the institutions of an entire national economy as well as strategies for national security.”24 Although the term first appeared in a 1987 article in The Atlantic by economist Robert Reich,25 much of the subsequent research and commentary focuses on industrial policies carried out by East Asian states over the course of the Cold War and post-Cold War period. It is important to note that techno-nationalism belies easy quantification; there is a variation of focus and emphasis within the academic literature. Techno-nationalist strategies of development differ considerably over time, place, and sector.
Despite lacking a uniform definition, Andrew B. Kennedy notes, “there are some common threads in the literature. First, whether the focus is defensive or developmental, there is broad agreement that techno-nationalists see nation-states as engaged in a competitive struggle in which technological prowess is crucial”
and that “techno-nationalism can be understood as a belief that technology is a crucial national asset in a highly competitive world.” He goes on to argue that a distinction must be made between “ideological” and
“instrumental” techno-nationalist regimes, stating that “pragmatic variants of techno-nationalism are not uncommon, and these embrace a mix of liberal and nationalistic policies in pursuit of national technology goals.”26
24 Richard Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army.” 1994, 31.
25 Robert Reich. “The Rise of Techno-Nationalism.” The Atlantic Monthly. May, 1987.
26 Andrew Kennedy. “China’s Search for Renewable Energy: Pragmatic Technonationalism. Asian Survey. 2013.
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Denis-Fred Simon, defining techno-nationalism in 1997, writes that it “is the practice of using technology as a tool of national power in global economic competition, either by trying to withhold technological
knowledge from other states or by wielding it aggressively as an economic weapon.”27 For Simon, techno-nationalist patterns of state behavior emerged, to varying degrees, not only in East Asia but also in the United States and Western Europe in response to concerns over economic and military security.
According to the definition provided by David Edgerton, techno-nationalism sees the nation-state as the core unit of analysis for understanding patterns of technological development. Processes of technological
innovation, absorption, and diffusion derive from underlying conditions of the nation-state.28 The development and utilization of new forms of technology is deemed essential to welfare and security. Put another way, the success of technological innovation and development is largely contingent on the state while, in turn, the security and material well-being of the state is largely contingent on its technological sophistication.
This framework for conceptualizing techno-nationalism builds upon the work of Christopher Freeman, who emphasized the role of “national systems of innovation” in determining the level of technological and economic development within a given nation-state. Freeman writes that the “national environment can have a considerable influence in stimulating, facilitating, hindering or preventing the innovation activities of firms.”29 In this line of thinking, the structure and orientation of state institutions serves as a key
determinant of how a given nation-state utilizes technology and bear heavily upon overall developmental outcomes.
Freeman, in turn, draws on the earlier work of Friedrich List, who advocated an array of interventionist state policies designated to facilitate industrial development, technological upgrading, and innovation. For
Freeman and List, the role of the state in market coordination, capital mobilization, and providing support
27 Denis-Fred Simon. Techno-Security in the Age of Globalization, 1997, 8.
28 David Edgerton. “The Contradictions of Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism: A Historical Perspective.” New Global Studies. 2007.
29 Christopher Freeman, The Economics of Industrial Innovation, 1997.
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and protection for infant industry in the face of international competition was seen as critical in facilitating technological “catch-up” and overall national development.30 Whereas liberal orthodoxy emphasized the importance of consumer well-being, List shifted the focus of economics toward incentivizing national production in advanced industries. List saw politically-defined “national” boundaries as highly relevant to understanding patterns and processes of economic activity; rejecting the “cosmopolitanism” of free trade in favor of the logic of industrial competition between national economies.31 In his view, the state played a critically important role in driving processes of economic/technological development. James Fallows, in summarizing List, writes that, “he argued, a society’s well-being and its overall wealth were determined not by what it could buy but what it could make…in strategic terms, nations ended up being dependent or independent based on their ability to make things for themselves…In material terms, a society’s long-run wealth was greater if it controlled more advanced activities.”32
List diverged considerably from his intellectual counterpart Adam Smith in doubting the capacity for free trade to facilitate peace amongst inherently competitive and insecure nation-states. Taking a realist approach to questions of trade and development, he emphasized the need for state investment in domestic defense production as a safeguard against external coercion. While such investments in domestic industry may come at expense to individual welfare or overall economic efficiency, they were, in List’s mind, warranted in preserving the vitality of the nation-state and protecting national welfare.33 Unlike Smith’s emphasis on individual sovereignty and rationality, List, according to Richard Samuels, “appreciated that the economic interest of individuals and the economic interest of the nation might diverge” and, accordingly, “there is a national purpose larger than individual utility.”34
According to Cheng Li, techno-nationalists see technology as playing an essential role in dictating both economic development and in shaping the distribution of power among nation-states in the international
30 Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, 1841.
31 Ibid
32 James Fallows, Looking at the Sun, 184.
33 Ibid
34 Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” 6.
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system. Implicit to ideational techno-nationalism is the realist view that technology enhances national power in a manner best safeguarding national security within the context of an anarchic and conflict prone
international environment. For Li, “techno-nationalism emphasizes the competitiveness among nation-states as the result of scientific discovery” wherein “technological strength is seen as one of the most important determinants of the rise and fall of major power.”35 Tai-Ming Cheung expands on the definition of techno-nationalism, finding a deep intertwining of regime attitudes toward technology and national security. He writes:
Techno-nationalists believe that only a state controlled and closed-door approach to technological innovation can safeguard national security, economic competitiveness, and international status.
Emphasis is placed on nurturing indigenous capabilities through the adoption of highly regulated protectionist regimes that sharply restrict foreign direct investment but encourage the one-way importation of advanced technology and knowledge.36
In summarizing the techno-nationalist worldview, technological capabilities are seen, first and foremost, not as instruments for the improvement of individual welfare but rather as tools for protecting the well-being of the collective “nation” as embodied and organized by the institutions of the Westphalian nation-state. In the techno-nationalist view, technology is a core facet of comprehensive national power and comprehensive national power is the key determinant of national survival. How a national economy develops and utilizes new forms of technology is therefore seen as an integral component of overall development, sovereignty, and, most critically, national strength.
Political economist Robert Gilpin expounds on the relationship between power, security, and technology, pointing out that “historically there has been a high correlation among technological, economic and political leadership. The rise of particular nations to preeminence – for example Great Britain, the United States,
35 Cheng Li. “Techno-Nationalism vs. Techno-Globalism: East Asia in Search of a New Vision for the 21st Century.” Institute of Current World Affairs, 1994.
36 Cheung, The Economy-Security Nexus in Northeast Asia, 66.
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Germany, and Japan – resulted from their ability to take advantage of the first and second Industrial Revolutions.”37